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Introduction: The preparation of injectable medicines involves a sequence of several 
phases, and an error at any stage of the preparation process could cause potential or actual 
danger to the patient. Few investigative studies have collected data concerning the 
incidence, type, severity and contributory factors associated with errors in the preparation 
of injectable medicines in pharmacy aseptic units and on hospital wards. 
Aims: To determine the incidence, types and severity of errors arising during the 
preparation of injectable medicines within the pharmacy environment and in clinical areas 
of hospital across the UK; to explore pharmacy staff and nurses’ opinions of the factors 
contributing to preparation errors; and to propose strategies to reduce these errors.  
Methods: A mixed methods approach was used, comprising three stages. Stage one: direct 
observation of the preparation of injectable medicine in three pharmacy aseptic units (two 
were licensed and one unlicensed) and four hospital wards. Data were then analysed using 
descriptive statistics (One-way ANOVA test) to compare the findings. Stage two:  a self-
completion questionnaire was distributed to a panel of two consultant physicians, two 
senior pharmacists and one senior nurse. Each respondent was provided with a description 
of the errors previously observed in stage one and asked to independently score the 
severity of each on a scale from 0 (no harm) to 10 (death). Mean severity scores were 
mapped to consequence descriptors as follows: mean severity scores of <0.5 = negligible; 
0.5-3.5 = minor; 3.5-6.5 = moderate; 6.5-9.5 = major; and >9.5 = catastrophic. Each of 
these consequence descriptors was then associated with a consequence score ranging from 
1 (negligible) to 5 (catastrophic). The error frequency data was mapped to the NPSA 
likelihood grades (1 to 5) using the NPSA timeframe descriptors of frequency. A risk score 
was calculated for each of the types of medication errors observed, and the consequence 
score multiplied by the likelihood score. Stage three: semi-structured interviews (Face to 
Face) were undertaken to explore the opinions of pharmacy staff and nurses concerning 
factors contributing to injectable medicines preparation errors in pharmacy aseptic units 
and hospital wards. A questionnaire survey was also distributed to nursing staff working 
on the four hospital wards to confirm their perceptions regarding the factors contributing 
to injectable medicines preparation errors. A thematic analysis was then applied to the 
qualitative data, employing the theoretical framework outlined in Reason’s (1990) 
accident causation model.  
Results: The overall error rate for internal errors for the three different pharmacy units 
was 4.6% and the external error was 0.09% in the large licensed unit (A). Wrong batch 
numbers for starting materials on the worksheets and wrong doses were the most common 
errors noted. Failure to record syringe volumes on the worksheet was also commonplace 
at the unlicensed unit (C). The majority of these errors were judged to have a minor to 
moderate severity. However, after taking likelihood into account and calculating the risk 
score, two types of errors were graded as extreme risk, and seven types of errors were 
graded as high risk. Lack of staff experience, lack of training, use of look-alike/sound-
 
 vi 
alike medicines, loss of concentration and distractions/interruptions inside the units were 
the factors most likely to result in an error. Poor layout of storage areas was stated as 
factor at the large licensed unit (A). Poor design of pharmacy computer systems was 
specified as a factor at the small licensed unit (B), while the heavy workload and low 
number of staff were specified as factors at the unlicensed unit (C). The following 
strategies were recommended in order of priority to minimise injectable medicines 
preparation errors in the three different pharmacy aseptic units: (1) effective use of 
computer alert systems (unit (A) & (B)); (2) improving the systems supporting the 
management of safe medicines (unit A); and (3) additional training of pharmacy staff at 
the (unit C). 
The overall rate of errors in the preparation of injectable medicines on the four wards was 
32.4%. Disregard for a clean/uncluttered treatment room, breach of aseptic non-touch 
technique (ANTT), wrong addition/mixing of drug, unused gloves, and failing to double 
check the final product were the most common preparation errors at both hospitals. Faulty 
labelling and filter needles not being used as specified were common in one hospital 
(Wards (H) and (B)).  Products being prepared in an unsuitable location (e.g. nursing 
station) was also common in one of these wards (Ward B). Disregard for a 
clean/uncluttered treatment room was specified as a factor at ward (S), while no double 
check for the final product was reported as factors at ward (C). The majority of the errors 
reported were ranked as of moderate to major severity for patients. However, after 
accounting for error frequency, twelve types of errors were graded as posing extreme risk. 
High workload with staff shortages, lack of knowledge or experience, lack of training, 
lack of concentration, forgetting to complete tasks, and distractions/ interruptions while in 
the IV treatment room were the most common contributory factors cited. Poor 
design/layout of the IV treatment room, lack of equipment and materials and lack of 
commitment or adherence to NHS Trust guidelines and policy processes were especially 
apparent on wards (H) and (B), while inadequate staff education were specified factors on 
wards (S) and (C). The following strategies were recommended in order of priority to 
minimise injectable medicines preparation errors in the four hospital wards: (1) improving 
training and education programmes (ward (S) and (C)); (2) preventing 
distractions/interruptions (ward (H) and (B)); (3) creating a commitment to guidelines and 
policies (ward (H) and (B)); (4) reporting and identifying errors (ward (H) and (B)); (5) 
systemising workflow (ward (C) and (B)); and (6) offering staff sufficient breaks during 
each shift (ward B).  
Conclusion: This is one of the first empirical studies to explore preparation errors in 
injectable medicines at three different aseptic pharmacy units and four hospital wards. The 
aim and objectives of the research were achieved. The results confirm injectable 
medicines preparation errors are prevalent in pharmacy and hospital environments and 
may cause severe harm to patients. Future work is essential to implement the 
recommended strategies and evaluate their success in practice.  
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1.1 Background  
 
 
The detection and prevention of medication errors (MEs) has become important for all 
healthcare providers (Kohn et al., 1999). Based on the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the aim of healthcare is to improve quality of life while reducing and 
preventing MEs in pharmacy environments, hospital ward areas, and other departments 
(WHO, 2000). However, many errors arise in healthcare, both known and unknown 
(Santell, 2008). During patient management, the healthcare professionals must make 
sure that the needs of the treatment outweigh the risks (Bates, 2007). Risk has been 
described as: 
“The probability or likelihood that harm may occur, coupled with the 
consequence of that harm” (Burrows, 2004, p.10).  
 
 
The concept of risk management was introduced into the National Health Service 
(NHS) in the early 1990s. Risk management is an overall process to determine, 
evaluate, and control error (Burrows, 2004). Clearly, errors are not easy to control or 
manage (Zhang et al, 2004). Furthermore, MEs have the potential to harm patients and 
may result in increased morbidity and mortality, and, in turn, higher hospital treatment 
costs (National Patient Safety Agency, 2015).  
 
Patient safety (PS) is the basis for good quality patient care. This has been defined as: 
 
“The prevention of errors and adverse effects to patients associated with health 




 “The avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries 







Vincent (2010) reported that:  
 
“Patient safety is the foundation of good patient care. The unnerving fact that 
healthcare can harm us as well as heal us is the reason for suggesting that 
patient safety is the heart of healthcare quality. Effectiveness, access to care, 
timeliness and the other dimensions of quality are all important. But when a 
member of your family goes into hospital or receives other healthcare then 
above all you want them to be safe. There is something horrifying about being 
harmed, or indeed causing harm, in an environment of care and trust. Both for 
patients and staff, safety is the emotional heart of healthcare quality. I also 
believe in terms of understanding, improvement and day-to-day running of 
healthcare that safety is a touchstone and guide to the care that is given to the 
patients; the clinician or the organization that keeps safety to the fore in the 
midst of the many other often competing priorities achieves something 
remarkable and provides the care that we would all want to receive” (Vincent, 




Despite continuous improvements in health services, healthcare providers can represent 
a cause of harm to patients, mainly as an outcome of the latent risks associated with 
injectable drug preparation. In the past five decades, numerous studies have been 
published on healthcare-related harm. This has prompted further acknowledgement by 
governments and healthcare providers that PS in an issue that should be processed at 
both a national and global level. 
1.2. Patient Safety and the provision of healthcare  
1.2.1. Patient safety  
 
 
The potential of medication to cause injury was established in 1930 when the term 
‘iatrogenic sickness’ was first utilised, meaning ‘illness caused by healthcare.  In 1964, 
Schimmel published the first research on PS based on the incidence of complications 
arising at a single university medical service. The study sample was more than 1000 
patients, and the results showed that 20% of patients had experienced at least one 





Practice Study (Brennan et al, 1991) on PS, Brennan and colleagues found that errors 
in healthcare occurred in 4% of patients when they studied the records of over 30,100 
patients admitted to 51 US hospitals in 1984. Of these, 28% of the errors were classified 
as having caused no harm, 3% of these mistakes led to significant harm (life threatening 
and serious injury), and around 14% led to patient death. In the following year, the 
Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation (APSF) was established in the US with the 
specific focus of reducing the mortality and morbidity rate correlated with anaesthesia, 
given the common impression that anaesthesia itself caused significant mortality 
(APSF, 2010). A study by Wilson and colleagues (1995) analysed data from 14,179 
patients at twenty-eight hospitals in Australia and reported that 16% (n = 2302/14,179) 
of patients had experienced errors in their care. However, 51% of these mistakes were 
assessed as having high preventability. Despite these studies, errors in healthcare were 
rarely considered within the field of therapeutic research until 1999, when the US 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) published the report ‘To Err is Human: Building a Safer 
Health System’ (Kohn et al., 2000). The report assessed the harm caused by mistakes 
in US healthcare and suggested strategies to increase PS (Kohn et al., 2000). The report 
also showed that between 44,000 and 98,000 people died annually in the US as an 
outcome of preventable mistakes in healthcare, and that these errors cost more than $27 
billion (Kohn et al., 1999; Brennan et al., 1991; Thomas et al., 2000). PS has received 
increased attention since the publication of this significant report, (Knaus, 2002; Han 
et al., 2005; Crowley, 2006; Clancy, 2009; Ulrich & Kear, 2014; Ameer, 2015).  
 
 In 2000, the UK Department of Health (DOH) published the report An Organization 
with a Memory, which reflected the approach of ‘To Err is Human’. The report 
summarised that errors in healthcare affected approximately 10% of patients, leading 





injury’ every year. The report described how the capacity to learn from mistakes was 
inadequate in the UK healthcare system (DOH, 2000). The report encouraged 
investigators to assess errors in healthcare and classify the failures leading to patient 
harm (Fisher et al., 2015). Since the launch of the report, significant and necessary 
research has been undertaken to enhance PS across the NHS. The construction of a safer 
NHS for patients was initiated in 2001 by defining the responsibilities of healthcare 
staff and applying the recommendations in the DOH report (Carruthers and Philip, 
2006). A significant suggestion was to support the development of local and national 
systems for monitoring and reporting errors in healthcare. This was to be developed 
and maintained by a separate independent agency, the National Patient Safety Agency 
(NPSA), which was established that same year (DOH, 2001).  
 
PS is defined by the NPSA as: 
 
“The identification, analysis and management of patient-related risks and 
incidents, in order to make patient care safer and minimise harm to the patient” 




A patient safety incident (PSI) is defined by the NPSA as:  
 
 
“Any unintended or unexpected incident(s) that could have or did lead to harm 




The NPSA created a criteria categorisation system for PSI terminology depending on 







  Table 1.1: Patient Safety Incident classification terms (adapted from NPSA, 2004, p.97)  
 




Patient safety:  
 
“The identification, analysis and management of patient-related risks and 
incidents, in order to make patient care safer and minimise harm to patients”. 
Incident critical 
Incident medical error 
Clinical error medical 
Mistake sentinel event 
Adverse incident 
Adverse event clinical 
Patient safety incident: 
 
“Any unintended or unexpected incident(s) that could have or did lead to harm for 
one or more persons receiving NHS-funded healthcare”.  
 
 
No harm event Patient safety incident (level of severity no harm): 
 “A patient safety incident that caused no harm but was not prevented (‘impact not 
prevented’) or a patient safety incident that was prevented”. 
Near miss/close call Patient safety incident (prevented): 
 “Any patient safety incident that had the potential to cause harm but was 




The objective of the NPSA was to improve health services and safeguard patients’ 
health by identifying and evaluating errors (DOH, 2001), and publishing training 
programmes to prevent errors to patients (Smith, 2004). Central to the NPSA was the 
institution of a national system for collecting reports of patient safety incidents. Thus 
the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) database was established in 
England and Wales in 2003 and has been used to record PS incidents and identify 
specific areas where errors or near misses can occur (NPSA, 2003). The NPSA (2003) 
stated that a cultural change from blame to openness was essential to the effectiveness 
of error reporting. To further enhance PS, the NPSA developed a document entitled 
Seven Steps to Patient Safety to describe what NHS organisations should do to enhance 
patient safety. The key components (adapted from NPSA, 2003, p. 7) were as follows: 
 
1. Building a culture of safety. 





3. Combine risk management activities. 
4. Enhance reporting. 
5. Engage and communicate with patients and the parents. 
6. Study and share safety programmes. 
7. Carry out solutions to avoid error. 
 
In 2012, responsibility for PS was transferred from the NPSA to the NHS 
Commissioning Board (NHS CB, commonly known as NHS England) (NPSA, 2012). 
The NHS CB uses the NRLS database, considered the world’s most comprehensive 
database of patient safety information, to classify and address important patient safety 
issues at their source (NPSA, 2012). Working across sectors, the NHS CB utilises PSI 
data to analyse risk, drive learning and improve patient safety (NPSA, 2012). Figure 
1.1 shows data from a previous study on the 526,376 medication errors reported during 
2005–2010, representing nearly 10% of all PSIs in that period (Cousins et al, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Medication incidents and the phases of the medication process between 1 Jan 2005 and 31 











































Healthcare organisations throughout the world now take PS very seriously, resulting in 
the establishment of special agencies for PS including the World Alliance for Patient 
Safety (WHO, 2009), the Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI, 2015) and the 
National Patient Safety Foundation in the US (NPSF, 2015). The key purpose of these 
agencies is to minimise errors in the medical field by defining the contributing factors 
of such errors and then building strategies to prevent them from occurring again (WHO, 
2009). These PS organisations have all contributed to the enhancement of PS. For 
example, the World Alliance for Patient Safety has published training programmes to 
improving PS in many countries focused on injectable medicines and guidance on the 
correct procedures for medication use (WHO, 2013). Terry and colleagues (2005) 
reported that, in the UK, the NPSA has contributed to improving PS by developing 
reporting systems to collect and analyse cases from staff and patients. The NPSA also 
has several resources and tools available to help NHS organisations make modifications 
to their working environments and safety procedures with the purpose of minimising 
errors in healthcare (NHS, 2009).  Despite these interventions, latest reports show that 
PS remains a global problem, even in developed nations. In 2013, James showed that 
preventable PSIs were responsible for two million deaths globally and more than 
200,000 cases of major harm per year in the United States (James, 2013). These 
numbers were depends on results from four studies using the Institute for Health 
Improvement (IHI) Global Trigger Tool for detecting patient safety incidents from 
hospital medical files (Griffin and Resar, 2009). A World Health Organization report 
on patient safety incidents among inpatients in the European Union (EU) found that 
more than 10% of admitted patients were influenced by patient safety incidents, and 
that 60% of these errors were preventable (WHO, 2013). Lastly, in the United 





reported that more than 237 million medication errors are made across the UK hospitals 
every year and caused the death of 22,000 patients. This research has stated that errors 
in healthcare are common and can be a significant factor leading to major harm to 
patients. Most healthcare errors are considered preventable. Clinical governance has 
been presented as a comprehensive strategy to process patient safety problems and 
develop the quality of healthcare at the individual and organisational levels (Scally and 
Donaldson, 1998).  
1.2.2. Clinical governance  
 
 
The concept of clinical governance is a framework for the NHS, which aims to enhance 
the quality of healthcare provided, and guarantee that a safe and appropriate expectation 
of care is delivered.  Starey (2001) identified six components of clinical governance 
that can together provide high-quality healthcare (Figure 1.2). 
 
 


















Dean (2000) stated that clinical governance is not a new idea; it integrates several 
quality factors that have been established for some time and increases the quality of 
healthcare provided to patients. In late 1997, the DOH published a report entitled “The 
new NHS: modern, dependable”, which classified the basic procedures needed by 
organisations to ensure efficient clinical governance. These chief actions were as 
follows: procedures to ensure quality improvement, such as clinical audit, are in place; 
evaluation of risk management and implementation of risk reduction programmes; 
application of evidence-based practices; implementation of ongoing development 
programmes; development of leadership skills; and specified responsibilities at the 
level of clinical teams. The WHO and IOM have also suggested that risk management 
and ensuring safety are important factors in effective and high-quality healthcare 
(WHO, 1989; Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2001). Hence, clinical risk 
management has been incorporated into healthcare to minimise the harm resulting from 
healthcare errors (Vincent and Moss, 1995).  
1.3. Medication errors (MEs) 
 
 
MEs alone, whether occurring inside or outside of the hospital or pharmacy 
environment, clearly cause death or severe harm to patients every year (Bateman & 
Donyai, 2010).  
1.3.1. Differential terminology used for MEs  
 
 
Diversity exists in the terminologies and definitions used to describe MEs (Allan & 
Barker, 1990; O'Shea, 1999; Crowley, 2006; Lisby et al. 2010; Kongkaew et al. 2013 
Ameer, 2015). For instance, ‘adverse drug event’ (ADEs), ‘adverse drug reaction’ 





errors’ (MEs) are all used to define issues associated with drug use (Australian Council 
for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2002). Yu and colleagues (2005) reviewed more 
than 150 PS reports and identified over 23 different terms related to medication 
incidents and more than 117 different definitions. The term adverse event (AE) was the 
most commonly defined term, with twenty-one definitions, followed by error (thirteen 
definitions).  
 
This variance in definitions is believed to be a key factor leading to the non-reporting 
of medication errors (Armitage & Knapman, 2003; Crowley, 2006; Ghaleb et al, 2010, 
Ameer, 2015). In addition, variable classifications and rates of errors make the 
evaluation of data between studies challenging or unacceptable (Bates, 1996; Caldwell 
et al., 2001; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Kongkaew et al., 2013). Furthermore, to develop 
effective strategies to reduce the incidence of medication errors and thus to mitigate 
their effects requires a method for reliable comparison of medication errors, which 
cannot be succeeded without a clear and agreed definition of medication error and 
associated terms (Yu et al. 2005; Ferner, 2009; Aronson, 2009).  
1.3.2. Definition of medication errors (MEs) 
 
In simple terms, a medication error is a mistake that happens at any point during the 
medicine process (Gandhi et al., 2000). In 1996, Bates reported that some definitions 
of medication error concentrated on the medication use process (MUP) and ignored 
errors in the prescribing stage (Bates, 1996). The author believes that this definition of 
medication errors was insufficient as prescribing errors are an important factor that can 
lead to serious injury or death. Crowley (2006) reported that most of the definitions of 





errors, and argued that this may lead to a lack of improvement in the healthcare 
provided to the patient. Several definitions of ME are used by organisations concerned 
with medication safety. Based on the National Coordinating Council for Medication 
Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP), an ME is defined as: 
“Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use 
or patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care 
professional, patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to professional 
practice, health care product, procedure, and system, including prescribing; 
order communication; product labelling, packaging, and nomenclature; 
compounding; dispensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring 
and use” (NCC MERP, 1998, p. 6). 
 
In 2006, Ferner and colleague suggested a comprehensive definition of ME as  
 
“A failure in the treatment process that leads to, or has the potential to lead to, 
harm to the patient” (Ferner & Aronson, 2006, p. 1013).  
 
 
Ferner and colleague described the management procedure as the procedure that starts 
after the decision to begin management and involves prescription, the assembly of 
starting materials, preparation, dispensing, administration, and monitoring, which is the 
last phase of management (Ferner & Aronson, 2006). This definition was found to be 
the most robust when examined against different scenarios of MEs (Yu et al., 2005). 
The NPSA definition of medication errors, which encompasses the whole medication 
procedure, is:  
“Any incident where there has been an error in the process of prescribing, 
dispensing, preparing, administering, monitoring or providing medicines 
advice, regardless of whether any harm occurred or was possible” (NPSA, 
2009, p. 6).  
 
 
Table 1.2 shows other examples of ME definitions that include all MUPs, most of which 
use the phrase ‘error’ and relate MEs to the possibility of error prevention. Table 1.3 
illustrates examples of ME definitions that focus on the differences between prescribed 









US Pharmacopeia (1995) 
 
“Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate 
medication use or patient harm while the drug is in the control of 
the health care professional, patient or consumer” 
Bates and colleagues (1995) 
 
“Errors occurring at any stage in the process of ordering or 
delivering a medication, regardless of whether an injury occurred 
or the potential for injury were present. They include the entire 
range of severity, from trivial errors to life-threatening errors”  
Kohn and colleagues (2000) 
 
“An error occurring at any stage in the process of delivering a 
medication. They include the entire range of severity, from trivial 
errors, such as orders that necessitated clarification or missing 
doses, to life-threatening errors, (such as a patient receiving a ten- 
fold overdose of a toxic agent “ 
Australian Council For 
Safety And Quality In Health 
Care  
(2002) 
“Failure in the (drug) treatment process that leads to or has the 
potential to lead to, harm to the patient and includes an act of 
omission or commission “ 
Lisby and colleagues (2005) “Errors in the medication process: ordering, transcription, 
dispensing, administration and discharge summaries” 
Kopp and colleagues (2006) “An error occurring during the medication use process, regardless 
of whether an injury occurred or the potential for injury was 
present” 
World Health Organization 
(WHO, 2009) 
“Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate 
medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the 
control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer” 
Lisby and colleagues (2012) 
 
“An error in the stages of the medication process − ordering, 
dispensing, and administering and monitoring the effect − causing 
harm or implying a risk of harming the patient”  
Kongkaew and colleagues 
(2013) 
“Any error in the prescribing, dispensing, or administration of a 
drug, irrespective of whether such errors lead to adverse 
consequences or not”  
 
 




Allan and Barker (1990) “Deviation from the physician’s medication order as written on the 
patients chart” 
Dean and colleagues  
(1995) 
“A dose prepared (or omitted) that deviated from the most recently 
written medication order for that patient “ 
Cooper (1995) “A dose of medication that deviates from the physician’s medication 
order on the patients chart” 
Dean and Barber 
(2001)  
“Any discrepancies between the medication prescribed and that 
prepared” 
Barker colleagues  
(2002) 
“Any discrepancy between the prescriber’s interpretable medication 





1.3.3. The correlation between ADEs, potential ADEs and MEs 
 
 
The definitions that follow relate to the principal terms, their meaning and their 
relationship. Some of these definitions agree with NPSA defined terminologies, while 
others have been chosen by leading healthcare professionals. It is vital to clarify the 
correlation between ADEs, ADRs, potential ADEs (Near miss) and MEs when studying 
approaches to increase safety in medicine use (Bates et al., 1995; Morimoto et al., 
2004).  
 
ADEs are typically defined as ‘preventable ADE’, which includes MEs resulting in 
patient injury during any phase of the medicines management for example: hypothermia 
due to overdose of analgesic and opiates, and ‘non-preventable ADE’, which include 
harm arising from the use of a medicine which is not the result of any mistake (i.e., an 
ADR) (Von Laue et al., 2003; Otero & Schmitt, 2005). 
 
Adverse Drug event (ADE) 
“Injuries resulting from medical interventions related to a drug” (Bates et al., 
1995, p. 199). 
 
And later shortened to   
 
“An injury due to medication” (Morimoto et al., 2004, p. 307).  
 
Adverse drug reaction (ADRs) (non-preventable ADE) 
“Injury from medication not involving any error” (Von Laue et al. 2003.P. 409).  
 
ADEs have been divided into different categories, (Morimoto and colleagues, 2004, p. 
307): 
Potential ADE (Near miss):  
 
“… A medication error with the potential to cause an injury but which does not 
actually cause an injury, either because of specific circumstances or because 





In simple expression “Medication errors that do not result in patient harm or errors 
with potential for harm but detected before they reach the patient” (DOH, 2004, p.22) 
For example,  
I. Wrong volume of diluent: Picked 100ml Sodium Chloride 0.9% instead of 50 
ml Sodium Chloride 0.9%. 
II. Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air embolism or 
measurement of incorrect volume, but corrected before given to patient. 
 
Preventable ADE (reached the patient):  
 “…An injury that is the result of an error at any stage in the medication use”  
 Figure 1.3 shows the correlation between MEs, ADEs, and ADRs. The red ring 
exemplifies preventable drug events (all MEs, all potential ADEs, and preventable 
ADEs). Only a few types of medication errors are preventable ADEs or potential ADEs. 
Furthermore, all potential ADEs (near miss) are medication errors and, that only limited 





















Preventable ADEs  
(ADEs with medication errors) 
 





1.3.4 Prevalence and preventability of medication errors in hospitals  
 
 
There have been numerous studies reporting MEs in hospitals throughout the world. In 
1994, Leape reported that 20% of patients in US hospitals had experienced MEs and 
were also considered a key factor of resulting harms (Leape, 1994). Bates and 
colleagues (1995) examined data from more than 4,000 patients at eleven medical and 
surgical wards in two hospitals. The authors recognised 247 definite ADEs and 194 
potential ADEs. The ADEs were considered preventable in 28% of all cases, and 
represented a major harm in 42% of cases. Furthermore, in 1995, the Quality in 
Australian Health Care Study examined the medical records of 14,100 patients at 28 
hospitals in Australia and reported that 11% of all errors among admitted patients were 
MEs. The study showed that more than 40% of MEs were considered preventable, 
around 16% were identified as causing major harm and more than 5% led to death 
(Wilson et al., 1995). In another investigation of General Practice in Australia, 51% of 
reported errors were stated to be medication errors and more than 70% of which were 
preventable (Runciman et al., 2003). A systematic review by Von Laue and colleagues 
(2003) examined the occurrence and preventability of ADEs in hospital settings 
globally and found that ADEs affected between 0.5% and 7% of admitted patients, with 
up to 57% of these ADEs being preventable. In 2006, Otero-Lopez and colleagues 
recognised more than 190 ADEs with 2,643 hospitalised patients 7% (n= 191/2643), 
20% (n=38/191) of which were preventable. Williams (2007) has identified that 
medication errors influence between 1.8% and 13.6% of patients admitted to hospitals. 
Nuckols et al (2007) studied more than 3,800 error reports from three voluntary 
reporting systems in two US hospitals. They stated that medication errors accounted for 
28.2% (n=1094/3875) of all reported errors, and that about 92.9 %( n= 1017/1094) of 





around 45% (1017/2246) of all preventable errors analysed in the research, an 
observation which reveals the increased preventability of medication errors compared 
with other types of errors (Nuckols et al., 2007). An investigation of medication errors 
in an NHS hospital reviewed incident reports and discharge records, as well as direct 
observation of drug prescriptions by pharmacists, and found that ADEs composed 50% 
of total AEs identified, with 10% affecting patients (Olsen et al., 2007).  A study in 
Japan specified 1,010 [1.7% (incidence=17/1000 patient per day)] ADEs and 514 
[0.87% (incidence=8.7/ 1000 patient per day)] MEs at three hospitals over a 6-month 
period. Among all ADEs, 33% caused severe harm, 14% were preventable, 4.9% life 
threating, and 1.6% caused death (Morimoto et al., 2010). Another study examined 
1,000 deaths in ten acute hospitals in England in 2009 and found that 5% of adult deaths 
had a 50% or more chance of being prevented. Twenty-one percent of these preventable 
adult deaths were because of the wrong medicine or incorrect fluid treatment (Hogan 
et al. 2012).  
 
In summary, medication errors are common, and account for a large percentage (10% 
n=526,167) of reported incidents. Between 2005 and 2010, medication errors were the 
second most common type of error stated by the NRLS in England and Wales, after 
patient accidents (Cousins et al., 2012). The report showed that MEs represented 10% 
of all PSI. The percentage of MEs increased from 10% to 11% between 2005 and 2010, 
and to 11.4% and 11.1% in 2011 and 2012, respectively. In 2013, MEs was the third 











 MUP describes the phases through which drugs pass before being delivered to the 
patient, and are illustrated in Figure 1.4. In pharmacy or hospital environments, these 
stages include (A) prescribing; (B) transcribing; (C) preparing, usually by registered 
nurses; (D) dispensing; (E) administration; and (F) monitoring of treatment effects and 
possible adverse events (IOM, 2007). These phases form a complex system that 









MAR = medication administration record  
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Several investigative studies (e.g. from observational research) on the incidence of 
medication errors in UK hospitals have been reported, with most medication errors 
reported in hospitals shown to arise during drug prescribing (usually including 
transcribing) and administration, followed by preparing/dispensing and monitoring 
(Ashcroft & Cooke, 2006; NPSA, 2009). Comparable findings to the IOM (2007) on 
medication error categories within each medication use process step have been 
recognised in an analysis of medication errors at a UK hospital (Ameer, 2015). These 
mistakes can happen during any phase of prescribing, transcribing, preparation and 
dispensing or administration. However, it should be noted that sufficient monitoring of 
treatment effects and adverse events is not performed continuously (Vogenberg & 
Benjamin, 2011). The wrong patient, time, medicine, dose and administration route 
have all been identified typical types of MEs and have been labelled the ‘five wrongs’ 
(Ghaleb et al., 2010; Ameer, 2015).  
 
In previous studies, investigators have used different definitions to describe MUP 
stages (Tully, 2012), that vary between countries, meaning that MUP comparisons 
between hospitals in the UK and in Europe or the US are somewhat unreliable due to 
the variances in the procedure.  
 
Table 1.4, adapted from James (2009), shows the differences in MUP between these 
countries. As is apparent from Table 1.4, the main difference is the number of types of 
healthcare professionals (i.e. physician; pharmacist and nurses) involved in the different 
stages of MUP in the UK compared to the hospital environments in other countries in 
Europe and the US. For example, in the UK, hospital prescriptions are handwritten, or 





however, in European and US hospitals they are handwritten or computer generated by 
physicians only. Furthermore, the most notable differentiation between the UK, Europe 
and US hospitals is the use of unit dose systems for drug dispensing and distribution. 
In the US hospital setting, the unit-doses for each prescribed medicine are dispensed 
for individual patients in a pharmacy and stored in a computerised cabinet on the ward 
until use. In the UK, wards hold stocks of common medicines which can be used for 
any patient, whilst whole boxes of unusual medicines are supplied for individual 




















































Table 1.4.  A summary of MUPs in hospital environments in the UK, Europe and the US (adapted from James, 2009, 
pp. 36)  
 






Prescriptions are handwritten or 
computer generated by doctors, 
nurses’ prescribers, and 
pharmacist prescribers. 
Prescription types include 
medication charts and discharge 
and outpatient prescriptions. 
Prescriptions are 
handwritten or computer 
generated by doctors. 
Prescription types 
include medication 
charts and discharge and 
outpatient prescriptions. 
Prescriptions are 
handwritten or generated 
using computerised 
physician order entry 
systems by doctors. 
Prescription types 
include medication 





Medication orders may be 
transcribed from a prescription to 
a pharmacy requisition by nurses, 
pharmacists, and pharmacy 
technicians. 
Nurses transcribe details 
from a prescription to a 
pharmacy requisition. 
Nurses transcribe details 
from a handwritten 
prescription to pharmacy 
requisition or medication 
administration record. 
Computerised physician 
order entry generated 
prescriptions are 
accessed directly by 






Pharmacists review patient’s drug 
chart, prescription and pharmacy 
requisition on the ward to identify 
prescribing and transcribing errors 
(clinical checks). Centralised 
pharmacy departments assemble 
medications. Patients are supplied 
with an original manufactures’ 
packed labelled with patient 
name, date of dispensing, drug 
name, strength, form, directions 
for administration and 
warning/cautionary advice. Some 
pharmacies will dispense 
discharge prescriptions at ward 
level using patients’ own drugs or 
previously supplied medications. 
All total parenteral nutrition and 
parenteral cytoxic medications are 
prepared by pharmacy. Some 
pharmacies prepare a limited 




pharmacy staff work 
solely from the 
centralised pharmacy 
departments. Medication 
charts, discharged and 
outpatient prescriptions 
are checked by 
pharmacists for accuracy 
and appropriateness of 
prescribing and 
transcribing. Pharmacy 
supplies patients with 
manufactures’ original 
packs of medicine 
without a dispensing 
label giving details of 
drug or directions. 
Pharmacy staff review 
medication orders for 
safety from a 
decentralised pharmacy 
unit at ward level. Unit 
doses of each drug 
ordered for a patient are 
assembled by the 
decentralised pharmacy. 
All intravenous 
medications for patients 
are prepared and 






Medication is stored in a locked 
drug trolley or individual patient 
locker. Nurses administer 
medications to patients and 
document supply on the 
medication chart which is both a 
prescription and a record of 
medication administration. 
Medication is stored in 
locked cupboards on the 
wards. Nurses document 
administration of 
medications to patients 
on a medication 
administration chart. 
 




of medications to 






1.4.1 Cost of medication errors  
 
 
Addition to the injury that may outcome from MEs, their financial implications and 
costs may be important. In 1997, Bates and colleagues assessed the costs associated 
with 190 ADEs, of which 60 were preventable, in patients admitted to hospital in the 
US. They reported that ADEs increased the period of hospitalisation by three days, with 
an estimated cost after the event of $2,570. In preventable ADEs, the length of 
hospitalisation increased by five days, with costs after the event of $4,695. The IOM 
(2007) report assessed the additional cost of managing each preventable ADE that 
arises in hospital to be almost $8,755, and with the statement that 400,000 preventable 
ADEs happen every year, the overall additional cost of all MEs on the US healthcare 
system was estimated at $3.7 billion per year.  
 
Roughead and colleague (2009) proposed that more than 185,000 patient admissions 
happen each year in Australia because of MEs, accounting for 2-3% of admissions to 
Australian hospitals and costing about $660 million. Furthermore, around 50% of these 
incidents were potentially preventable.  
 
In the UK, the DOH (2004) has stated that 10-20% of all MEs were estimated to cost 
the NHS £200–400 million, which with legal action costs added was almost £750 
million (Smith, 2004). The NPSA (2007) report rated the cost of preventable injury 
resulting from medication errors and showed that preventable medication errors cost 
the UK NHS more than £700 million each year. This included the cost of preventable 
inpatient injury, £411 million; the cost of preventable admissions due to harm caused 
by drugs, £359 million, and the cost of legal action, £4 million. In addition, Cousins 





more than £2 billion in 2012 (Cousins et al., 2012). From 2012 to 2014, medication 
costs in hospitals increased by 17% to £5.8 billion (Health and Social Care Information 
Centre, 2014).   
1.5 Review of studies reporting MEs 
 
 
Over the last two decades there has been a rapid development of ME indication in 
worldwide. But, a small number of comprehensive studies were conducted.  Bates et al. 
(1995) studied the incidence and preventability of ADEs in two US hospitals by 
reviewing charts and self-reported events by nurses and pharmacists. They reported that 
48.4% (n = 128) of 264 preventable ADEs happened during the prescribing phase and 
that 11.3% (n = 30) occurred during transcribing. They acknowledged that a limitation 
of their study was that it was carried out in teaching hospitals, meaning that findings 
might not be generalisable. 
 
Leape and colleagues examined patient profiles in two hospitals and reported that 
38.9% (n = 130) of 334 errors happened during the prescribing phase, and 38% (n = 
126) in the administration phase. The most common types of medicines administration 
errors (MAEs) were wrong dosage (27%; n = 34), wrong administration technique 
(14%; n = 18), wrong drug (12%; n = 15), and omissions (8%; n = 10) (Leape et al., 
1995).  
 
Kaushal et al. (2001) analysed medication errors in children’s clinics at two US 
teaching hospitals. They reported that most medication errors happened during the 





(n=62/616) arose in the transcribing phase. The most common type of error was wrong 
dosing, at 34%.  
 
Dean and colleagues examined the incidence and clinical significance of prescribing 
mistakes at a UK hospital. The analysis included more than 36,100 written drug 
prescriptions over 4 weeks, and detected a prescribing error in 1.4% (n = 538/36,200) 
of the prescriptions. The majority of errors 60.9% (n= 328/538) happened during the 
prescription writing process, while errors that happened during the prescribing decision 
process represented 39% (n = 210/538) of the total. The most common types of errors 
were dosing errors (53.7%; n = 289/538), errors in selecting the demand for drug 
treatment (17.8%; n = 96/538) and errors when writing instructions on how to give the 
medicine (12.8%; n = 69/538). Furthermore, the authors stated that most of the severe 
errors (about 58%) happened during the prescription writing procedure, and that the 
transcribing error rate was less than 1%. Overall, (26.3%; n=142/538) of errors were 
potentially severe, of which 58% happened during the prescribing decision process 
(Dean et al., 2002).  
 
An analysis of 24 hospitals and 12 nursing homes in the US approved by Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations identified that the 
proportion of medication errors was 18.8% (n=605/3216) of all administered medicines 
(Barker et al., 2002). In spite of the fact that the rate was lower in hospital settings, 
(16.4%) compared with nursing homes (21.7%) but this variance was not significant. 
The most common types of mistakes were administering the wrong dose, timing, 






Observational investigations of medication errors in intensive care units reported that 
error rats started from 7% to 56% of observed medicines administrations (Tissot et al., 
1999; Van den Bemt et al., 2002). 
 
Tissot and colleagues observed medicines administration errors in medical and surgical 
wards at a teaching hospital in France and found that medicines administration errors 
rates ranged from 15% for all detected medicines (Tissot et al., 2003).  
 
Winterstein and colleagues (2004) examined the nature of ME reports in a single 
teaching hospital and reported that 73% (n = 174/240) of analysed MEs happened in 
the prescribing phase and 6% (n = 15/240) in the transcribing phase.  
 
A study examined dispensing errors recognised in a NHS hospital pharmacy showed 
that 2% of 4,849 dispensed medicines had more than one dispensing error (Beso et al., 
2005). One clear weakness in the study analysis, which was based on self-reporting, 
was that errors may have been under reported, particularly those identified outside of 
the department, in order to avoid blame. The different types of mistakes reported in 
each MUP phase support this observation. Errors identified outside of the department 
were less likely to be labelling errors (66% n=21/32) and more likely to be content 
errors (34% n=11/32) (e.g. missing doses or incorrect drug); this may reflect the fact 
that content errors are easier to identify, or that they are noticed as more significant and 
thus reported.  
 
In the UK, the rate of administration errors was significantly higher than that of other 
phases of the medications use process and started from 47% to 84% (Ashcroft & Cooke, 
2006; Maidment & Thorn, 2005). In 2006, Ashcroft and colleague examined 





university hospital in the UK (One thousands beds). The authors found that 46.4% 
(n=230/495) of the 495 presented errors were associated with the administration phase, 
compared with 38.7% (n=190/495) in the prescribing phase and 14.7% (n=73/495) in 
the dispensing phase (Ashcroft and Cooke, 2006). In the same year, an observational 
study in the US examined dispensing errors at one hospital. The results identified 5,075 
dispensing errors, a rate of 3.6% (n = 140,755 doses), and that 79% of these errors were 
discovered during double checks with 21% of observed errors undiscovered. Among 
the undiscovered errors, 24% were potentially harmful, of which 0.8% were life 
threatening (Cina et al., 2006).  
 
A systematic review of the incidence of medication errors in children wards was 
managed by Ghaleb and colleagues (2006) and included 8 observational investigations 
from 5 various countries, involving the UK hospitals. The authors reported that the 
observed medicines administration errors rate was 0.6% and was 10.3% when 
intravenous medicine were excluded, and that higher rates of 18–27% were found when 
intravenous medicine were included. The most common errors were omission errors, 
wrong administration route and wrong frequency of administration.  
 
Kopp and colleagues (2006) reported that Intensive Care Unit errors in a US teaching 
hospital from 27% during the administration phase. The most common types of errors 
were omissions 47.6% (n = 20/42) and wrong dose 14.2% (n = 6/42). 
 
An investigation carried out in New Zealand presented that 61% (n = 224) of errors 
happened at the prescribing phase compared with 45% (n=164) during the 
administration phase, 15% (n=55) during the monitoring phase, and 9% (n=34) at the 





Lewis and colleagues carried out a systematic review of the prevalence, incidence and 
types of mistakes correlated with the prescribing phase in adult or paediatric hospital 
settings. The review, which involved 65 studies (25 from the US and 22 from the UK), 
reported that 7% of medicine orders involved errors and found that the most common 
mistake was prescribing the incorrect dose (Lewis et al., 2009). In the same year, the 
NPSA stated that 53% (n=34,137) of medication errors reported at hospitals in England 
and Wales in 2009 happened during the administration of medicines, compared with 
18% (n=11,180) during the prescribing phase and 11% (n=7,436) during the medicine 
preparation phase. In the same year, a Malaysian observational study examined the 
incidence of MAEs and found an error rate of 11.3% (n=127) in 1,118 observed doses. 
In total, 10% of errors were potentially life-threatening. The most common errors were 
incorrect administration time (25%; n=34), wrong administration technique (16%; 
n=22), and unauthorised medicine errors (14%; n= 19). The authors identified that IV 
doses were more likely to be linked with errors, compared with non-IV doses (21% vs. 
7.9%; P < 0.001) (Chua et al., 2009).  
 
Valentin and colleagues (2009) observed data from 113 ICUs in 27 countries, including 
16 centres in the UK, to investigate MAEs associated with parenteral medicines. The 
authors reported that MAEs happened in 7.3% (n = 861\11,725) of administrations and 
influenced 33% of patients. The authors also reported 75 errors per 100 patient days. 
The most common types of errors were wrong time (44.8%; n = 259), omissions 
(30.1%; n = 386) and wrong dose (13.7%; n = 118).  
 
In 2009, James and colleagues presented a review of global studies on the incidence 
and type of dispensing errors. The analysis included 18 studies of hospital pharmacy 





errors detected in the pharmacy) and unprevented (i.e. errors detected after the drug has 
left the pharmacy) dispensing errors. In UK hospitals, eight studies showed that the rate 
of prevented dispensing errors ranged from 0.10% to 2.6%, and nine studies found that 
the rate of unprevented errors ranged from 0.008% to 0.02%. Higher percentages were 
reported in US hospitals, where prevented dispensing errors rates ranged from 0.05% 
to 17% (16 studies), although only one research stated the rate of unprevented 
dispensing errors (0.76%). The most common types of unprevented errors were 
dispensing of the incorrect dose, incorrect quantity, incorrect drug strength and 
incorrect drug. Dispensing of the incorrect drug or strength and faulty labelling were 
the most common types of prevented dispensing errors in both manual and automated 
systems (James et al, 2009). Nevertheless, other studies from the UK have shown that 
automation systems significantly decrease drug content mistakes (e.g. incorrect drug, 
incorrect form, incorrect quantity and incorrect strength) (Fitzpatrick et al., 2005; 
Franklin et al., 2008).  
 
A Japanese analysis assessed the incidence of ADEs and found an error rate of 67% (n 
= 319) at the prescribing stage compared with 17.4% (n = 83) at the monitoring phase, 
14.2% (n = 68) at the administration stage, and 1.8% (n = 8) during the dispensing phase 
(Morimoto et al., 2010). 
 
Ghaleb et al. (2010) reported that 13.2% (n = 391/2,955) of medicine orders were 
related with prescribing errors at five NHS hospitals in London. The most common 
types of prescribing errors were incomplete prescriptions (41%; n = 161), use of 
abbreviations (24%; n = 94), and dosing mistakes (11%; n = 44).  
 
Poon and colleagues observed 6,732 medicine administrations in medical, surgical, and 





rate of 11.5% (n=776/6,732). The most common mistakes were wrong administration 
route (37.2%; n=289/776), incorrect documentation (24.7%; n=192/776) and dosing 
errors (21%; n=163/776). Generally, 1.8% (n=123/6,732) of observed administrations 
were categorised as potentially clinically significant, 1.3% (n = 88/6,732) caused 
serious injury and 0.029% (n = 2/6.732) were life-threatening (Poon et al., 2010). 
 
Ghaleb and colleagues studied one hundred sixty one nurses preparing and 
administering medicines and found an error rate of 19% (n=429/ administration 
errors/2,249 opportunities for error) (Ghaleb et al., 2010).  
 
Kelly and colleagues (2011) reported that, out of 2,129 observed drug administrations, 
11% involved errors. The rate of errors increased more than 30% when timing errors 
were added. The most commonly observed errors were incorrect time (71%), wrong 
preparation (8%), omissions (5%), wrong form (5%) and wrong dose (3%).   
 
A large investigation by James and colleagues (2011) examined the rate and description 
of prevented and unprevented dispensing incidents reported in 5 Welsh NHS hospital 
pharmacies. Among 221,670 dispensing events, a significant difference was observed 
between prevented incidents (0.13% n=131/100,000) and unprevented incidents 
(0.01% n= 16/100,000). The investigation also reported significant differences in the 
ratio of incidents involving a faulty on the label or incorrect directions (p = 0.02), 
dispensing the wrong strength (p = 0.02), wrong medicine information on the label (p 
= 0.01), and incorrect expiry dates (p = 0.002) between prevented and unprevented 
incidents.  
 
Rodriguez and colleagues (2012) reported that (23%; n=509/2,314) of administered 





systems were linked with errors. They found that 86.6% (n = 441/509) of errors 
happened at the administration phase and 13.3% (n=68/509) happened during the 
preparation phase. The most commonly detected mistakes were the use of wrong 
administration procedures (14%; n =321); wrong preparation (i.e. wrong dilution [2%; 
n=40]); omission (1%; n =32), and wrong route (1%; n=27). In total, 96% of errors did 
not cause harm at all, whereas 2% needed monitoring and 0.5% were linked with short-
term harm. 
 
Keers et al. (2013) performed an international systematic review of 91 observational 
studies to analyse the prevalence and type of MAEs and found a median error rate 
among adult and paediatric studies of 20%, involving timing mistakes and 8% without 
timing mistakes. The most common mistakes reported were wrong dosage, 
unauthorised medicines, timing errors and omissions. However, another systematic 
review of MAEs in hospitals found that the median error rate was 10.5% of the overall 
opportunity for error (TOE), from 34 studies. The median error rate in a further fifteen 
studies was 6.9% of the TOE (Berdot et al., 2013).  In the same year, a systematic 
review of UK observational MAE research (n = 16) reported a total error rate of 6% for 
non-IV doses and 36% for IV doses. The study presented that MAEs for IV doses were 
five times higher than for non-IV doses (McLeod et al., 2013).  
 
A two-year research of 20 hospitals in the UK compared the proportion of prescribing 
errors made by junior physicians with those made by senior physicians and other 
prescribers. Throughout the research phase, pharmacists checked medicine orders for 
prescribing errors. The authors found that among 124,260 checked medication orders, 
11,235 prescribing mistakes were recognised in 10,986 orders, giving a mean error rate 





errors among physicians in training compared with consultants. The error rate in 
prescriptions written by physicians in training was 8.6% for foundation year 1 
physicians and 10% for foundation year 2 physicians, compared with an error rate of 
5% for consultants. The most common types of errors detected in the research were the 
omission of drugs needed at admission (29%) followed by under-dosage (11%) and 
over-dosage (8%) (Ashcroft et al., 2015).  
 
All of the studies above are large-scale, and well recognised. Despite the different 
settings, methodologies, and ME rates stated in these studies, they all show that MEs 
are a common problem that affect both adult and paediatric inpatients worldwide. They 
also show the high preventability of MEs. Some of the research reviewed above 
investigated MEs only on weekdays (Van den Bemt et al., 2002; Tissot et al., 2003). 
Other studies did not explore MEs during night shifts (Greengold et al., 2003, Tissot et 
al., 2003). Moreover, a number of studies did not identify the observation times 
(morning, evening, or night), and whether the observations were presented during 
weekdays or weekends (Ridge et al., 1995).  Previous studies were very varied in the 
number of observation sites. For instance, Barker et al. (2002) employed a large sample 
size (n=3,216 doses) across 36 organisations to classify the prevalence of MEs. A large 
sample such as this may provide more representative results (Barker et al., 2002). Table 
1.5 presents more details about other large-scale investigations of MEs. It includes the 
essential information relating to each research, and a summary of the main results. As 
can be noted, the research can be categorised into two groups: prospective observational 














Two large University hospitals 
 
UK: 2756 opportunities for error 
 
US: 919 opportunities for error 
 




UK 3%  
 
US 6.9%  
 
UK: Omission 
 (58% 49 n=) 
Incorrect dose  
(14% n= 12)  
 Incorrect formulation  
(10% n= 8)  
Incorrect medicine  
(7% n=6)  
USA:  Omission  
(22% n=14)  
Wrong dose  
(30% n=19)  
Unordered medicine  




al, 1997  
 
US A teaching hospital. 9-year study 
period were assessed.  
 
Size of sample: 3,903,433 
prescriptions.  
Prospective study; pharmacists used any available 
information sources, including the pharmacy computer 
system which had automated checking functions, to evaluate 
prescriptions prior to dispensing.  



















UK One elderly care ward  
 




Observational studies  
 
MAEs = 5.4% (119/2170)  
 
Omissions (50.4%)  
Incorrect dose  
(16%, 19) 
Incorrect preparation technique (13%) 





 MAE rate was 
significantly higher on 
weekdays (6%) than 
weekends (4%).  
MAE rate was higher 
during pharmacy 
opening hours (8%) 
than during the closing 
hours (5%).  






Continued Table 1.5 
4Who did not join the programme, offered comprehensive care, involving medicine delivery, for six patients each.  5After getting a brief review programme on safe medicine use, were responsible especially for medication 
delivery for up to eighteen patients each. 6OR: Odds Ratio; CI: Confidence Interval. 
 
Study Location Study settings Method /Design Error rate Errors type & rate Comment 
Barker  
et al  
(2002)  
 
US 36 hospitals 
 
opportunities for error = 3216 
 
Observational studies  
 




 MAEs without 
timing mistakes 
10.8%  
Timing mistakes (43%)  
Omission (30%) 




7% of errors were assessed as potential ADEs.  
 
The significant potential risk factors: 








2 University hospitals  
 
9,453 opportunities for error  
                           and  
1,457 errors  
 
Observational studies  
 
MAEs: 
 General nurses:4  
14.9% (545)  
 
MAEs  
Medication nurses:5  




Incorrect dose preparation  
(1.4%)  
Omissions (0.9%)  
Wrong dosage (0.8%) 
Wrong route (0.6%) 





et al  
(2005)   
Denmark One medical and one surgical ward  
 
2467 opportunities for error in all stages 
and 1065 errors  




(39% n= 167), 
Transcribing 




(41% n=166).  
Lack of identity control 
(36,4%, 150), Incorrect 
time  
(4.4%, 18) 
Incorrect delivery (2.9%, 
12)  
Incorrect administration 
technique (1.9%, 8)  
Severity of MAEs:  Fatal (1% n=2)                                     
Major injury (20% n=33)               
 Significant (32% n=53)                        
  Non-significant (46% n= 77) 
 




A paediatric teaching hospital. 1-year 
period were observed.  
 
Size of sample: 336 patients, 485 nurse-
observation periods.  
 
Prospective study; 12, 5th year 
pharmacy students accompanied nurses 
giving medicines (undisguised) and 
observed the preparation and 
administration of medicines to find 
discrepancies between physicians’ 
orders and actual medicine 
administration 




19.7% related to  
Anti-infective which were 
the 3rd highest drug class 
associated with errors 
(OR=2.57, 95%CI: 1.01%–










Continued Table 1.5 
 





Study Location Study settings Method /Design Error rate Errors type & rate Comment 
Jayawardena et 
al, 2007  
US One community teaching hospital. Computerised 
prescription order entry system.  
 
Study for 1 year.  
 
Size of sample: 466,311 prescriptions.  
Retrospective study. Pharmacist reviewed prescriptions placed before 
the medicine was released to the nursing staff. If there was any 
hesitation about a specific order, the pharmacist would directly 








et al, 2008  
 
Germany One teaching hospital. One monitor visited each 
ward in the busy morning hours from 7 to 10 for 10 
days.  
 
Size of sample:  87 nurses observed.  
 
Prospective study; three-trained pharmacy students monitored drug 
handling (storage, preparation and administration) and assessed the 
occurrence of 20 detected errors.  
60.5% n=833 
handling errors  
Preparation.  
 (68.5 n=571%) 
Administration 
 (30.5 n=254%)  
Storage 
 (1% n=30) 
In total, (29.5% 
n=246) related to 
antibiotics which was 
the medicine class 
most linked with 
errors. 
Lewis et al, 2009  
 
UK Published between 1985 and 2007 that stated on the 
finding and rate of PEs in prescriptions handwritten 
for hospital environment were reviewed.  
 
Size of sample: 65 studies (including 25 from the 
US and 22 from the UK).  
Systematic review to identify appropriate studies.  
 




et al, 2009  
 
Worldwide 113 ICU in 27 countries (involving 17 from the UK). 
Drug administrations to all adult patients staying in 
the units, involving those admitted or discharged 
during a 24-hour period.  
 
Size of sample: 1,328 patients (including 200 from 
the UK) who received 11,725 drug administrations.  
 
Prospective study; All nurses and physicians were asked to fill in a 
single multi-entry questionnaire (self-reporting) available at the 
bedside of each patient that ask if, and at what time, a mistake in IV 







Of these, MAEs, 20.7% 
(n=179/861) associated 
to antimicrobials which 
was the 2nd most 
commonly related with 
errors  
9.4% n=1905 









Continued Table 1.5 
 
8 IQR: interquartile range.  
Study Location Study settings Method /Design Error rate Errors type & rate Comment 
Dornan  
et al, 2009  
 
UK 19 teaching hospitals. All new prescriptions made on 
seven monthly- separated weekdays were examined. 
 
Size of sample: 124,260 prescriptions.  
Prospective study pharmacists reported errors 
in prescriptions as part of their routine job.  
 
 
PEs 8.9% n=11077 
/ 
124,260  









One teaching hospital. 2-gastroenterology ward, all 
drug administrations during all shifts over a 1-week 
period were observed. 
 
Size of sample: 73 patients who received 213 drugs.  
 
 
Prospective study, six pharmacists and five 
nurses disguisedly observed drug 
administrations and assessed the MEs rate.  
 
60.5% n=833 handling errors  MEs  
21.9%n=509/2314 
 12.8% n=297/2314 related to 
antibiotics which was the drug class 
most linked with mistakes.  
There was a significant relationship 
between MEs and antibiotics 
incidence (OR=3.1, 95%CI: 1.98–
4.85)  
Berdot et al, 
2012  
 
France One teaching hospital. 4 adult wards, drug 
administrations to all patients during the three 
medicine rounds on each of 6 days per ward were 
observed.  
 
Size of sample: 28 nurses caring for 108 patients.  
Disguisedly observational study. MEs while 
accompanying nurses and observing the 
preparation and administration of drugs. 
Directly after the round, the pharmacist 
compared the drug administrations to the 
physician order.  
MEs was 28% n=415/1501 
 
55 (13%) MEs occurred in 50 
anti-infective (12%) 
opportunities for error (33% of 
all 150 anti-infectives 
opportunities for error. 
N/A 
Seden  
et al, 2013   
 
 
UK Nine hospitals (3 teaching; 3 district; 3 specialist). 
Every hospital was asked to check a minimum of 400 
prescriptions. All types of medication orders were 
checked.  
 
Size of sample: 4,238 prescriptions. 
Prospective study. Clinical pharmacists 
prospectively reported PEs at the phase of 
clinically checking admission or discharge 
prescriptions.  
 
3,011 PEs were detected in 
1,857 prescriptions (44% of 
all prescriptions assessed).  
423 (23%) contained 
antibiotics. These involved 130 
(31%) antibiotic-related PEs 




Keers et al 
(2013) 
 
UK Published between 1985 and May 2012 that stated on 
the rate of MEs resulting only from direct observation 
at long-term care or hospital settings were reviewed. 
Size of sample: 91 studies (including 25 from the US 
and 22 from the UK).  










 6.4-35.9%.  
Out of 10 studies specified the 
medications most commonly 
related with errors,  
4 reported that antimicrobials 







1.6 Injectable Medications Errors  
 
 
Injectable medicines are an important aspect of healthcare and are given to nearly all 
inpatients. Furthermore, injectable medicines are not always used effectively with 
errors occurring all too often (WHO, 2013). MEs occurring in the hospital or pharmacy 
environment have been shown to cause death or major harm to patients every year 
(Crowley, 2006; Cousins et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015). The highest-risk medicines are 
typically those administered by injection. Injectable drugs must be carefully prepared 
and administered, and patients receiving injectable drugs should be monitored closely. 
Injectable drugs are classified by the NPSA as high-risk medications (NPSA, 2007), 
and defined as follows: 
“Medicines intended for administration by bolus injection, perfusion or infusion 
by any of the following routes: intravenous, intramuscular, intrathecal, intra-
arterial, subcutaneous, intradermal, intraventricular, epidural, intravascular, 
intravitreal, intrapleural and intraocular” (NPSA, 2007, p. 9). 
 
 
The UK NRLS received 9,000 reports on medication safety incidents related to 
injectable drugs in 2006. Moreover, these incidents accounted for 53% of patient deaths 
or major harm to patients (NPSA, 2006). As a result, the UK NPSA published Patient 
Safety Alert 20, ‘Promoting the Safer Use of Injectable Medicines’ (NPSA, 2007). Its 
recommendations are summarised below (adapted from NPSA, 2007, p. 2): 
 
1. Start a risk assessment of injectable drug procedures and products in all hospital 
wards to classify high risks, and develop an action plan to reduce them. 
2. Ensure that there are up-to-date policies and protocol/procedures for 





3. Ensure basic technical information on injectable drugs is available and 
accessible to healthcare staff in hospital wards at the point of use. 
4. Implement a purchasing for safety policy to encourage purchase of injectable 
drugs with inherent safety features. 
5. Afford training for, and supervision of, all healthcare staff involved in 
prescribing, administering and monitoring injectable drugs. 
6. As part of the annual drugs management audit programme, healthcare 
organisations should include an audit of medicine practice with injectable drugs. 
 
A preparation error is defined as  
 
“The preparation of an injectable medication that deviates from the 
prescription, manufacturer’s guidelines, nationally or locally agreed-upon 
policy, procedure or guidance, or generic standards for clean or aseptic 
preparation” (Crowley, 2006, p. 136). 
 
 
Concerns about the safety of injectable medicines were reported in the late 1970s due 
to the severity of errors associated with these therapies (O’Hara et al., 1995). The 
Breckenridge report (1976) noted the risks related with the preparation of injectable 
products in hospital wards. It recommended that injectable drug preparations should be 
under the control of a specialised pharmacist in an adequate workplace (Breckenridge, 
1976). It stated that IV medicines should be prepared in pharmacy-run facilities but 
where this was not possible, pharmacists should be available in hospital wards to advice 
about IV additions and be heavily included in medical and nurse training. Aseptic 
pharmaceutical preparation facilities are now commonplace within the NHS and in 
private hospital pharmacies (Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, 






In the UK, pharmacy aseptic preparation units are licenced differently by the Medicines 
and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), which licenses units that have 
a policy for preparing drugs without the need for marketing authorisation (i.e. for 
preparing batches of products). Other unlicensed units can prepare drugs only for a 
named patient (e.g. hospital prescriptions) (MHRA, 2012). Figure 1.5 shows the 
specialised environmental conditions required for preparing injectable medicines in a 
pharmacy aseptic unit, adopted by many pharmacy aseptic production units in the UK. 
Figure 1.5. Typical environment conditions used to prepare injectable drugs in a pharmacy aseptic unit 






Access to Aseptic Suite 
Staff wear overshoes and hairnets 
 
Changing Room 




Parenteral products are prepared in a grade A isolator within a grade C cleanroom. Preparation unit 
must be cleaned and disinfected frequently. 
 
Clean unit Items for use in preparation of intravenous admixture, cytotoxic medicine or TPN enter 
clean unit through a hatch. Before entering into clean unit, equipment’s and materials for use in 
preparation are sprayed with alcohol. Air-entering cleanroom is passed through a high efficiency 
particle air filter, which removes greater than 99% of particles greater than 0.3μm. 
 
Isolator unit Items for use in preparation of intravenous admixture must be sprayed with alcohol 
before entering into isolator.  Microbiological monitoring involves the exposure of culture plates to 
isolator environment throughout preparation of IV admixture. Also finger tests, which involve the 
operators touching the surface of an agar plate, inside the isolator, with each finger after preparation 
of IV additive to detect possible microbial contamination. 
 
 
Exit from Preparation Zone 
Final product removed from isolator via the exit port. The final product is then passed out of the 








1.7 Injectable Preparation Errors (IPEs) 
 
 
Clearly, there are many stages from the prescription of an injectable medicine to its 
administration, and injectable errors can be introduced during any of these stages 
(Fraind et al., 2002). Although ideally all injectable medicines prepared in pharmacy 
and significant proportion made in hospital wards. Cousins et al, 2012 reported that 
there were a total of 526 376-medication errors reports during (2005-2010), which 
represents preparation errors 3rd most important injectable medicines errors.  
 
There are two types of IPEs: 
 
Internal errors (near misses):  
Errors in the preparation of an injectable medicine that are discovered during the work 
process before the medication has been delivered to the bedside for patient use.  
 
External errors (errors):  
Errors in the preparation of an injectable medicine that are discovered and recorded 
after the medication has left the pharmacy unit or IV room in the hospital ward and 
which may or may not lead to patient harm. 
1.7.1 Review of studies reporting IPEs in aseptic pharmacy settings 
 
 
Some studies on the type, incidence, and causes of injectable MEs in pharmacy settings 
are summarised in Table 1.6. In 1996, Escoms and colleagues examined the incidence 
of self-reported anti-neoplastic drug preparation errors in a Spanish hospital between 
1993 and 1994 (Table 1.6). They found an overall low incidence of errors (6.6%; n = 
314 errors/4,734 preparations) and attempted to classify these by error type. The most 





errors/4734 preparation) (e.g. incorrect expiry date on label and wrong type of diluent) 
(Escoms et al., 1996).  
 
 
An observational study by Flynn and colleagues in 1997 examined error rates in five 
US hospital pharmacies during the preparation (i.e. compounding) of intravenous (IV) 
admixtures. Using comprehensive methodology, the authors provided a detailed 
description of the pharmacy procedures at each of the study sites and a clear description 
of the role of the observer, especially concerning inclusion/exclusion criteria when 
classifying errors. Using disguised, direct observation, a reasonably high error rate 
(8.6%; n = 145 errors/1,679 doses) was noted and the specific types of errors observed 
and drugs associated with these errors were described. However, no effect of daily 
workload on error rates was identified. The authors also highlighted error-related issues 
associated with automated compounding machines (see Table 1.6) (Flynn et al., 1997).   
 
Limat and colleagues studied the frequency, type and associated risk factors of 
preparation errors in a single centralised cytotoxic preparation unit in France. They used 
a retrospective study design based on the self-reporting of errors by pharmacy 
technicians to show the types of minor and major errors reported. Errors occurred in 
approximately 0.45% of preparations. They also found that major risk factors 
contributing to errors included unsuitable drug product presentation and the number of 
bottles used in the preparation. Specifically, they found that increased workload 
increased the incidence of error. Specifically, a daily workload of 60 or more 
preparations per day was associated with a higher incidence of errors (see Table 1.6) 





In 2008, Parshuram and colleagues examined errors in the preparation of IV 
medications in a Canadian hospital using a direct observation methodology in a 
nonclinical environment (i.e. they set up various ‘work trial’ tasks outside of working 
hours (Table 1.6). Participants included a range of personnel (including nurses and 
pharmacy technicians) involved in the preparation of IV medicines. They also 
examined the relationships between a range of individual characteristics and other 
factors (e.g. stress, fatigue) and observed errors. They identified mistakes in 1.5–4.9% 
of infusion-preparation tasks and a greater magnitude of infusion errors among fatigued 
personnel (Parshuram et al., 2008).  
 
The following year, Sacks et al. examined the frequency, type and severity of MEs 
associated to the parenteral nutrition process in a US hospital. The authors state in their 
method that this was an observational study, but clearly it was not. Instead, it is an 
evaluation of data from the hospital’s internal error reporting system. An error rate of 
1.6% was identified in parenteral nutrition prescriptions, and the types of transcription 
and preparation errors were documented. Twenty-four percent of observed errors 
occurred during preparation. The authors showed the distribution of harm for the errors 
observed but did not classify these results according to phase, meaning that it is 
impossible to determine the level of harm specific to preparation errors. However, the 
percentage of preparation errors was much higher than that associated with the use of 
high-risk drugs, both within their hospital setting and within partner hospitals using 
similar error reporting procedures (Sacks et al., 2009) (see Table 1.6).  
 
Bateman and Donyai analysed self-reported errors from the National Aseptic Error 





preparation process. They found an overall low incidence of preparation errors (0.5%; 
n= 4,691 error reports/958,532 preparations) (see Table 1.6). The authors 
acknowledged that the majority of reported errors were identified before the product 
left the pharmacy, so the data mainly represent near misses. Furthermore, the study 
details the personnel involved in making errors, those involved in recognising them, a 
full breakdown of the different types of errors and phases of the system in which they 
occurred, and various other factors shown by the data to be associated with particular 
errors (categorised by the process involved). The authors acknowledged the weaknesses 
of their study, namely that it was based on self-reported data and that the focus was on 
near misses rather than errors that caused harm (Bateman & Donyai, 2010).  
 
In 2010, Serrano-Fabia and colleagues studied the efficacy of a multi-disciplinary 
approach to minimising errors in antineoplastic chemotherapy and identifying them 
before they reached the patient. Over the course of 2 years, they identified errors 
including those during preparation in a centralised pharmacy compounding unit. They 
found an overall low incidence of preparation errors (0.35%; n = 58 errors/16,473) and 
reported that, within a multi-disciplinary team, the pharmacist identified the most MEs 
(see Table 1.6) (Serrano-Fabia et al., 2010).  
 
 In 2011, Ranchon and colleagues examined MEs in the use of antineoplastic drugs and 
their associated costs in a centralised cytotoxic preparation unit in a hospital setting in 
France (Table 1.6). They described the process from prescribing to dispensing, and 
detected errors using self-reporting and double-checking of the preparation process. 
The low error rate identified for preparation errors (0.12%; n = 26 errors/22,138 





and a bureaucratic and time-consuming process for reporting incidents (see Table 5) 
(Ranchon et al., 2011).   
 
An observational study conducted in a university hospital in Germany examined drug 
preparations made in a central pharmacy and compared them with those made on the 
ward. They found more errors on ward-prepared solutions but found a significant error 
rate in those made in the pharmacy too. They break down the error rate according to 
the three infusion solutions prepared: amiodarone, noradrenaline, & hydrocortisone 
(Dehmel et al, 2011) (see Table 1.6). 
 
Some of the studies outlined in the literature review above have reported the error rate 
as a function of the number of injectable preparations. Several different techniques have 
been used to classify and investigate IPEs in pharmacy settings. These can be divided 
into prospective observational studies, and retrospective review studies. An observation 
study of the injectable preparation practice is carried out in either a disguised or an 
undisguised manner. Retrospective review studies identified IPEs by reviewing 
medication errors specific reports, and analysing serious incident reports and 
medication charts. Using a direct observation method will provide great vision into the 
culture of injectable medication safety within the pharmacy environment (Flynn et al., 
2002; Parshuraman et al., 2008).   
 
In total, the studies reported that the observed IPEs rate ranged from 0.12% to 8.6% 
(Escoms et al., 1996; Flynn et al., 1997; Limat et al., 2001; Sacks et al., 2009; Bateman 
& Donyai, 2010; Serrano-Fabia et al., 2010; Ranchon et al., 2011). The majority of 





is increasing concern about the number of patients harmed by IPEs in pharmacy aseptic 
departments in the UK; the number of studies published on this subject is increasing 
rapidly. A limited numbers of studies are available on IPEs as shown in this review, the 
majority have been focused on administration and prescribing mistakes. Although IPEs 
can also result in significant patient harm, there has been relatively little investigation 
in this area.  
 
Given the increasing attention on the role of guidelines and procedure for injectable 
preparations in pharmacy aseptic units, it is important to understand the frequency, 
types, and causes of the IPEs that currently occur, to help identify strategies to prevent 





Study Location Medical domain Method / Design Error type Error rate Comment 
Escoms et al (1996) Spain Antineoplastic 
preparations 
Analysis of an internal “paper control” based 
error detection process relying on self-
report/detection of errors 
 








Faulty labelling  
 
 
Incorrect expiry date  
 
 
Wrong type of diluent 
314 errors / 4734 
preparations (6.6%) 
 
314 errors / 94680 error 
opportunities (0.3%) 
 
150 errors / 4734 
preparations (3.1%) 
 
47 errors / 4734 
preparations (1%) 
 
24 errors / 4734 
preparations (0.5%) 
No association between 
number of daily 
preparations  
(i.e. workload) and error 
rate 




Direct, disguised observation 
 

















145 errors / 1679 doses 
(8.6%) 
 
30 errors/1679 doses 
(2%) 
 
7% of errors 
 
69% of errors 
 
16% of errors 
 
3% of errors 
 
5% of errors 
Associations between 
types of materials and 
solutions and error rates 
 
No observed association 
between workload and 
error rate 






      Continued Table 1.6 
Study Location Medical domain Method / Design Error type Error rate Comment 
Limat et al (2001) France Cytotoxic 
preparations 
Self-detection by technicians during 
preparation or at time of control 
 
























39/140 errors (27.9%) 
11/140 errors (7.9%) 
4/140 errors (2.9%) 




31/140 errors (22.1%) 
22/140 errors (15.7%) 
21/140 errors (15%) 
6/140 errors (4.3%) 
A strong association 
between drug produce 
presentation (e.g. no. 
vials) and preparation 
errors 
 
An association between 
workload and errors (i.e. 
>=60 preparations a day 
was a significant risk 
factor for errors) 
Parshuraman et al 
(2008) 
Canada Morphine infusions Direct observation hospital staff involved in 
preparing IV infusions1  
Performing infusion preparation tasks in a 
















Objective analysis of 
morphine infusions 
58 errors / 1180 drug 
volume calculations 
(4.9%) 
30 errors / 1180 
rounding calculations 
(2.5%) 




7 errors / 451 infusions 
(1.6%) 
 





were fewer infusions per 
week, increased years 
professional experience, 
use of more 
concentrated stock 
solutions and 






1 14% of the sample were pharmacists/pharmacy technicians (referred to from here on as pharmacists). The rest were nurses and anaesthesiologists. However, pharmacists were for the most part significantly represented 
among those participants who made at least one error: drug volume calculation errors (35% were made by pharmacists), rounding errors (6% were made by pharmacists), volumetric errors (24% were made by 






       
   Continued Table 1.6 
 
Study Location Medical domain Method / Design Error type Error rate Comment 
Sacks et al (2009) USA Parenteral Nutrition 
preparations 
Analysis of a self-report error 
reporting system 
 
Longitudinal (1.5 years) 
Preparation errors including: 
Wrong selection of electrolyte 
salt 
 




18 preparation errors / 
4730 preparations 
(0.4%) 
Preparation errors were 
associated with specific 
PN components: 
electrolytes (65%), drugs 
(29%), 
Macro-nutrients (6%) 
Bateman & Donyai 
(2010) 
UK Aseptic preparation 
units 
Analysis of UK National Aseptic 
Error Reporting Scheme reports 
 














4691 error reports / 958 












Most error reports related 
to cytotoxic products 
(40%), IV additives 
(27%), adult parenteral 
nutrition (15%), and 
other prefilled syringes 
(7%) 
 
Technicians were most 
likely to be associated 
with making errors 
(51.2%) followed by 
ATO`s (25.5%) and 
pharmacists (15.2%) 
 
Other factors perceived 
to have contributed to 
errors include individual 
staff error (78.1%), 
distraction/interruption 
(4.3%), inadequate 








         
     Continued Table 1.6 
 
 
 2 Inadequately defined in paper 
 
Study Location Medical domain Method / Design 
 
Error type Error rate Comment 




Self-report and cross validation of the 
pharmo-therapeutic process 
 















disciplinary team, the 
pharmacist identified the 
most medication errors 
Ranchon et al (2011) France Antineoplastic 
preparations 
Self-report and double checking of 
fabrication process 
 









between overall errors 
and month of the year 
Dehmel et al (2011) Germany Pharmacy-based 
automated production 




deviates from intended 











16 / 100 solutions (16%) 
 






1.7.2 Review of studies reporting IPEs in ward settings 
 
Several studies on the type, incidence, and causes of injectable errors in ward settings 
are summarised in Table 1.7. O’Hare et al. (1995), who used a disguised observation 
method in one UK hospital, stated that 291 mistakes were identified in 168 of the 
observed doses, of which 237 errors were made by senior house officers (non-
consultant hospital doctors). Of the 132 doses given by senior house officers, 97.7% 
(129 errors/132 doses) had at least one error, compared with 83% (39 errors/47 doses) 
of those given by nurses. The majority of errors were: incorrect administration time, 
incorrect rate of administration, incorrect volume of diluent, omitted dose, and incorrect 
diluent. The authors stated that no major or serious errors were detected. They also 
showed that mistakes in IV administration of medicines were statistically more likely 
amongst busy junior medical staff than amongst nurses, who have formal training and 
operate a double-checking system. O’ Hara and colleagues also reported that a reduced 
workload and improved quality of care may minimise errors in the future (see Table 
1.7). 
 
Hartley and Dhillon (1998) carried out research to establish the incidence, type, and 
causes of prescribing and administration IV drug mistakes occurring on two surgical 
and one medical ward in one UK hospital. The errors were categorised in regard to their 
potential to harm the patient and the implications for the system of supply, preparation 
and administration. Most of the drugs were administered via IV (47%, 72 IV drugs/154 
patients). The authors reported that 14% (25/178) of prescription IV drugs from both 
medical and surgical wards did not follow the local policy on prescribing, and 11% 
(20/178) were stated to be clinically inappropriate. Over 39 days the authors observed 




were: wrong time of doses (53%, 168/320), omissions (13%, 40/320), and incorrect 
preparation technique (7%, 23/320). The authors assessed the severity of errors 
observed, and identified that 78% (198/254) were classed as representing a minor risk 
to the patient, 17% (44/254) were classed as representing moderate risk, and 5% 
(12/254) represented a major risk to the patient. While the majority of errors observed 
had a minor effect on the patient, the study suggested that using knowledge of the 
causes observed to change or support the existing system of IV drug supply, preparation 
and administration, could minimise the IV drug error rate (see Table 1.7). 
 
Bruce and Wong (2001), in a direct disguised observation research in one UK hospital, 
reported an error rate lower than other previous studies; this may be because of the 
different methodologies, small sample size, or more effective nursing training and 
operating procedures. The authors identified 27 errors, which produced an error rate of 
25%, including incorrect time errors. Excluding wrong time errors, the most frequently 
occurring type of error, reduced this error rate to 10.3% (see Table 1.7).   
 
Wirtz and colleagues (2003) observed IV MEs in the UK and Germany. This study is 
useful because it identifies the different practices in British and German hospitals and 
analyses the occurrence of different error types within these different settings. The 
authors used a disguised observation methodology and convenience sampling, and 
found that one of the higher preparation error rates in IV dosing from 31%. The authors 
provided a breakdown of the different preparation error types and severities across the 
different settings. They also noted deviations from aseptic techniques but did not 
specifically identify these deviations as errors. The study also referenced useful medical 
error classification schemes, error severity schemes, and descriptions of error types, as 
well as listing the types of drugs most commonly associated with the different error 




Taxis and Barber (2003), in an observational investigation in two UK hospitals, 
reported that 49% of 430 observed injectable doses correlated with more than one error. 
The authors reported a preparation errors rate of 7.4% (n = 32/430) and administration 
error rate of 36% (n = 155/430). The findings showed that the most common errors 
observed were rapid administration of an IV bolus dose (30%), wrong diluent (8%), 
wrong dose (3%), and omission (3%). Furthermore, errors were evaluated according to 
Reason’s classification system (i.e. slips, lapses, mistakes, violations, and active/latent 
failures). The authors employed an observational approach by a subject expert and 
follow-up interviews with staff involved in errors. They ranked the severity of the errors 
and discussed factors associated with different errors by staff (see Table 1.7).  
 
Cousins et al. (2005) examined errors associated to IV drug preparation and 
administration in hospital wards in England, France and Germany. This study included 
some useful information relevant to the design of the present study, and identified 
labelling errors, diluent errors and errors in aseptic methods. However, the focus of this 
study was limited to nurses preparing injectable treatments in ward areas. Several 
violations in aseptic technique were observed, and the UK aseptic clean room scenario 
(with its associated stringent training) was presented as a model of how aseptic errors 
could be eliminated. The authors found that the observed preparation error rates were 
69% (n = 185/273) in the UK, 52% (n = 262/425) in Germany, and 34% (n = 34/100) 
in France (see Table 1.7).  The following year, Crowley (2006) investigated the 
incidence and type of injectable preparation errors using a direct observation approach 
in hospital wards that were employed from an acute university hospital NHS Trust 
located over four sites, providing a wide range of secondary and tertiary specialties with 
more than 1,500 inpatient beds. Using direct observation, a reasonably high error rate 




detected), and the specific types of errors observed and drugs associated with these 
errors were described. However, no assessment of error severity was carried out (see 
Table 1.7) (Crowley, 2006).   
 
Fahimi and colleagues examined errors in the preparation of injectable medications by 
nurses at the ward level in a university hospital in Iran (Table 1.7). They identified a 
low rate of preparation errors (127 errors/4,040 opportunities for error [3%]) (Fahimi 
et al., 2008).  Narula et al. (2011) examined reported errors (using an internal hospital 
error self-reporting scheme) in the entire paediatric parenteral nutrition process (Table 
6). They divided the process into different sections, including transcription, preparation 
and dispensing. The results revealed errors in other stages but not in the preparation 
stage. The authors suggested that this was because the process is tightly controlled, and 
suggested that, based on other evidence, that self-reporting did not necessarily lead to 
an underestimation of errors in that particular hospital for various organisational 
reasons (Narula et al., 2011) (see Table 1.7).  
 
Ong et al. (2013) used direct observation to examine preparation and administration 
errors for IV drugs prepared at the ward level in a hospital setting in Malaysia. The 
authors identified an overall preparation error rate of 32.8% (n = 112/349). 
Interestingly, they classified errors as occurring pre-preparation, during preparation, 
and during labelling, and described in detail many of the errors found within these 
phases and the drugs they were associated with (see Table 1.7). They also used a chi-
square test to examine the factors associated with errors and identified factors including 
administration time (pre-preparation errors) and amount of IV drug to be given 





The majority of UK studies on preparation errors have investigated both the preparation 
and administration of injectable drugs by nurses in clinical areas (O’Hare et al., 1995; 
Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Bruce & Wong, 2001; Taxis & Barber, 2003, 2004; Wirtz et al., 
2003; Cousins et al., 2005). However, two studies focused solely on nurse preparation 
errors (Taxis &Barber, 3004; Crowley, 2006). All research used direct observation of 
nurses to detect preparation errors. Higher error rates were observed in injectable 
preparation in hospital clinical areas, with the observed error rate ranging from 7.4% to 
39.7% (Taxis & Barber 2003; Crowley, 2006; Ong et al., 2013). 
 
 In total, the rate of errors during injectable preparation and administration ranged from 
42% in two studies from Germany and the UK (Writz et al., 2003; Taxis & Barber, 2004) 
to 69% in one UK-based study (Cousins et al., 2005). Factors contributing to nurse 
preparation errors were classified as: inadequate training, staff shortages, complex 
calculations, lack of workspace, and interruptions (Crowley, 2006). A limited number of 
studies focused on injectable preparation errors, while most studies investigated injectable 
administration. Injectable drug preparation is an important step before the drug is 
administered to the patient, and incidents at this phase are less likely to be detected before 
administration, resulting in more opportunities for error. This review suggests that more 
studies investigating injectable drug preparation errors are required. The results of such 
studies should enhance the safety of injectable medicine preparation, by minimising the 
number of incidents and consequently the harm that might result from these. Identifying 
the mistakes, understanding the causes, and ultimately building strategies to minimise the 














  Study Location Study settings Method / Design Error rate Errors type & rate Comment 







Disguised observation              
IV medicine 
administration errors; 
type, rate, potential sever              
Number of IV doses 
observed 179  
Overall preparation and 
administration error rate     168 
doses with 291 errors. 
93.9% doses 
 
Incorrect time of administration  
(78%, 140/179) 
Incorrect rate of administration 
(64%, 114/179) 
Incorrect volume of diluent 
(13%, 24/179) 











IV medicine prescribing 
and administration errors 
(rate, type, cause, 
potential harm) 
Implication to MUP               
Number of IV doses 
observed 323 
Overall preparation and 
administration error rate     
79.3% 
morphine PCA, insulin & 
heparin infusions were excluded 
 
 
Wrong time of doses (53%, 168/320),  
Omissions (13%, 40/320)  
Wrong preparation technique  
(7%, 23/320) 
Potentially severe errors    (5%, 
n=12), 
 Potentially moderate errors (17%, 
n=44) 






 One hospital: 
admissions ward, 
continual daytime  
 
Disguised observation 
Error rate during 
preparation and 
administration of IV 
medicines. Number of IV 
doses 107 
 
Overall preparation and 





Wrong time (16%, 17/107),  
Wrong preparation technique  
(6%, 6/107) 
Incomplete labeling error 
(2%,2/107) 
Good hand washing and used 
gloves is the single most important 
procedure for the prevention of 
nosocomial infections; hands have 
been shown to be an important 
route of transmission of infection. 






       Continued Table 1.7 
 
 
3The traditional British ward pharmacy service (TBP), the German method involving large stocks of commonly prescribed medicines on wards (TGP) or another German method where a satellite 
















Disguised observation.         
Data were collected on 6- 
10 consecutive days on 
each ward involving 
weekends and covered all 










Both types of errors 
(6%, 25/430). 
 
Errors in multiple step preparations 
(14%, 50/345), 
Bolus dose injection (73%, 172/235), 
Intermittent infusion (9%, 15/163)  
Preparation errors: 
errors in solvent/diluents (8%, 36/430), incorrect 
dose (3%, 12/430), and omission (3%, 12/430) 
Administration errors: 
fast bolus dose (peripheral line) (30%, 127/430), 
fast bolus dose (central line) (8%, 36/430), 
Incompatibilities (3%, 12/430). 
Potentially severe errors       (1%, 
n=3), 
Potentially moderate errors (29%, 
n=126) 















observation of 3 different 
ways of dealing with IV 
medications1 
 







Nurses and junior doctors 
 
(TBP): 
Preparation errors: 22%, 
Administration errors: 27% 
 
(TGP):  
Preparation errors: 23% 
Administration errors 49% 
 
(GSP): 
Preparation errors: 31% 
Administration errors 22% 
 
Types of preparation errors 
TBP: wrong dose 3%, wrong dosage form 7%, 
omissions 10%, and wrong preparation technique 
3%  
TGP: wrong dose 21%, omissions 1%, and 
wrong preparation technique 1% 
GSP: wrong dose 5%, wrong dosage form 2%, 
omissions 20%, wrong preparation technique 
1%  
Types administration errors 
 
TBP: wrong rate 27%. 
TGP: wrong rate 37%, and compatibility errors 
17% 
GSP: wrong rate 20%, and compatibility errors 
2% 
Potential minor errors 
27% 
 






      Continued Table 1.





Germany  1 surgical ward 
and 1 surgical 
ICU.  
  
22 nurses were 
observed.   
 
34% of all prescribed 
doses were observed 
  
Overall rate (48%, 58/122)  
 




 (23%, 28/122)  
 
Both types of errors   
(6%, 7/122).   
Preparation errors:  
Errors in solvent/ diluents (20%, 24/122), wrong 
dose (2%, 3/122), Omission (1%, 1/122), 
unauthorised medicine (2%, 2/122)  
 
Administration errors:  
Fast bolus dose (2%, 3/122), incompatibilities 
(25%, 31/122).  
  
Potentially minor errors   (13% 
n=16) 
 Potentially moderate        (31% 
n=38) 














surgical wards in 
four hospitals  
 
Germany: 
 2 surgical ICUs 
and 1 general 














were observed.  
 
Preparation and administration 
error rates excluding faulty 
labelling and omissions: 
  
UK  
(69%, 185/273)  
 
Germany (52%, 262/425)  
 
France  
(34%, 34/100)  
  
UK: faulty labelling (43%), incorrect diluents 
(1%), incorrect rout (1%), wrong rate (48%), 
wrong time (18%), incorrect dose or infusion 
volume (0.5%)  .  
 
Germany: faulty labelling (99%), incorrect 
diluents (49%), incorrect rate (21%), incorrect 
time (2%), incorrect dose or infusion volume 
(2%).  
 
France: faulty labelling (20%), incorrect diluents 
(18%), incorrect rate (5%), incorrect time (4%), 





UK Medical, surgical 
wards, paediatric 
ward and critical 
care in acute 
teaching hospital 
NHS Trust  
 





Total of 68 preparations 
were observed 
 




Wrong addition / mixing (23.5%, 16/68) 
Faulty labelling  (13.2%, 9/68) 
Unacceptable clean technique; re-use of single 
dose container (2.9%, 2/68) 
Expired / degraded or unknown expiry (2.9%, 
2/68) 
Wrong medicine (2.9%, 2/68) 







Continued Table 1.7 
Study Location Study settings Method / Design Error rate Errors type & rate Comment 
Fahimi  
et al (2008) 













Frequency of preparation 
errors 
(3%) 




Wrong dose (17%) 
 
Diluent calculation (17%) 
 
Inappropriate diluent (9%) 
 








One hospital  
 
Participants 
All hospital staff 
 
 
Analysis of a self-report 

























112/349 samples (32.8%) 
Wrong drug (0.3%)  










1.8 Significance of the research 
 
 
The preparation of injectable drugs is a high-risk, complex procedure, yet very little is 
known about preparation errors in UK hospitals. There is a need for investigations that 
can expand the current understanding of factors influencing injectable drug preparation 
in UK hospitals and how incidents that threaten patient safety arise. In 2006, the UK 
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) received 9,000 reports of medicine 
safety incidents related to injectable drugs. That year, injectable drugs accounted for 
53% of patient mortality or harm due to medication errors (NPSA, 2006). In response, 
the UK NPSA published a report called ‘Patient Safety Alert 20: Promoting the Safer 
Use of Injectable Medicines’ (NPSA, 2007). In this thesis, an injectable preparation 
error is defined as “the preparation of an injectable medication that deviates from the 
prescription, manufacturer’s guidelines, nationally or locally agreed-upon policy, 
procedure, or guidance, or generic standards for clean or aseptic preparation” (Crowley, 
2006). This study adopted this definition to enable a direct comparison of injectable 
drug preparation errors. By using Crowley’s study in particular, this protocol can take 
advantage of that study’s links with Patient Safety Alert 20 (Crowley, 2006). 
 
An in-depth assessment of errors can help to recognise strategies to avoid similar 
mistakes occurring in the future and thus improve PS. Injectable medicines are 
considered hazardous mainly because of the immediate onset of the systemic effects 
that they can trigger, the low therapeutic index of many injectable medicines, and the 
difficulty of reversing pharmacologic effects after injectable administration 
(MEDMARX database 2002–2006, 2008). Mistakes in the preparation of injectable 
drugs within the pharmacy environment occur are rate of 0.12%-8.6% (see literature 
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review 1.7.1), and the consequences of such errors can be catastrophic (NPSA, 2007). 
For example, in 2006 at Guy’s and St Thomas’ Hospital in London, a baby died 
following the administration of an overdose of glucose after the wrong dose was 
calculated in a pharmacy aseptic production unit (R v. Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS 
Trust, 2008). In another case, at Guy’s and St Thomas’ Hospital in London (2007) a 
child needed extra supportive treatment after having a ten-fold overdose of vinorelbine. 
In an incident that occurred in June 2014, a baby died from septicaemia as an outcome 
of being administered Total Parental Nutrition (TPN) prepared from a raw ingredient 
contaminated with Bacillus cereus (NRLS, 2015). Studies on the inherent risk of harm 
related to drugs has shown that errors are reported for a large percentage of PSIs 
occurring in hospitals (Thomas et al., 2002; Nuckols et al., 2007; Morimoto et al., 2010; 
NPSA, 2015). ME reports from the UK have detected that the majority of incidents 
linked with patient harm and deaths happened during the preparation phase (NPSA, 
2015).  In response, this PhD project employed direct observation to investigate 
injectable drug preparation errors recorded in pharmacy aseptic units and hospital 
wards. This research focused on internal errors, or near misses that occurred during the 
preparation of an injectable drug. These were discovered during the work process 
before the medication had been delivered to the hospital bedside for patient use. The 
investigation will be guided by Reason's (1990) model of human error, and Vincent et 
al.’s (1998) framework for healthcare organisation accidents.  
 
This study will explore the incidence and type of injectable medicines preparation 
errors. Furthermore, it will review and identify the most effective interventions to 
improve the injectable preparation of high-risk medicines. The preparation process of 
such injectable medicines, as well as the causes of errors and suggestions of how to 
avoid these errors, will also be investigated. Such research is needed in order to increase 
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the understanding of the processes, incidences, types and causes of injectable 
preparation errors, so that effective risk-reduction strategies can be developed and 
implemented to safeguard PS. 
1.9 Aims & Objectives 
 
The overall aim of this project is to investigate the incidences, types, severity and causes 
of errors in the preparation of injectable medicines within the pharmacy environment 
and hospital ward areas, with the goal of identifying strategies for reducing the risk of 
injectable preparation errors in both environments.  
1.10 Research Objectives 
 
 
Detailed research objectives for this thesis are summarised in Table 1.8. 
 
 











Determine the incidence of injectable medicine preparation errors in the pharmacy 
environment and hospital ward areas.   
Identify the types of injectable medicine preparation error in the pharmacy environment 
and hospital ward areas. 
Compare the incidence and types of injectable medicine preparation errors occurring in an 
unlicensed pharmacy unit, and in small and large licensed pharmacy units  
 
Compare the incidences and types of injectable medicine preparation errors occurring on 
four wards at two participating hospitals 
 
Determine the drugs involved in injectable medicine preparation errors in the pharmacy 
environment and hospital ward areas. 
Establish the causes of injectable medicine preparation errors in the pharmacy environment 
and hospital ward areas. 
Rank the severity of injectable drug preparation errors observed in pharmacy aseptic units 
and on hospital wards on a scale of 0-10.  
 
Identify strategies for reducing the risk of injectable medicine preparation errors in the 
pharmacy environment and hospital ward areas. 
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In the present study, the aim of the investigation is to identify strategies to minimise 
IPEs in pharmacy environment and hospital wards as illustrated in Figure 1.6. This data 
is collected using a number of methods: (1) observe injectable medicine preparation 
practice on three different pharmacy aseptic units and on four hospital wards, (2) 
explore the incidence and types of errors in different pharmacy aseptic units and on 
hospital wards (3) rank the severity of IPEs observed in pharmacy aseptic units and on 
hospital wards on a scale of 0-10, (4) characterise IPE contributory factors and 
interventions as stated by healthcare professionals in interviews and questionnaires 
using Reason’s (1990) organisational accidents model, and (5) suggest strategies to 





















Figure 1.6: Overview of thesis content and associated chapters 
Prospective Observation of 
Injectable Medicine 
Preparation in Pharmacy and 
hospital environments 
 
Determine the incidence 
(error rate) and identify the 
types of errors in Pharmacy 
(chapter 3) and hospital 
environments (chapter 5) 
 
Interview and questionnaire 
of IPE Interventions in 




IPE Contributory Factors & 
Interventions by Healthcare 
Professionals in Pharmacy 
(chapter 4) and hospital 
environments (chapter 6) 
 
 
Assessment of the severity of 
IPEs and identify the highest 
severity score in Pharmacy 
(chapter 3) and hospital 
environments (chapter 5) 
 
IPE Safety Strategies in 
Three Different Aseptic 
Units (chapter 4) and Four 




































2.0 Research methodology 
2.1 Introduction  
 
 
Investigation of medication errors (MEs) is essential for quality development owing to 
the unique relationships between ME contributory factors (Vincent, 2010; National 
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention, 2015; Ameer, 
2015). Figure 2.1 illustrates that many MEs go unidentified and that most identified 
errors are not reported (Smith, 2004). Identifying MEs is the first step in reporting errors 
followed by use of information in error reports to build strategies for a safer treatment 
system and prevent errors from occurring again. Reports and alerts on MEs are 
significant for raising the understanding of the risks of these errors and to motivate 
healthcare organisations to develop their performance (Vincent et al., 2006). Several 
national healthcare systems and regulatory agencies, for example the Australian Patient 
Safety Foundation (APSF), NPSA, European Medicines Agency (EMEA), MHRA, 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), United States Pharmacopeia (USP) and Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations (JCAHO) establish and 
release these warnings and reports (Crowley, 2006; Montesi & Lechi, 2009; Ameer, 
2015) 
 
Figure 2.1: The medication error iceberg (adopted from Smith, 2004, p.22) 
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Several methods have been used to assess and investigate MEs in healthcare systems. 
The validity and reliability of the approaches used are significant, not just to study MEs 
however also to assess the efficiency of the strategies applied to minimise the rate of 
errors. Common methods for detecting MEs include direct observation, chart review 
and incident reports, interviewing staff providers, and managing medical rounds (Allan 
& Barker, 1990; Flynn et al., 2002; Thomas & Petersen, 2003; Tully & Franklin, 2015). 
A less commonly used technique involves urinalysis to examine for the absence of 
drugs, of the detection of omission errors using returned doses recorded in drug charts 
(Allan & Barker, 1990; Barker et al., 2002).  
2.2 Medication error (ME) detection methods  
 
Incident reports, chart review, and direct observation are the most common techniques 
used for detecting medication errors (Allan & Barker, 1990). Table 2.1 summarises the 
ME detection methods described in the literature and documents the advantages and 
disadvantages of each (adapted from Thomas and Petersen, 2003, p.62 and James, 2009, 
p.13).  
 
2.2.1 Incident reports  
 
Incident report deliver data from all hospital areas over a long time, in contrast with the 
observational technique, which offers data from a certain time period and from 
exclusive areas. However, the incident report technique may be insufficient for the 
identification of medication errors (Allan & Barker, 1990; Flynn et al., 2002; Thomas 
& Petersen, 2003, James, 2009). For example, in 2002, Flynn et al. reported that 
incident reports were less efficient than chart review and direct observation in exploring 
administration errors. Olsen et al. (2007) conducted a UK study on three different 
 
65 
approaches to explore adverse events (AEs) in the same group of patients. Out of two 
hundred and eighty eight patient discharges, real-time chart review identified sixty-
seven MEs; pharmacy control “active control of admitted patient prescriptions and 
medicine management” identified thirteen MEs; and incident reporting identified 
eleven MEs. Three MEs were detected through both pharmacy control and chart review, 
and one ME was detected by both incident reporting and chart review. This suggests 
that incidence report were the least effective of those tested and that use of more than 
one ME detection method increases the validity of the results, as each approach 
identifies different errors.  
2.2.2 Chart review  
 
 
Chart review is known as a retrospective approach which depends on sources, for 
example administrative records, prescription data and drug charts, and has been 
reported to be less effective than direct observation for investigating error rates (Allan 
& Barker, 1990; Flynn et al., 2002; Montesi & Lechi, 2009, Ameer, 2015). Although it 
is used to detect prescribing errors, a limitation of chart review is that the documentation 
in the drug chart may be incomplete. Some errors might not be recorded on charts and 
may therefore be lost (Thomas & Petersen, 2003). Bates and colleagues described a 
further factor with respect to the reliability of data in the chart review approach whereby 
reports in some serious areas, for example Intensive Care Units (ICUs) may include 
more information than those on other wards, resulting in detection bias. Many studies, 
which have used chart review, have also employed other data collection approaches. 
These extra approaches involved requested reports from pharmacy department, optional 
reports from nurses, analyses of medicine sheets by a trained researcher and incident 
reports (Bates et al., 1993; Bates, 1995; Morimoto et al., 2010).  
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2.2.3 Direct observation 
 
 
Observation has been shown to be the most accurate method for detecting MEs, 
especially preparation errors, but it is also the most expensive. A study by Flynn and 
colleagues (2002) in 36 US healthcare facilities investigated three methods of detecting 
MEs among 2,556 doses. The direct observation technique identified three hundred 
medication errors (12%; n=300/2556), whereas record review identified seventeen 
(0.6%; n=17/2556) and incident report analysis stated only one (0.03%; n=1/2556). The 
mean cost of error identified was much higher for direct observation ($4.8 per dose) 
compared with chart review ($0.6 per dose). Barker and colleagues stated that the 
comments collected by the observer were one of the advantages of observational 
techniques, and could be helpful in classifying the causes related to errors (Barker et 
al., 2002). A key concern with direct observation is the effect caused by the observer’s 
presence. This is recognised as the reactive effect or the ‘Hawthorne effect’ (Smith, 
2002). The Hawthorne effect advocates that: 
 
The presence of the researcher, and the knowledge that the study is taking place, 





This effect has the potential to influence the validity of the research. According to 
Bowling (2002) and Smith (2002), several strategies can be used to reduce this effect. 
For example, they suggested that the observer should communicate with participants in 
the research area before data collection. In addition, to control behavioural changes, the 
observer needs to collect as much data and present for as long as possible (Bowling, 
2002; Smith, 2002). To minimise the impact of the observation on the action of the 
observed individual, Alan and Barker (1990) also recommend conducting the disguised 
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observation method developed by Barker and McConnell (1962). Dean and Barber 
(2001) examined the validity of direct observation in investigating medicine 
administration errors and investigated the potential impact of observation on medicines 
administration errors rate by comparing the proportion of omissions documented on 
non-observation and observation days. The authors reported no change in the 
proportion of documented omissions between these days, and decided that observing 
staff during medicine administration at a UK hospital did not significantly impact the 
percentage of medicine administration errors.  
 
An additional limitation of observational methods is that data gathered are specified to 
the observed shifts and periods and furthermore even during the observation shift, 
observation does not normally cover all medications. Most studies describe how more 
than one participant prepares medications at the same time, while only one or two 
observers may be present. Hence, some preparations may go undetected. Moreover, in 
these studies specific wards or units are investigated and therefore may not be 
representative of all wards or units in all hospitals (Allan & Barker, 1990; Barker et al., 
2002). Another issue that has been considered is observer bias, described as: 
“A system difference between a true situation and that observed owing to 
variation in perceptions” (i.e. interpretation) (Bowling, 2002; p.362). 
 
 
Observer bias can be controlled by good observer training, such as realisation to 
reporting what really occurred rather than what was supposed to have happened 






    Table 2.1: Summary of methods for detecting medication errors (adapted from Thomas and Petersen, 2003, p. 62 and James, 2009, p.13)  
 
 
1ADE: adverse drug event.2ADR: adverse drug reaction3PEs: preparation errors 4MAEs: medicines administration errors 
 
 
Method Data collection Incident type Strengths Weaknesses 
Computerised 
monitoring 
Computer systems screen 
administrative data and clinical 
database using pre-programmed 
criteria. Case note review is 
undertaken for identified incidents 
ADEs and potential ADEs  
 
1. Sensitive 




1. Requires advanced information systems (e.g. 
electronic patient records) and programming  
2. Number of identified incidents depends on the 
information system links 
3. Limited information on potential ADEs  
Chart review 
 
Trained reviewers screen patient’s 
chart using pre- defined criteria to 
identify incidents. 
 
1ADEs, 2ADRs  
and  
Medication errors  
(Mainly 3PEs and 4MAEs 
 
1. Large amount of information obtained  
 
1. Costly 
2. Time consuming 
3. Relies on documentation of incidents in patient’s 
chart 
4. Dependent on reviewers’ experience and ability to 
conduct an adequate review 
5. Limited information on administration and 







Details of incident reported by staff on 
standardised forms or in interviews 
 
ADE, potential ADEs, ADRs                             
and medication errors. 
 
1. An ongoing reporting mechanism  
2. Anonymity eliminates fear of disciplinary 
action 
3. Inexpensive 
1. Reporting requires an awareness of incident 
occurrence  
2. Under-reporting due to fear of disciplinary action  
3. Incidents may not be reported if considered 
harmless or advised against reporting by peer  
Critical incident 
technique 
Observation or interviews of staff to 
identify casual factors 
ADEs, potential ADEs    and                         
medication errors 
1. Detailed information on case incidents 
 
1. Difficult analysis of data  
2. Difficult interpretation of data  
3. Multiple sources of bias  
Litigation claims 
data 
Review of litigation claims ADEs and medication errors 1. Inexpensive  1. Less sensitive data  
2. Limited data  
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    Continued Table 2.1 
Method Data collection Incident type Strengths Weaknesses 
Focus group Multi-disciplinary discussion 
used to identify major incidents 
ADEs, potential ADEs    and                         
medication errors 
1. Target major issues  
2. Rapid identification of Issues in 
need of addressing  
3. Inexpensive 
1. Does not address daily events or trends  
 
Pharmacist intervention  
 
Documentation of errors or issues 
identified and rectified by 
pharmacists during review of 
medication charts/case notes  








3. Inexpensive  
1. Depends on knowledge and experience of 
pharmacist  
 
2. Limited information on administrative errors  
 
Patient surveys  
 
Postal surveys, telephone or 
direct interviews with patients to 
identify adverse events 
experienced following period of 
hospitalisation or outpatients 
appointment  
ADEs, potential ADEs and 
medication errors  
 
1. Can be used for outpatients 
2. Detects incidents not documented in 
case note  
 
1. Relies on patients awareness of incidence  
2. Highly subjective, relying on patient recall  
3. Resource intensive  
 
Morbidity and mortality 
conferences and autopsy  
 
 
Details of incident reported by 
healthcare professionals  
ADE, potential ADEs, ADRs                             
and medication errors. 
1. Can recommend latent failure             
2. Familiar to healthcare providers and 
required by accrediting groups  
1. Hindsight bias                                                       
2. Reporting bias                                                       
3. Focused on diagnostic errors                               
4. Infrequently and non-randomly utilised 
Direct observation  Investigators observe member of 
staff and document any incidents 
witnessed  
 
Potential ADEs and 
medication errors  
(Mainly preparation and 
administration)  
 
1. Highly sensitive                                    
2. Large amount of data obtained in a 
short time                                                   
3. Does not rely on awareness of 
incidents or willingness of staff to report                                               
4. Casual links can be identified  
1. Requires trained observer                                     
2. Expensive                                                            
3. Time-consuming                                                  
4. Presence of observer may influence staff 
(Hawthorne effect)                                          
5. Observer may misinterpret observation              
6. Limited information on prescribing errors  
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Despite its disadvantages, direct observation is considered the most thorough approach 
as it is the only method which does not rely on either staff being aware that they have 
made an error or the error having a consequence which is detectable in some other way. 
Staff are not usually aware an error has been made, as they intend to carry out 
procedures correctly, and many errors do not have a consequence that is detectable. 
Therefore, direct observation was chosen for this study. 
 
2.3 Classification of errors 
 
Numerous approaches of categorisation have been used to categorise medication related 
errors. For example they have been classified according to the phase of the medication 
use process (MUP) during which they occur (prescribing, transcribing, dispensing, 
preparation, administration or monitoring), the type of error (e.g. incorrect drug, 
incorrect diluent, wrong dose or incorrect expiry date). Alternatively errors can be 
categorised on the basis of a psychological classification of human errors that focus on 
the psychological mechanism of the incident rather than its type (i.e. incidents are 
identified according to whether they are errors, slips, lapses, or violations) (Ferner & 
Aronson, 2006). The psychological categorisation of Ferner and Aronson is based on 
Reason’s (1990) human error theory and allows for a better understanding of the errors, 
which helps in developing strategies to prevent them. For example, improving 
clinicians’ knowledge can reduce knowledge-based mistakes and introducing 
computerised decision support (CDS) tools can reduce rule-based mistakes. Training 
can help in preventing slips and checklists and computerised systems can help to reduce 
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lapses. Table 2.2 shows examples of each psychological class of ME, with potential 
preventive strategies.  
 
Morimoto and colleagues used several standards to identify medication errors and 
adverse drug events (ADEs). Figure 2.2 shows the authors’ categorisation of these errors 
according to phase (prescribing, transcribing, dispensing, preparation, administration, 
or monitoring), preventability (preventable or non-preventable MEs) (see Section 1.3.3), 
severity, individual responsible (e.g., pharmacist or nurse), and ameliorability 
(ameliorable or non-ameliorable ADE). The authors defined an ameliorable adverse 
drug events as harm where the severity can be minimised if a treatment is started, while 
a non-ameliorable adverse drug events is harm where the severity cannot be managed 
(Morimoto et al., 2004).  
 
In the present study errors classified according types; incidence; severity and 





  Table 2.2: Examples of plans/strategies for minimising the incidence of different psychological classes of medication errors (adapted from Ferner and Aronson, 2006, p. 8–9) 
 
Strategy for preventing error Phase of management 
(Treatment) procedure 
Examples Strategy 
Lapses- Memory-based errors  
 
Agreeing to treat the patient                 
Start to writing the prescription  
Dispensing the drug         
Preparing the drug                
Giving the drug                 
Monitoring the management   
Modifying or stopping 
management  
Forgetting that the patient is allergic to drug namely (penicillin)                                                
Omitting a date on which to stop giving drug                                                                              
Leaving a tablets or bottle on the counter when preparing                                                        
Forgetting to wipe the rubber septum of a medicine vial                                                            
Forgetting to check the allergy  patient wristband                                                                                    




Slips-Action-based errors  
 
Agreeing to treat the patient                               
Start to writing the prescription  
Dispensing the drug         
Preparing the drug                
Giving the drug                  
Monitoring the management   
Modifying or stopping 
management 
                                                                                                   
Absently writing chlorpropamide for chlorpromazine                                               
Dispensing 10mg vials of vincristine rather than 1mg vial                                                     
Mixing up dopamine, not doxapram                                                                                 
Injecting into an IVs a drug should to be administered by SC         
Making a blood clinic appointment for 6 months, not 6 weeks                                         
Stopping blood treatment after 6 months for recurrent deep vein thrombosis  
1. Improved checking 




drug, patient and 
condition are stated 




Agreeing to treat the patient                              
Start to writing the prescription  
Dispensing the drug         
Preparing the drug                
Giving the drug             
Monitoring the management   
Modifying or stopping 
management 
--                                                                                                                                                
Writing illegibly, so that ‘Daonil®’ (glibenclamide) is dispensed for 
amoxicillin                                                                                       
Dispensing the wrong drug or wrong strength                                                                    
Failing to mix infusion to which potassium was added                                                             
Giving intravenous injection extravascular                                                                           
Failing to measure blood pressure properly                                                                            








Strategy for preventing 
error 
Stage of treatment process Examples Strategy 
Knowledge-based errors 
 
Agreeing to treat the patient                 
Start to writing the prescription             
Dispensing the drug                          
Preparing the drug              
Giving the drug           
Monitoring the management    
Modifying or stopping 
management 
Unaware of value of sodium bicarbonate in amitriptyline poisoning               
Unaware of the interaction between Factor VIII and warfarin                                     
Failing to know that chloroform and chloroform water are different                                                   
Not knowing that Factor VIII dissolve with water                                                 
Being unaware of the course of the major nerve                                                                         
Taking blood for lithium concentration into a heparin tube, unaware that it 
contains lithium heparin                                                                                                                                          
Continuing after 3 weeks to give amiodarone at the higher dose  
1. Improved training 





misapplying a good rule 
 
Agreeing to treat the patient                 
Start to writing the prescription  
Dispensing the drug       
Preparing the drug              
Giving the drug           
Monitoring the management    
Modifying or stopping 
management 
Starting cardiac massage in a patient who has fainted                                                   
Prescribing oral treatment in a patient with difficult swallowing                      
Holding needed management while checks are complete                                                                
-                                                                                                                                                  
Giving an intramuscular injection of diclofenac into the thigh                                                   
Taking a blood sample at the time of trough lithium concentration                                                   
Starting a short course of antivirus management 
1. Improved training 




applying a bad rule or 
failing to apply a good 
rule  
 
Agreeing to treat the patient                  
Start to writing the prescription  
Dispensing the drug       
Preparing the drug             
Giving  the drug            
Monitoring the management    
Modifying or stopping 
management 
Prescribing Augmentin for sore throats                                                                                   
Printing drugs chart without check the allergies                                                     
Dispensing Augmentin and Amoxicillin together                                                
Preparing multi dose vials                                                                                                                    
Not taking Augmentin tablets with water                                                                           
Monitoring for urine level when giving Augmentin                                               
Extending antibacterial treatment unnecessarily  
Systematic 
examination of and 



















Figure 2.2. A diagram categorising the occurrence of adverse drug events and medication errors 
(from Morimoto et al., 2004, p. 312) 
 
2.4 Identification of harm 
 
 
Generally, patient safety incidents (PSIs) are categorised based on their potential clinical 
significance (harm caused) to patients, however the clinical effect of errors is individual 
and is according to the knowledge and experience of the researcher (NPSA, 2004). 
Numerous scales have been established and used to classify the severity of medication 
safety incidents. In 1999, Dean and Barber developed a validated scale to measure the 
severity of MEs employing a linear rating scale from zero (no harm) to 10 (death). This 
scale does not need the investigator to identify the patient outcome and is not influenced 
Incident 
MEs MEs 






















ADE without MEs 
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by the healthcare profession of the evaluators (Dean & Barber, 1999). In 2001, the 
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC 
MERP) established an index of nine classes to grade the severity of medication errors 





When patient safety incidents are recorded in the National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS), real patient harm is recorded based on the National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA) categorisation of level of harm (NPSA, 2007). Table 2.3 illustrates the 
National Patient Safety Agency domains and definitions used for categorising the 
severity of real patient harm. 






Table 2.3: National Patient Safety Agency domains and definitions for categorising the severity of patient 
harm (adapted from NPSA, 2007, p 54).  
 






“Impact prevented: any patient safety incident that had the potential to cause 
harm but was prevented, resulting in no harm to the person(s) receiving NHS-
funded care” 
 
“Impact not prevented: any patient safety incident that ran to completion but no 
harm occurred to the person(s) receiving NHS-funded care” 
Minor “Any patient safety incident that required extra observation or minor treatment, 
and caused minimal harm to the person(s) receiving NHS-funded care” 
Moderate “Any patient safety incident that resulted in a moderate increase in treatment, 
and which caused significant but not permanent harm to the person(s) receiving 
NHS-funded care” 
Major “Any patient safety incident that resulted in permanent harm to the person(s) 
receiving NHS-funded care” 
Death “Any patient safety incident that directly resulted in the death of the person(s) 
receiving NHS-funded care” 
 
2.4.1 NPSA risk scoring 
 
 
In 2008, the NPSA established a risk matrix to help evaluate risk in a consistent manner 
(NPSA, 2008). Errors are studied by merging ratings of consequence (i.e. severity of 
patient harm) and likelihood (frequency) of recurrence to ascertain the magnitude of a 
given risk. The examples shown in Table 2.4 describe the consequence of a given 




Consequence score (severity levels) and examples of descriptors 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Domains Negligible 
(No harm 
Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
Impact on the safety of 
patients, staff or public 
(physical / psychological 
harm) 
Minimal injury requiring 
no/minimal intervention or 
treatment. 
No time off work 
 





Requiring time off work 
for >3 days 
 
 
Increase in length of 
hospital stay by 1-3 days 
 
Moderate injury requiring 
professional intervention 
Requiring time off work for 
4-14 days 
Increase in length of hospital 
stay by 4-15 days 
RIDDOR/agency reportable 
incident 
An event which impacts on a 
small number of patients 
 
Major injury leading to long-term 
incapacity/disability 
 
Requiring time off work for >14 
days 
 
Increase in length of hospital stay 
by >15 days 
 
Mismanagement of patient care 
with long-term effects 
 
Incident leading to death 
 
Multiple permanent injuries or 
irreversible health effects 
 
An event which impacts on a 
large number of patients 
 
Additional examples Incorrect medication 
dispensed but not taken 
Incident resulting in a 
bruise/graze 
Delay in routine transport 
for patient 
 
Wrong drug or dosage 
administered, with no 
adverse effects 
 
Wrong drug or dosage 
administered with potential 
adverse effects 
 
Wrong drug or dosage 









The frequency of each type of error was used to calculate an observed error rate and 
predict the number of errors likely to occur in one year. 
 
 Observed error rate =   Number of times a type of error occurred each in unit/ward 
 
                                                                Total observations in unit/ward 
 
 
Predicted number of = (Observed error rate ×Total items prepared in unit/ward) ×Numbers of working days/year 
  errors in one year 
                   Number of days of observation 
 
 
Values obtained for the predicted number of errors in numbers of working days/year 
(365 in hospital ward and minus weekends and bank holidays =252 for pharmacy units) 
for each hospital ward and pharmacy unit were mapped on to NPSA frequency 
descriptors to obtain a likelihood score of 1–5, as presented in Table 2.5.  
 




NPSA descriptor NPSA likelihood score 
Not expected to occur for years 
 
Rare 1 




















The assessment of ‘likelihood’ means that the probability of a risk happening is ranked 
from 1 to 5, and the higher the number means the more likely it is that the consequence 
will occur.  Consequence and likelihood scores were multiplied together to calculate a 
risk score (1-25). This then enabled the risk level of the different types of error to be 
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determined. Table 2.6 shows the risk matrix as both numerical scoring and colour 
bandings. A risk management strategy must be used to classify the level at which the 
risk will be run by the hospital’s organisation, gives main concern for corrective action, 
and determines whether risks are to be accepted on the basis of the colour bandings 
and/or risk score (NPSA, 2008). According to the clinical consequence of the incident 
and the likelihood of recurrence, incidents are scored from 1 to 25, where higher scores 
mean higher incident risk (NPSA, 2008). The advantages of the model risk matrix are 
presented in Table 2.7. 
 
  Table 2.6: Grading risk score by multiplying consequence score and likelihood score (NPSA, 2008). 
Risk score Assigned grades 
1-3  Minor risk 
4-6  Moderate risk  
8-12   High risk 
15-25  Extreme risk 
 





It is simple and flexible 
 
NHS Trusts are familiar with the matrix.  
 
It is depends on simple mathematical formulae and is easy for use in extra notes.  
If the risk classification is altered, NHS Trusts will still be able to compare scores 
to monitor risks and confirm they are measured in a comparable condition.  




In the present study the validated Dean and Barber (1999) was applied and used to 
calculate consequence score. This combined with error frequency data to calculate a risk 
score analogues to that used by NPSA (2008).   
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2.5 Methodology and study design 
2.5.1 Methodology 
 
This research will meet the requirements of Patient Safety Alert 20 promoting the safer 
use of injectable medicines by undertaking a study of the risks associated with injectable 
medicine preparation (NPSA, 2007). The researcher (AA) has used direct observation 
to detect and record injectable drug preparation errors (IPEs) made by staff in pharmacy 
aseptic units and on hospital wards. A mixed methods approach has been used 
employing quantitative and qualitative techniques. Quantitative methods measure a 
phenomenon and produce numerical data, which can be statistically analysed. 
Qualitative methods assess the meaning of people’s experiences. Quantitative data will 
be analysed to identify the incidence and types of injectable medicine preparation errors. 
Qualitative research will focus on those who have made errors in order to further explore 
the causes of injectable medicine preparation errors (Spradley, 1979; Flynn et al. 1997; 
Limat et al. 2001; Wirtz et al. 2003; Parshuram et al. 2008). Health sciences research 
has used qualitative methods since 1990. Furthermore, highly respected medical 
journals such as the British Medical Journal have begun including qualitative studies, 
which are important for assessing the quality of research (Reynolds et al, 2011). 
Neergaard and colleagues noted that qualitative description is not meant to be a theory 
development or the expository meaning of an experience however is: 
 
“A rich, straight description of an experience or an event” (Neergaard et al., 
2009; p.2).  
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Furthermore, whereas quantitative research is useful for identifying types and incidents 
of errors, qualitative research methods can  
 
“Explore the complexity of human behaviour and generate deeper 
understanding” (Johnson & Waterfield, 2004; p.121). 
 
2.5.2 Study design 
 
 
A mixed-methods approach offers several advantages for this project. A quantitative 
method is useful for identifying the incidence and types of errors made in the preparation 
of injectable medicines (Flynn et al., 1997; Wirtz et al., 2003; Parshuram et al., 2008).  
In the Health Sciences, SPSS is the software most commonly used for statistical data 
analysis and was chosen for this study. SPSS makes it easy to generate frequency tables, 
bar charts and a variety of other quantitative representations of data that can clarify the 
frequency of the data and associations between different types of data (Neergaard et al., 
2009). A qualitative method allows exploration of the causes of errors in the preparation 
of injectable products (Flynn et al., 1997; Limat et al., 2001; Wirtz et al., 2003; 
Parshuram et al. 2008).  
 
A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the mixed-methods approach is 
shown in Table 2.8 (Creswell, 2009). Qualitative data will be analysed according to the 









In this investigation, case study methodology has been adopted (Yin, 2009). Yin, defines 
the case study research method as 
 
 “An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (Yin, 2009.p.18) 
 
 
Case study design is flexible and is useful for identifying the types, incidents and causes 
of errors in the preparation of injectable medicines (Creswell, 2009). However, case 
studies have several weaknesses. For example, obtaining access to an organisation can 
be difficult (Collis & Hussey, 2009). There can also be difficulty analysing the data 
because of the huge amount of data collected (Hodkinson, P.  & Hodkinson, H., 2001). 
The advantages of the case study design are that they often produce unexpected results 
and can produce in-depth understanding of the theoretical framework of this research 











Can account for a broad range of 
variables, questions, and hypotheses. 
Time consuming and expensive. 
Can expand a set of results. 
 
Must have experience in both 
quantitative and qualitative research. 
Can identify additional research 
opportunities. 
More time spent on analysis. 
Can detect data that may have been 
missed using only one design. 
May be difficult to combine or 
interpret data. 
Can corroborate previously established 
results. 




2.5.3 Ethical approval 
 
Ethical approval for this investigation was obtained according to the University of 
Bath’s Research Ethics policy (Appendix1). Details of ethical approval obtained for this 
study are documented in chapter three and five. 
2.5.4 Data Storage 
 
 
Data collection forms were stored in a locked filing cabinet at the University of Bath 
and according to the rules of the National Data Guardian for Health and Care in the UK 
(2016); the results will be kept for five years. These data do not contain any personal 
information and will be kept strictly confidential. 
2.6 Quantitative study  




Direct observation was used to identify the types and incidence of internal and external 
errors occurring during the preparation of injectable drugs. Observation is the gold 
standard method for identifying medication errors (Allan & Barker. 1990; Flynn et al. 
1997; Smith. 2002; Parshuram et al. 2008). Observational approaches have been used 
previously in healthcare sites and in regard to medication preparation (Carthey, 2003) 
(see section 2.2.3).  This study used an observation schedule to guide the data collection 
from directly observed staff in the preparation of injectable drugs. In a quantitative 
observation at study: 
“The researcher observes and records activities and/or interactions to provide 
numeric frequencies of these different activities, often possibly with the intention 
of investigating relationships between them and/or generalising the findings to 
a wider population” (Smith, 2002; p.l61).  
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Direct observation is a valuable tool, which enables investigators to record actual events, 
instead of trusting reports that might not accurately represent what has been happening 
(Allen & Barker, 1990; Dean & Barber, 2001; Bowling, 2002; Smith, 2002; Carthey, 
2003; Bryman, 2004), as has been the method previously (Hoppe–Tichy et al., 2002; 
Crowley, 2006). The study participants might feel under pressure, or uncomfortable 
about being observed when preparing injectable medicines. However, study participants 
who felt uncomfortable or stressed are unlikely to consent to participate in research. 
Throughout the data collection process, and with participants’ consent, the investigator 
watched, but did not interrupt, nursing staff as they prepared injectable drugs (see 
section 2.2.3). 
 
There are several other methods used to detect errors during the preparation of injectable 
medicines, which are not presented in this project because it doesn’t fit the research 
objectives (Table 2.9). Moreover, the weaknesses of these methods justified, why they 













Table 2.9: Quantitative Methods for detecting medication errors (from Flynn & Barker, 2007).  
 
Method Strengths Weaknesses 
Telephone survey 
1. Suitable for low literacy groups.  
2. Findings can be getting quickly 
1. Needs list of phone numbers.  
2. Response rates often low. 




1. Can reach large numbers. 
 
2. Questionnaires can be fairly long 
and detailed. 
3. Inexpensive 
1. Not appropriate for non-English 
speakers except if translation service 
available. 
2. Needs expertise in use of statistical 







1. Helpful to determine cause of 
mistakes.  
2. Useful aiming of main problems 
1. Very large sample required.  
2. Data interpretation difficult. 
 
Chart review 1. Best detection often used in the 
studies of Adverse Drug Events. 
 
3. Clinical significance of 
injectable medication errors. 
 
1. Expensive method.  
 
 







2. Reasonably sensitive. 
1. Dependent upon technology in use. 
 
2. Needs an electronic prescribing and 




In order to identify risk reduction strategies, it is important to have a complete 
understanding of the types of errors occurring in a health care setting. Therefore, this 
project used the direct observation method, as it enables the researcher to record real 
events rather than trusting reports that might not completely and accurately represent all 
errors (Allen & Barker, 1990; Dean & Barber, 2001; Bowling, 2002; Smith, 2002; 
Carthey, 2003; Bryman, 2004). The advantages and disadvantages of using non-




Table 2.10: A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of using direct observation (Allen & Barker, 











Enables capture of events as 
they occur. 
Expensive and fatiguing; need to maintain 
attention for long periods. 
More reliable and valid than 
self- reporting. 
Assigning skills and transferring 
knowledge from the staff to the observer 
can be challenging. 
Independent of willingness to 
report incidents. 
Observer should be existing where can 
observe all needed data. 
High response rate with 
single observer. 
Participant may change his/her behaviour 
if the research topic is sensitive. 
Does not rely on memory. Bias may present by the project procedure 
or observer presence. 
Allows detection of errors, 
where staff might be 
unaware. 
Observer’s personal and interpersonal 
attributes are also importance, namely 
(preserving a fair blame culture). 
High response rate with 
single observer 
Less response rates are achieved where 
the presence of the observer is (in 
disturbing or breakdown activities). 
 
2.6.2 Assessment of severity (Overview) 
 
 
Injectable preparation errors (IPEs) occur frequently and they are the type of medication 
error most likely to outcome in serious injury and death (NPSA, 2009).  Direct 
observational studies in the pharmacy environment estimated preparation error rates of 
around 0.12% to 8.6% (Escoms et al., 1996; Flynn et al., 1997; Limat et al., 2001; Sacks 
et al., 2009; Bateman & Donyai, 2010; Serrano-Fabia et al., 2010; Ranchon et al., 2011) 
with drugs prepared for patients. A small percentage of these errors will result in serious 
harm outcomes, and even minor errors can be responsible for long-term impact on 
patients (Taxis and Barber, 2003 and Bateman & Donyai, 2010). Injectable drugs pose 
specific risks; this is due to their higher complexity and the several phases needed for 
their preparation, administration and monitoring. Relatively limited investigations have 
particularly concentrated on injectable error rates in hospital wards, although those 
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available do verify allegations that error rates are as high as 49%; 48%; 69% and 39.7% 
(Taxis and Barber, 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2004; Cousins et al., 2005; Crowley, 2006).     
 
An exception is one UK study, which reported no errors detected during the injectable 
preparation/compounding process in a regional paediatric centre (Naurla et al., 2011).  
Severe patient outcomes are considered to be over represented among injectable errors 
when compared with other adverse incidents (Leape et al., 1995).  In the UK in 2007, 
more than 60% of voluntarily reported incidents worldwide that led to death or severe 
patient harm involved injectable drugs (NPSA, 2009). Studies from the US also 
explained that injectable medication errors produce a significantly higher rate of 
correlated deaths than other medication errors (Phillips et al., 2001). 
 
A detailed investigation has been conducted to assess the specific types of errors 
reported in relation to injectable medicines, in particular those triggering the most severe 
outcomes. This thesis aimed to investigate the incidence, type, causes and severity of 
IPEs in pharmacy and hospital environments to classify strategies for minimising the 
risk of IPEs occurring in the both of these environments. 
2.6.3 Research Method 
 
 
Severity data was obtained following completion of questionnaires. A questionnaire is 
a data collection approach requiring participants to answer questions offered in a form 
layout (Bryman, 2012). This method was chosen as an alternative to the Delphi method. 
The Delphi technique is a group communication procedure used when conducting 
detailed investigations about specific subjects for the purpose of policy investigation, 
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aim setting, or when expecting the occurrence of upcoming incidents (Ulschak, 1983; 
Turoff & Hiltz, 1996; Ludwig, 1997).  
 
The Delphi technique offers a thorough and rigorous analysis of panel members’ views, 
but in practice it can be challenging to arrange to meet all panel members in the same 
setting at the same time, and the data is also subject to researcher bias and a poor 
response rate (Beretta, 1996; Mead & Moseley, 2001; Hsu & Sandford, 2007).   
 
Thus, for this research, a self-completed questionnaire delivered via email was selected 
as the method most likely to meet the research objectives. Table 2.11 describes a number 
of advantages associated with the self-completion questionnaire method. 
 









delivered via email 
Advantage 
Self-completion questionnaires delivered via email are being used 
increasingly in healthcare practice so participants will be aware with the 
format and understanding of this method 
 
Reduce risk of changing behaviour and bias by researcher Participants will 
be able to express their opinions without interference from the researcher 
or other participants.  
 
Participants will have time to consider their answers. 
  
Does not require the presence of the researcher with the participant. 
 
Does not distract the participants from their usual duties and 
responsibilities. 
 
Standardised collection of responses that ensures consistency and can be 
repeated at a later date.  
 
Self-completion questionnaires delivered via email are inexpensive 
 
Self-completion questionnaires represent a large number of responses, so 




2.6.4 Development of the questionnaire 
 
This research employs a visual analogue scale to rank the severity of medication errors. 
This is simple to use and is a tool familiar to the majority of healthcare professionals 
(Dean & Barber, 1999; Taxis & Barber, 2002) (see section 2.4). This approach of 
measuring the potential for severity was used previously by the General Medical 
Council for prescribing errors in primary care settings (Avery et al., 2012). It was 
initially developed by Dean and Barber (1999) to measure the severity of medication 
errors in the absence of knowledge about patient outcomes. This approach of measuring 
potential severity was selected here, since it was found to be both valid and credible 
(Taxis & Barber, 2003; Ameer, 2015). Dean and Barber (1999) suggested that, scoring 
severity using a panel of at least four experienced healthcare professionals provides a 
reliable severity index. In June 2016, a pilot study was conducted by an experienced 
hospital pharmacist to assess how easy the questionnaires were to complete, how long 
it took to complete them, and whether any improvements could be made in pharmacy 
aseptic units (questionnaire A) and in hospital wards (questionnaire B). A minor 
modification was subsequently made to optimise the panel response data and in July 
2016, the final questionnaires were ready for distribution in pharmacy aseptic units 
(questionnaire A) and in hospital wards (questionnaire B).  
2.6.5. Selection of Severity panel 
 
 
This study employed an independent panel technique to collect the opinions of 
healthcare professionals via self-completed questionnaires delivered by email. The 
panel comprised five experts: two physicians (a general physician and an oncologist), 
two pharmacists (a clinical pharmacist and an aseptic pharmacist), and one senior nurse. 
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The research team chose the panel based on its area of clinical expertise. Each member 
was invited to complete the questionnaire independently, for observations previously 
reported as errors in pharmacy aseptic units (questionnaire A) (Appendix 2) and in 
hospital wards (questionnaire B) (Appendix 2). Each panel members was sent an email 
requesting their participation in the study. The email gave an overview of what they 
would be expected to do and what they might be expected to be paid for their time. Each 
panel member was given a description of the errors observed, and asked to agree or 
disagree about whether these were indeed errors, using a definition adapted from a 
previous study (Crowley, 2006). When three or more of the five judges agreed 
consensus was considered to have been achieved (Ameer, 2015). The participants were 
then asked to rank the severity of each IPE in terms of its potential to cause clinical harm 
to a patient on a scale of zero to ten: A mean score between 0.5 and 3.4 indicates a minor 
level of harm, a score between 3.5 and 6.4 a moderate level of harm, and a score between 
6.5 and 9.4 a major level of harm; a score of ≥9.5 indicates potential for death (NPSA, 
2008). As none of the errors recorded previously have been disclosed to the patient, the 
consequences of these errors was unknown. However, a small number of the errors 
(approximately 10% of the total) (wrong calculation, wrong dose, wrong diluent and 
faulty labelling) with known patient outcomes were included (NPSA, 2007) to validate 
the method. The panel members were not made aware of which these errors were. This 
is a well-established method for obtaining data concerning the severity of an error (Dean 
& Baber, 1999; Taxis & Barber, 2002; Avery et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015) (see section 





2.6.6 Data collection 
 
 
Panel members, who had agreed to participate in the study, were sent a full protocol and 
questionnaire (Appendix 2); contact details for the research team were also provided in 
case the participants had any questions. The questionnaire was anticipated to take 
approximately two hours to complete. The panel members returned their completed 
questionnaire to the researcher via email within a two-week time frame. On receipt of 
the completed questionnaires, the panel members received a £50 gift voucher of their 
choice. The responses were kept confidential to prevent the disclosure of information 
that could be linked to individual participants.  
2.6.7 Data Analysis  
 
 
This thesis used a validated scale to measure potential clinical harm arising from errors 
when preparing injectable drugs (Dean & Baber, 1999; Taxis & Barber, 2002; Avery et 
al., 2012). Before the questionnaires were sent to each healthcare professional, the 
supervisors (JL; MJ) checked the descriptors for each error very carefully. A coding 
framework was developed for the severity questionnaire, and the questionnaire data was 
entered into a Microsoft Excel 2007 Worksheet (Microsoft, Redmond, Washington, US) 
by the researcher (AA) for analysis. All the data was subsequently double-checked by 
the researcher to ensure its accuracy on a second occasion. Data extracts from the 
questionnaires were used to validate whether observations previously reported as errors 
were indeed errors, and to ascertain the severity of the errors previously reported. 
Validation of errors was considered to have occurred when three out of the five panel 
members acknowledged them. If any of the observations previously reported as errors 
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were deemed not to be errors by three or more panel members, then a new error rate 
would be calculated according to the following equation (Allan and Barker 1990): 
 
Number of new internal errors × 100 / Number of observations 
 
The mean panel severity score was calculated from scores provided by each of the panel 
members and then used as an index of severity. If a panel member stated that an incident 
was not an error, it was assumed they would give it a severity score of zero. A Kruskall-
Wallis test was used to identify any significant differences between the severity scores 
for the different units or wards; a p value = p<0.05 was considered statistically 
significant. After this, Mann-Whitney U-tests were used to compare the median severity 
scores assigned to the three pharmacy aseptic units and the four hospital wards. As this 
involved multiple comparisons, a Bonferroni correction was applied, using a 
significance threshold of <0.017.  Mean severity scores and error frequency data for a 
range of different error types from three aseptic pharmacy units and four hospital wards 
were then used to determine consequence and likelihood scores, in order to assign an 
overall risk score that would be analogous to that used by the National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA, 2008) to help prioritise which types of errors to focus on in order to 
develop risk reduction strategies. Mean severity scores were then mapped to 
consequence descriptors as follows: Mean severity scores of <0.5 = negligible; 0.5–3.4 
= minor; 3.5–6.4 = moderate; 6.5–9.4 = major and ≥9.5 = catastrophic. Each of these 
consequence descriptors was then associated with a consequence score ranging from 1 
(negligible) to 5 (catastrophic). Error frequency data were mapped to NPSA likelihood 
grades (1 to 5) using already determined NPSA timeframe descriptors of frequency 
(NPSA, 2008) (see section 2.4.1).  
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The risk score was calculated for each category of medication error observed. This was 
done by multiplying the consequence score by the likelihood score. Those panel 
members responsible for ranking the severity of each IPE verified the final mapping 
score. The five panel members agreed the approach is reasonable and confirmed that it 
is easy to assess from the description which of the five fields the error falls into (see 
section 2.4.1). 
2.7 Qualitative study (interview method) 
2.7.1 Methodology and study design  
 
 
The interview is the most usual approach applied in qualitative study (Bryman, 2012). 
Interviews must be comprehensive and thorough, and should also provide details 
relating to the research topic (Rubin & Rubin 2011). This research adopted a semi-
structured (face-to-face) interview model. According to Creswell (2009), there are four 
types of interviews: face-to-face, by telephone, by focus group, and by email. Semi-
structured interviews have been usually used in health-services study to discover the 
causes of errors because they allow individuals to describe in their own words how such 
errors occurred (Creswell, 2009).  
 
In the present study, semi-structured interviews were conducted by the researcher (AA) 
with pharmacists and nursing staff engaged in internal errors to explore their cause. It is 
important with this type of interviewing to listen to the participants’ opinions about what 




The advantage of this type of interview is that it does not rely on specific questions; it 
is open-ended, concentrates on specific information and actions rather than simply the 
opinion of the interviewee (King, 2004).  
 
The principal disadvantage of this type of interview, however, is that it is time 
consuming to develop, conduct, and analyse (King, 2004). Different types of qualitative 
medication-error detection methods are available with known strengths and weakness; 
these were summarised by Flynn and Barker, as shown in Table 2.12 (Flynn & Barker, 
2007). Weaknesses in these methods justified why they were not chosen for this project 
(Table 2.12).  The topic guide of interview was based on literature and aims of study. 
The current study employed semi-structured interviews with participants who had been 










  Table 2.12: Qualitative methods for detecting medication errors (from Flynn & Barker, 2007).  
 
2.7.2 Data analysis  
 
 
The objective of the data analysis was to clarify the meaning present by reviewing the 
transcripts of the interviews. In addition, the analysis phase includes targeted activities 
designed to comprehend a massive amount of qualitative data (Creswell, 2013). First 
the data set for analysis was established, and then the in depth data analysis was 
conducted, before finally the results written up. There are several data analysis methods, 






1. Increase understanding among 
staff  
1. Interviewers must be trained.  
2. Problems with interviewee bias. 
 
3. Data analysis is time consuming.  
Focus groups 
1. A details information of data 
on experiences and their effect 
on Staff  
  
1. Researcher needs training. 
2. Responses can be effected by more 
controller persons.  
3. Data analysis is time consuming 
Web-based 
comments (free text) 1. Let’s staff to write any 
feedback they want to about the 
injectable drugs they have 
prepared.   
2. Respondents can be asked to 
give their views about specific 
topics.  
 
3. Responses are available for 
others to read.  
1. Not appropriate for staff members that 




2. Places must be controlled to prevent 
unwanted comments.  
Staff diaries 
1. Can be used to collect 
comment on staff’s journey.  
 
2. Can be used for informal 
comments  
1. Sites a heavy load on staff to record 
relevant information.  
 
2. Allows producing huge data that is hard 





1. All Trusts receive some of 
these, so they can be analysed to 
identify specific incidents and 
general trends.  
1. Many staff do not make formal 
complaints, even when things go wrong.  
 





such as thematic analysis of data, interpretative phenomenological analysis, grounded 
theory and pattern-based discourse analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2013). There are 
variances present when analysing, describing and interpreting data. The data analysis 
phase focuses on the inter-relatedness of data and questions, answering the question: 
“How do things work?” Description of data mostly tackles the question: “What is going 
on here?” Interpretation of the data answers questions correlated to meaning and 
context, for example: “What does it all mean?” and “What is to be made of it all?” 
(Wolcott, 1994; Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
2.7.3 Qualitative data analysis methods  
 
 
There are two techniques employed when approaching study; these are either inductive 
or deductive (theoretical). When employing an inductive method, the investigator 
gathers specific data and use it to build a new theoretical framework this can be viewed 
as transferring from the specific to general. On the other hand, when employing 
deductive approach the investigator uses a current theory to design a study for data 
collection and data analysis; this can be viewed as transferring from the general to the 
specific (Braun and Clarke, 2013). The present study employed the deductive method 
using Reason’s accident causation model as a theoretical framework (Reason, 1990; 
Ritchie & Spencer, 2002) (see section 2.7.5) to build strategies to reduce the risk of 
repeated IPEs in the pharmacy environment and on hospital wards.  
 
Before conducting the analysis for this research the most common analytical methods 
in health research were evaluated. These include: interpretative phenomenological 
analysis, grounded theory, narrative analysis, discourse analysis, and thematic analysis 




Interpretative phenomenological analysis, involves making a comprehensive 
investigation of the participant’s life-context; this includes exploring their personal 
experiences, and is concerned with the individual’s personal insight or account of a 
special event (Braun and Clarke, 2013). This thesis avoids the method of interpretative 
phenomenological analysis, which can only be used to answer research questions about 
experience and experiential self-report data.  
 
Grounded theory is created from the data itself; the data is systematically collected and 
analysed during the research process. When conducting a grounded approach, the 
researcher examines theories as they arise in relation to one another. It is an associative 
process that targets the generation of theory from data, meaning that data collection and 
analysis are often intertwined (Ryan & Bernard, 2008; Bryman, 2012). The investigator 
becomes grounded in the data and generates concepts and answers to explain how the 
study issues appearances (Ryan & Bernard, 2008). This research avoided grounded 
theory as an analytical method because of the significance of the related published 
literature, which the investigator felt required to be read and understood prior to the data 
collection phase, particularly as it concerns the subject of types, incidence, and the 
causes of IPEs in the pharmacy environment and on hospital wards. This is essentially 
a deductive study, in which the published literature plays an important part in mapping 
the questions asked during the data collection and analysis phases.  
 
Narrative analysis usually examines experience across a specified time frame. 
Introducing events in story form can be useful for investigators, because stories convey 
meaning. Meaning is attained by understanding how incidents connect in their original 
form, not just when running the processes of coding and classification, as with other 
analytical methods. Every story has a start, middle, and end point, and goals to explain 
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the participants’ lives, as well as the features of the story, such as its meaning, 
consequences, and total outcome (Creswell, 2013; Braun and Clarke, 2013). This thesis 
avoided using narrative analysis, because the investigator was asking for a technique 
that offers a systematic data analysis process.  
 
Discourse analysis focuses on speech patterns, the frequencies of these patterns and their 
implications. Discourse analysis is the analysis of language that answers questions about 
why and how language is used in a specific setting. It aims to classify how discourse not 
only explains the social world but also how it creates or modifies it (Braun and Clarke, 
2013). This method was also avoided, as discourse analysis would not deliver the data 
in a format that provides a firm understanding of types, incidence and causes of IPEs in 
the pharmacy and hospital environment. Thematic analysis is a qualitative descriptive 
method of data analysis that is commonly used in qualitative healthcare research 
(Crowley, 2006; Gale et al. 2013; Vaismoradi et al. 2013; Ameer, 2015). Thematic 
analysis is “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within 
data” (Braun and Clarke 2006, p.79). A framework approach is some themes employed 
to thematically analyse face-to-face interview transcripts (Gale et al. 2013). It also 
stresses the importance of not disregarding previous studies when coding answers. It 
should be noted that theoretical framework analysis is not content analysis. Content 
analysis shows results in a quantitative way and was used to calculate the number of 
code recurrences to ascertain the most common causes of errors (Lawton et al., 2012).  
 
This thesis used thematic analysis, because by identifying multiple themes and codes, it 
permits an in-depth analysis of the data collected from interviews. It is not difficult to 
follow, flexible, and involves the numerous details experienced by the qualitative 
investigator during the data analysis. All these qualities supported the investigator's 
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choice to follow and use this method of qualitative data analysis. The strengths and 
weaknesses of using thematic analysis are summarised in Table 2.13. Moreover, 
different data analysis techniques are available, revealing strengths and weakness; these 
were presented by Braun and Clarke, as shown in Table 2.14 (Braun and Clarke, 2013).  
 
Table 2.13: Strengths and weaknesses of thematic analysis from (Braun and Clarke, 2013. p180).  
 








Easy and flexible in phrase of 
theoretical framework, study 
objectives, approaches of data 
collection and sample size 
 
Flexibility makes it difficult to focus on 
what phase of the data to concentrate on 
Comparatively easy and quick 
technique to learn, and perform 
Limited interpretive power in an 
analysis excludes the theoretical 
framework 
 
Can helpfully summarise the 
significant characters of a large 
sample of data, and deliver a strong 
description of the data set 
 
 Difficult to provide a meaning of 
connection across data including 
personal information 
Allows highlighting the similarities 
and differences across the data 
arranged 
 
Does not let investigators make claims 
about language use 
Allows for social interpretations as 
well as psychological data 
 
Findings are mostly accessible to 
educated members of the general 
public 
 
Can be helpful for creating 
qualitative analyses appropriate for 




   Table 2.14: Summary methods for qualitative data analysis (from Braun and Clarke, 2013.p183-198) 




1. Accessible technique for novice qualitative studies. 
 
2. A standard that resonates strongly with a common sense knowing of what it 
means to be human and how we experience ourselves. 
 
3. 3. Allows a focus on personal experience and the details of that experience. 
1. Because of the double focus on personal cases and themes across cases, it can 
lack the depth and richness of substantive thematic analysis. 
 
2. Lack of theoretical flexibility of thematic analysis. 
 
3. The lack of clarity in the role of the social cultural context. 
 
4. Lack of real guidance about higher-level (interpretative) analysis and analysis 
that is often limited to simply describing participants’ concerns. 
Grounded theory 1. Different forms of grounded theory to suit different theoretical frameworks. 
 
2. A valuable technique for studies interested in social psychology process (rather 
than individual experiences). 
 
3. Several grounded theory procedures such as line-by-line coding and memo 
writing, which are suitable with almost any kind of qualitative analysis. 
1. There are so many versions of grounded theory and so many different sets of 
guidance for doing grounded theory not to mention different terminology that 
it can be difficult to know where to start. 
 
2. Some versions of grounded theory procedures are inexplicably complex. 
 
3. Exhaustive process  
 
4. Reviewing the literature without developing assumptions. 
 
5. Limited generalisability. 
Narrative analysis 1. Ability to reveal the temporal, emotional and contextual facets of lives, to 
illuminate experience. 
 
2. Helps others to understand topics by telling stories. 
 
3. Captures everyday new data. 
1. Participants might fake the data. 
 
2. Has no method in the sense of a canonical sequence of prescribed steps to be 
followed. 
 
3. No claims are made to have discovered human reality through method. 
Discourse analysis 
 
1. They take language seriously, treating it as more than simply information 
transfer. 
 
2. Several different phases to fit different of topics and research questions. 
3. They provide exciting possibility for understanding the social contexts in and 
which person psychological life is produced. 
1. Need to fully understand the theoretical frameworks that discourse analysis 
relies upon; these can be very complex and take a long time to comprehend 
(time consuming). 
2. Lack of clear guidance. 
 
3. Does not produce analysis that can be easily applied to research. 
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2.7.4 Braun and Clarke thematic analysis 
 
Braun and Clarke (2013) presented a systematic method of thematic analysis involving 
seven stages. It begins with organising and planning data for analysis. This stage 
comprises activities such as writing up the collected data, e.g. transcribing interviews. 
Second, the investigator reads the data obtained to establish an overall impression of 
what the participant has said. Third, the analysis phase begins by coding the data. Braun 
and Clarke (2013) explained coding as a procedure of assembling and placing data into 
units of text before describing the meaning of those units. These units of information 
have to be gathered into categories and labelled according to the participants’ 
explanations about them. Fourth, the coding produces themes for analysis. Fifth, the 
process of re-examining themes, creating a map of the temporary themes and substances, 
and defining the relationships between them. Sixth, stating and naming themes. Seven, 
interpreting the meaning of the data (writing and finalising the analysis).  
 
This analytical technique was explained by Braun and Clarke (2013) who provided an 
in-depth description of how thematic analysis is achieved. It is not difficult to follow, 
flexible, and incorporates numerous details met by qualitative studies during the data 
analysis phase. All these issues motivated the investigator (AA) choice to follow and 
employ this method. The following processes, as described by Braun and Clarke (2013) 
were followed when analysing the data as follows:  
 
1. Transcribing the interviews: Anonymised audio recordings were transcribed 
verbatim and checked against the recordings and the investigator's written notes. 
All the transcripts were then read and double-checked against the recordings by 
two of the three supervisors (JL; MJ; LJ) who made the necessary modifications 
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to the written transcripts to confirm whether all the recordings were correctly 
transcribed.  
2. Familiarisation with interviews: Familiarisation was attained by listening and 
re-listening to the audio recordings and reading the transcripts and any written 
notes, to create preliminary thoughts. The process was repeated as many items 
as necessary.  
3. Coding and complete; across entire dataset: Interviews transcripts were 
assigned different codes and each unit of the text appointed a related code. These 
codes were revised by analysing the remaining interviews it required to ensure 
the data would not be ignored; further added another code under each theme for 
data that did not fit the code. 
4. Searching for themes: Themes were extracted from the theoretical model 
namely (active failure; error producing condition and latent condition). Codes 
were then associated with the most appropriate theme based on the interview 
data and theoretical description. 
5. Re-examining themes: The created themes were double checked to measure 
whether they bring into line with coded texts from the entire dataset. The 
developed framework or thematic map was revised as essential by either 
merging or gathering together codes.  
6. Labelling and naming themes: At this phase of the analysis, the details of each 
theme were revised and each theme was labelled and given a name.  
7. Writing the results: Writing up the findings of all the earlier phases was the final 
phase of the data analysis. This phase was considered a final chance to analyse 
the data, as the data pulled out from the interviews was interpreted and linked 
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back to the study objectives and the published literature (Braun and Clarke, 
2013).  
 
In this thesis the respondents’ transcripts were coded manually. This process was 
employed to double check the validity of the themes as they developed. NVivo may 
have been useful, but all forms of data analysis have weaknesses. According to Ishak 
and Bakar (2012, p.102):  
“NVivo is just another set of tools that will assist a researcher in undertaking 
an analysis of qualitative data. However, regardless of the type of software being 
used, the researcher has to dutifully make sense of all the data him or herself, 
without damaging the context of the phenomenon being studied. Inevitably, the 
software cannot replace the wisdom that the researcher brings into the research 
because at the back of every researcher’s mind lies his or her life history that 




Therefore, it was decided to check the data analysis manually during the study analysis 
to enhance the reliability and validity of the results. Before interpreting the results, the 
analysis was validated by the research supervisors (JL; MJ; LJ). 
2.7.5 Theoretical Framework 
 
A theoretical framework has been employed to guide data collection and analysis. In the 
late 1980s, numerous studies investigated the human and organisational factors that 
affect safety in healthcare settings. The first investigations focused on the work of ICUs 
and anaesthetists (Reason, 1995). After some time, the significance of human factors 
increased throughout various healthcare systems and multiple therapeutic specialities 
(Vincent et al., 1993; Vincent et al., 1998; Taylor-Adams & Vincent, 2004; Vincent, 
2004; Cornish & Jones, 2012). Human Factors in healthcare settings stated as: 
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“Enhancing clinical performance through an understanding of the effects of 
teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace, culture and organisation on human 
behaviour and abilities and application of that knowledge in clinical settings” 
(Catchpole, 2010. p. 3).  
 
 
System-factor errors are a result of the conditions under which individuals work. 
Individual factor errors are deeply integrated within healthcare but by studying a 
systems approach it is possible to build in defences to prevent mistakes or reduce their 
impact. The most common MEs were found to result from failures in systems with 
which clinicians work (Cohen & Shastay, 2008). This view, whereby mistakes mostly 
result from system failures and not from individual negligence, has become essential to 
the development of new strategies for addressing safety in healthcare (Leape et al., 
2002).  System-factor errors are related to the environment where the work is performed 
and are linked to the understanding that people are not unfailing; as human beings, they 
will make mistakes, even in the most safety-conscious organisations. Furthermore, the 
individual condition cannot be altered, but the setting or culture in which individuals 
work can be (Reason, 2000). The NPSA has chosen to use a system approach to 
medicines safety (NPSA, 2003). Taxis and Barber analysed the causes of identified 
injectable MEs using human error theory as a framework (Taxis & Barber, 2003) and 
found that injectable medicine errors were caused not only by individuals’ actions but 
also by organisational and managerial factors, including training. Reason hypotheses 
that human error is the result of one or more levels of failure. For this thesis Reason’s 
accident causation model was used as the theoretical framework (Reason, 1990; Ritchie 
& Spencer, 2002) because of the following: 
 
1. It detects accident causation at different levels of the organisation.  
2. It does not blame individuals (Dekker, 2003). 
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An influential model of accident causation is Reason’s Swiss cheese model. In this 
model, healthcare, with its natural protections, is likened to slices of Swiss cheese, and 
each slice is associated with a defence or barrier that protects the patient from mistakes. 
Whilst these barriers are normally effective, there are defects, which appear as holes of 
altered forms and ranges in different locations in the cheese at altered periods of time. 
A hole in one slice of Swiss cheese is not an issue but when holes in several slices align 














Figure 2.4. Reason's Swiss cheese error causation model (adapted from Reason 2001, p.ii21) 
 
Based on Reason (2000) the holes in the Swiss cheese model start from active failures 
and latent conditions. Active failures are defined as: 
“Unsafe acts committed by people who are in direct contact with the patient or 
system. They take a variety of forms: slips, lapses, fumbles, mistakes and 
procedural violations. Active failures have a direct and usually short-lived 
impact on the integrity of the defences” (Reason, 2000, p. 769). 
 
Active failures can occur in different ways (Anon, 2006):  
 
1. Errors arising from a lack of or slip in concentration 
2. Lapses caused by a ‘faulty memory’ 
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3. Errors, one of these two: rule-factor, where rules are forgotten or confused, or 
memory-factor, correlated with a lack of education or training (knowledge 
factor) 
4. Violations that deliberately ignore rules 
 
Latent conditions result from management decisions and are defined as 
“The inevitable ‘resident pathogens’ within the system” (Reason, 2000, p.769). 
 
 
Latent conditions produce two types of adverse effect: 
 
1. They can cause error-producing conditions (EPCs) within the local workplace. 
These are situations, which increase the probability of an error. Examples 
include too few staff members (overworked), staff fatigue at work and time 
pressure. 
2. They can lead to weaknesses in the system’s defences, for example, equipment 
failure and non-applicable procedures (Taylor-Adams et al., 1999). 
 
Latent conditions that have the potential to lead to failure may not be discovered for 
many years until alignment with an error-producing condition and an active failure 
results in an accident (Reason, 2000). However, there is a limitation to this theory, as it 
assumes a fixed position within the organisation (errors often get through the holes, i.e. 
the holes in the Swiss cheese are always not stays in one place). In addition, it does not 
give enough information about where the holes in the cheese represent (Dekker, 2003). 
Vincent et al. (1998) developed a model (Figure 2.5) based on Reason’s ‘Swiss cheese 
model’, to deliver a better understanding and explanation of the framework of 
organisational accidents and to facilitate analysis of adverse incidents in healthcare 
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organisations. As can be seen in Figure 2.5, the chain of the error starts when latent 
conditions (management or organisational factors) are created by poor management 
decisions and organisational factors. The latent conditions then spread via different 
organisational routes to the work environment (e.g. IV treatment room) where mistakes 
and violation conditions are occur e.g. lack of staffing, high workload, lack of 
supervision, lack of equipment and patient related condition. To describe the conditions 
of work and correlated latent conditions which give rise to unsafe acts, Vincent et al. 
(1998) developed a framework to link related conditions and factors that may help to 
reduce the risk of unsafe acts for use as a system to analyse and manage the safety 
performance of healthcare systems. The Vincent framework involved the key elements 
met in healthcare for example issues related to organisation and management, work 
environment, individuals (healthcare staff), teamwork, tasks and patients conditions 
(Vincent et al. 1998). Table 2.15 illustrates why errors occur and some examples clarify 



















 Figure 2.5. Organisational accident model based on work based on work by Reason (from Vincent et al., 
1998; p. 1155). 
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It has been reported that UK hospital have not realised the important of poor design to 
patient safety (The Department of Health and The Design Council, 2003; p.18). This 
can help healthcare to generate procedures and environments that are controlled, 
suitable and comfortable environments to minimise the likelihood of accidental 
mistakes.  
 
In research to classify stages where design could increase patient safety in the UK 
hospitals, some plans were advised that employed a system design method (The 
Department of Health and The Design Council, 2003).  
 
Factor types Affecting contributory factors Examples 
Individual                 
(active failure) 
Education/knowledge and  experience ; 
and mental factor 
Lack of education/ 
knowledge or experience; 
slips; lapses 
Work environment 
factors                  
(error producing 
conditions) 
Number of staff and workload; skills mix; 
shift patterns; design, availability of 
equipment/medicines/materials; and 
supervisory support 
Heavy workload; staff 





Task design and simplicity of structure; 
availability and use of procedures 
Non-availability of protocols; 
complexity of 
medicines/equipment’s 
Patient factors Difficulty and importance; language 
communication; personality and parents 
factors 




Verbal communication; written 
communication; supervision and looking 
for help; team workflow     (i.e. 
supervisors) 
Poor communication 




Economic resources and restrictions; 
organisational workflow; rule/polices and 
objects; safety background and main 
concern 
Absent of a good workflow 
process for risk reduction 
Institutional context 
 
Financial and controlling setting;; clinical 
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Further example from safety dangerous industries has been stated the significance of 
design to increase safety where, 
“Design is a structured process for identifying problems and developing, testing 
and evaluating user-focused solutions (The Department of Health and The 
Design” Council, 2003; p.9). 
 
In addition, studying from other safety critical industries, for example aircraft, gas or oil 
industry and nuclear power has exposed the significance of a whole explanation of why 
and how an error happened (Taylor Adams et al., 1999).  
 
2.8 Conclusion  
 
Chapter two discussed the available data collection methods and outlined the proposed 
study design and data analysis methods. Numerous data collection methods were 
debated, for example incident reports, chart reviews, observations, questionnaires and 
interviews. Reasons were provided for using direct observation as the key quantitative 
data collection method. These were followed by a discussion of different quantitative 
methods, for example a postal survey (self-completion), the critical incident technique 
involving participant observation, chart review, and computerised surveillance. All 
these quantitative methods were introduced, defined, and the reasons for rejecting or 
adopting them given. Also, a visual analogue scale was used to rank the severity of the 
medication errors. Finally, the current study was in line with Braun and Clarke’s (2013) 
qualitative analytical method, which provided a detailed description of how thematic 














Investigating Injectable Preparation Errors and Assessing 















Aseptic drug preparation is a significant part of service delivery by pharmacy departments 
that deliver high quality, accurately prepared ready to use injectable. This is a complex and 
demanding activity that requires qualified personnel, appropriate facilities and close 
monitoring and control (Royal Pharmaceutical Society (RPS), 2016). In the UK, the 
principles for aseptic preparation have come under close inspection in recent years (RPS, 
2016). Aseptic pharmacy units are required to prepare cytotoxic medicines and total 
parenteral nutrition (TPN) especially for individual patients. Numerous hospital 
pharmacies also offer a centralised intravenous additive service (CIVAS) that provides 
mini-bags or syringes that are prefilled with additives. However, it is still also common 
practice to prepare medicines in clinical areas as this facilitates administration. 
 
The Breckenridge Report (see section 1.6) recommended that all aseptic products should 
be prepared in an appropriate workplace under the control of pharmacists (Anon., 2005). 
While it would be ideal to eliminate ward-based injectable preparation, the lack of 
influence of pharmacy departments has and the lack of funding has not yet made this 
possible (Crowley et al., 2004). Injectable drugs, including drugs that are considered to be 
“high risk,” continue to be prepared on hospital wards (Audit Commission, 2001; Anon., 
2005). This has caused concern as injectable medicines have become more complex and 
more prevalent (Root, 2006). This is a multi-professional problem that requires input from 
a range of relevant specialists. The Royal Collage of Nursing (RCN) has published nursing 
guidelines on how to work aseptically but these differ from pharmacy practice (RCN, 
2106). While injectable drug preparations are usually performed in wards by qualified 




themselves, the Pharmacist remains responsible for all phases of medication treatment 
(Beaney and Goode, 2003; Beaney et al, 2005).  
 
The pharmaceutical industry could help minimise risk to patients by licensing more doses 
in a ready-to-administer form that need minimum processing before preparation or use 
closed systems (RPS, 2016). 
3.2 Conditions and Terms for Aseptic Preparation 
 
 
The number of companies producing licensed medications is insufficient to deliver good 
healthcare to NHS patients. To resolve this issue, unlicensed injectable medicines can be 
obtained from two hospital pharmacy sources (Beaney, 2004). These are: Medicines and 
Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) inspected and licensed manufacturing 
units acting in compliance with the Medicines Act (1968) and non-licensed units working 
solely under the control of a pharmacist. Licensed manufacturing units can prepare 
products in batch and sell them to external organisation (e.g. NHS). Unlicensed 
manufacturing units prepare products in accordance with a prescription for a named patient 
(those units operate under a Section 10 exemption of the 1968 Medicines Act). The NHS 
Pharmaceutical Quality Assurance Committee works together with the MHRA to ensure 
that good standards are met by both licensed units (that manufacture products and sell to 
external customers) and unlicensed units (dispensing directly to named patients). Injectable 
medicines prepared in either of the two types of unit are expected to have the same level of 





In late 1990s, hospitals were asked to decide whether they required an "aseptic" 
manufacturing license from the then Medicines Control Agency (MCA) (now the MHRA), 
or whether they could carry on as they were using an exception to the UK Medicines Act 
(1968). The exception allows preparation of aseptic medicines to take place provided five 
standards are met (MCA, 1992): 
 
1. The injectable preparation is run by or under the guidance of a pharmacist, who 
takes full responsibility for the quality of the final product. 
 
2. The injectable preparation uses solely systems.  
3. Licensed sterile medical products are used as ingredients or the ingredients are 
manufactured sterile in a licensed unit.  
4. Injectable medicines are specified a shelf life of one week or less. The shelf life 
should be supported by stability data. 
 
5. All activities should be in agreement with defined NHS procedure/guidelines.  
 
 
These terms apply to aseptic products that are prepared to be used directly on patients 
(MCA, 1992).  
 
In 1993, the Pharmaceutical Quality Control sub-Committee published the first edition of 
the Quality Assurance for aseptic injectable preparation in unlicensed aseptic preparation 
units and provided advice to ensure the reliable quality of medicines prepared in unlicensed 
aseptic preparation units (Quality Control Sub-Committee, 1993). In 1995, these criteria 
were expanded and updated to take into consideration publications of for example the 
Farwell Report (Aseptic Dispensing for NHS patients) (Lee, 1996). The term “preparation” 




Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), whereas “manufacture” 
is used to indicate a licensed activity (Farwell, 1995). 
 
The Farwell report clarified this situation as follows: 
“The supply or issue of a finished product to the patient or to the person responsible 
for administering it is dispensing. The manipulation of the product leading to this final 
presentation is preparation” [Farwell, 1995, p.4].  
 
The report focused on service providers and the monitoring and application of practice 
standards and led to the production of a guiding document entitled ‘Guidance for aseptic 
dispensing for NHS patients’ (Farwell, 1995). This guide concerns aseptic dispensing, total 
parenteral nutrition preparation (TPN), central IV additive services (CIVAS), dispensed 
cytotoxic medicines and radiopharmaceuticals. Injectable preparation is only used when 
licensed end terminally sterilised products are not available. Preparing these medicines in 
an aseptic unit provides more sterility assurance than when they are prepared in a ward 
(Farwell, 1995).  
 
In 1996, the Medicines Control Agency (MCA) started to inspect unlicensed aseptic units 
working under these guidelines. They reported that 60% of units they investigated had 
significant deficiencies and that standards were well below those expected of units that 
carried out unlicensed manufacturing (MCA, 1996). In the same year, the Department of 
Health released an Executive Letter that required all unlicensed aseptic units to double 
check their standards (NHS Executive, 1996). Their findings were classified and were 
made available in another Executive Letter the following year (NHS Executive, 1996). 
Until that year, unlicensed aseptic units were not obliged to go through an external 




programme of external inspection by Regional Quality Assurance Specialists in association 
with performance management (Lee, 1996). This programme is ongoing and has resulted 
in important developments in the standards pertaining to, for instance, documentation, 
training and facilities (Lee, 1996). The NHS Pharmaceutical Quality Assurance (formerly 
Quality Control) Committee manages the programme of external inspection of unlicensed 
units and works together with the MHRA to try to ensure consistent standards for licensed 
and unlicensed aseptic units (Lee, 1996). In 1996, further MHRA assessments were carried 
out of models of unlicensed NHS units that led to quality improvements. The development 
of pharmacy aseptic units, which has mainly resulted from the audit procedure, is in line 
with clinical governance. The UK government policy document entitled ‘The New NHS: 
Modern, Dependable’ introduced clinical governance and confirmed the significance of 
setting and promoting quality standards (NHS Executive, 1997). External inspections were 
not usually useful for unlicensed aseptic units in the UK before the setting up of standards 
in 1997 (NHS Executive, 1997). An additional NHS Executive report in 1998 called for 
the setting of clear national standards and highlighted the necessity for reliable monitoring 
actions. This applies to both clinical and specialised preparation settings (licensed and 
unlicensed units) (NHS Executive, 1998). In 1999, the clinical inspection procedures 
improved and internal inspection procedures of aseptic services were created as a way of 
maintaining and enhancing service quality (NHS Executive, 1999). Valuable guidelines on 
the inspection of aseptic services were issued by the NHS Pharmaceutical Quality 
Assurance Committee in 1999 (NHS Pharmaceutical Quality Control Committee, 1999). 
In 2000, a significant number of Controls Assurance Reports were presented by the UK 
Department of Health (NHS Executive, 2000). The reports highlighted the importance of 




regarding the inspection culture within the NHS. The basic control requirement for 
injectable drugs is regular inspection of aseptic preparation within the pharmacy 
department and risk assessment of aseptic preparations in clinical areas (NHS Executive, 
2000). The five standards (mentioned above) that need to be met by unlicensed aseptic 
units concur with NHS rules (Beaney, 2001). The latest modification of these rules was 
made in 2001 and concerns standards relating to items for short-term use (one day) 
(Beaney, 2001). Research regarding these requirements shows that the NHS environment 
is far from typical in terms of aseptic management and that procedures and training 
practices do not take into account the requirements relating to the quality of the products 
(Beaney, 2003). Quality assurance of medicines depends on clearly defined policies, 
facilities, design, equipment, process validation, training and capacity planning. Hence, 
pharmacy aseptic injectable preparation is strictly controlled, with clear national guidance 
to ensure the quality of the injectable medicines (Beaney, 2004). In 2004, the UK 
government updated the NHS pharmacy manufacturing service to bring it in line with 
clinical governance principles (Beaney, 2004). Further, in order to ensure that the 
manufacturing process of traditional pharmaceutical drugs, for example terminally 
sterilised injections and dermatological products, has been updated, licensed units were 
encouraged to support unlicensed aseptic units that had fewer resources and were working 
within restrictions (Beaney, 2006). The last decade has seen consistent advance being made 
in the UK to enhance quality in pharmacy aseptic units, mainly through inspections and 








There is now increasing focus on assessing risk in aseptic preparations being carried out 
outside pharmacy departments. The aim is to increase the quality of the aseptic preparation 
programme and decrease the risk to patients. 
3.3 Significance of the Research 
 
 
Injectable medicine preparation is more complex than other preparations and the 
consequences errors can often be more severe and have immediate effects (Cadman & Park, 
1999). Numerous deadly medication errors (MEs) in hospital patients have been attributed 
to concentrated form (e.g. concentrated potassium chloride injections) or injectable drugs 
with narrow therapeutic ranges (Argo et al., 2000). The first National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA) patient safety alert concerned IV potassium injectable medicines (NPSA, 
2002).  Several previous studies (see section 1.7.1) have investigated error rate during 
injectable medicines preparation, some with a high error rate outcome (Escoms et al., 1996; 
Flynn et al., 1997; Limat et al., 2001; Parshuraman et al., 2008; Sacks et al., 2009; Bateman 
& Donyai, 2010; Serrano-Fabia et al., 2010; Ranchon et al., 2011; Dehmel et al., 2011).  
The preparation stage is the first stage of management process; therefore errors in this stage 
can lead to serious injuries that harm the patient (Cousins et al., 2012). In addition, ME 
reports from the UK show that the majority of errors correlated with patient severe harm 
occurred during the preparation phase (NPSA, 2007). Consequently, it is evident that more 
efforts are needed to develop the safety of medicine preparation by minimising the errors 
and harm that may result.  This study investigates injectable medicines preparation-related 




interventions to improve the use of high-risk injectable medicines in pharmacy 
environment.  
3.4 Aims and Objectives 
 
This investigation will explore the incidence, type and severity of injectable preparation 
errors made by staff in three pharmacy aseptic units.  Severity scores and error frequency 
data for different error types will then be used to determine a risk score analogous to that 
used by the NPSA. Errors with highest risk scores will provide a focus for developing 
strategies to help prevent these types of mistakes happening again. 
3.5 Research Objectives 
 
 
Specific research objectives for this study are summarised in Table 3.1. 
 






Determine the incidence of injectable medicine preparation errors in the pharmacy 
environment. 
 
Identify the types of injectable medicine preparation errors in the pharmacy 
environment. 
 
Determine the drugs involved in injectable medicine preparation errors in the 
pharmacy. 
 
Compare the incidences and types of injectable medicine preparation errors 
occurring in unlicensed pharmacy units and small and large licensed pharmacy 
units. 
 
Confirm that the injectable drug preparation errors observed on hospital wards can 
be classified as errors. 
Identify the severity of these errors on a scale of 0-10. 
Determine consequence and likelihood scores and assign an overall risk score 





3.6 Overview of Methodology 
3.6.1 Study Design 
 
This study adopts the case study methodology to detect and identify injectable drug 
preparation errors in three pharmacy aseptic units in Wales. A case study (Creswell, 2013) 
allows this research to investigate and classify injectable preparation errors (IPEs) in detail 
by studying the data in its environment and in the process of injectable drug preparation. 
Case studies are typically conducted in the location of the study (in this case, pharmacy 
aseptic units). They permit an investigation of the whole procedure (how IPEs are classified 
and why such errors have occurred). Moreover, case studies allow investigators to 
concentrate on the experience of certain performers, individuals or groups; in this research, 
the knowledge of pharmacy staff is unit of analysis. In case studies, investigators can 
collect data using various means, such as direct observation, questionnaires, and semi-
structured interviews (Braun and Clarke, 2013). All these aspects of the case study 
methodology help the objectives of this study (see section 2.5).  
3.6.2 Study Setting 
 
 
This study was conducted within three aseptic processing units in the UK. Units were 
chosen using purposive sampling. The purposive sampling method is defined as:  
“The identification and selection of particular individuals who share 
characteristics relevant to the study, and whom the researcher therefore believes 
will be most informative in achieving their objectives”. [Smith, 2002, p. l19] 
 
 
Three Welsh aseptic pharmacy production units that reported error data to the UK National 




the sample included a small licensed unit (defined as preparing <1000 items per month), a 
large licensed unit (defined as preparing >1000 items per month) and an unlicensed unit 
(defined as preparing medicines for specifically named patients). The sites chosen for this 
research and some of their characteristics are summarised in Table 3.2. 
 
  









 In this thesis, a trained researcher (AA) conducted direct observation (non-participant) at 
the manufacturing units to determine the incidence and type of mistakes happening during 
the preparation of injectable drugs. Only participants who agreed to the observation of their 
practice when preparing injectable drugs were observed. Observation was chosen as the 
Unit type Large licensed unit 
A 
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(adult and paediatric) 
 
2. Parenteral nutrition 
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study method because it is the gold standard method for categorising medication errors 
(Allan & Barker, 1990) (see section 2.6).  
3.7.2 Definition of IPEs and Types of Errors 
  
This thesis adopts the definition of IPEs developed by Crowley (2006) (see section 1.6). 
This definition was chosen for this research as it delivers a full understanding of what is 
meant by IPEs and because it was developed through a process of three-round Delphi 
technique by experts in medicine safety study. There is therefore no need to redevelop the 
definition given that it has been deemed valid and reliable (Crowley, 2006, pp. 56–66).  
 
The definitions of IPE subtypes that were used in this research are illustrated in Table 3.3. 
The definitions were developed following a review of previous studies and discussion 
within the research team (LJ; JL; MJ; AA). The subtype definitions were adapted from 
Flynn et al., 1997; Limat et al., 2001 and Bateman & Donyai, 2010. The definitions were 
found to be valid during the pilot study and fit for the aim of this study following a review 








Table 3.3: Definitions of IPE subtypes used during the observation study (adapted form Flynn et al., 1997; 
Limat et al., 2001; Bateman & Donyai, 2010). 
 





“Aseptic technique was violated (e.g. lack of hand washing, 
inadequate air injection, inadequate vial venting, inappropriate 
shaking, inappropriate decontamination of vials and materials, 
inappropriate syringe selection, not using a filter needle to inject 
the reconstituted product when this is normal procedure, 
inappropriate needle use, needle contamination, incorrect dose 
calculation for final product) or there were deviations from 
hospital policies and procedures that were not justified and 
affected the accuracy or sterility of the final product” 
 
Wrong patient “Preparing a prescribed medicine but for the wrong patient”  
Wrong drug “A medicine prepared that was not drug prescribed” 
 
Wrong dose “The concentration and volume of medicine used in preparing the 
final product resulted in a dose that deviated from the prescribed 




“The use of incorrect diluent than that prescribed or recommended by 
the injectable preparation guidance” 
 
Wrong route “The preparation of correct medication by a route that was not 
prescribed”.  
 
Omission “A medicine set on the IV room was not prepared and there was no 
sign that a staff member would be preparing the medicine at the 




“The volume or solution used to reconstitute the product was 
contraindicated in the medication’s package insert or in the 
injectable guide or reconstitution was incomplete”.  
Unauthorised 
medicine 




“Any other mistake that is not stated above including errors such as 







3.7.2 Development of Observation Schedule 
 
 
Errors were recorded on an observation schedule adapted from a previous study (James 
and Bateman, 2013). These authors developed the observation schedule based on the results 
from a focus group and a published literature of types of injectable-preparation errors 
(Flynn et al., 1997; Limat et al., 2001; Bateman & Donyai, 2010). Discussions were 
conducted with pharmacists, pharmacy technicians and pharmaceutical scientists involved 
in the preparation of injectable drugs. Moreover, they used failure mode and effects 
analysis (FMEA) as a mapping process by the focus group participants to explore the 
processes and risks associated with the preparation of injectable drugs. In April 2014, the 
original observation schedule was piloted by Dr. Lynette James at one of the selected 
hospitals to verify that all error types were included in the observation schedule and a minor 
change was made. In May 2014, a simulation of the observation schedule was conducted 
at the University of Bath; the final version generated following this simulation is the one 
used for this study (Appendix 3). 
 3.7.3 Ethical approval  
 
Ethical approval for this research was obtained according to the University of Bath’s 
Research Ethics policy (Appendix 1). The study was registered as an NPSA 20 audit and 
the investigator (AA) had an honorary contract at each participating site (Appendix 3), so 
NHS Research Ethics Committee approval was not required. The research was undertaken 
according to the Research Governance Framework. During observation, the observer (AA) 
only watched the process of preparing an injectable medicine.  The investigator observed 




During the observations, the observer ensured he had chosen appropriate location inside 
treatment room and not in the way of the staff. If error was observed, then the observer 
politely asked the participant to stop before continuing to prepare the product. This was 
documented as an IPE. However, if the participant noticed the error prior to preparation 
and acted without the observer’s interference this was not documented as an IPE. If the 
participant was unsure a medication error mentioned by the observer had occurred, the 
observer stated that he believed a possible error might have happened. The observer then 
asked that they get the preparation checked by another qualified member of staff. If they 
believed there was potential to harm the patient if the preparation were administered, they 
informed the unit manager. This would allow the unit manager to investigate the incident, 
and where suitable follow the Trust’s incident reporting procedure. In addition, to confirm 
the consistency of the observations, the observer reviewed all the collected data after 
completion of the observations and before additional data analysis. This was to ensure that 
each observation was documented and interpreted reliably. This approach was adopted to 
reduce unnecessary expenditure of staff time medicines and other consumables. Although 
there is a theoretical risk that informing a participant of an error early in the preparation 
process might increase the risk of subsequent errors, in a previous study the subsequent 
error rate was not found to be significantly affected by stopping the preparation process 
(Dean and Barber, 2001). Data collection of internal errors and recording of external errors 






3.7.4 Study Participants 
 
 
Before the commencement of the data collection phase, the researcher (AA) requested 
permission to observe pharmacy staff involved in the preparation of injectable drugs. Staff 
members were given an information leaflet (Appendix 4) and a consent form (Appendix 
5). Those willing to participate in the study were required to provide written informed 
consent. Those who did not provide consent were not observed.  
3.7.5 Data Collection 
 
 
The research methodology and data collection method were selected on the basis of a 
previous study conducted by James and Bateman (2013), which was discussed previously 
(see section 3.7.2). Critical risk activities included errors transcribing the 
medical prescription (Rx) to the worksheet, labelling errors, setup errors, errors in making 
the product, and final checks of injectable-medicine production at each phase. Furthermore, 
FMEA previously identified wrong patient information, medicine details, dosage and 
administration instructions, expiry dates, warnings/precautions, and storage details in each 
phase of preparation (James and Bateman, 2013). Appendix 6 shows a map of the process 
of preparing injectable drugs as described by the focus group participants (adapted from 
James & Bateman, 2013). Observation data were collected by spending four working 
weeks (i.e. Monday - Friday; 20 days in total) at each study unit. Observation in large and 
small licensed units was carried out from 8am - 5pm and in unlicensed unit from 8am – 
2pm; 2pm –5pm for emergency cases. The study period for this research was based on the 




Cardiff Hospital (Crowley, 2006). During the data collection period, the investigator 
observed the preparation process of all injectable drugs (whether or not an error occurred) 
and recorded data for each drug prepared on a separate observation schedule (Appendix7). 
Internal errors were observed (direct observation) and external errors that had been made 
during the observation period were recorded from the standardised UK National Aseptic 
Dispensing Error Database form (Appendix8) and analysed (Bateman & Donyai, 2010). 
The data recorded included the types of injectable drugs and the nature of the errors. 
3.7.6 Data Analysis 
 
 
A coding framework was developed to analyse completed observation schedules for 
injectable preparations that contained errors (James and Bateman, 2013). Coded data for 
internal and external errors were entered into SPSS for quantitative statistical analysis on 
the types of internal and external errors; then, a comparison of manual- and SPSS-produced 
frequency tables was performed to ensure that the data had been entered correctly into more 
than one The overall rates of internal and external errors were calculated as described by 
Allan and Barker (1990): 
 
The Rate of internal/external errors (%) = Number of actual errors (incorrect in one or more ways) x 100 
                                                                                    Number of observations 
 
 
A one way ANOVA was used to measure the difference between observed and expected 




(licensed (large or small) or unlicensed) will not significantly affect the error rate. A p < 
0.05 was considered statistically significant.  
3.8 Severity Study 
3.8.1 Overview 
 
This study employed an independent panel of healthcare professional who independently 
assessed severity through completion of a questionnaire (see section 2.6.3). In order to 
select which errors to focus on to develop risk reduction strategies, guidance used by the 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was adapted to obtain risk assessment scores 
(NPSA, 2008). Mean severity scores and error frequency data for different error types were 
used to calculate consequence and likelihood scores. These values were multiplied together 
to determine the risk assessment score. The risk of an error type is related both to how often 
it happens and how severe the consequences are. Both need to be considered when deciding 
on strategies, so the NPSA method was adopted. 
3.8.2 Research method 
 
Each member of the panel was given a description of the error and asked to agree or 
disagree that each observation was an error using definitions adapted from a previous study 
(Crowley, 2006). Agreement of opinion among three of the five judges was considered a 
consensus (Ameer, 2015). Then the panel were asked to rank the severity of these errors 
on a scale of 0 – 10. The Inclusion of four errors of known outcome was included to validate 




within two weeks timeframe for analysis. This technique for measuring severity was 
selected as it was found to be valid and reliable (Taxis & Barber, 2003) (see section 2.6.4).  
1. Determination of Consequence Score 
 
 
Mean severity scores obtained from three different pharmacy units in this study were 
mapped onto NPSA consequence descriptors and assigned a consequence score of 1-5 as 
summarised in Table 3.4. Panel members agreed with alignment of severity scores with 
consequence scores. 
 
Table 3.4: Mapping of mean severity data on to NPSA consequence descriptors to obtain a consequence 
score. 
 




<0.5 Negligible 1 
0.5-3.4 Minor 2 
3.5-6.4 Moderate 3 
6.5-9.4 Major 4 
≥9.5 Catastrophic 5 
 
 
2. Determination of Likelihood Score 
 
 






       Observed error rate = Number of times a type of error occurred each in unit  
 
                                                 Total observations in each unit  
 
 
Predicted number of =   (Observed error rate × Total items prepared in each ward during observation 
period) ×252 
           errors in one year 
                                                                                         20   
 
Values obtained for the predicted number of errors in one year ((52x5)-8 bank holidays) 
for each unit were mapped on to NPSA frequency descriptors to obtain a likelihood score 
of 1–5, as shown in Table 3.5.  
 
Table 3.5: Mapping of error frequency into NPSA time frequency description to obtain likelihood score. 
Predicted number of 














Expected to occur at 
least annually 
Unlikely 2 
13–51 Expected to occur at 
least monthly 
Possible 3 
52–251 Expected to occur at 
least weekly 
Likely 4 











3. Determination of Risk score 
 
Consequence and likelihood scores were multiplied together to calculate a risk score (1-25) 
and assign a risk grade as shown in Table 3.6 (see section 2.4.1).  
 
Table 3.6: Grading risk score by multiplying consequence score and likelihood score (NPSA, 2008). 
Risk score Assigned grades 
1-3 Minor risk 
4-6 Moderate risk 
8-12 High risk 
15-25 Extreme risk 
 
3.8.3 Data collection and data analysis  
 
Data collection and data analysis were discussed in detail in Chapter Two (see sections 
2.6.6 and 2.6.7). 
3.8.4 Data Storage 
 
Raw data will be securely retained for five years before secure destruction. Coded data may 
be retained indefinitely. All data apart from consent forms will be identifiable by reference 






3.9.1 Results from Observational Study (Demographic Data)  
 
 
The direct observation of the preparation of injectable medicines at three pharmacy aseptic 
units in Wales was conducted over 12 weeks (excluding weekends). Each day covered 8 
hours of the shift. There were a total of 2112 scheduled injectable medicine doses prepared 
during the duration of the observations. It was possible to observe 47.2% (n = 997 doses) 
preparations of scheduled injectable medicines doses, making the data representative. The 
majority of the preparations were of chemotherapy medicines (n= 641), followed by 
preparations of monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) (239), total parenteral nutrition (TPN) (n= 
87) and others (n= 30).  
 
In total, 27 pharmacy staff members were observed during the 60 days. Table 3.7 presents 
the overall demographic data in detail. There was good acceptance by all pharmacy aseptic 
unit staff of this study and all were made aware of the aim of the research. There was no 
objection by any member of staff to being observed. Unit managers supported the observer 
with their resources and advice. There were no concerns expressed by the staff due to the 










Table 3.7: Observation study of the preparation of injectable medicines at three pharmacy aseptic units 
demographic data  
 




Forty-six IPEs were detected. The observer (AA) intercepted one IPE incident before the 
drug reached the patient at the last point of medication delivery. There were also three IPEs 
that were caught in time by members of staff being observed or by the second checker of 













Number of days 
observed 
20 20 20 60 
Number of staff 
observed 
13 9 5 27 
Number of chemo 
observed 
153 207 281 641 
Number of adult chemo 
observed 
105 187 275 567 
Number of paediatric 
chemo observed 
48 20 6 74 
Number of MAbs 
observed 
27 85 127 239 
Number of adult MAbs 
observed 
27 85 127 239 
Number of paediatric 
MAbs observed 
0 0 0 0 
Number of TPN 
observed 
11 76 0 87 
Number of adult TPN 
observed 
9 65 0 74 
Number of paediatric 
TPN observed 
2 11 0 13 
Others injectable 
medicine observed 
12 6                               12 30 
Others adult injectable 
medicine observed 








included in the count of forty-six IPEs. The three IPEs that were caught in time by the staff 
concerned wrong route of administration, wrong diluent, and wrong medicine. The 
incidence of injectable preparation errors that occurred during observation at each unit is 
shown in Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8: Incidence of errors during the preparation of injectable drugs at the three pharmacy aseptic units. 
 
 
The overall mean rate of IPEs for three units was: 46 errors observation/997=4.6%. There 
was no significant difference between the incidence of internal errors at units A, B and C 
(One away ANOVA, f = 0.1223, p. value = 0.8891).  However, it should be noted that the 
rate of errors in the large licensed unit was 1.8 times greater than that in the unlicensed 
unit. Given that errors (the numerator) were relatively rare, a larger number of observations 
(the denominator), giving greater statistical power, may have enabled a significant 
difference between these errors rates to be detected. In particular, fewer observations were 
completed in the large licensed unit, meaning the estimate of the error rate for this setting 
is less precise than the estimates for the other two units. 
 

















1 0 0 1 
Total Number 
of Errors 











 One external error occurred on the labelling of a chemotherapy medicine with the incorrect 
expiry date being given on the product label. A summary of the injectable preparation errors 
recorded at units A, B and C is shown in Table 3.9. Errors most commonly occurred during 
the preparation of chemotherapy medicines (31 errors/641=4.8%). 
 
Table 3.9: A summary of the types of medicine for which injectable preparation errors were recorded at the 
three pharmacy aseptic units. 
 
 
Table 3.10 summarises where the injectable preparation errors occurred during preparation. 
In unit A, errors were made during three phases: worksheet, set up of materials and 
labelling. In unit B, errors were made during four phases: labelling, worksheet, set up and 
making up the final product. In unit C, errors were made during two phases: worksheet and 
making up the final product. The most common occurrence of errors in the preparation 
phase was at the worksheet preparation stage (24 errors/46=52.1%), but errors were also 
recorded whilst making up of the final product (12 errors/46=26%); during the setup of 
materials (9 errors/46=19.5%) and during labelling (1 errors/46=2.1%). At unit C, almost 

















Chemo 11 7 13 31 
TPN 2 2 0 4 




1 0 0 1 








Table 3.11 summarises the types of injectable preparation errors that occurred at the three 
aseptic units. According to stage of preparation the most common error made on the 
worksheet was failure to record the syringe volume (n=14), which for unit C was by far the 
most prevalent. During the setup of materials, the most common error made was incorrect 
quantity of syringes (n=5). This error was observed at unit B. The next most common error 
made was wrong diluent selected (n=3), an error that was observed at unit A. Errors were 
also recorded whilst making the product. Here, the most common error recorded was wrong 
dose (n=4), an error that was detected at unit A, followed by signatures of maker missed 
(n=2), an error that was reported at unit B. 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.11 below, the total number of worksheet errors reported by unit 
A were can be categorised into three errors types, namely: error in logging expiry data 
information (n=1), incorrect direction for administration (n=1) and wrong batch number of 
starting materials (n=1). In unit B, there were two types of worksheet error, namely, wrong 
batch number of starting materials (n=5) and not attaching label to the worksheet (n=1). In 














Worksheet 3 6 15 24 
Labelling 0 1 0 1 
Set up 4 5 0 9 
Making up 
product 
7 4 1 12 
Final check 0 0 0 0 





materials (n=1) and missing syringe volume (n=14). In units A and C there were no types 
of faulty labelling, while in unit B there was only one type of faulty labelling, namely: 
wrong patient name (n=1).  
 
It is clear that the difference between units in the assembly of starting materials phase that 
unit A there were two types of assembly errors, namely, wrong dose of drug strength 
selected to prepare the final product (n=1) and wrong diluent selected (n=3), while in unit 
B there was one type of assembly errors, that is, the incorrect number of syringes provided 
(n=5) and in unit C there were no types of errors during set up of materials. When all the 
errors made in the three units are taken into consideration it can be seen that the last stage 
of preparing the product are the second common of errors occurred. In unit A there were 
four types errors recorded during the making up of the final product i.e. incorrect dose 
(n=4); incorrect expiry date (n=1); incorrect diluent used (n=1) and wrong volume of 
diluent (n=1). In unit B there were three types of errors made when making up the product 






   1
External error
 
Types of injectable preparation errors Large licensed (A) Small licensed (B) Unlicensed (C) Total 
Error Transcribing Rx to worksheet 
Wrong batch number of starting materials 
 





Error in logging expiry date information  1 (PL2) 0 0 1 
Incorrect directions for administration 1 (PL5) 0 0 1 
Missing syringe volume 0 0 14 (PU33; PU34; PU35; PU36; PU37; 
PU38; PU39; PU40; PU41; PU42; PU43; 
PU45; PU46) 
14 
Not attaching a label to the worksheet 0 1 (PS16) 0 1 
Total errors 3 6 15 24 
Labelling phase 
Wrong patient name 0 1 (PS19) 0 1 
Total errors 
 
0 1 0 1 
 
Set up of materials  
Wrong dose of drug strength selected to 
prepare the final product 
1 (PL12) 
 
0 0 1 
Wrong diluent selected 3 (PL1; PL4; PL14) 0 0 3 
Incorrect number of syringes provided 0 5 (PS22; PS23; PS24; PS25; PS26) 0 5 
Total errors 4 5 0 9 
Errors in making up the product 
Wrong dose 4  (PL6; PL7; PL8; PL13) 0 1 (PU31) 5 
Wrong expiry date1 1 (PL11) 0 0 1 
Wrong diluent used 1 (PL9) 0 0 1 
Wrong volume of diluent  1 (PL10) 0 0 1 
No filters used as specified 0 1 (PS20) 0 1 
Signatures of maker not included 0 2 (PS15; PS21) 0 2 
Product made on incorrect day 0 1(PS17) 0 1 
Total errors 7 4 1 12 




3.9.3 Severity Assessment of Injectable Preparation Error (IPEs) 
 
 
A total of forty-six observed errors and four errors from the literature with known outcomes 
were classified and ranked by an independent panel of five experts.  
3.9.4 Confirmation of Errors 
 
There was a high level of agreement between panel members about the errors observed in 
the three pharmacy aseptic units with absolute agreement in 44 out of the 46 errors. Three 
of the panel members agreed on the remaining two errors (PL13: PU33), so a consensus 
was still achieved. These results mean that all the errors were included in the subsequent 
analysis.  
3.9.5 Validation of Method for Rating Error Severity 
 
 
In this severity scale, a mean severity score < 0.5 indicates negligible level of harm; 
between 0.5 and 3.4 indicates a minor level of harm; a score between 3.5 and 6.4 represents 
a moderate level of harm; a score between 6.5 and 9.4 indicates major harm; and a score of 
≥ 9.5 indicates the potential for death. Results obtained for the 4 errors with a known patient 
outcome (PL15, PS32, PU49, and PU50) are shown in Table 3.12. There was agreement 
between the severity score and the patient outcome for PS32 and PU50 as a severe patient 
outcome was assigned a high severity score. There was no agreement on PL15 and PU49 
as some panel members (mainly the pharmacists) ranked the severity of these errors as 
greater than that, which was known to occur. However, it should be noted that PU49 was 
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a morphine error adapted for this study and this confused the panel (see discussion). The 
correct identification of errors with a severe outcome and the higher severity ranking of 
















Error description Chemotherapy 
delayed for second 
day due to incorrect 
calculation. 
 
A 500 mg dose of 
clarithromycin was 
prepared for a patient 
as an I.V bolus 
injection instead of 
diluted in 250 ml of 0.9 
% sodium chloride 
infusion. 




of in small 
doses of 2mg. 
Isoprenaline was 
drawn up into a 
syringe but labelled 
as metaraminol. 
Clinical pharmacist 7 7 4 9 
Physician 2 7 5 10 
Nurse 3 4 6 8 
Oncologist 5 7 5 8 
Aseptic pharmacist 8 9 8 9 






















rating and actual 
patient outcome 
Disagree Agree Disagree 
 
Agree 




3.9.6 Severity Ranking of Errors 
 
Table 3.13 shows the mean severity score assigned to the 46 observed errors by the 
professional healthcare panel. The mean severity ranking assigned by the panel was 
distributed across two levels of harm: 67.4% (n=31) were assigned a minor level of harm 
(severity score 0.5-3.4) and 32.6% (n=15) were assigned a moderate level of harm (severity 
score 3.5-6.4). 
 
The fact that no errors were ranked as severe and that the respondents categorised these 
errors as causing minor or moderate harm suggests that the risk control mechanisms in 
pharmacy units are working. The highest severity score error (6.4) occurred in unit A and 
referred to a wrong expiry date in the labelling phase (PL11). The lowest severity score 
(0.6) also occurred in unit A and resulted from the recording of the wrong number of doses 
of drug prepared while making the product (PL13).  
 
For all forty-six errors, the overall mean severity score was 2.9 and the median severity 










        Table 3.13: Mean Severity Scores assigned to errors observed in three aseptic units by the panel (n=46). 
 




















PL1 Wrong diluent Wrong strength of diluent picked to 
prepare final product: 5%glucose instead 
of 10% glucose. 
4.6 
PL2 Wrong expiry date Wrong expiry date of medicine  
(starting material) on worksheet and label 
4.2 
 
PL3 Wrong batch number Wrong batch number of medicine 
(starting material) on worksheet and label 
2.2 
PL4 Wrong diluent Wrong strength of diluent picked to 
prepare final product: 0.45% sodium 
chloride instead of 0.9% sodium chloride 
4.6 
PL5 Wrong route Wrong route of administration: 2.6mg in 
2.6 ml prepared for I.V. instead of 2.5mg 
in 1ml for subcutaneous 
6.2 
PL6 Wrong dose Wrong quantity of drug prepared: syringe 
contained 10mg Daunorubicin in 5ml 
instead of 20mg in10ml. 
4.2 
PL7 Wrong dose Wrong quantity of drug prepared: final 
syringe contained 200mg in 2 ml rather 
than 100mg in 1 ml hydrocortisone. 
6 
PL8 Wrong dose Wrong dose of drug prepared: final 
syringe contained 85mg/m2 instead of 
130mg/m2  Oxaliplatin. 
6 
PL9 Wrong diluent Wrong type of diluent and wrong volume 
of diluent for reconstitution: 1mg of 
Bortezomib in 1ml water rather than 
2.5mg of Bortezomib in 1ml 0.9% sodium 
chloride 
5 
PL10 Wrong diluent Wrong volume of diluent: 20 ml water 
used rather than 10 ml water. 
4.2 
PL11 Wrong expiry date1 The final product expired: out of date 
drug delivered to ward due to error in 
logging expiry date in fridge record. 
6.4 
PL12 Wrong dose Wrong strength of drug (starting 
material): picked to prepare final product 
(10% magnesium instead of 50% 
magnesium. 
4.8 
PL13 Wrong dose Wrong number doses of drug prepared: 
only 1 dose needed. However, 3 extra 
doses prepared.  
0.6 
PL14 Wrong diluent Wrong strength of diluent picked to 
prepare final product: 0.45% sodium 






Unit REF Type of error Description of error Mean 
severity 












PS15 Worksheet error Signature of member of staff who labelled product 
missing from worksheet 
2.8 




Product made on incorrect day 2.2 
PS18 Wrong batch 
number 
Wrong batch number of medicine  
(Starting material) on worksheet and label. 
2.8 
PS19 Faulty labelling Wrong spelling of patient name on label. 4 
PS20 Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used during making TPN: 
reconstituted Vitlipid +Solvito not added to TPN 
bag through filter. 
5.8 
PS21 Worksheet error Signature of member of staff who labelled product 
missing from worksheet. 
2.6 
PS22 Assembly error Not enough syringes provided. 2.4 
PS23 Assembly error Not enough syringes provided. 2.4 
PS24 Assembly error Not enough syringes provided. 2.4 
PS25 Assembly error Not enough syringes provided. 2.4 
PS26 Assembly error Not enough syringes provided. 2.4 
PS27 Wrong batch 
number 
Wrong batch number of medicine  
(Starting material) on worksheet and label. 
1.8 
PS28 Wrong batch 
number 
Wrong batch number of medicine  
(Starting material) on worksheet and label. 
1.8 
PS29 Wrong batch 
number 
Wrong batch number of medicine  
(Starting material) on worksheet and label. 
1.8 
PS30 Wrong batch 
number 
Wrong batch number of medicine  















PU31 Wrong dose Leakage from vial resulted in dose being too low. 3 
PU32 Wrong batch 
number 
Wrong batch number of medicine  
(Starting material) on worksheet and label. 2.2 
PU33 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8  
PU34 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU35 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU36 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU37 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU38 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU39 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU40 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU41 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU42 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU43 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU44 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU45 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 
PU46 Worksheet error Volume size of syringe missing from worksheet. 1.8 




Table 3.14 compares the overall severity ranking with that obtained for each unit. It can be 
seen that the majority of errors in unit A were categorised as having a moderate level of 
harm whereas the majority of errors in the B and C units were categorised as having a minor 
level of harm. 
 
 
  Table 3.14: Overall severity ranking compared with that obtained for each unit. 
 46 errors from 997 observations   * 14 errors from 203 observations 




Table 3.15 shows the mean and median severity scores obtained for each pharmacy aseptic 
unit. It can be seen that panel members assigned higher severity scores to errors in unit A, 
which correlates with data in Tables 3.14 and 3.15. In order to assess the significance of 
this test, the median severity scores assigned to each unit were compared using the Kruskal-
Wallis test. This gave a p<0.001, showing that there were significant differences between 
units. Subsequently, Mann-Whitney U-tests were used to compare the median severity 
scores assigned to the three pharmacy aseptic units. As this involved multiple comparisons, 
a Bonferroni correction was applied, giving a significance threshold of p=0.017. The 




Errors assigned a 
minor level of  
harm 
% 
Errors assigned a 
moderate level of 
harm 
% 
Errors assigned a 
major level of 
harm 
% 
Overall 4.6 3.1 1.5 0 
Large unit (A) 6.9* 1.0 5.9 0 
Small unit (B) 4.3** 3.5 0.8 0 
Unlicensed unit (C) 3.8*** 3.8 0.0 0 
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unit C, p < 0.001 and for unit B vs. unit C, p= 0.0236. Hence, the Mann-Whitney U-tests 
found that the median severity score from unit A was significantly larger than both the B 
and C units, but there was not a significant difference between the B and C units. 
 
Table 3.15: The Differences in Potential Harm Scores between Three Types of Pharmacy Units. 
 
 
Table 3.16 (a, b, c) summarises the frequency of error types and the corresponding severity 
categories in the three different pharmacy units. In the large aseptic unit (A), the most 
common types of error were wrong dose and wrong diluent, both of which were categorised 
as causing a moderate level of harm. In the small aseptic unit (B), the most common types 
of error related to assembly and batch number, both of which were categorised as causing 
a minor level of harm. For the unlicensed unit (C), the most common type of error related 








Pharmacy aseptic unit Severity score 
Mean Median 
Large unit (A) 4.6 4.5 
Small unit (B) 2.7 2.5 
Unlicensed unit (C) 1.9 2 
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 Table 3.16 (a): Breakdown of the Injectable Drug Preparation Error Severity Scores in large unit (A) (n=14). 
 
 
 Table 3.16 (b): Breakdown of the Injectable Drug Preparation Error Severity Scores in a Small Unit (B)  
(n=16). 
Type of Error Harm Level Total (n=14) 
Minor  Moderate  
Assembly error (n=5) 
 
5 0 5 
Wrong batch number (n=5) 
 
5 0 5 
Worksheet error (n=3) 
 
2 1 3 
Unprescribed medicine (n=1) 
 
1 0 1 
Faulty labelling (n=1) 
 
0 1 1 
Wrong preparation technique 
(n=1) 
0 1 1 
Wrong dose (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 
Wrong diluent (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 
Wrong expiry date (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 







13 3 16 
 
Type of Error Harm Level Total (n=14) 
 Minor   Moderate  
Wrong dose (n=5) 1 4 5 
Wrong diluent (n=5) 0 5 5 
Wrong expiry date (n=2) 0 2 2 
Wrong batch number (n=1) 1 0 1 
Wrong route of administration 
(n=1) 
 
0 1 1 
Worksheet error (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 
Assembly error (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 
Unprescribed medicine (n=0) 0 0 0 
Faulty labelling (n=0) 0 0 0 
Wrong preparation technique 
(n=0) 
0 0 0 
Total 
 
2 12 14 
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3.9.7 Risk scoring and grading of errors 
3.9.8 Consequence Score 
 
 
Results obtained for the different units are shown in Table 3.17 (a, b, c). A consequence 
descriptor of ‘moderate’ (score 3) was assigned to four types of errors in the large unit, two 
types of error in the small unit and no types of error in the unlicensed unit. Most of the 
error types in the large unit were categorised as ‘moderate’ whereas most errors occurring 
in the small and unlicensed units were categorised as ‘minor’ (score 2). 
Type of Error Harm Level Total (n=14) 
Minor  Moderate  
Worksheet error (n=14) 
 
14 0 14 
Wrong dose (n=1) 
 
1 0 1 
Wrong batch number (n=1) 
 
1 0 1 
Assembly error (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 
Unprescribed medicine (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 
Faulty labelling (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 
Wrong preparation technique 
(n=0) 
 
0 0 0 
Wrong diluent (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 
Wrong expiry date (n=0) 
 
0 0 0 










Table 3.17 (a): Mapping of severity data from the large aseptic unit (A) on to NPSA consequence descriptors 




Table 3.17 (b): Mapping of severity data from the small aseptic unit (B) on to NPSA consequence description 




Table 3.17 (c): Mapping of severity data from the unlicensed aseptic unit (C) on to NPSA consequence 










Wrong route of 
administration (n=1) 
6.2 3 Moderate 
Wrong expiry date (n=2) 5.3 3 Moderate 
Wrong diluent (n=5) 4.6 3 Moderate 
Wrong dose (n=5) 4.3 3 Moderate 
Wrong batch number (n=1) 2.2 2 Minor 








5.8 3 Moderate 
Faulty labelling (n=1) 4 3 Moderate 
Worksheet error (n=3) 3 2 Minor 
Assembly error (n=5) 2.4 2 Minor 
Unprescribed medication 
(n=1) 
2.2 2 Minor 
Wrong batch number (n=5) 2 2 Minor 






Wrong dose (n=1) 3 2 Minor 
Wrong batch number (n=1) 2.2 2 Minor 
Worksheet error (n=14) 1.8 2 Minor 
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3.9.9 Likelihood Score 
 
 
Results obtained for the likelihood scores in the three units are shown in Table 3.18 (a, b, 
c). Two types of error (wrong dose and wrong diluent) were likely to occur at least daily in 
the large aseptic unit. Errors in the small unit were likely to occur at least weekly or monthly 
and unlicensed unit one types of error (worksheet errors) were likely to occur at least 
weekly. 
 
Table 3.18 (a): Mapping of predicted number of errors from large aseptic unit (A) onto NPSA time frequency 
descriptors to obtain likelihood score. 
 
* Total Observations = 203   ** Total Items prepared = 1119     












Type of error  Error 
rate* 
Predicted number of 






Wrong dose (n=5) 
 
0.025 352 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Wrong diluent (n=5) 
 
0.025 352 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Wrong expiry date (n=2) 
 
0.009 127 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong batch number (n=1) 0.005 70 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong route of 
administration (n=1) 
0.005 70 Expected to occur 




Table 3.18 (b): Mapping of predicted number of errors from small aseptic unit (B) onto NPSA time frequency 
descriptors to obtain likelihood score. 
 
* Total no. Observation = 374    ** Total no. Items prepared = 550              




Table 3.18 (c): Mapping of predicted number of errors from unlicensed aseptic unit (C) onto NPSA time 
frequency descriptors to obtain likelihood score. 
 
Type of error  Error 
rate* 
Predicted number of 






Worksheet error (n=14) 
 
0.033 184 Expected to occur at 
least weekly 
4 
Wrong dose (n=1) 
 












* Total no. Observations = 420    ** Total no. Items prepared = 443                       
Likely       Unlikely 
 
 
Type of error  Error 
rate* 
Predicted number of 






Assembly error (n=5) 
 
0.013 90 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong batch number (n=5) 
 
0.013 90 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Worksheet error (n=3) 
 
0.008 55 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Unprescribed medicine (n=1) 0.003 21 Expected to occur 
at least monthly 
3 
Faulty labelling (n=1) 
 
0.003 60 Expected to occur 
at least monthly 
3 
Wrong preparation technique 
(n=1) 
0.003 60 Expected to occur 




3.9.10 Risk score 
 
 
Risk scores assigned to the types of error which occurred in each of the aseptic units are 
shown in Table 3.19 (a; b; c).  
 












  Table 3.19 (c): Risk scores assigned to error type in the unlicensed aseptic unit (C) 
 
 
Type of error (n=14) Consequence Likelihood Risk Score 
 
Assigned grade 
Wrong diluent (n=5) 3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Wrong dose (n=5) 3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Wrong expiry date (n=2) 3 4 12 High risk 
Wrong route of administration  
(n=1) 
3 4 12 High risk 
Wrong batch number (n=1) 
 
2 4 8 High risk 
Type of error (n=16) Consequence Likelihood Risk Score Assigned grade 
 
Wrong preparation technique 
 (n=1) 
3 3 9 High risk 
Faulty labelling (n=1) 3 3 9 High risk 
Wrong batch number (n=5) 2 4 8 High risk 
Worksheet error (n=3) 2 4 8 High risk 
Assembly error (n=5) 2 4 8 High risk 
Unprescribed medication (n=1) 
 
2 3 6 Moderate risk 
Type of error (n=16) Consequence Likelihood Risk Score Assigned grade 
Worksheet error (n=14) 2 4 8 High risk 
Wrong dose (n=1) 
 
2 2 4 Moderate risk 
Wrong batch number (n=1) 
 




Most of the errors were graded ‘high risk’ or ‘moderate risk’ but two types of error, which 
occurred in the large unit that were assigned the grade ‘extreme risk’. Where possible, the 
highest risk errors for each unit were selected for the development of risk reduction 
strategies. For the unlicensed unit, strategies were developed for moderate risk errors. 
However, the strategies proposed for worksheet errors in the small unit may also be 
applicable to the high-risk worksheet errors observed in the unlicensed unit.  
 
Errors categorised as extreme risk, high risk and moderate risk were selected for the 
development of risk reduction strategies. Furthermore, the different levels of risk assigned 



























The aim of healthcare is to improve the quality of life for patients; this includes reducing 
and preventing errors in the preparation of injectable medicines used in the treatment of 
illnesses and injuries. However, numerous errors, both identified and unidentified, are 
made in the preparation of injectable medicines and these have the potential of harming 
patients’ health and quality of life. Therefore, the aim of this research was to identify the 
types, incidence and severity of errors in the preparation of injectable drugs in the pharmacy 
aseptic production unit to calculate a risk score. Errors with the highest risk scores will 
provide a focus for developing strategies to help prevent these types of mistakes from 
reoccurring.  
 
This section will discuss quantitative data obtained on the type, incidence and severity of 
drug preparation errors made in three different pharmacy aseptic units: a large licensed (A), 
a small licensed unit (B), and an unlicensed unit (C). The overall error rate of internal errors 
for the three units was 4.6% and the external error rate was 0.09% in the large licensed unit 
(A). These results showed that the internal and external error rate is higher than that 
reported in previous UK studies (Bateman and Donyai, 2010) that reported an internal error 
rate of 0.49% and an external error rate of 0.0025%. This difference could be related to the 
methods used in their study. For example, Bateman and Donyai (2010) used incidence 
report details of internal errors from the UK National Aseptic Error Database. Self-
reporting depends on staff knowledge that an error has happened. Moreover, staff may not 
be aware of the reporting process and they may be hesitant to report errors if they fear being 
blamed. On the other hand, the overall internal error rate in this research is consistent with 
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the rate reported in a research carried out by Flynn et al. (1997) in the US. The study 
reported a median internal error rate of 5% in five US hospital pharmacies. The fact that 
both that study and this one reported a similar error rate could be due to the fact that the 
same method (direct observation) was used in the two studies. The external error rate found 
in this research was lower than that found by previous studies conducted in the US and in 
other countries (Escoms et al., 1996; Limat et al., 2001; Sacks et al., 2009; Serrano- Fabia 
et al., 2010; Ranchon et al., 2011). In the US, the recorded external error rate was 0.4% 
(Sacks et al., 2009). In European hospital pharmacy units, the external error rate of IPEs 
varied between 0.12% and 0.45% of all doses prepared by staff (Escoms et al., 1996; Limat 
et al., 2001; Serrano- Fabia et al., 2010; Ranchon et al., 2011). As mentioned above, this 
difference is unsurprising because incident report relies on staff knowledge and experience 
that an error has happened. Hence incident reporting can underestimate the incidence of 
preparation errors (Allan & Barker, 1990). The rate of internal error for the different study 
units was compared using one-way ANOVA. A p <0.05 was considered statistically 
significant. Our results confirmed the hypothesis that there is no significant difference in 
the incidence of internal errors between the three pharmacy aseptic units.  
 
In a previous study (James & Bateman, 2013) critical risk activities identified by focus 
group participants included the worksheet phase, label phase, setup of materials, and 
making products. This tallies with the results of this study, where injectable preparation 
errors occurred during these phases of preparation. The most common type of medicines 
where errors occurred were cytotoxic products (31errors/ 46 total number of errors=67%), 
followed by the monoclonal antibody (MAbs) (10 errors/ total number of errors=22%), 
parenteral nutrition (TPN) (4 errors/ 46 total number of errors=9%), and others 
 
154 
(subcutaneous hydrocortisone) (1 errors/ 46 total number of errors=2%). This is consistent 
with Bateman and Donyai’s (2010) findings that most error reports related to cytotoxic 
products (40%), IV additives (27%), parenteral nutrition (TPN) (15%) and other pre-filled 
syringes (7%). The high number of errors related to cytotoxic products may be due to the 
fact that these products are made up in high numbers in pharmacy aseptic production units 
(641/997=64% of all medicines prepared). Also, according to Plumridge et al. (2001), 
cytotoxic products are hard to prepare and the person preparing the product is required to 
follow an exact procedure; for this reason, many errors can occur during preparation.  
 
The phases where errors occurred during the preparation process in this study also 
correlated with results reported previously in the UK (Bateman and Donyai, 2010). For 
example, the most common error found in this research was the failure to record syringe 
volumes on the worksheet, followed by wrong batch number recorded on the worksheet 
phase. The second most common error reported wrong dose during making up the product 
stage. This is consistent with Bateman and Donyai’s findings (2010) that most errors in the 
preparation process occurred during the worksheet and making the final product. These 
errors are likely to cause the patient harm. It is possible that such errors are not recognised 
by staff as being important and may not always be included when self-reporting incidents. 
This could account for the differences in error rates reported in our study and other studies 
(Bateman and Donyai, 2010). 
 
 
One of the limitation of this research is that the findings obtained may not be generalisable 
to all aseptic preparation units as this study used a purposive sampling method, which leads 
to a sample that is not random or representative. Moreover, observer bias and changing 
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behaviour (the Hawthorne effect) of the worker during observations may have affected the 
accuracy of this study’s findings. There is a possibility that staff may have changed their 
normal behaviour in the presence of the observer during the study (the Hawthorne effect). 
In 1980, Barker found that the members of staff resumed their normal behaviour three hours 
into the observation period. The injectable preparation medicines that were to be observed 
were selected randomly by the researcher; thus, the observer could not foresee and correct 
any errors that could potentially occur. Therefore, the occurrence of an error in the observed 
product was due to chance. In addition, the error rate of week 1 was the same as the one 
for weeks 2, 3 and 4. As clarified in Section 2.2.3, several studies have shown that the use 
of the observation method to identify medical errors does not affect the results of these 
studies (Barker and McConnell, 1962; Alan and Barker, 1990; Dean and Barber, 2001; 
Bowling, 2002; Smith, 2002). Most of the recommendations made in previous studies were 
adopted in this study. For example, the recommendation for the researcher to spend some 
time with the staff in the injectable preparation room before they start collecting data; the 
recommendation to inform the staff of the nature of the study and give them assurances 
that the results will be confidential; the recommendation to inform the staff about the 
significance of working with normal behaviour; the recommendation to collect extraneous 
data to reduce the incidence of altered behaviour (Crowley, 2006) and the recommendation 
to ignore initial observation data as the effect of the observer minimises over time 
(Bowling, 2002; Smith, 2002; Ameer, 2015).  
 
The influence of observer bias was reduced through the use of an observation schedule 
with clearly defined tasks and types of errors, a trained observer and verification of errors 




The second part of this study confirmed that the injectable drug preparation errors 
previously observed in pharmacy aseptic units could be categorised as errors and ranked 
the severity of these errors on a scale of 0 to 10. Finally, error severity and error frequency 
data were used to calculate consequence and likelihood scores and determine a risk score 
for each error analogous to that used by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA, 2008). 
Errors with the highest risk score will provide a focus for developing strategies to help 
prevent these types of errors in the future.  
 
This study includes a discussion of the quantitative data obtained from three different 
pharmacy aseptic units: a large licensed unit, a small licensed unit, and an unlicensed unit. 
All errors previously observed were classified as errors by the panel and thus 46 errors 
were included in the analysis. This initial verification of errors was important as errors were 
documented by just one observer, in contrast to other studies (Dean and Barber, 2001; 
Barker et al, 2002; Buckley et al, 2007). Having one observer reduces the Hawthorne effect 
but increases the risk associated with reliance upon the judgement of one researcher. Errors 
detected by more than one observer are more robust, but the Hawthorne effect will be 
increased. In this study, an expert panel with five members was selected to assess severity, 
as mean severity scores should be more reliable than those provided by a single judge (Dean 
& Baber, 1999; Taxis & Barber, 2003). However, as the actual patient outcome of these 
errors was unknown, it was important to validate the method in this research context. 
Therefore, a small number of errors (approximately 10% of the total) with a known patient 
outcome were included. The panel members were not aware which errors these were. The 
results showed agreement between severity scores and patient outcome in 50% of the cases. 
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Although there was also no agreement in 50% of cases, one of these errors (PU49) was 
poorly described (as noted by one panel member) and both were rated as more severe than 
the actual patient outcome. This demonstrated that the panel would be unlikely to 
underestimate the severity associated with an error and thus the researcher was confident 
that the method was appropriate. 
 
Assessing the severity of injectable drug preparation errors identified in this research was 
carried out by a panel. This comprised two physicians (a general physician and an 
oncologist), two pharmacists (a clinical pharmacist and an aseptic pharmacist), and one 
senior nurse. Injectable drug preparation errors were presented to the panel in the form of 
a questionnaire; a method, which has been found to be valid and credible (Taxis & Barber, 
2003; Ameer, 2015). Dean and Barber (1999) showed that scoring severity using a panel 
of at least four experienced healthcare professionals is a reliable index of severity. This was 
the first reliable, validated scoring method to assess the severity of medication errors for 
which patient outcomes are not known. Their statistical analysis showed that, if any four 
reviewers from a panel of 30 experienced U.K. pharmacists, medical staff, and nursing staff 
were used their mean scores would be generalisable to any other four reviewers selected 
from the same panel. In contrast, some previous studies stated that judges from different 
health fields of study differ in their assessment of medication errors (William & Talley, 
1994; Nixon &Dillon, 1996; Ameer, 2015). However, Dean and Barber (1999) explained 
that in each of these studies there was only one representative of each professional group, 
therefore it was impossible to determine whether the differences in scores were attributable 
to individual differences or professional differences. According to Dean and Barber (1999) 
there is one main limitation associated with this severity assessment method. A linear scale 
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was used to assess injectable drug preparation errors severity because these types of scales 
are easy to use and are known to most health care professionals. However, any assessment 
of severity must allow for the probability and the extent of harm (Royal Society, 1992). 
Theoretically, injectable drug preparation error severity should therefore be represented 
graphically, with extent of patient harm being plotted along the X-axis and the probability 
of patient harm along the Y-axis. Different medication errors would have different areas 
under the curve. This approach has been used in the assessment of prescribing errors 
(Hawkey et al., 1990), where a judge was asked to estimate the probabilities of occurrence 
of different levels of patient harm. The use of such probability distributions is complex; so, 
in this study, it was decided to assess injectable drug preparation error severity by using a 
single score. It is also important to consider the fact that the questionnaire did not explore 
the cost implications of the errors. Scores obtained in this study may therefore not reflect 
financial consequences. It was decided that five expert health care professionals should 
participate in the assessment of the severity of each injectable drug preparation error using 
a scale numbered from 0-10. The five expert health care professionals should ideally 
include a doctor, a pharmacist and a nurse. The mean score for each injectable drug 
preparation errors can then be used as an index of severity and these should be both valid 
and reliable. 
 
The majority of these errors received a score ranging from minor to moderate severity, 
which gives the impression that risk control mechanisms in pharmacy units were working. 
However, after taking likelihood into account, the results showed that two types of errors 
ranked as extreme risk and seven types of errors ranked as high risk, which indicates that 
risk control mechanisms in pharmacy units need to be improved. As far as the researcher 
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is aware, this is the only UK study focused on injectable drug preparation errors observed 
in pharmacy aseptic units.  
 
In the UK, the majority of MEs reported to the NRLS were associated with no harm (83.1% 
n=49.714); minor harm (12.6% n=7.6552) and moderate harm (4% n2.391); however, 0.1% 
were linked with severe harm and 0.1% resulted in death (NPSA, 2009). In comparison, 
this study determined that 31/46 errors (67.4%) were deemed capable of causing minor 
harm, and 15/46 errors (32.4%) were deemed to be of moderate harm. None of the 46 errors 
had a mean score higher than 6.5, suggesting that none of the errors were considered to be 
severe or fatal. The findings of this research indicate that most of the reported IPEs resulted 
in a minor level harm (67.4%; n=31). This is comparable to an observational study of 
medicine administration errors that also showed that incidents resulting in minor harm were 
the most common in studies using the American NCC MERP Index harm categorisation 
(Keers et al. 2013). The distribution of errors over mostly two levels of harm correlates 
with three previous reports. Avery et al. (2012) identified 128 errors (42.4%) as minor, 
with a score under 3 and another 163 errors (54.0%) as moderate, with a score between 3 
and 7. Ameer (2015) reported that 30% of the incidents were associated with minor harm 
and 67.1% were classified as posing moderate harm. Taxis & Barber (2003) reported that 
31% of errors (n=38) were potentially of moderate harm and 13% (n=16) were potentially 
minor. In this study, there are no errors with a severe score, unlike in other studies, for 
example, Taxis & Barber (2003), who reported that 3% (n=4) of all observed preparation 
and administration of intravenous drug errors posed severe harm; Avery et al. (2012), who 
found that 3.6% (n=11) of all prescribing and monitoring errors posed severe harm and 
Ameer (2015), who stated that 2.9% (n=12) of all medication administration errors in 
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Paediatric Intensive Care Unit were graded as potentially causing severe harm. These 
variations in the results could be attributed to the differences in the cases observed or the 
study setting in both sets of research. It is often difficult to establish the true level of harm 
due to the complexity of the conditions under treatment (Chedoe et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015). 
In addition, differentiation of severity of harm between studies is not easy due to the 
different standards used to define the levels of harm (Keers et al. 2013). To enable 
comparison across different systems, standardising harm classification is necessary. 
 
This study used severity data and frequency data to calculate a risk score for the preparation 
errors observed to provide a focus for developing risk reduction strategies. The results 
showed that data can be divided into three levels: extreme risk, high risk and moderate risk. 
In this research, the investigator has chosen to focus on extreme risk and high-risk errors 
to develop risk reduction strategies for the three different aseptic units. Also, the resulting 
risk scores suggest that there are different priorities that need to be tackled to reduce errors 
in each of the units. For example, in the large licensed unit risk reduction strategies should 
focus on ensuring that the wrong dose and wrong diluent is not supplied; whereas in the 
small licensed unit the focus should be on preparation techniques and preventing assembly 
errors. In the unlicensed unit, risk reduction strategies should prioritise avoiding worksheet 
errors. 
 
In the large licensed unit, two types of errors were graded as posing extreme risk (wrong 
diluent and wrong dose) and three types of errors were graded as high risk (wrong expiry 
date, wrong route of administration and wrong batch number). This might be because the 
large licensed unit prepared more medicines than the small and unlicensed units thus 
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leading to a higher frequency of potential errors. On the other hand, in the small licensed 
unit there were five types of errors that were graded as high risk (assembly error; wrong 
preparation technique; faulty labelling; worksheet error; and wrong batch number). In the 
unlicensed unit there was just one error classified as being a high-risk error (worksheet 
error). This is of concern because such errors can have a direct effect on the patient’s 
treatment. Nevertheless, it bears pointing out that there were no cases of wrong drug during 
this research in contrast to the patient safety incident reports. Furthermore, it is possible 
that this research did not capture all the IPEs as only 47.2% of the total injectable medicines 
doses prepared during the observation period were observed. Also there may have been 
incidents of omitted medicines and others, for example a mismatch between patient and 
medicine. The presence of the researcher in the preparation room may have helped to 
minimise some errors. However there is no concrete evidence to prove this interpretation. 
 
 
The limitation of the study was that the responses received from questionnaires answered 
closed-ended questions with ‘yes / no’ or numbers and, as such, did not provide detailed 
descriptions. Secondly, the questionnaire was sent via email, so no clarification was 
available for reviewers during completion. Thirdly, the data synthesis would have been 
more robust if the replies had been collected personally from the healthcare professionals. 
This would also have improved the level of detail contained in each response. Finally, as 
discussed in section 2.6.7, the severity questionnaire data entry was completed and checked 
by the researcher (AA) only. An independent check of the data entry by a second person 








A significant number of patient safety incidents occur as a result of injectable medication 
use in the pharmacy environment. Usually, the highest-risk medicines are those 
administered by injection, so injectable drugs must be prepared and administered carefully. 
Patients given injectable drugs should be monitored closely.  No difference was found in 
the injectable preparation errors rate between three different types of aseptic units; there 
were differences in the stage of the preparation process where the error occurred. There 
were also differences between the severities of errors in the different units; on average 
errors, which occurred in the large unit, were ranked as being moderately severe, whereas 
those in the other units were ranked as being of minor severity. However after accounting 
for error frequency, two types of error were graded as posing extreme risk in the large unit 
and seven types of errors were ranked as posing a high risk in the small and unlicensed 
units.   
 
This analysis has thus provided an important tool for prioritising risk reduction strategies 
when preparing injectable medicines in the three different pharmacy units, which will 
improve patient safety. Each error should be analysed to identify the contributing factors; 
in this way, staff can learn from errors and decide what modifications and strategies must 
be implemented to prevent the occurrence of similar errors in the future. Furthermore, 
training needs and design problems should be investigated to minimise the rate and severity 




This requires a coordinated approach from practitioners, regulators, and the pharmaceutical 
industry. Eventually, the reduction and prevention of errors in injectable-medicine 
preparations will save lives and reduce the cost of health care and the money saved could 
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The preparation of injectable medicines is accompanied by extensive risk (Taxis and 
Barber, 2003; Beaney, 2004; Bateman, 2003; Bateman and Donyai, 2010; James et al., 
2016). In 2000, The UK Department of Health (DOH) reported that NHS staff made a 
number of fatal errors, from which they failed to learn lessons and so prevent such errors 
from reoccurring. It was established that one out of every ten such errors related to 
injectable medicines, half of which were avoidable (DOH, 2000). The National Patient 
Safety Agency (NPSA) suggested that, in order to improve the safety of injectable drugs 
and minimise risks associated with their preparation, some high-risk injectable (e.g. 
chemotherapy and TPN medicines) should be prepared under the control of the pharmacy 
department (Royal Pharmaceutical Society, 2016).  
 
The aseptic preparation of medicines in the UK is undertaken either in units holding a 
manufacturer’s special licence, or in unlicensed units, promoting a satisfactory level of 
safety combined with regular external audit (see Section 3.2). However, it is possible that 
errors may occur more frequently than currently believed during the pharmacy preparation 
of injectable medicines (see section 1.7). The error rate of injectable medicines in the UK 
ranges from a low of 0.49% (Bateman and Donyai, 2010). However, the causes of these 
errors are several and varied, with little understanding of the contributing factors. There 
have been a number of errors within pharmacy aseptic units in the UK (Gandy et al., 1998), 
i.e. a fatal error occurred in 1994, when the administration of contaminated TPN caused 
the death of two infants. However, previous studies have revealed very little evidence 
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concerning errors in pharmacy aseptic units, leading to a need to understand the causes of 
IPEs, in order to improve safety.  
 
This thesis has adapted Reason’s (1990) organisational accidents model (see Section 2.7.5), 
established to identify the sequence of actions resulting in error. This model considers the 
actions of staff, and, more significantly, their working conditions, in order to establish the 
latent factors resulting in such errors (Reason, 1990). Reason’s model categorised human 
contribution to such errors as follows: (1) active failures (i.e. the individual factor); (2) 
error producing conditions (i.e. the environment factor); and (3) latent failures (i.e. the 
organisational factor). This model therefore identifies failures with immediate outcomes 
(i.e. active failures and error producing conditions) potentially leading over the long term 
to unsafe outcomes (i.e. latent failures) (see Section 2.7.5).  
 
A number of factors contributing to Injectable preparation errors (IPEs) have been reported 
in the published literature (see Section 1.7.1) related to: (1) the work environment (i.e. 
workload, destruction or interruption); (2) individual factors (i.e. stress and fatigue); and 
(3) latent factors (i.e. lack of adequate training) (Limat et al., 2000; Parshuraman et al., 
2008; and Bateman & Donyai, 2010). 
 
 
The procedure for the preparation of injectable medicines is currently little understood, 
including the risks, as well as the sources of information or guidance employed by staff for 
problem solving. This current study examines the views and opinions of, as well as the 
difficulties and solutions faced by, pharmacy staff working in injectable drug preparation 
on a practical level.  
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4.2 Significance of the Research 
 
 
The purpose of preparing injectable medicines within a pharmacy department is to improve 
the quality of the final product (Hospital Pharmacists Group, 2002). However, as 
previously discussed, errors still occur during injectable drug preparation in aseptic units 
in the UK. This is demonstrated in a number of published studies (Bateman and Donyai, 
2010) and from data revealed in Chapter Three, in which an observational study provided 
valuable information concerning the types and frequency of errors, including issues of risk. 
In order to reduce the risk of mistakes taking place, it is first important to understand the 
cause. This chapter therefore examines the underlying causes of a number of errors reported 
in the observational study, focussing on the opinions of the pharmacy staff involved. It also 
establishes the opinions of staff concerning how such errors can be reduced, in order to 
develop future preventative strategies. 
 
4.3 Aims and Objectives  
 
 
As noted above, this study examines the opinions and views of pharmacy staff involved in 
errors previously observed in three pharmacy aseptic units. The aim of this examination is 
suggestions ways to minimise the IPEs in three different pharmacy aseptic units. The 
objectives are the following points:  
 
 Establish the causes of errors observed during the preparation of injectable 
medicines from the aseptic units by pharmacy staff. 
  Identify strategies for minimising the risk of such errors reoccurring. 
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Qualitative data can provide a rich source of information and can be effective in explaining 
the results of quantitative analysis (see Section 2.7). Qualitative research methods have 
increased since the 1990s, with their use gaining significance in health services as well as 
pharmacy practice research (Smith, 1998). The qualitative approach is considered 
appropriate for investigating little known areas, as well as sensitive or complex topics 
(Creswell, 2013), and to deliver vision and in-depth information concerning complex cases 
(Bowling, 2009). Qualitative research approaches focus on issues of ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ 
events take place, with the collected data focussing on examining and understanding 
individuals’ thoughts and behaviours. Unlike quantitative methods (which focus on the 
viewpoint of the investigator and are based on a standardised method), qualitative 
approaches are more flexible and receptive to the opinions of the respondents (Smith, 
1998).  
The most frequently employed approaches in a qualitative study include undertaking 
interviews employing the following methods: (1) face-to-face; (2) telephone; (3) focus 
group; (4) email; and (5) semi-structured interviews (Bowling, 2009; Creswell, 2013) (see 
Section 2.7). The most frequently employed methods are semi-structured interviews, which 
have been established as effective in investigating the perceptions of individuals and how 
they make sense of their own environment (Bowling, 2009; Creswell, 2013). They are also 
the most frequently used qualitative method for research related to health services and 
medical practice (Smith, 1998). Semi-structured interviews are considered a shared 
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technique, allowing rich data to be collected through communication between the 
investigator and the interviewee, enabling the investigator to obtain detailed answers 
relating to the subject under discussion (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). They are based on a 
flexible topic guide and contain open-ended questions concerning the topic studied, in 
order to explore participants’ experiences and opinions and to establish their personal views 
(Creswell, 2013). A focus group is considered a more time efficient method, allowing a 
number of individuals to be interviewed simultaneously, thus documenting a general view, 
rather than that of an individual, while some participants may not interview well in group 
situations (Creswell, 2013) (see Section 2.7). 
This thesis employed interview-based research, using a semi-structured interview method. 
This technique allowed an increasing understanding of the perceptions of pharmacy staff 
concerning contributing factors of IPEs.  




The development of the interview schedule was based on a review of the literature 
concerning human error theory. It consisted of open questions and topic headings employed 
by the interviewer to stimulate discussion (Oppenheim, 1992; Smith, 2002), and invited 
participants to describe: (1) how an error occurred; (2) the contributing factors; and (3) 
potential strategies to be implemented to prevent any reoccurrence. The interview schedule 
was reviewed by Dr. Richard Bateman, a Regional Quality Assurance Specialist 
Pharmacist in East and South East England Specialist Pharmacy Services and Dr. Bateman 
a member and former Chair of the NHS Pharmaceutical Quality Assurance Committee. A 
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simulation of the interview was conducted at the University of Bath during May 2014, with 
supervisor Dr. Lynette James and psychologist Dr. Nick Forbes, resulting in the final 
interview schedule (Appendix 9).  
 
The interview schedule (see Appendix 9) was developed to collect significant details 
concerning the contributing factors behind IPEs. This was based on the framework of 
factors impacting on health practice developed by Vincent et al. (2000) to analyse risk and 
safety in aseptic pharmacy practice, categorising the following preparation factors: (1) 
active failure; (2) error producing conditions; (3) environmental conditions; (4) the team; 
(5) patients; (6) latent factors; and (7) barriers or defences leading to failure. This 
framework focuses on the significance of developing appropriate medicine safety, leading 
to a 'no blame culture', enabling lessons to be learnt from any mistakes.  
 
The interview was divided into four main sections. Firstly, participants were asked if they 
considered specific events had led to errors in the preparation injectable drugs, followed 
by the identification of such mistakes. Secondly, questions focused on the causes of IPEs, 
based on the classification of active failure (i.e. individual), error-producing conditions and 
latent factors identified by Vincent et al. (2000). Thirdly, there was a discussion of the 
presence of underlying contributing factors, followed by participants being requested to 
define any failure of barriers or defences indirectly leading to error. Fourthly, there was a 
discussion of potential strategies to minimise the reoccurrence of errors. In each part, 
questions were employed to elicit any further explanation, if required. Interviews were 
audio recorded for a verbatim transcription and the interviewer also took written notes.  
 
171 
4.4.3 Study setting 
 
This study was undertaken within a range of aseptic processing units throughout the UK, 
and forms one of the first UK investigational studies to actively investigate errors taking 
place during real working conditions within this complex domain (see Section 3.6.2). 
4.4.4 Study Participants 
 
 
Pharmacy staff who had made injectable medicines preparation errors during the period of 
observation were invited for interview. Those wishing to participate in this study were 
provided with a participant information leaflet and consent form (see Appendix 4) and were 
required to provide written informed consent (see Appendix 5) prior to being interviewed. 
Due to the qualitative nature of this study, there was no need for a formal sample-size 
calculation to establish the required number of interviews, while the variation within 
qualitative research leads to a lack of any specific method of measurement (Pope and Mays, 
2000; Guba and Lincoln, 2005). It was anticipated that the investigator would be able to 
interview all staff who had made an error, with the majority agreeing to be interviewed 
within forty-eight hours of the error taking place. It was agreed for the purposes of 
feasibility that the number of interviews should be between six and twelve. Although the 
interview selection criteria was likely to result in a small sample size, the additional 
interviews undertaken with nine pharmacy technicians and assistant technical officers was 
aimed to gather opinions from staff with a range of professional experience and 
backgrounds. The minimum sample sizes needed to attain saturation in interview-based 
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study is nine interviews, and hence it was presumed that the determined sample size would 
be suitable to create relevant themes and codes (Hennink et al., 2017). 
4.4.5 Ethical approval 
 
 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Research Ethics Procedure of the 
University of Bath’s (see Section 3.7.3). 
4.4.6 Data Collection 
 
 
In accordance with previous dispensing error research, participants were interviewed in a 
private room, using the developed interview schedule, within forty-eight hours of the error-
taking place (Gothard et al., 2004; Beso et al., 2005). The interviews were undertaken with 
technical pharmacists and Assistant Technical Officers (ATOs) in three aseptic pharmacy 
production units. Each interview lasted approximately forty-five minutes and, with consent 
from the participant, was audio-recorded using an MP3 player. Audio-recordings of the 
interviews were transcribed verbatim.  




All data remained confidential. Data from interviews were anonymised on transcription 




4.4.7 Data Analysis 
 
Data was analysed by means of thematic analysis employing the theoretical framework (as 
described previously in Chapter Two, Section 2.7.3) of Reason’s (1990) accident causation 
model (Reason, 1990; Ritchie & Spencer, 2002). The researcher (AA) and two academic 
staff members (i.e. Dr. Lynette James and Dr. Julie Letchford) independently scrutinised 
interview transcripts for: (1) active failures; (2) error producing conditions; (3) latent 
failures; and (4) barriers/defences. All themes and coded forms of individual, 
environmental and latent factors, along with defences, barriers and strategies, were 
extracted from the interviews. The findings were subsequently discussed and a consensus 




The forty-eight hour timeframe was based on previous study investigating dispensing 
errors (Gothard et al., 2004; Beso et al., 2005). However, due to staff being too busy (or 
unwilling) to be interviewed, it was not possible to obtain interview data for all preparation 
errors observed by the researcher in the three pharmacy aseptic units. Therefore, nine 
interviews (corresponding to nine observed errors) were undertaken with staff involved in 
injectable preparation errors across the three participating sites, with four interviews 




This led to interviews with five pharmacy technicians (large licensed n=3, small licensed 
n=2) and three ATOs (large licensed n=1; unlicensed unit n=2), with two of the errors being 
made by one individual working in the small unit (PS17 and PS21). All participants were 
full-time employees qualified to prepare injectable medicines, with their experience 
ranging between one month and over twenty years. Interviews were obtained for the errors 
summarised in Table 4.1. 
 
             Table 4.1 Summary of interviews obtained for detected errors  
 
Ref Site Job title Gender Type of error Description of error 
 
Risk score 
PL1 A Pharmacy 
technician 
Male Incorrect diluent 
(internal error) 
Incorrect strength of diluent 
picked to prepare final 
product, i.e. 5% glucose 
instead of 10% glucose. 
Extreme risk 
PL12 A Pharmacy 
technician 
Female Incorrect dose 
(internal error) 
Incorrect strength of drug 
(starting material) picked to 
prepare final product (50% 
magnesium instead of 10% 
magnesium). 
Extreme risk 
PL13 A ATOs Male Incorrect dose 
(internal error) 
Incorrect number of doses 
of drug prepared with only 
one dose required, but an 
additional three doses 
prepared. 
Extreme risk 
PL11 A Pharmacy 
technician 
Male Incorrect expiry 
date 
(external error) 
The final product had 
expired, i.e. an out of date 
drug was delivered to the 
ward due to error in logging 
the expiry date in the fridge 
record. 
High risk 
PS16 B Pharmacy 
technician 
Female Worksheet error 
(internal error) 
Incorrect label affixed to 
worksheet. 
High risk 
PS21 B Pharmacy 
technician 
Female Worksheet error 
(internal error) 
Signature of member of staff 
who had labelled the product 
missing from worksheet. 
High risk 





Product made on an incorrect 
day. 
Moderate risk 
PU31 C ATOs Female Incorrect dose 
(internal error) 
Leakage from vial resulted in 
dose being too low. 
Moderate risk 
PU32 C ATOs Female Incorrect batch 
number 
(internal error) 
Incorrect batch number of 
medicine (i.e. starting 





Fourteen errors were observed in Unit A, with interview data obtained for 30% n=3/10 
errors classified as extreme risk and 25% n=1/4 errors classified as high risk. Sixteen errors 
were observed in Unit B, with interview data obtained for 13.3% n=2/15 classified as high-
risk errors and 1/1 error classified as moderate risk. Thus, qualitative data was obtained for 
all risk grades associated with units A and B. In addition, sixteen errors were observed in 
Unit C, with interview data being obtained for 2/2 errors classified as moderate risk. 
Unfortunately no interview data was obtained for high risk errors obtained in unit C that 
accounted for 14/16 errors observed. 
 
4.5.1 Causes of injectable preparation errors  
 
I. Active Failures 
 
A total of nine active failures were identified by the interviewees (see Table 4.1), classified 
as lapses, slips, or mistakes. There were two lapses, six slips (one of which related to the 
external error), and one knowledge-based mistake. Lapses involved forgetting to sign the 
label and not attaching a label to the worksheet. Typical examples are given below: 
I find that’s when it happens, when you’ve got someone else labelling, because they 
will just label and forget to sign to say that they’ve labelled it. (PS21) 
 
Sticking the label on the back is something that we did with the old system … so it’s 
not something that I should have forgotten. (PS16) 
 
 
Slips involved selecting the incorrect strength of drug from the shelves to prepare the final 
product, and included: (1) selecting the incorrect strength of diluent; (2) withdrawing the 
incorrect volume of diluent from a vial to prepare the final product; (3) writing an incorrect 
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batch number of diluent on the worksheet; (4) product made on an incorrect day (i.e. 
internal errors); and (4) an incorrect expiry date on the product label (i.e. external error). 
For examples: 
Magnesium 50% was setup. It was sprayed into the unit. … Another checker came 
in [and] they realised it was 50%, not 10%. This could have had fatal errors, as it 
was 5 times the strength it should have been. (PL12)  
 
 
The expiry date wasn’t changed on the computer, so it came out with a later expiry 
than it should have, and I missed that. (PL11) 
 
 
Amm. My first day back after annual leave. (Laughs) Amm… I didn’t think. I had 
any things else on my mind…amm it’s just, amm, amm. Initially it was the kind of 
thing like the needle sledding on the bung, really I would not say it was stress or 
anything, it’s just, amm, concentrating on what I am doing. (PU31) 
 
The knowledge-based mistake involved a member of staff unintentionally requesting the 
incorrect number of hydrocortisone vials for a paediatric patient, having accepted the 
details populated by the computer generated worksheet without understanding that the 
number of vials needed to be manually amended for paediatric prescriptions. For example: 
Okay, so when putting the worksheet through the computer … you have to put the drug 
in according to the prescription, and you choose the number of vials based on what 
comes up on the computer. So I picked two, because that [is] what it says to [do]. [I] 
printed out the worksheet, [then] someone else checked it and they told me that, 
because it is for a child, it only needs one vial of hydrocortisone, not two. (PL13) 
 
 
In large Unit A, at least some of the errors classified as being of extreme risk were caused 
by two slips and one knowledge-based mistake (i.e. an incorrect strength of diluent picked 
from the shelves and the preparation of an incorrect strength of drug and incorrect number 
of doses) as well as a number of errors classified as high risk that were caused by a single 
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slip (i.e. an incorrect expiry date). In small Unit B, some of the errors classified as high 
risk were caused by two lapses (i.e. an incorrect label attached to a worksheet, with the 
signature of the maker being omitted and an incorrect expiry date), while some of the errors 
classified as being of moderate risk were caused by a single slip (i.e. the product being 
made on the incorrect day). In unlicensed Unit C, at least some of the errors classified as 
being of moderate risk were caused by two slips (i.e. leakage from a vial resulting in a dose 
being too low and an incorrect batch number of medicine (i.e. starting material) being 
placed on the worksheet and label). This identifies the need to focus on extreme and high 
risks in understanding causes and developing preventative strategies based on the data from 





II. Error producing conditions (EPCs) 
 
Based on the above categories, there were a total of four main Error Producing Conditions 
(EPCs), and twenty-seven codes. During the interviews, participants stated that error-
producing conditions contributed to errors in drug preparation, as demonstrated in Figure 
4.1, below.  
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Mental stressors n=9 












Lack of communication n=1 
 
Lack of accountability n=1  
Lack of support n=1 
 
Work alone n=3 
 





1) Working Environment  
 
Issues related to workload contributing to injectable preparation errors were regularly 
reported in interviews (n=6) using the following terms: ‘busy’; ‘busy workload’; and ‘high 
level of workload’. A further contributing factor included shortage of staff (n=3): Typical 
examples are given below: 
Busy, very busy, hardly anyone about...you haven’t got all the staff around you to 
help. (PL1)  
 
I think the workload is too high… I would say for one person. (PU32) 
 
Not enough staff in here and you will rush, amm… and maybe you miss something. 
(PU32) 
 
 In our area, we have CIVAS next door, and because we are short of staff, I had to 
make the CIVAS and we knew we had to get TPN up and running because we were 




2) Individual factors  
 
A number errors (n=3) were identified as resulting from stress and pressure due to the 
workload inside the aseptic unit during the preparation of the final product (n=6), along 
with distractions, i.e. the phone ringing and staff speaking. For examples: 
The product in question actually came in quite late, so we needed to setup under 
pressure, and it would have been checked under pressure. We were under pressure 
because it was for a set delivery time of 11.30. So we were trying to make sure it 
went out at that delivery time, so there was quite a great deal of pressure at all 
stages. (PL1) 
It was busy. The phone was going all the time, which means you are constantly on 
the phone to people outside and pharmacists. So it was quite a busy time. (PL13)  
Being stressed under pressure and just a genuine mistake. Sometimes you feel like 




An individual factor contributing to two errors was identified as a lack of familiarity with 
the computer system. Typical examples are given below: 
 
I am not really familiar with Episys. I have only ever been shown and I have never 
used it before by myself. (PS16)  
 
I was quite new to Ascribe, I had just started on Ascribe, and was just learning 
about putting the worksheets through. (PL13) 
 
A further individual factor (i.e. a negative attitude to patient safety) contributed to a single 
error, i.e. a lack of accountability. Staff who were less vigilant demonstrated a lack of 
responsibility, assuming that that they did not need to be vigilant as there would be 
additional checks. For example: 
 
It wasn’t too much of a problem because there are so many checks. There’s the 
check after Ascribe, and then it goes into the unit and is checked there. (PL13)  
 
 
3) Task and Team factors  
 
Team and task factors contributing to the manufacture of a medication on the incorrect day, 
included poor communication between the wards and the aseptic manufacturing unit, along 
with poor prescribing practices. For example:  
Sometimes they [prescription charts] come quite sporadically. Some will come on 
a Thursday, some on a Friday, and they might send some on a Monday, so you’re 
thinking, “all right, they are all for today”. Yeah. It was only when I looked in the 
fridge and I thought “they haven’t picked up this patient” that I went and checked 




A team factor contributing to a single error in one unit consisted of lack of support, i.e. one 
interviewee stated that of a lack of teamwork resulted from a member of staff being ill or 
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on annual leave, and that a number of staff were not qualified to help while others had little 
experience with the system. For example: 
As a checker, I don’t just do the aseptic unit, I do the production side. So, if there’s 
no technician in to check their work, I get called on to check their work, to check 
aseptic. ... It’s just one of those days where you’re out there on your own. (PL1)  
 
Three interviewees identified a further team factor contributing to an error as being lone 
working, i.e. the interviewee from unit C noted a high workload in the clean room as being 
a result of an absence of teamwork. Furthermore, the interviewee noted that she/he was a 
lone worker and did not understand the procedure, thus resulting in the incident: Typical 
example is given below: 
Ok ... I know Friday is a very busy day, especially in the afternoon, and I was on 
my own here in the afternoon doing all the worksheets. (PU32)  
 
 
An interviewee from unit A noted a lack of teamwork placing considerable pressure on 
staff, with some staff being unable to help with the preparation. In unit B however, an error 
arose as a result of the strong desire of a member of staff to assist his/her team when he/she 
lacked familiarity with the system. For examples: 
We have had problems recently about staff not doing the work for various reasons, 
so there’s a lot of pressure on other people...you’ve got people now just standing 
there and it’s not that they don’t know what they are doing, they just don’t see the 
urgency. (PL12) 
 
You just want to help out. You don’t want to be sitting around doing nothing. You 
just want to help out. (PS16) 
 
A number of conditions in Unit A leading to errors classified as being of extreme risk, 
resulted from a lack of knowledge, and included: (1) workload; (2) lack of staff; (3) 
pressure; and (4) distractions or interruptions. Some of the error producing conditions 
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resulting in high risk errors in unit B included: (1) miscommunication between the 
pharmacy and the ward; (2) a lack of support; and (3) poor handwriting (i.e. the prescription 
chart). A number of the error producing conditions in Unit C leading to errors classified as 
being of moderate risk included lone working. The contributing factors identified above 
should be used to develop strategies aimed at minimising the reoccurrence of IPEs. 
 
III. Latent conditions 
 
 
In this current study, twelve codes of latent conditions were identified from two main 
themes. The interviewees considered that latent conditions contributed to injectable drug 
preparation errors, as summarised in Figure 4.2. As noted in Chapter Two, this current 
study is based on Reason's (1990) Swiss cheese error causation model, which was 
subsequently further developed by Vincent et al. (1998). Thus, all these themes and codes 
were extracted and defined using the interview data collected as part of this study, and 








Staff rotation n=1 
Latent failure 
Local work and task condition Weakness in the system defence 
Low staff numbers n=5 
High workload n=4 
Poor design of the computer system 
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Poor design of the storage area      
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1) Local work and task conditions  
 
The interviewees classified a number of latent conditions contributing to injectable 
preparation errors. High workload (n=4), associated with low numbers of staff (n=5), was 
frequently stated as contributing to such errors. For examples:  
A lot of expectations, a lot of work, but not enough people. That’s not always good. 
We could do with more people sometimes. (PL11)  
 
So, if you’re on your own out there, it’s quite busy and with the way things are in 





2) Weaknesses in the system’s defences  
 
A potential cause of error was considered a consequence of staff rotation, due to this 
leading to a potential lack of ownership, i.e. a requirement from staff to be on the ward at 
a specific time led to other staff being given responsibility for completing the process of 
preparing the injectable medicine. For example: 
It was very busy yesterday. We had quite a lot of work on and with our rotation 
staff ...myself and X work there fulltime, but the rotational staff only come in on 
certain days. So Y was covering on the ward yesterday afternoon, I think she was 
on the bleep, so she needed to be back in work by two o’clock to cover that. So, 
because we didn’t come out of the unit until ten past one, everything was put in the 
quarantine shelf and Y just came in to sign her bits, and I think that, because I was 
the one who labelled them, that’s when I missed that one. (PS21) 
 
 
One participant reported poor design of the computer system as resulting in a single error. 
For example:  
I was quite new to Ascribe, but there’s nothing there to tell you that it only needs 
one vial and even people more experienced than me still make that mistake. (PL13) 
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The design of the storage area inside the unit was mentioned by other participants as 
contributing to the selection of incorrect drug vials and/or the incorrect strength of diluent. 
Typical example is given below: 
They are all together, all the sodium, the water and the glucoses, they are all 
together. They are different strengths but it is very easy to quickly go and grab the 
wrong one. (PL 1)  
 
 
Latent factors associated with errors classified as extreme risk included: (1) a high 
workload; (2) the low number of staff; (3) the layout of storage room; and (4) a poorly 
designed computer system, i.e. the strength of diluent picked from shelves, an incorrect 
strength of drug and an incorrect number doses of drug prepared. A number of latent factors 
associated with the errors classified as high risk resulted from: (1) staff being overworked; 
(2) insufficient staff to undertake work on the aseptic product; (3) staff rotation; and (4) 
poor design of the computer system, i.e. the final product expired; an out of date drug was 
delivered to the ward as the result of an error in logging the expiry date in the fridge record; 
an incorrect label was attached to worksheet; the signature of the maker was missing; and 
an incorrect expiry date. A number of latent factors associated with errors classified as 
moderate risk resulted from staff rotation and high levels of work undertaken with an 
inadequate number of staff, i.e. (1) product made on incorrect day; (2) leakage from vial 
resulting in the dose being too low; and (3) an incorrect batch number for the medicine (i.e. 
starting material) being placed on the worksheet and label. It is thus possible to establish 
error reduction strategies in response to the data obtained for active failures, along with 




IV. Barriers and defences  
 
The interviewees suggested a number of strategies to reduce the risk of errors during the 
preparation of injectable medicines, including training (n=3) lasting between six months to 
one year. Typical examples are given below: 
I think when people from the production side come across, there’s not enough 
training there. When I first started as an ATO, I shadowed someone, so I would be 
with that person all day for months and months, but people from production have 
just been dropped in the ocean [to] sink or swim. We haven’t really got a training 
person here. I mean X does it, but she’s not always here. (PL12)  
 
Just the initial training, like I said, having proper training plans in place for new 
starters, and new people to the department, so they can gain experience and have 
a six month probationary period in the area before being trusted with lifesaving 




Training included: (1) shadowing staff in the manufacturing unit; (2) visiting the ward to 
observe medication being given to patients; and (3) the provision of a dedicated trainer. 
For example:  
One-to-one training, and the three-check rule, so if people are observed and made 
aware of the errors and they understand, I think that’s the biggest thing. [To] 
understand that it’s important you double check yourself that it’s correct. (PL12) 
 
  
A second strategy identified by two interviews consisted of double-checking. They 
suggested that this minimises the risk of errors during the preparation of injectable 
medicines (n=2). Typical examples are given below:  
 
We need to highlight the fact that we must check the date and that it’s not just 
technicians that are putting through the worksheets and the labels. I think the 
pharmacists clinically...need to check that date as well...and also say to us: “this is 
a different date to the others, can we check and chase it up?” So yeah, we just need 




A further interviewee suggested that an observation strategy could be used to reduce the 
risk of errors (n=1). For example:  
 
So maybe if someone watched me for a bit, to see what I was doing, that might have 
prevented that error as they would have seen that it was for children, and therefore 
I should only have used one vial. (PL13)  
 
 
It was recommended that pharmacists and checking technicians should confirm the date on 
the prescription with the date the medicine is to be administered to the patient, in order to 
avoid a product from being prepared on the incorrect date (n=1). For example: 
 
We need to correspond more with the medical day unit ... We need to communicate 
more with them, not just rely on them to contact us. I think we need to contact them 
as well, like we do with X... Y... We phone them. If they haven’t phoned us by 
quarter past ten, we phone them to say: “Do you know who’s cancelled?” or 
“What’s going on?” (PS17)  
 
There was also a suggestion to increase in the number of staff inside the clean room, in 
order to resolve the issue of time pressure and workload and thus minimise the risk of drug 
preparation errors (n=3). For example: 
 
Umm... I think more staff is needed, that’s all. (PL11) 
 
  
One interviewee raised the issue of computer software as contributing to one error, 
suggesting that the programming of alerts into the aseptic computer software could warn 
users and prevent errors (n=1). For example: 
 
Maybe something on the software, so if this and this are together, then a warning 




Two interviewees suggested strategies to minimise the risk of preparation errors in relation 
to injectable drugs, including the separation on storage shelves of drugs that are similar and 
different strengths of the same drug (n=2), along with the use of colour coding (n=1). 
Typical examples are given below: 
 
Yeah, separate the 10% and 50%, label the boxes so they are nowhere near each 
other and separate them with big notices saying ‘please check the product’. (PL1)  
 
So, I think colour coding of different products would be good, but it’s to do with 
companies and money isn’t it? Changing packaging could be pretty pricey. (PL12) 
 
 
In addition, it was suggested that errors could be avoided (n=1) by improving the working 
environment through the designation of a quieter room with no phones for checking the 
worksheet and labelling. Typical example is given below: 
 
We could have a quieter room, or a room just for doing checking that’s not got a 
phone that acts as the main phone, so it’s not ringing constantly, and that people 
don’t come in every five minutes and use the computer. Just having a quieter room 
would make a lot of difference, because you can concentrate without being 










This study investigated errors made by staff working in three pharmacy aseptic units, along 
with their views of how such errors occurred and how they might be avoided. The results 
demonstrated that errors can be divided into a number of different classifications: (1) issues 
relating to the work environment limiting the ability of staff to prepare injectable 
medicines; (2) individual factors; and (3) errors resulting from management decisions. This 
ensured that errors could be readily be divided according to Reason’s (1990) organisational 
accident causation model (Vincent et al., 1998).  
 
This study has established that the most commonly cited contributors to the occurrence of 
injectable preparation errors consisted of a low level of staffing accompanied by high 
workload. Previous research in pharmacy aseptic units (which were based on the self-
reporting of errors) failed to identify any correlation between rates of error and workload 
(Escoms et al., 1996; Flynn et al., 1997). The current results are, however, consistent with 
a UK study by Limat et al. (2001), which examined the impact of workload on errors taking 
place during the preparation of chemotherapy injections. It was reported that a daily 
workload of over sixty preparations undertaken by a single member of staff posed a 
significant risk factor for error (p=0.016). Successful human resource management can (as 
previously reported) minimise the occurrence of errors during injectable preparation by 
ensuring: (1) the competency of staff; (2) reducing workload pressure inside the aseptic 




A considerable number of research participants reported that stress or pressure contributed 
to IPEs, relating to: (1) inadequate staffing; (2) lone working; (3) high workloads; (4) 
distraction; and (5) miscommunication. Recommended strategies for minimising stress-
related injectable preparation errors include: (1) enhanced human resource management to 
ensure adequate staffing and skill mix; (2) development of guidance on handling 
distractions; (3) removing telephones from the production unit; and (4) varying staff 
activities, thus allowing for mental breaks from risk-critical activities (Radde, 1982).  
 
The factors perceived as contributing to preparation errors in this study were similar to 
those identified in previous studies (Bateman and Donyai, 2010), including mistakes by 
individual members of staff, distraction, interruption, and inadequate training. Two of the 
participants interviewed in this study (from both the large licensed and small licensed units) 
viewed the occurrence of incidents as relating to a lack of familiarity with the computer 
system inside the aseptic unit, resulting from insufficient training. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies (Crowley, 2006; James et al., 2008, Bateman and Danyai, 2010), 
indicating a need to establish a clear training programme for all pharmacy staff, in order to 
minimise injectable preparation errors for the aseptic unit (NPSA, 2012). There is a lack of 
standardisation across NHS Trusts in the training of pharmacy staff in the process of 
preparing injectable medicines. However, standardised approved training programmes are 
available for teaching technicians to: (1) undertake accuracy checks of worksheets; (2) set 
up drugs and diluents; and (3) undertake volume checks and double checks of used vials. 
It could also be possible to establish a similar standardised training programme for aseptic 
preparation, in order to reduce injectable preparation errors, alongside the ongoing 
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validation of all pharmacy staff. James et al. (2008) suggested the following additional 
strategies to minimise the risk of errors:  
 
1) Regular meetings with staff preparing injectable drugs, in order to highlight potential 
errors.  
 
2) Attendance of conferences by staff involved with injectable drug preparation. 
 
3) Displaying of posters highlighting the risk of injectable preparation errors.  
 
The interviewees in this current study clarified that distractions and interruptions consisted 
of: (1) ringing telephones; (2) being called upon by other staff; and (3) conversations taking 
place inside the room. The interviewees put forward a number of suggestions on methods 
of resolving these issues and reducing the risk of injectable preparation errors in aseptic 
pharmacy units, i.e. the creation of a quiet room, without a telephone, specifically 
designated for writing worksheets, labelling, and checking products. This is similar to a 
number of aseptic pharmacy units, which have already removed telephones from the unit 
to the pharmacy help desk (Andalo, 2002 and Subramoney, 2009). A number of 
prescription alerting systems have been instated in some pharmacy departments, in order 
to avoid distractions by allowing ward staff to determine when the prescription has been 
received and the final product completed (Andalo, 2002).  
 
In accord with previous studies (Crowley, 2006; James et al., 2008), participants in this 
current study identified the cause of a number of errors as the close placement within a 
storage area of drugs with similar names, as well as those of a similar strength. It has been 
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estimated that 28% of medication errors reported annually to the USA Institute for Safe 
Medication Practices (ISMP) were attributed to similar packaging, leading to instructions 
by regulatory and patient safety bodies on the labelling and packaging of medicines 
(MHRA, 2003; NPSA & Helen Hamlyn Research Centre, 2006; Council of Europe Expert 
Group on Safe Medication Practices, 2007). However, a proportion of drug packaging fails 
to comply with these instructions. The NHS Pharmaceutical Quality Assurance Committee 
has established a risk assessment procedure to avoid the purchasing of medicines with 
similar packaging (Alldred, 2006), including purchasing from different manufacturers. 
Interviewees from Wales recommended separating sound-alike, or similar strength, starting 
materials onto different shelves, in order to minimise incidents. In addition, it was 
suggested that colour-coded packaging should be used in the storage area to separate 
different drugs and diluents used to prepare products, along with the employment of bar-
code identification of the selected drug during the checking phase. This is consistent with 
previous studies from a hospital in Wales, which recommended the separation of drugs of 
similar strength or colour-coded packaging (Crowley, 2006; James et al., 2008).  
 
Between fourteen and sixteen errors classified as high risk were identified in the unlicensed 
unit, along with between two and sixteen errors classified as moderate risk for patients. The 
majority of these consisted of worksheet errors, potentially due to medication being 
dispensed directly to named patients where the final check formed the main stage of the 
checking process.  
 
A summary of the errors categorised as extreme risk, high risk, and moderate risk has led 
to the development of risk reduction strategies for each unit, as summarised in tables 4.2, 
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4.3, and 4.4. These were developed from the results of the interviews conducted with 
participants in the three different pharmacy aseptic units, as well as in published literature 
(Flynn et al, 1997; Limat et al., 2001; Ferner & Aronson, 2006; Bateman & Donyai, 2010). 
Tables’ 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 reveal that individual, EPC and latent factors can contribute to 
injectable preparation errors in the pharmacy environment. The main factors identified in 
large unit A involved inadequate training of pharmacy staff concerning the complexity of 
some injectable preparations requiring complex calculations, i.e. paediatric doses (PL13). 
The results of the current study confirm the findings of published literature in terms of the 
lack of training in preparing injectable drugs for aseptic manufacture staff, while only 
limited studies have specifically studied the contributing factors of errors related to 
injectable medicine preparation in pharmacy aseptic units (Bateman and Danyai, 2010).  
 
The main factors in small Unit B related to difficulties related to the design of pharmacy 
computer systems, with one participant noting a lack of training on the new system, 
including in relation to the differences between the old and new system. The observed error 
was therefore due to the lack of clarity as to where the label was affixed to worksheet, i.e. 
being on the front in the previous system, but being now placed on the back (PS16). As 
stated above, interviewees identified the issue of a lack of appropriate training, and that the 
Trust needs to check the training methods for staff prior to, and following, competency.  
 
The main factors in unlicensed Unit C concerned the heavy workload and low number of 
staff working in the aseptic pharmacy unit. Two interviewees identified difficulties in 
working in a unit as the result of a lack of staff, and the need for additional staff to minimise 
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the reoccurrence of IPEs. One interviewee identified the high air pressure in a vial due to 
the resultant leakage of liquid (i.e. the drug), resulting in too low a dose (PU31). The 
interviewee further stated that heavy workload and low levels of staff led to a lack of 
breaks, and recommended that supervisors should allocate specific break times to all 
members of staff, to be taken regardless of the amount of work needing to be completed.  
 
This current study has a number of limitations. Firstly, in qualitative interview studies, a 
small sample size can limit the results. However, due to the lack of any new themes 
developing during in the final interviews, the sample size was considered effective for the 
current study. Furthermore, a number of significant similarities exist between the results of 
the current and previous studies employing either an interview technique or different 
methodologies to identify the causes of IPEs (Limat et al., 2001; Bateman and Donyai, 
2010).  
 
Secondly, the current study focussed on only one aspect of each unit (i.e. the large, small 
and unlicensed units). This may lead to the pharmacists’ views being limited to the study 
site and thus lacking in generalisability to other sites. But, as numerous of the participants 
had previously worked in other pharmacy units, they may have provided varied opinions 
that reduced the impact of this weakness.  
 
Thirdly, interviews were undertaken within forty-eight hours of the error occurring, leading 
to the potential for the interviewee to fail to recall some of the events leading up to the 
mistakes. Furthermore, as noted above, an interviewee can prove reticent in describing the 
actual event leading to the error, due to a fear of being held responsible (Creswell, 2009). 
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Issues may also arise concerning the reliability of data, as the perceptions of individual 
staff may have been influenced by transference of blame from themselves to others (i.e. 
own bias). However, the interview responses were consistent with those of published 
literature (Limat et al., 2001; Bateman and Donyai, 2010).  
 
Finally, a number of interviewees were pharmacy checkers and therefore subject to 
desirability bias, i.e. “participants tendency to present a favourable image of themselves” 
(Van de Mortel, 2008, p.102). Such bias may lead to altered responses concerning the IPEs 
in their units, due to their position of responsibility. In addition, pharmacy staff may also 
have given a more positive response when questioned about their individual factors. 
However, as participants were informed of the benefits of such study in improving the 
safety of medication, and were encouraged to suggest suitable solutions, this may have had 
a limited impact on this research. Furthermore, many of the individual factors contributing 
to errors were volunteered by the interviewees themselves, i.e. inadequate levels of 
knowledge and training.  
This current study supports previous studies reporting a correlation between errors and 
contributing factors, leading to a need for additional studies to: (1) explore the nature and 
role of each factor leading to IPEs; and (2) provide improved understanding of the 
relationship between these factors. Future research should also focus on set interferences, 
resulting in significant long-term improvements in medication safety. A number of studies 
have identified the most common contributors to IPEs as being workload and staffing 
levels. However, there remains a lack of relevant information relating to aetiology, and any 
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potential combination with further factors (i.e. interruptions and distractions), leading for 
a need for additional investigation into the role of such factors in IPEs.  
 
Interviewees identified pharmacy computer software as contributing to IPEs. An 
interviewee from the large licensed unit stated that a lack of guidance concerning computer 
software (PL13) used to prepare worksheets resulted in an incorrect quantity of drug vials 
being requested on the worksheet. On the other hand, the Episys system [(employed in a 
small licensed unit to prepare worksheets for cytotoxic and central IV additive services 
(CIVAS) medication)] was considered as being clear, due to relating worksheet preparation 
to label generation, i.e. incorrect information would show on the worksheet if entered into 
the computer system during label generation. Episys automatically calculates the volume 
of diluent needed to prepare medicines and clearly indicates the preparation procedure. In 
2014, an examination of the Episys system shown that it minimised the number of steps 
and the potential for error in the preparation of worksheets and labels, while enhancing 
efficiency by minimising the time taken to prepare worksheets and labels (Tyrell, 2014). 
Nevertheless, Episys presently relies on the manual entry of a batch number by the system 
operator, leading to potential errors relating to incorrect batch numbers appearing both on 
the label attached to the worksheet and the batch record book. This identifies a need for the 
software to automatically generate a batch number, while also being linked with the 
hospital patient administration system, thus ensuring that the patient’s registered hospital 
number and name appears on the label and worksheet, and so minimise errors. Episys 
software is capable of supporting this function, however it was not operational at the small 
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licensed unit during the period of data collection. The Episys system if therefore an 
example of how software can prevent errors, but only if implemented properly. 
 
A considerable number of the participants in this study reported issues relating to the design 
of pharmacy computer systems, including worksheet errors resulting from a lack of clarity 
as to: (1) when the expiry date should be noted; (2) whether a product had been made on 
the correct day; and (3) a failure to specify whether product had been transferred to the 
ward. Issues related to worksheets could be improved by introducing an electronic 
preparation system already activated (Episys) in some areas of the Trust forming the focus 
of this current study. Further studies should therefore assess whether an electronic 
preparation system (Episys) addresses worksheet errors, including reducing those related 
to both timing and the expiry date.  
 
This study has supported previous studies in identifying the contribution to IPEs of low 
staffing levels and skill mixes, in particular in units preparing a high number of injectable 
medicines (i.e. large Unit A and small Unit B), including inadequate training for the 
preparation of injectable medicines. A large number of studies reported the negative impact 
on medication safety of workload and staffing levels, identifying that an increased level of 
staffing (of experienced staff in particular), was associated with improved patient outcomes 
and reduced medication errors. However, the data analysis of a small number of UK studies 
has supported the relationship between medication errors and the proportion of experienced 
staff available (Limat et al., 2006; Bateman and Danyai, 2010). However, there remains a 
need for staff managers and institutional management to focus on the issue of staffing 
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levels, and further studies employing more robust methods are required to establish ideal 
staffing levels (taking the shift patterns into consideration) for the three different pharmacy 
aseptic units. Further work is also needed to quantify the relationship between the 
proportion of experienced staff within a team and the level of medication preparation 
errors.  
 
Interviewees in this current study identified the lack of adequate training and assessment 
provided by the Trust, i.e. the need for additional training in the practical aspect of 
injectable preparation, rather than learning from their peers, which included bad practice, 
such as deviation from policies and guidelines (Taxis and Barber, 2003). It is thus vital that 
staff (and in particular new staff) are given appropriate training, in order to improve patient 
safety and reduce errors. This can be achieved by re-evaluation of the competency 
examinations undertaken by staff prior to being approved to prepare medicines. Continuous 
education programmes should also be considered, in order to ensure that staff knowledge 
of medicines is up to date. Furthermore, a checker also emphasised the importance of the 
re-evaluation of competency for preparing injectable medicines at regular intervals (PL1). 
Further work is thus required to evaluate the Trust’s training programmes and assess their 
influence on staff skills and knowledge.  
 
The issue of the microbial contamination of the prepared injectable medicines was outside 
the scope of this current thesis, however, it has now gained additional attention following 
the deaths of several babies who had received total parenteral nutrition (TPN) contaminated 
with Bacillus cereus prepared by ITH Pharma (British pharmaceutical company) (MHRA, 
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2014). Commercial and NHS aseptic production units continuously monitor environmental 
conditions and microbial growth in clean rooms, and further work is now required to study 
the incidence, types, severity and causes of microbial contamination of injectable 
medicines prepared in the pharmacy environment.  
 
Technicians were identified as being involved with the majority of errors, due to being 
most frequently involved in the preparation of injectable drugs. The majority of errors were 
detected by pharmacists (Bateman and Danyai, 2010), suggesting that the inclusion of 
pharmacists can play an important role in recognising and addressing the training needs of 
technicians. Future work is essential to assess whether the presence of pharmacists during 

















The preparation of injectable medication forms a common, high-risk task within the 
pharmacy department. Previous studies have reported the frequency of medication errors 
during the preparation stage. The semi-structured interviews in this current study explored 
the views, opinions and experiences of pharmacy staff in relation to: (1) the preparation of 
injectable medicines; (2) the resources and methods employed to prepare injectable drugs; 
and (3) how those factors could be minimised. A previous study of this aspect had been 
untaken within the research Trust, revealing that IPEs have a number of correlating factors 
contributing to errors. The results of this current study have revealed that factors 
contributing to IPEs include individual, work environment and latent (i.e. organisational or 
managerial). Therefore, both organisations and individual staff share responsibility for 
ensuring the safe preparation of medication for patients.  
 
Classified factors focused on: (1) the work environment (e.g. high workload; low number 
of staff; distractions and interruptions; and staff rotation); (2) the task of medication 
preparation, primarily related to prescribing quality (i.e. illegible hand writing); (3) 
inadequate checking by the checker; (4) individual factors (e.g. lack of knowledge; lack of 
familiarity with the unit or medications; and mental stressors, such as pressure or 
distraction/interruptions); (5) issues within teams (i.e. lack of communication, or 
miscommunication between pharmacy and ward, and supervision); and (6) latent factors 




This current study has confirmed the main factors identified in previous studies, and the 
need to address these factors to improve the safety of medication preparation. Future 
research should investigate the nature and contribution of such factors, in order to prioritise 
efforts to reduce IPEs rates within the three different pharmacy aseptic units, including the 
outcomes of long-term developments in medication safety.  
  
This study has proposed a number of strategies for minimising error. The significant factors 
for those managing pharmacy aseptic units are as follows: (1) errors within both large and 
small units were attributed to distractions, interruptions and inadequate training; (2) errors 
within unlicensed units were attributed to lone working and a high workload, combined 
with low staffing levels. This study has therefore identified a number of recommendations 
in relation to: (1) training of pharmacy staff; (2) the effective use of programmed computer 
alert systems; and (3) improving systems supporting the management of safe medicines. 
Future studies should therefore examine the influence of these risk reduction strategies on 












Type of error Class of 
contribution factor 




Active failure Slip 
(i.e. similar 
packaging) 
Separating similar packaged medications on shelf; 
standardising colour signs for medications; bar-
code verification of medicine/diluent identify at 
accuracy check.  
EPC 1.Work environment 
(i.e. high workload) 







3. Team factor 
(i.e. lone worker) 
1. Setting priorities of work by pharmacy staff. 
 
2. Designation of a quiet room without telephones 
for filling worksheets, labelling and checking 
products and installation of prescription tracking 
systems capable of being accessed by ward staff, 
to see whether the prescription is ready for 
collection from pharmacy. 
 
3. Plan workforce to ensure adequate staff and skill 
mix and listing staff to do specific responsibilities. 
Latent failure Incorrect layout of the 
storage areas 
Ensure adequate lighting; separate look-alike, or 
sound-alike drugs on pharmacy shelves and 
fridges; underline drug names on pharmacy 




Active failure Slip:  
1. Look-alike, sound-




2. Similar packaging 
 
1. Separating drugs which look or sound-alike on 
drug shelves; highlighting problem drug names on 
shelf labels; educating staff concerning easily 
confused drugs.  
 
2. As for incorrect diluent (PL1). 
EPC Mental stressor 
(i.e. pressure) 
Rotating dispensary staff responsibilities may 
reduce stress, fatigue and risk associated with 
prolonged task performance; improved workforce 
planning; prioritisation of workload with products 
made in advance if appropriate  
Latent failure Inadequate staffing 
 
Workforce planning to determine adequate 
staffing levels  
Incorrect number 




Active failure Mistake based 
knowledge 
(i.e. design of 
computer system) 
Setting up software to calculate the volume of drug 
required to prepare product during worksheet 
preparation. 
 
EPC Individual factor  
(i.e. lack of 
knowledge and skill) 
Teaching technicians to: undertake accuracy 
checks of worksheets; set up the starting materials; 
volume check and double check of used vials; and 
enable staff to attend conferences and view posters 
demonstrating the risk of injectable preparation 
errors, i.e. techniques of showing error results and 
risk reduction strategies to ensure they are up to 
date. 
Latent failure 1. Inadequate skill 





2. Design of computer 
systems 
 
1. Ensuring staff are familiar with standard 
operating procedures; standardising the training of 
staff; development of validation procedures to 
ensure that staff transferring from different 
hospitals are competent to work in manufacturing 
units. 
2. Careful design of pharmacy computer screens, 
i.e. programming alerts into computers to highlight 
worksheets for paediatric patient overdoses.  






                     Table 4.3: Risk-reduction strategies for active failure; EPC and latent failure to minimising the risk of IPEs in the small Unit B.  
Type of error Class of contribution 
factor 






Active failure Slip 
Inadequate checks  
(i.e. failure to identify the 




Independent accuracy check of dispensed 
medicines performed by pharmacist or 
accredited checking technician; double checking 
of expiry dates; posters specifying expiry dates 
for products attached to walls in checking area. 
EPC 1. Work environment 
(i.e. high workload, in 
combination with low 
number of staff) 
2. Mental stressor 
(i.e.destruction/ 
interruption) 
1. Setting priorities of work by pharmacy staff 
and workforce planning to determine adequate 
staffing levels.  
 
2. As for incorrect diluent (PL1). 
 
Latent failure 1. Design of pharmacy 
computer systems  
2. Inappropriate training 
 
1. Programming alerts in computers to check 
expiry dates. 
2. Improved training on which drugs last twenty-
four hours and when the expiry date should be 
altered. 
Type of error Class of 
contribution factor 







Forgot to attach 
label to worksheet 
Highlighting red box where staff need to attach 







2. Mental stressor 
(i.e. pressure) 
3. Team factor 
(i.e. lack of 
teamwork ) 
1. Setting priorities of work by pharmacy staff. 
 
2. As for incorrect dose (PL12). 
 
3. Scheduling staff to undertake specific duties; 
encouraging staff to assist colleagues if they 
have completed their work earlier than 
anticipated; allocating office duties to staff with 
repetitive strain injuries. 
Latent failure Design of 
pharmacy 
computer systems  






Active failure Lapse 
Forgot to sign 
worksheet 
Highlighting red boxes where staff need to 






 Setting work priorities by pharmacy staff. 
 
 
Latent failure Design of 
pharmacy 
computer systems  
 Highlighting boxes where staff need to sign.  




                                        Continued Table 4.3 









                             
                  *2 errors made by 1 person interviewed. 
 
Table 4.4: Risk-reduction strategies for active failure; EPC and latent failure to minimising the risk of IPEs in the unlicensed   
Unit C 
Type of error Class of contribution 
factor 








(i.e. Product made 
on incorrect day ) 
Pharmacists and accuracy checking 
technicians to check the date product is to be 
prepared during clinical and worksheet 
checks.  
  





2. Task factor  
(i.e. prescription 
clarity)  




2. Standardising the format of hospital 
prescriptions across Trusts; development of 
prescribing standards. 
Latent failure 1. Design of 
pharmacy 
computer systems  
2. Lack of training 
1. Electronic prescribing and electronic 
transfer of prescriptions. 
2. Training prescribers to write prescriptions. 
Type of error Class of contribution 
factor 







Vial pressure (i.e. leakage 
from vial resulted in dose 
being too low) 
Reminding staff medicines to be kept 
slightly below the ambient air pressure to 
prevent the contents of vials from leakage. 
EPC 1.Work environment 
(i.e. high workload) 
 
2. Mental stressor 
(i.e. pressure) 




2. As for incorrect dose (PL12). 
 
Latent failure Inadequate training 
 





Active failure Slip 
Design of computer software  
(i.e. incorrect batch number of 
medicine (starting material) 
on worksheet and label) 
Computer software to automatically 
generate batch number. 
 
EPC 1.Work environment 
(i.e. high workload) 
2. Mental stressor 
(i.e. pressure) 
3. Team factor 
(i.e. lone worker) 
1. Setting priorities of work by pharmacy 
staff. 
2. As for incorrect dose PL12. 
 
3. As for incorrect diluent PL1. 
Latent failure 
 
Design of pharmacy computer 
systems 
Programming alerts into computers to 








Investigating Injectable Preparation Error Rates and 


























The purpose of medical treatment is to improve the status of the patient and to ensure 
the care process takes place with a minimum of harm. Such incidents can occur during 
the therapeutic delivery of medicines (Allan and Barker, 1990). Treatment with 
injectable medicines is beneficial for patients only if the conditions for their safe use 
are applied by both the relevant NHS organisation and their staff. Medication errors 
can arise at any phase of the treatment process, including when prescribing, preparing 
or administering the medicine. Injectable preparation errors (IPEs) can result in serious 
harm to patients with dire economic consequences (Cohen, 2007).  
 
In the United Kingdom hospitals, injectable medicines are prepared mainly by nurses 
in a clean but not sterile environment (Beaney and Black, 2012).  The Breckenridge 
report (1979) outlined the risks linked with the preparation of injectable medicines in 
hospital wards. Since that time, several incidents have been reported involving errors 
in the preparation of injectable medicines on hospital wards, and there are enduring 
fears over the risk of medicines being contaminated (Beaney and Goode, 2003). The 
present review considers studies conducted in Europe in detail. 
 
The most common types of IPEs in hospitals’ clinical areas, as reported in UK and 






The reviewed literature showed that the most commonly reported errors regarding 
injectable preparation are use of incorrect dose, incorrect diluent, incorrect aseptic 
method, and incorrect diluent volume (Figure 5.1). The rate of errors affecting ward-
based injectable drug preparation was reported as high 53% (see section 1.6) and, while 
the consequences of most of these errors are minor, some errors result in serious harm 
to patients (Taxis and Barber, 2003).  







Wirtz et al        (2003)    TBP
Wirtz et al        (2003)    TGP
Wirtz et al        (2003)    GSP
Taxis & Barber (2003) Germany Cousins et al (2005)  UK
Cousins et al (2005)  Germany
Cousins et al (2005)  France
Crowley       (2006)   UK
Notes:
TBP: Traditional British ward pharmacy service. 
TGP: Traditional German ward pharmacy service. 



















Figure 5.1: Most common types of injectable preparation errors in the hospital clinical areas 
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A further issue is that the environment in which injectable medicines are prepared is 
not sterile and drug products can become contaminated. For example, one study showed 
that 7 of the 20 containers prepared on the wards were contaminated with 
Staphylococcus, a skin microorganism (Beaney and Goode, 2003). The risk of 
microbiological contamination is much greater when making preparations in an 
uncontrolled environment such as a ward, compared with a pharmacy aseptic unit where 
air is filtered and staff are clothed to prevent contamination of the product (Beaney and 
Goode, 2003). The authors suggested that risks to patients can be reduced by: 
 Enhancing the treatment room - e.g. aseptic cleaning, hand washing, and putting 
on gloves and aprons before preparation. 
 Applying non-touch techniques during medicine preparation. 
 Reducing the time between the preparation and administration (so that any 
contaminant has minimal time to grow) (Beaney and Goode, 2003).  
 
These guidelines represent a challenge to nurses, due to their working environment. 
Nevertheless, NHS Trusts are expected to ensure the above processes/policies be put in 
place to guide preparation techniques, regardless of the working environment (Crowley 
et al., 2004). 
 
In 2007, the National Patient Safety Agency became aware of the continuing high level 
of errors reported regarding injectable medicines. This led them to issue a patient safety 
alert regarding hospital wards, requiring the NHS to carry out six actions (see section 
1.6). These principles remain relevant, and form the basis of current procedures 
imposed when preparing injectable medicines. Additionally, the Department of Health 
(2008) Clean, Safe Care initiative was based on these principles, although it applies 




As mentioned above, in pharmacies the preparation of injectable medicines is expected 
to be performed in a well-established environment, such as an aseptic preparation room. 
However, environment and work process controls in hospital wards are less strict in the 
hospital ward environment, and as a result, medication errors are more frequent 
(Beaney and Goode, 2003; Crowley, 2006; Beaney, 2010), as is microbiological 
contamination leading to infection (Beaney and Black, 2012).  
 
Other studies performed outside Europe (Abbasinazari et al., 2012; Shamsuddin and 
Shafie, 2012; Nguyen et al., 2013; Vaismoradi et al., 2013), establishing the errors that 
arise during the preparation or administration of injectable medicines in hospital 
clinical areas have posited that use of the incorrect diluent, incorrect dose calculation, 
and incorrect preparation techniques are the most common errors. The conclusion of 
these studies is that the expertise of pharmacists should be consulted when preparing 
injectable medicines to minimise errors. Thus, nurses should ideally work together with 
the pharmacy department to report possible incidents and minimise the risks to patients. 
 
In this project the researcher investigated the incidence, types, causes and severity of 
internal errors, which occurred during the preparation of injectable drugs in clinical 
settings. The researcher then proposed interventions to reduce the types of errors, which 







5.2. Significance of the study  
 
 
Risks to patients are greater when injectable medicines are prepared in hospital wards, 
than they are when prepared in the hospital pharmacy (Beaney and Black, 2012). 
Therefore, there is a need for studies to expand our current understanding of those 
factors influencing errors during injectable drug preparation in clinical areas, to learn 
more about how incidents threatening patient safety arise. Only by discussing these 
factors can applicable solutions be developed to improve patient safety. Thus, this 
project was designed to meet the requirements of Patient Safety Alert 20 to investigate 
the preparation of injectable medicines (NPSA, 2007).  
 
The majority of studies summarised in the literature review reported error rates based 
on the sum of all recorded preparation or administration errors, divided by the sum of 
the prepared or administered drug doses observed. These studies evaluated both 
preparation and administration errors for intravenous drugs on specific wards (e.g. 
intensive care units and surgical wards) and reported a wide range (i.e. 7–53%) of error 
rates during preparation, although this variability could have partly resulted from 
different study durations. Another explanation for the wide range in reported 
percentages might be the use of different definitions for what constitutes an error. In 
terms of their limitations, many of the reviewed studies did not extensively investigate 
the IPEs, resulting in a lack of comprehensive descriptions of error characteristics. In 
response, the proposed study seeks to partly resolve the above, for the following 
reasons: 
 
1. The proposed study can improve the detection of the incidence of errors during 
injectable drug preparation in hospital clinical areas. Many previous studies 
focused on injectable preparation and administration errors. For example, 
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Crowley (2006) specifically examined IPEs, yet did not interview the nurses 
involved in making these errors. By contrast, the proposed observational study 
and follow-up interviews and questionnaires will be conducted with staff who 
committed errors, to provide an in-depth understanding of the underlying causes 
of IPEs and, more importantly, raise staff awareness and promote patient safety.  
2. Previous studies often did not classify the severity of errors; to it is hard to know 
the consequences of previously observed errors rates. An in-depth assessment 
of errors can help identify possible strategies to avoid similar errors happening 
in the future, and thus improve patient safety. In response, this project assessed 
the severity of injectable drug preparation errors recorded on hospital wards 
following direct observation.  
5.3 Aims and objectives 
 
The aim of this study was to determine the types, incidence, and severity of errors made 
by nurses in four wards located at two different hospitals (two wards in each hospital), 
during the preparation of injectable medicines, to allow for the development of 
strategies to prevent the most common and most severe errors. 
5.4 Research Objectives 
 
Research objectives for this study are to: 
 
1. Determine the incidence of injectable medicine preparation errors on hospital 
wards. 
2. Identify the types of injectable medicine preparation errors on hospital wards. 




4. Compare the incidence and types of injectable medicine preparation errors 
occurring on four wards. 
5. Confirm that the injectable drug preparation errors observed on the hospital 
wards can be classified as errors. 
6. Assess the severity of these errors on a scale of 0-10. 
7. Determine consequence and likelihood scores, to assign an overall risk score 
analogous to that used by the National Patient Safety Agency. 
8. Use the data to put forward error reduction strategies for errors associated with 
the highest risk scores 
5.5 Overview of methodology 
5.5.1 Study Design 
 
 
This study adopted a case study design, as defined in chapter two. The case study 
approach allows an investigator to closely investigate the data within a certain setting 
(in this case, the hospital’s wards). In general, a case study approach selects a small 
environmental area (i.e. a ward) or a very small group of individuals (i.e. nurses) as 
subjects. Case studies explore and investigate real-life phenomena through a detailed 
analysis of data, providing a number of incidents or conditions and describing their 
relationships. In practice, a case study design allows the investigator to perform an 
observational study in the environment in which errors are occurring. A case study 
design was chosen for the proposed research because it is a flexible and practical 
approach (Creswell, 2009). The study employed a quantitative methodology when 
identifying the types and incidents of errors made during the preparation of injectable 
medicines (Flynn et al., 1997; Wirtz et al., 2003; Parshuram et al., 2008), Neergaard et 
al., 2009) (see section 2.6.1).  
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This study was conducted in two clinical areas at two UK hospitals. One was a large 
teaching hospital with 1,500 beds, and the other was a medium-size district general 
hospital with 650 beds. The sample included both surgical and general medicine wards.  
 
The observational study was carried out over a total of eight weeks; four weeks of 
observations were completed on a medical ward and four weeks on a surgical ward (see 
Table 5.1). The observer (AA) witnessed the preparation of injectable medicines between 
11am and 8:30pm Monday to Friday. These times were chosen following discussion with 
ward managers, who explained that where possible, injectable medicines were not given 
during the morning drug round (8am), as staff are busy giving many oral medicines and 
performing other tasks at this time. Therefore, data were collected during the times of day 
when injectable medicines are most likely to be prepared. 
 
A standard observation schedule was drawn up based on relevant local policy namely 
[Aseptic Non Touch Technique (ANTT) Staff Workbook, 2015; Management Policy: 
Prescribing, Preparing and Administrating Injectable Medicines in Clinical Areas, 2015 
and Hospitals Injectable Medicines Administration Guide, 2010] and national policies 
[Royal College of Nursing (RCN), Standards for Infusion Therapy, 2016 and IV Policy: 
Medicines Code: Administration of Intravenous Drugs, 2016]. Any deviation from the 





    Table 5.1: Characteristics of the four wards chosen for this study 
 Surgical ward (S) Medical ward (C) Medical ward (B) Surgical ward (H) 
Number of beds 30 beds, arranged in 4 bays of 6 beds 
(2 male bays and 2 female bays) and 6 
single side rooms. 
22 beds which included three single-sex 
bays of four beds each and ten single 
rooms. 
32 beds that treat patients 
with chronic/acute respiratory 
diseases and 6 bedded 
isolation suite that cares for 
patients with complex 
infectious diseases, including 
HIV and TB. 
32 beds that treat patients 
with a range of general 













11. Coagulation Factor VIII Complex 
(Human). 











10. Coagulation Factor VIII Complex 
(Human). 
















15. Sodium ferric gluconate 
16. Electrolyte infusions (e.g. 












13. Electrolyte infusions (e.g. 
sodium chloride 0.9%). 
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A trained investigator (AA) was present on each of the four wards for two weeks, in 
order to observe the process of preparing injectable medicines. Previous studies 
conducted a total of between 68 and 430 observations (Wirtz et al., 2003; Taxis & 
Barber, 2003; Crowley, 2006; Ong, 2013). Initial hospital visits suggested it would be 
possible to observe 35-45 preparations during an 8-hour shift. It was therefore decided 
to carry out observations on each ward for a two week period (ten working days), thus 
giving 350-450 observations per ward, as this would result in a large number of 
observations than previous studies. In addition, two weeks on each ward was the longest 
period of time for it was practical to collect data.  
 
Direct observation, the so-called ‘the gold standard method’ (Allan & Barker, 1990) 
(see section 2.6.1), was used to determine the incidence and types of errors that occur 
when preparing injectable medicines, and data was collected using a standard structured 
observation schedule (Appendix 10). Direct observation is a valuable tool, which 
enables investigators to record actual events, instead of trusting reports that might not 
accurately represent what has been happening (Allen & Barker, 1990; Dean & Barber, 
2001; Bowling, 2002; Smith, 2002; Carthey, 2003; Bryman, 2004), as has been the 
method previously (Hoppe–Tichy et al., 2002; Crowley, 2006). The study participants 
might feel under pressure, or uncomfortable about being observed when preparing 
injectable medicines. However, study participants who felt uncomfortable or stressed 
are unlikely to consent to participate in research. Throughout the data collection 
process, and with participants’ consent, the investigator watched, but did not interrupt, 
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nursing staff as they prepared injectable drugs. The investigator recorded all the 
injectable medicines prepared on the observation schedule, noting any errors at the 
preparation stage, the location of the error, and a description of the type of error. The 
mistakes observed by the investigator were kept confidential, and identified using a 
reference number; no personal information was collected on the observation schedule. 
The observations commenced at the point when the equipment was collected and went 
on until the drug was ready to administer. To enable calculation of the total number of 
errors per year (see section 5.8.2), for the duration of the ten day observation period, 
nursing staff recorded the total number of injectable medicines prepared in each 24 hour 
period. 
 
The observations took place from Monday to Friday, between 11 am and 8:30 pm, as 
recommended by Crowley (2006). During that time, the investigator observed all the 
drugs that were prepared; however, the investigator did not observe the nightly drug 
round; a notable limitation of this observational study. Another major limitation of the 
observational method is the observer effect, or Hawthorne effect, whereby “the 
presence of the researcher, and the knowledge that the study is taking place, may 
influence the behaviours of the individuals being observed” (Smith, 2002; p. 168). This 
effect can restrict the validity of an investigation, although according to Bowling (2002) 
and Smith (2002), several strategies can be used to minimize it. The researcher applied 
some of these strategies; for example, communicating with staff in the area of study 





5.6.2 Definition of IPEs and Types of errors 
 
A variety of definitions have been used to describe IPEs in previous research, as 
summarised in Table 5.2. This study adopted Crowley (2006) definition. The 
advantages of adopting a consistent definition include allowing comparison of IPEs. By 
drawing on data from Crowley’s study in particular, this study can take advantage of 
that study’s links with the Patient Safety Alert 20 (Crowley, 2006). 
 
Table 5.2: A summary of previous studies definitions of injectable drug preparation error  
 
 
The definitions of IPEs subtypes used in this study are showed in Table 5.3. The subtype 
definitions were also adapted from Crowley (2006), and have been approved by the 
study team (JL; MJ). Definitions were found to be valid during the pilot study phase, 






Wirtz et al. (2003), p. 105 
UK 
 
“Any deviation in preparation of an IV dose from the original 
prescription, or any act in the preparation that deviates from the 
manufacturer’s instructions or the hospital’s drug policy”  
Wirtz et al. (2003), p. 106 
Germany  
 
“The German hospitals researched had no medicine policy, so the 
leaflets produced by the manufacturer (Fachinformation), which 
were mainly designed for health care professionals, were used as the 
definition of correct practice. Errors identified by nurses and patients 
and corrected before administration were not recorded as errors”. 
Taxis and Barber (2003), p. 816 
Germany 
“A deviation in preparation of a drug from a doctor’s prescription, 
the hospital’s IV policy, or the manufacturer’s instructions” 
Cousins et al. (2005), p. 191 
UK 
 
“A deviation in the preparation of a medicine from a doctor’s 
prescription, hospital intravenous procedures, or the manufacturer’s 
instructions” 




“The preparation of an injectable medication that deviates from the 
prescription; manufacturer’s guidelines; nationally or locally 
agreed-upon policy, procedure, or guidance; or generic standards 
for clean or aseptic preparation” 
Dehmel et al. (2011), p. 1312 
Germany 
“Drug concentration deviates from intended concentration” 
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Type of error Definition 
Wrong medicine 
 
“A dose of medicine prepared that was not the drug prescribed is an 
error”.  
“Where manufacturers’ instructions for preparation of a branded or 




“Preparing a wrong dose product or wrong strength infusion. (Where 
products are made from whole vials e.g. amoxicillin 250mg from a 
250mg vial, no deviation from this dose would be allowed. Where a 
fraction of a dose unit is required, or any other measurement, any 
discrepancy greater than ±10% from the dose would be an error)”.  
Diluent error “Deviation from the manufacturer and/or hospital’s instructions on the 
choice, or volume, of a diluent, solvent or infusion fluid, without 
documented patient-specific instructions”.  
Un-prescribed error “Preparing for a patient an injectable medication that is not prescribed 
(excludes flushes)”.  
Wrong route “Preparing an injectable dose using the wrong route of administration 
is an error, e.g. preparing a medication dose for administration 




“Failing to fully reconstitute a product during preparation, or adhere 
to the mixing instructions. (This includes failure to dissolve the powder, 
failing to activate a mini bag plus infusion device that has a vial of 
powder attached, or vigorously shaking a medication that foams e.g. 
Factor VIII and teicoplanin)”.  
“Inappropriate addition to a syringe/infusion container (e.g. adding to 
a rigid or flexible bag hanging on an IV infusion stand, or not mixing 
thoroughly after addition)”.  
Calculation error “Any calculation mistake that produces a preparation (± 10% dose 
instructed) is an error”.  
Allergy 
 
“Preparing an IV medication for a latex-allergic patient without either 
avoiding latex exposure, or not following hospital guidelines, where 
available, on the care of latex-allergic patients”.  
Wrong storage 
 
“Using an IV ingredient that has not been stored according to 
instructions, without verifying its suitability with pharmacy before 
preparation (e.g. using a product needing refrigeration that was left at 
room temperature overnight)”.  
Faulty labelling 
 
“Faulty labelling is an error. (Labels are required for all infusions. 
Labels for bolus doses are needed when more than one dose is 
prepared, or the prepared dose is put down or passed to another 
practitioner, or where administration is delayed)”.  
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Continued Table 5.3: 
Type of error Definition 
Incompatibility error 
 
“Adding a medicine to a syringe/infusion already containing a drug with 
which the medicine is incompatible”.  
“Preparing a medication, in an incompatible container (e.g. insulin, 
glyceryl trinitrate)”.  
“Adding an IV medicine to a blood product or compounded (ready to 
administer) parenteral nutrition where there is not locally documented 
acceptability”.  
Expired / degraded or 
unknown expiry 
 
“Preparing a medication using an expired ingredient”.  
“Preparing a medication using degraded or unsuitable ingredient 
(includes cracked emulsions; solutions with unintended particles or 
discolouration; damaged containers)”.  
“Using a previously opened IV multi dose container, where the date of 
first use is not documented”.  
“Using a single use IV ingredient whose tamper-evident seal has been 





“Chemotherapy preparation must never occur in general clinical areas, 
without additional specialist facilities (e.g. isolator)”.  
“Re-using an intravenous medication that is licensed for single use on a 
subsequent occasion, or another patient, unless there is a written 
hospital policy authorising this, is an error (e.g. using an infusion bag to 
withdraw flushes for more than one patient)”.  
“Not filtering a product when the manufacturer’s instructions or 
hospital policy state the product must be filtered (e.g. phenytoin)”.  
“Filtering a product whose stability may be adversely affected by this 
process (e.g. using a 0.22micron filter with a lipid)”.  
“Not changing the filter needle before adding to a syringe or infusion, 
having drawn up medication through a filter needle to prevent 
contamination of the product is an error”.  
“Pouring the IV medication into unsterile cup to aid drawing up is an 
error”.  
“Failing to take appropriate infection control precautions after an 
injury during preparation is an error (e.g. continuing preparation 
without changing the needle after a needle-stick injury)”.  
“Breach of ‘no touch’ technique, where the operator touches areas that 
might cause contamination such as the syringe tip or needle hub is an 
error”.  
“Gross disregard for clean/aseptic technique during IV medication 
preparation is an error e.g. dropping an uncapped syringe and needle 
on the floor and continuing preparation without any corrective action”.  
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5.6.3 Development of the Observation Schedule 
 
 
A list of the required variables needed to assess whether an error had occurred was 
based on the type of IPE, as set out in the framework established in section 5.6.2. This 
data, together with information from relevant local (i.g. ANTT Staff Workbook, 2015; 
Management Policy: Prescribing, Preparing and Administrating Injectable Medicines 
in Clinical Areas, 2015 and Hospitals Injectable Medicines Administration Guide, 
2010) and national policies (RCN, Standards for Infusion Therapy, 2010), was used to 
adapt and a schedule used previously (Crowley, 2006). The final observation schedule 
aimed to collect data pertaining to the error and not to investigate the staff, as no 
personal information was recorded. In November 2015, a draft observation schedule 
was designed (Appendix 11) by the researcher and reviewed by Dr. Lynette James and 
Dr. Julie Letchford at the University of Bath to verify that all error types were included. 
Minor improvements were made to the design, based on feedback from the author’s 
supervisors. In March 2016, a trial observation to pilot the schedule was conducted on 
a general medical and surgical ward with the staff and managers’ permission. Further 
minor changes were made to the observational schedule to improve its data recording 
capacity, before it was then used on the hospital wards. In April 2016, the final draft of 
the data collection tool was ready for use (appendix10). 
5.6.4. Ethical approval  
 
 
This project has been approved in accordance with the University of Bath’s ethics 
procedures (Appendix 1). The study was conducted as a service evaluation at each 
participating NHS organisation in England, with the approval of the relevant medicine 
governance committees. Individual patient consent to view their medication record was 
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not granted, because the studies were approved as either audit (pharmacy aseptic units) 
or service evaluations (hospital wards), and consent is not a requirement in these 
situations. This is in line with similar research conducted in the UK recently as it is not 
practical to gather consent from everyone, especially in the case of ill patients 
(Blandford et al, 2016; Furniss et al, 2018; Lyons et al, 2018). The investigator was also 
given an honorary contract at each participating site, sharing the same duties of care 
and responsibilities as the other members of staff employed by the NHS organisation 
(Appendix 12). All the activities, discussions, and details of the personnel and patients 
witnessed by the investigator were kept strictly confidential. 
 
The data collection of IPEs was confidential and any errors were identified by reference 
number only. During the study, a temporary list of staff names and reference numbers 
were compiled to facilitate the study operation. This list was stored securely and 
confidentially, and destroyed once the data collection was complete and the interviews 
transcribed. Demographic data was also stored confidentially and only reported in 
aggregate form. Electronic files were stored exclusively in the University of Bath’s 
secure data management facility. All hard copies (e.g. written consent forms) were 
stored in a locked filing cabinet at the University of Bath. 
 
The results of the project were shared with each organisation in the form of a written 
report, however participating individuals were not identifiable. 
5.6.5 Study Participants 
 
 
Prior to data collection the investigator (AA) requested permission to observe nursing 
staff, at which time a suitable schedule for observations was agreed. Two weeks prior 
to the observations, the investigator distributed an information leaflet to all the nursing 
 
221 
staff likely to be preparing injectable medicines during the study period. Before each 
nurse’s first observation, they were provided with an explanation of the aim of this 
research, stating that it was a protocol study (appendix 13), based on distribution of 
participant information leaflet (appendix 14) and face-to-face discussions, and that they 
would need to provide their written consent (Appendix 15). Moreover, it was explained 
that nurses who did not provide their consent would not be observed. It was also noted 
that the investigator would behave in a professional non-judgemental way, and that the 
researcher would only intervene if the error would be likely to harm to the patient, and 
in such cases their personal information would not be recorded. The nursing staff were 
also asked to inform the patients, or their representatives, if questioned about the study, 
that the investigator would not be interfering in their care management and is merely 
observing the nurse. Furthermore, the investigator took training from one of the senior 
clinical pharmacists and a sister to collate experience about the medication preparation 
procedure and drug charts.  
5.6.6 Data collection 
 
 
The observer (AA) introduced himself to the members of staff on the clinical ward, and 
discussed convenient times (11am and 8:30pm) on weekdays to conduct the data 
collection. Written consent was obtained from those willing to participate in the study. 
Preliminary observations were carried out to familiarise the observer with preparation 
process and how the clinical ward typically operated when not under scrutiny. When 
familiarisation was attained, the data collection process was commenced. The 
observations were carried out for 10 days on each ward (from 11am to 8:30pm) 
excluding weekends, between September 2015 and November 2015. The author 




As mentioned above, the data collection form was designed according to that previously 
used by Crowley (2006). The investigator observed the preparation of injectable 
medicines and recorded the data on the data collection form. During the observations, 
the observer ensured he had chosen appropriate location inside treatment room and not 
in the way of the nurses. If error was observed, then the observer politely asked the 
nurse to stop before continuing to prepare the product. This was documented as an IPE. 
However, if the nurse noticed the error prior to preparation and acted without the 
observer’s interference this was not documented as an IPE. If the nurse was unsure a 
medication error mentioned by the observer had occurred, the observer stated that he 
believed a possible error might have happened. The observer then asked that they get 
the preparation checked by another qualified member of staff. If they believed there 
was potential to harm the patient if the preparation were administered, they informed 
the ward pharmacist. This would allow the pharmacist to investigate the incident, and 
where suitable follow the Trust’s incident reporting procedure. In addition, to confirm 
the consistency of the observations, the observer reviewed all the collected data after 
completion of the observations and before additional data analysis. This was to ensure 
that each observation was documented and interpreted reliably.  




A coding framework was developed for the observation schedule, and the coded data 
was later entered into Microsoft Excel (2007; Microsoft, Redmond, Washington, US) 
for analysis. The overall rate of errors in the preparation of injectable medicines was 




Overall error rate (%)  
 The number of doses with one or more error / Number of observations x 100 
 
Medicine specific error rate (%) 
Number of preparations of specific drug that contained an error/number of observations 
for that drug preparation x100 
 
Percentage of preparations associated with error for specific drug (%) 
Number of errors for a specific drug / Number of observations × 100 
 
Frequency tables were created for the types of errors and their occurrence in the 
preparation process, and a One-Way ANOVA test was used to measure the differences 
between wards. Any result in which p ≤ .05 was considered statistically significant.  
 
In a subsequent phase of the project, any observed errors were retrospectively graded 
for severity by a panel consisting of experienced healthcare professionals (two doctors, 
two pharmacists and a nurse) using a method validated by Dean and Barber (1999). 




Injectable medicines preparation consists of a chain of multiple phases, and any mistake 
during these represents a potential or actual risk to the patient. Few studies have 
examined the severity associated with IPEs in hospitals’ wards (Taxis and Barber, 
2003; Cousins et al., 2005; Beaney, 2006). The aim of this study is to assess the severity 
of errors previously observed in four wards and calculate a risk score. Using 
consequence and likelihood scores analogous to that used by the National Patient Safety 
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Agency (NPSA). Errors with highest risk scores were provide a focus for developing 
strategies to help prevent these types of errors from occurring again (see section 2.6.2).    
5.7.2 Research Method 
 
A professional healthcare panel carried out the assessment of the severity of the IPEs 
reported in this study. The panel consisted of a general doctor, an oncologist, a clinical 
pharmacist and an aseptic pharmacist, and one senior nurse (see section 2.6.3).  
5.7.3 Development of the Severity Study 
 
 
The severity questionnaire was similar to that used for assessing errors in pharmacy 
aseptic units. Each potential error was confirmed and its severity determined via a 
widely used validated method, appropriate for situations where the actual patient 
outcome is unknown, as in this study (Dean and Barber, 1999) (see section 2.6.4).  
5.7.4 Selection of Severity Panel 
 
 
A panel of two senior general physicians, two senior pharmacists and one senior nurse 
completed a questionnaire containing a brief description of each potential error 
independently. They were asked individually to: 
 
 Confirm or refute each potential error; and 
 Score the potential clinical significance of each potential error on a scale from 





The five individual severity scores obtained for each error were then used to calculate 
a mean severity score for each error (see section 2.6.4). 




To select which errors merited focus to develop strategies for risk reduction, the 
guidelines of the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) were adopted to obtain risk 
assessment scores (NPSA, 2008). Mean severity scores and error frequency data for the 
different types of error were used to calculate consequence and likelihood scores, which 
were multiplied to calculate risk assessment scores (see section 2.4.1). 
5.7.6 Consequence score: 
 
The mean severity scores obtained for each ward were mapped onto the NPSA 




Table 5.4: Mapping of mean severity data on to NPSA consequence descriptors to obtain a consequence 
score. 
 
Mean severity score NPSA consequence descriptor NPSA consequence score 
 
<0.5 Negligible 1 
0.5–3.4 Minor 2 
3.5–6.4 Moderate 3 
6.5–9.4 Major 4 
≥9.5 Catastrophic 5 
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5.7.7 Likelihood score: 
 
 
The frequency of each type of error was used to calculate an observed error rate and 
predict the number of errors likely to occur in one year (see section 2.5.6).  
 
 
 Observed error rate = Number of times a type of error occurred each in ward  
 
                                              Total observations in each ward  
 
 
Predicted number of = (Observed error rate × Total items prepared in each ward    
during observation period) ×365 
     errors in one year 
                                                                            10 
 
Values obtained for the predicted number of errors in one year for each ward were 
mapped on to the NPSA frequency descriptors to obtain a likelihood score of 1–5, as 
shown in Table 5.5.  
 
 
  Table 5.5: Mapping of error frequency into NPSA time frequency description to obtain likelihood score. 
 
 
5.7.8 Risk score: 
 
 
 Consequence and likelihood scores were multiplied to calculate the risk scores (1–25) 
and assign a risk grade, as shown in Table 5.6 (see section 2.4.1).  
 
Predicted number of errors 







<1 Not expected to occur for years Rare 1 
1-11 
 
Expected to occur at least annually Unlikely 
 
2 
12–51 Expected to occur at least monthly Possible 3 
52–364 Expected to occur at least weekly Likely 4 




  Table 5.6: Grading risk score by multiplying consequence score and likelihood score (NPSA, 2008). 
 
5.7.9 Data collection and data analysis  
 
Data collected was analysed using Microsoft Excel 2007 (Microsoft, Redmond, 
Washington, US) programme. All the data collected from the panel was independently 
entered by the researcher and checked by the supervisors to ensure the quality of data 
entry (see section 2.6.6). The data set was then analysed as previously described (see 
section 2.6.7). 
5.7.10 Data storage 
 
Raw data will be securely retained at the University of Bath for five years before secure 








Risk score Assigned grades 
1–3  Low risk  
4–6  Moderate risk  
8–12   High risk 




5.8.1 Results from Observation Study  
 
 
During the study period, 2602 scheduled injectable medicine doses were prepared in 
total. The researcher was present for 40% of each 24 hour period and observed the 
preparation of a similar proportion of the total number of doses (44.1%) of these. The 
majority of the doses were intravenous (IV) doses (n=1042), followed by subcutaneous 
(SC) doses (n=105) and intramuscular doses (IM) (n=1). The most common 
preparations were antibiotic medicines (n= 391); there were also electrolyte infusions 
(n=341) (e.g. sodium chloride 0.9%), and enoxaparin (n=90).  Table 5.7 provides a 
summary of the data. In total, 66 nurses participated in the observations during the 
eight-week study.  
 
All nursing staff reacted well to the study and expressed an interest in its aims. None 
expressed concern about being watched. The senior nurse and the physicians on the 
ward supported the observer with their resources and suggestions. Although not 
systematically collected, on two occasions, the parents of the patients commented to 
the observer that they were pleased the study was being carried out. None of the 





























Number of days observed 10 10 10 10 40 
Number of staff observed 17 11 15 23 66 
Number of antibiotics observed 83 47 144 117 391 
Number of electrolyte infusions observed 43 57 118 123 341 
Number of heparins doses observed 2 7 68 44 121 
Number of analgesics observed 28 8 9 27 71 
Number of antiemetics observed 2 14 24 21 61 
Number of diuretics observed 3 6 18 2 29 
Number of aciclovir sodium doses observed 0 2 15 2 19 
Number of corticosteroids doses observed 1 2 16 0 19 
Number of Pabrinex doses observed 1 0 11               3 15 
Number of chemotherapy dose observed 0 10 0 0 10 
Number of Hartmann’s solution infusions 
observed 
2 0 3 5 10 
Number of digoxin doses observed 2 4 2 2 10 
Number of phytomenadione doses observed 2 0 6 0 8 
Number of hyoscine butylbromide doses observed 0 1 4 3 8 
Number of calcium gluconate 10% infusions 
observed 
3 0 0 2 5 
Number of potassium chloride infusions observed 0 4 0 1 5 
Number of insulin doses observed 2 0 2 0 4 
Number of magnesium sulphate infusions 
observed  
0 0 4 0 4 
Number of coagulation factor VIII complex 
(human) doses observed 
0 3 0 0 3 
Number of calcium folinate doses observed 0 3 0 0 3 
Number of ranitidine doses observed 0 0 0 3 3 
Number of adrenaline doses observed 1 0 0 0 1 
Number of human albumin solution (Zenalb) 
infusions observed 
1 0 0 0 1 
Number of human normal immunoglobulin 
(Privigen) infusions observed 
0 1 0 0 1 
Number of sodium ferric gluconate doses 
observed 
0 0 1 0 1 
Number of aminophylline infusions observed 0 0 0 1 1 
Number of amiodarone doses observed 0 0 0 1 1 
Number of chlorphenamine doses observed 0 1 0 0 1 
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5.8.2 Incidence and Types of Injectable Medicine Preparation Errors in the 
Hospital wards 
 
Three hundred and seventy two (372) IPEs were recorded from the 1148 dose 
preparations observed. The observer intercepted all the IPE incidents before the patients 
received the drug. There were also 13 IPEs that were corrected by the nurse being 
observed or by the second nurse responsible for checking the preparation before 
delivering it to the patient. These corrected errors were not included in the total of 372 
IPEs. The 13 IPEs that were detected in time by the nurse were: wrong dose (n=3); 
faulty labelling (n=2); wrong diluent (n=5), and wrong medicine (n=3). The incidence 
of IPEs that occurred during the observations on each ward are shown in Table 5.8. 
 
Table 5.8: Incidence of errors during the preparation of injectable drugs in each ward 
 
There was no significant difference in the incidence of errors between the medical and 
surgical wards (One way ANOVA, f = 0.8706, p. Value (P) = 0.5264). The overall rate 
of IPEs for the four wards was 32.4%. 
 
Table 5.9-5.12 show the IPEs, which occurred on the surgical ward (S), the medical 
ward (C) the medical ward (B) and the surgical ward (H) respectively. Errors were most 
commonly occurred during the preparation of antibiotics, electrolyte infusions, 
analgesics and antiemetics. 








Total number of 
injectable medicine 




393 365 981 863 
Number of observations 176 170 445 357 
Number of errors 45 44 150 133 






  Table 5.9: A summary of the injectable drug preparation errors that occurred in the surgical ward (S) (n=176). 
 
Surgical ward (S)  
Type of medicine 
 
Route Number of drug observations Number 
of errors 
Medicine specific 
error rate (%) 
Percentage of preparations associated 
with error for specific drug (%) 










Adrenaline I.V. 1 2 100% 0.5% 0 1 0 
Phytomenadione I.V. 2 4 100% 1.1% 0 2 0 
Furosemide I.V. 3 4 100% 1.7% 2 1 0 
Ondansetron I.V. 2 2 100% 1.1% 2 0 0 
Insulin I.V. 2 2 100% 1.1% 2 0 0 
 Tazocin I.V. 13 7 54% 3.9% 7 0 0 
Teicoplanin I.V. 2 1 50% 0.5% 1 0 0 
Meropenem I.V. 2 1 50% 0.5% 1 0 0 
Amoxicillin I.V. 29 14 48% 7.9% 7 2 1 
Co-amoxiclav I.V. 11 4 36% 2.2% 4 0 0 
Paracetamol I.V. 10 1 10% 0.5% 1 0 0 
Metronidazole I.V. 22 2 9% 1.1% 2 0 0 
Morphine sulphate I.V. 12 1 8% 0.5% 1 0 0 
Sodium chloride 0.9% I.V. 43 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Digoxin I.V. 2 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Fentanyl I.V. 5 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Gentamicin I.V. 3 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Pabrinex I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Human albumin solution 
(Zenalb) 
I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Heparin I.V. 2 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Calcium Gluconate 10% I.V. 3 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Hartmann’s solution I.V. 2 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Dexamethasone I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Clarithromycin I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Tramadol I.M. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
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For nine of the drugs delivered on the surgical ward (S) the preparation error rate was 
≥47% (Table 5.9). The most common of these were antibiotics (e.g. Tazocin and 
Amoxicillin) as these were amongst those drugs most frequently prepared. Other drugs 
where errors were of importance included adrenaline and insulin due to potential 
toxicity. 
         
Table 5.10: A summary of the injectable drug preparation errors that occurred in the medical ward (C) (n=170). 
 
Medical ward  













with error for 
specific drug 
(%) 










Melphalan I.V. 3 4 100% 1.7% 2 1 0 
Coagulation Factor VIII 
Complex  
I.V. 3 3 100% 1.7% 3 0 0 
Amoxicillin I.V. 3 3 100% 1.7% 3 0 0 
Teicoplanin I.V. 3 3 100% 1.7% 3 0 0 
Digoxin I.V. 4 4 100% 2.3% 4 0 0 
Cyclizine I.V. 7 4 57% 2.3% 4 0 0 
 Tazocin I.V. 29 16 55% 9.4% 11 1 1 
Paracetamol I.V. 4 2 50% 1.1% 2 0 0 
Furosemide I.V. 6 2 33% 1.1% 2 0 0 
Morphine sulphate I.V. 4 1 25% 0.6% 1 0 0 
Co-amoxiclav I.V. 4 1 25% 0.6% 1 0 0 
Sodium Chloride 0.9% I.V. 57 1 2% 0.6% 1 0 0 
Ondansetron I.V. 2 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
 Privigen I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Metronidazole I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Meropenem I.V. 3 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Gentamicin I.V. 3 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Hydrocortisone I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Hyoscine butylbromide I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Levomepromazine 
hydrochloride 
S.C. 5 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Aciclovir sodium I.V. 2 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Heparin I.V. 7 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Calcium folinate I.V. 3 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Chlorphenamine I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Potassium chloride I.V. 4 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Dexamethasone I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Clarithromycin I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Methotrexate I.V. 2 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Cyclophosphamide I.V 2 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Thiotepa I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Disodium Pamidronate I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
Idarubicin I.V. 1 0 0% 0% 0 0 0 
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For eight of the drugs on the medical ward (C), the preparation error rate was ≥50% 
(Table 5.10). The most common of these was Tazocin, as this drug was amongst those 
most frequently prepared. Other drugs of importance include melphalan, factor VIII, 
digoxin and paracetamol, due to potential toxicity. 
 
Table 5.11: A summary of the injectable drug preparation errors that occurred in the medical ward (B) (n=445). 
 
For twelve of the drugs on the medical ward (B), the preparation error rate was ≥50% 
(Table 5.11). The most significant of these were antibiotics, as these drugs were 
Medical ward (B)  












associated with error 
for specific drug (%) 












I.V. 1 1 100% 0.2% 1 0 0 
Digoxin I.V. 2 2 100% 0.4% 2 0 0 
Clarithromycin I.V. 1 1 100% 0.2% 1 0 0 
Heparin I.V. 17 17 100% 3.8% 17 0 0 
Insulin I.V. 2 2 100% 0.4% 2 0 0 
Ondansetron I.V. 15 13 87% 2.9% 13 0 0 
Amoxicillin I.V. 19 14 74% 3.1% 7 2 1 
 Tazocin I.V. 36 24 67% 5.4% 19 1 1 
Pabrinex I.V. 11 7 64% 1.6% 7 0 0 
Furosemide I.V. 18 11 61% 2.5% 11 0 0 
Meropenem I.V. 24 13 54% 2.9% 13 0 0 
Phytomenadione I.V. 6 3 50% 0.7% 3 0 0 
Levofloxacin I.V. 9 4 44% 0.9% 4 0 0 
Ceftazidime I.V. 23 8 35% 1.8% 8 0 0 
Methylprednisolone I.V. 6 2 33% 0.4% 2 0 0 
Hydrocortisone I.V. 10 3 30% 0.7% 3 0 0 
Magnesium sulfate I.V. 4 1 25% 0.2% 1 0 0 
Paracetamol I.V. 9 2 22% 0.4% 2 0 0 
Aciclovir sodium I.V. 15 3 20% 0.7% 3 0 0 
Teicoplanin I.V. 5 1 20% 0.2% 1 0 0 
Co-trimoxazole I.V. 7 1 14% 0.2% 1 0 0 
Levomepromazine S.C 7 1 14% 0.2% 1 0 0 
Metronidazole I.V. 7 1 14% 0.2% 1 0 0 
Sodium chloride 
0.9% 
I.V. 118 13 11% 2.9% 13 0 0 
Enoxaparin S.C 51 2 4% 0.4% 2 0 0 
Vancomycin I.V. 7 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Gentamicin I.V. 6 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Hartmann’s solution I.V. 3 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Metoclopramide I.V. 2 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Hyoscine 
butylbromide 
I.V. 4 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
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amongst those most frequently prepared. Other drugs of significance were heparin; 
ondansetron; meropenem and sodium chloride 0.9%. 
 
       Table 5.12: A summary of the injectable drug preparation errors that occurred in the surgical ward (H) (n=357). 
 
 
Surgical ward (H)  











associated with error 
for specific drug (%) 










Aminophylline I.V. 1 2 100% 0.5% 0 1 0 
Amiodarone I.V 1 1 100% 0.3% 1 0 0 
Morphine sulphate I.V. 9 9 100% 2.5% 9 0 0 
Tramadol I.V. 2 2 100% 0.5% 2 0 0 
 Tazocin I.V. 47 43 91% 12.0% 43 0 0 
Cyclizine I.V. 16 14 88% 3.9% 14 0 0 
Amoxicillin I.V. 7 5 71% 1.4% 5 0 0 
Flucloxacillin I.V. 24 15 63% 4.2% 10 1 1 
Oxycodone 
andmidazolam 
S.C. 2 1 50% 0.3% 1 0 0 
Co-trimoxazole I.V. 6 3 50% 0.8% 3 0 0 
Ondansetron I.V. 4 2 50% 0.5% 2 0 0 
Calcium gluconate I.V. 2 1 50% 0.3% 1 0 0 
Gentamicin I.V. 7 3 43% 0.8% 3 0 0 
Meropenem I.V. 6 2 33% 0.5% 2 0 0 
Vancomycin I.V. 3 1 33% 0.3% 1 0 0 
Pabrinex I.V. 3 1 33% 0.3% 1 0 0 
Ranitidine I.V. 3 1 33% 0.3% 1 0 0 
Ceftazidime I.V. 5 1 20% 0.3% 1 0 0 
Sodium chloride 
0.9% 
I.V. 123 24 20% 6.7% 24 0 0 
Enoxaparin S.C 39 2 5% 0.5% 2 0 0 
Teicoplanin I.V. 2 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Digoxin I.V. 2 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Paracetamol I.V. 16 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Furosemide I.V. 2 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Co-amoxiclav I.V. 2 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Metronidazole I.V. 6 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Hyoscine 
butylbromide 
I.V. 3 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Levomepromazine S.C. 1 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Aciclovir sodium I.V. 2 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Heparin I.V. 5 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Potassium chloride I.V. 1 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
Hartmann’s 
solution 
I.V. 5 0 0% 0.0% 0 0 0 
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There were twelve drugs administered on the surgical ward (H) for which the 
preparation error rate was ≥50% (Table 5.12). The drugs involved in the highest 
proportion of errors were antibiotics, as these drugs were amongst those most 
frequently prepared. Additionally, other drugs of note were morphine and cyclizine. A 
description of each of the individual errors that occurred on all four wards, is shown in 
Appendix 16 with reference to the following violated policies: 
 
 ANTT: (ward S and C) Aseptic Non Touch Technique Staff Workbook, 2015. 
 
 IV Policy: (ward S and C) Medicines Code: Administration of Intravenous 
Drugs, 2016. 
 
 RCN: Royal College of Nursing, Standards for Infusion Therapy, 2016. 
 
 University College London Hospital (UCL): (ward B and H) UCL Hospitals 
Injectable Medicines Administration Guide, 2010. 
 
 Medicine Management Policy (ward B and H): Prescribing, Preparing and 
Administrating Injectable Medicines in Clinical Areas, 2015. 
 
 
Errors occurring on the four wards were grouped into two categories and numerous 
subcategories, as shown in Table 5.13 The most common contamination-related health 
and safety issues on the four wards were that the area was not clean and tidy before 
and during injectable dose preparation, protective clothing was not worn (apron and 
gloves), and staff failed to prepare drugs using the correct aseptic non-touch technique. 
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The most common errors that occurred during dose selection and preparation were 
faulty labelling and not using a filter needle when specified.  
 
Some preparation errors were common to all four wards. These included missing 
signatures, failure to perform a double check, and vigorously shaking drug vials to help 
the product to dissolve. A common error on medical ward (C) was that the treatment 
area was not clean and tidy and that drugs were prepared by an open window. A common 
error on the surgical ward (S) was violation of ANTT, and failure to wear the correct 
protective clothing. A common error on medical ward (B) was preparing the product 
outside the treatment room in unsuitable location, such as at the nurses’ station. A 
common error on surgical ward (H) was that a filter needle was not used with products 












       
         Table 5.13: Description types of errors that occurred at the four wards. 
Type of errors 
 
Surgical ward (S) Medical ward (C) Surgical ward (H) Medical ward (B) Total 
Contamination, health and safety issues 
 
Treatment area not cleaned and not tidy before and during injectable dose preparation. 7 3 17 17 44 
Aseptic non-touch technique “ANTT” not followed. 4 1 16 18 39 
Apron not worn. 5 0 16 16 37 
Product prepared in unsuitable location such as nurse reception. 1 0 6 20 27 
Gloves not worn. 1 0 16 9 26 
Not swabbing septum on vial with alcohol. 1 0 0 8 9 
Injectable dose prepared in area with open window. 0 6 0 0 6 
Total errors 19 10 71 88 188 
Dose selection and preparation 
 
Faulty labelling. 1 0 26 19 46 
No filters used as specified. 1 2 21 20 44 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final product not clear, “cloudiness”). 2 4 9 5 20 
Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles 4 9 0 5 18 
No second checker 4 8 1 1 14 
Signature of second checker who checked product missing from the label. 4 7 0 0 11 
Wrong dose 2 0 2 4 8 
Wrong medicine used. 2 1 0 2 5 
Wrong volume of diluent used. 1 0 2 2 5 
Forgetting to sign the drug chart/label by the maker. 3 1 0 0 4 
Omitted dose 1 0 0 3 4 
Incorrect expiry date. 0 2 0 0 2 
Wrong diluent used. 1 0 0 0 1 
Signature of nurse who checked product missing from drug chart. 0 0 0 1 1 
Calculation error. 0 0 1 0 1 
Total of errors 26 34 62 62 184 
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5.8.3 Severity assessment of injectable preparation error (IPEs) 
 
 
A key aim of this research was to confirm that observed injectable drug preparation 
errors could be categorised as errors, and then to rank the severity of these errors on a 
scale of 0 – 10. A total of 372 observed errors were classified and ranked by an 
independent panel of five experts.  
 
5.8.4 Confirmation of errors 
 
All panel members agreed that all the observed cases could be classified as errors. All 
the errors were therefore included in the subsequent severity analysis (45 errors on 
surgical ward (S), 44 errors on medical ward (C), 133 errors on surgical ward (H), and 
150 errors on medical ward (B)). 
 
5.8.5 Severity ranking of errors 
 
 
Appendix 16 shows the mean severity score assigned to each of the 372 observed errors 
by the panel of healthcare professionals. The mean severity ranking assigned by the 
panel was distributed according to three levels of harm: minor harm (13.1%; n = 49), 
moderate harm (79.5%; n = 296), and major harm (7.2%; n = 27). The results showed 
that some errors were assigned a major level of harm, suggesting the risk control 
mechanisms in the hospital wards are dysfunctional. The highest severity score error 
(8.6) occurred in the surgical ward (S) and resulted from an incorrect volume of diluent 
for an insulin infusion (S38). The lowest severity score (2.4) occurred on two wards: the 
surgical ward (S) and the medical ward (C). On both wards the lowest severity score 
was attributed to a missing signature on a product label by the nurse who checked the 
product (S21, S22, S33, S37, C54, C55, C56, C66, C67, and C72). For all 372 errors, 
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the overall mean severity score was 5.2, and the median severity score was 5 
(interquartile range: 3.7; minimum: 2.4; maximum: 8.6. 
 
 
5.8.6 Severity Ranking of Errors 
 
 
Table 5.14 presents the overall severity grading for errors observed on each ward. The 
majority of errors on four wards were assigned a moderate level of potential harm, as 
has previously been observed (Taxis and barber, 2003; Wirtz et al. 2003; Taxis and 
Barber, 2004). Furthermore, there was no significance difference between the numbers 
of errors of each level of severity on each ward (one away ANOVA) f = 0.5481, p. Value 
(P) = 0.6633). 
 
       Table 5.14: Overall severity rate compared with those obtained for each ward (n=372). 
 
 372 errors from 1148 observations * 45 errors from 176 observations ** 44 errors from 170     




Table 5.15 shows the mean and median severity scores obtained for each of the hospital 
wards. Panel members assigned higher median severity scores to errors on the medical 
ward (C). In order to assess the significance of this test, the median severity scores 
assigned to each ward were compared using the Kruskall-Wallis test. This gave a result 
of p=0.181, showing no significant difference between the severity of the errors 





a minor level of harm 
% 
Errors assigned 
a moderate level of harm 
% 
Errors assigned 
a major level of 
harm 
% 
Overall 32.4 4.4 (n = 50) 25.7 (n = 295) 2.3 (n = 27) 
Surgical (S) 25.5* 6.8 (n = 12) 17.0 (n = 30) 1.7 (n = 3) 
Medical (C) 25.8** 4.7 (n = 8) 18.2 (n = 31) 2.9 (n = 5) 
Surgical (H) 37.3*** 4.5 (n = 16) 31.1 (n = 111) 1.7 (n = 6) 
Medical (B) 33.7**** 3.1 (n = 14) 27.7 (n = 123) 2.9 (n = 13) 
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     Table 5.15: The mean and median potential harm scores for the four types of hospital wards. 
 
 
Table 5.16 (a, b, c, d) summarises the frequency of errors by type, and the related 
categories of severity in the four hospital wards. In the surgical ward (S), the most 
common type of error was gross disregard for cleanliness or clutter in the treatment 
room, which was assigned a moderate level of harm. Faulty labelling represented the 
second-most common type of error, which was assigned a minor level of harm in 86% 
of instances, and in 14% of instances a moderate level of harm. In the medical ward (C), 
the most joint common type of error was gross disregard for cleanliness or clutter in a 
treatment room, which was assigned a moderate level of harm in 78% of instances and 
in 22% of instances a major level of harm. Air bubbles not expelled before checking 
volume was also the joint most common concern assigned in 66.7% of instances a 
moderate level of harm, and in 33.3% of instances a major level of harm. In the surgical 
ward (H), six main types of error were identified: faulty labelling, a filter needle not 
used, gross disregard for cleanliness or clutter in the treatment room, breach of ANTT, 
unused apron, and unused gloves. Faulty labelling was the most common type of error, 
which in 85% of instances was considered assigned a moderate level of harm and in 
15% of instances a major level of harm. For medical ward (B), the most common types 
of error were inappropriate location of medicine preparation and a filter needle not being 
used, both of which were assigned a moderate level of harm. Also, it can be noted from 
Table 5.16 (a, b, c, d) that each error type tends to have just one severity level, however 
some spanned two severity levels. These suggest that error type is more important than 
Hospital ward Severity score 
Mean Median 
Surgical (S) 4.9 5.0 
Medical (C)  5.3 6.0 
Surgical (H) 5.3 5.0 
Medical (B) 5.2 5.0 
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drug in determining severity. For example harm level of faulty labelling in surgical ward 
(S43) was moderate because additional 200 mg added to infusion but label not changed. 
On the other hand the harm level of faulty labelling in surgical ward (S33) was minor 
due to the signature of nurse who checked product missing from label. 
 
Table 5.16 (a): Breakdown of injectable drug preparation error severity scores in the surgical ward (S)                





Type of Error Harm Level Total (n = 45) 
Minor Moderate Major 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
0 7 0 7 
Faulty labelling  6 1 0 7 
Unused apron  
 
6 0 0 6 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked  
0 4 0 4 
No double check  
 
0 4 0 4 
Breach of ANTT  
 
0 3 0 3 
Undissolved powder left in vial 
 
0 2 0 2 
Wrong dose  
 
0 2 0 2 
Wrong medicine  0 1 1 2 
Wrong diluent  0 0 2 2 
Unused gloves  
 
0 1 0 1 
Rubber septum not wiped  
 
0 1 0 1 
Filter needle not used 0 1 0 1 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation  
0 1 0 1 
Signature of nurse who prepared 
product missing from drug chart 
0 1 0 1 
Omitted medicine  0 1 0 1 
 
Wrong expiry date  0 0 0 0 
Calculation error  
 
0 0 0 0 
Total 
 
12 30 3 45 
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Table 5.16 (b): Breakdown of injectable drug preparation error severity scores in the medical ward (C)   






Type of Error Harm Level Total (n = 44) 
Minor  Moderate  major 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
 
0 7 2 9 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked  
 
0 6 3 9 
Faulty labelling  
 
8 0 0 8 
No double check  
 
0 8 0 8 
Undissolved powder left in vial 
 
0 4 0 4 
Filter needle not used  
 
0 2 0 2 
Wrong expiry date  
 
0 2 0 2 
Breach of ANTT  
 
0 1 0 1 
Wrong medicine  
 
0 1 0 1 
Wrong dose  
 
0 0 0 0 
Wrong diluent  
 
0 0 0 0 
Rubber septum not wiped  
 
0 0 0 0 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation  
 
0 0 0 0 
Signature of nurse who prepared 
product missing from drug chart  
 
0 0 0 0 
Omitted medicine  
 
0 0 0 0 
 
Unused apron  
 
0 0 0 0 
Unused gloves  
 
0 0 0 0 
Calculation error (n = 0) 
 
0 0 0 0 
Total 
 
8 31 5 44 
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Table 5.16 (c): Breakdown of injectable drug preparation error severity scores in the surgical ward (H) 











Type of Error Harm Level Total (n = 133) 
Minor  Moderate  major 
Faulty labelling  
 
0 22 4 26 
Filter needle not used  
 
0 21 0 21 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
 
0 17 0 17 
Breach of ANTT  
 
0 16 0 16 
Unused apron  
 
16 0 0 16 
Unused gloves  
 
0 16 0 16 
Undissolved powder left in vial 
  
0 9 0 9 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation  
 
0 6 0 6 
Wrong dose  
 
0 2 0 2 
Wrong diluent  
 
0 1 1 2 
No double check  
 
0 1 0 1 
Calculation error  
 
0 0 1 1 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked  
 
0 0 0 0 
Wrong expiry date  
 
0 0 0 0 
Wrong medicine  
 
0 0 0 0 
Rubber septum not wiped  
 
0 0 0 0 
Signature of nurse who prepared 
product missing from drug chart  
 
0 0 0 0 




16 111 6 133 
 
244 
Table 5.16 (d): Breakdown of injectable drug preparation error severity scores in the medical ward (B) 
(n = 150). 
Type of Error Harm Level Total (n = 150) 
Minor  Moderate  major 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation  
 
0 20 0 20 
Filter needle not used  
 
0 20 0 20 
Faulty labelling  
 
0 17 2 19 
Breach of ANTT  
 
0 14 4 18 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
 
0 16 1 17 
Unused apron  
 
14 2 0 16 
Unused gloves  
 
0 9 0 9 
Rubber septum not wiped  
 
0 8 0 8 
Undissolved powder left in vial  
 
0 5 0 5 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked  
 
0 1 4 5 
Wrong dose  
 
0 4 0 4 
Omitted medicine  
 
0 2 1 3 
Wrong diluent  
 
0 2 0 2 
Wrong medicine  
 
0 1 1 2 
No double check  
 
0 1 0 1 
Signature of nurse who prepared 
product missing from drug chart  
 
0 1 0 1 
Calculation error  
 
0 0 0 0 
Wrong expiry date 
 
0 0 0 0 
Total 
 
















5.8.7 Risk scoring and grading of errors 
 
5.8.8 Consequence score: 
 
 
The results obtained for the different wards are given in Table 5.17 (a, b, c, d). A 
consequence descriptor for ‘major’ (score 4) was assigned to one type of error on 
surgical ward (S), medical ward (C), and medical ward (B), and to two types of error in 
surgical ward (H). Most error types in all the wards were categorised as ‘moderate’ 
(score 3). In surgical ward (S), two types of error were categorised as ‘minor’ (score 2) 
(i.e. faulty labelling and unused apron), whereas one type of recorded error was 
identified as minor (score 2) on medical ward (C) (i.e. faulty labelling). On surgical 
ward (H) and medical ward (B), one type of error (i.e. unused apron) was assigned a 
minor consequence descriptor (score 2). 
 
Table 5.17 (a): Mapping of severity data from the surgical ward (S) on to NPSA consequence descriptors to 
obtain consequence scores. 






Wrong diluent (n = 2) 7.6 4 Major 
Omitted medicine (n = 1) 6.4 3 Moderate 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked (n = 4) 
6.2 3 Moderate 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
(n = 7) 
6.0 3 Moderate 
Breach of ANTT (n = 3) 6.0 3 Moderate 
No double check (n = 4) 5.4 3 Moderate 
Unused gloves (n = 1) 5.4 3 Moderate 
Wrong medicine (n = 2) 5.3 3 Moderate 
Undissolved powder left in vial 
(n = 2) 
5.2 3 Moderate 
Wrong dose (n = 2) 5.0 3 Moderate 
Rubber septum not wiped  
(n = 1) 
4.8 3 Moderate 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation (n = 1) 
4.6 3 Moderate 
Signature of nurse who 
prepared product missing from 
drug chart (n = 1) 
4.6 3 Moderate 
Filter needle not used (n = 1) 4.4 3 Moderate 
Faulty labelling (n = 7) 3.0 2 Minor 





Table 5.17 (b): Mapping of severity data from the medical ward (C) on to NPSA consequence descriptors 






Table 5.17 (c): Mapping of severity data from the surgical ward (H) on to NPSA consequence descriptors 












Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked (n = 9) 
 
6.5 4 Major 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
(n = 9) 
6.4 3 Moderate 
Wrong expiry date (n = 2) 
 
6.4 3 Moderate 
Wrong medicine (n = 1) 
 
6.2 3 Moderate 
Undissolved powder left in vial 
(n = 4) 
6.0 3 Moderate 
Breach of ANTT (n = 1) 
 
5.8 3 Moderate 
No double check (n = 8) 
 
5.6 3 Moderate 
Filter needle not used (n = 2) 
 
4.4 3 Moderate 
Faulty labelling (n = 8) 
 
3.0 2 Minor 






Calculation error (n = 1) 7.6 4 Major 
Wrong diluent (n = 2) 7.1 4 Major 
Faulty labelling (n = 26) 6.2 3 Moderate 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
(n = 17) 
6.2 3 Moderate 
Undissolved powder left in vial 
(n = 9) 
5.9 3 Moderate 
Breach of ANTT (n = 16) 5.8 3 Moderate 
Wrong dose (n = 2) 5.8 3 Moderate 
Unused gloves (n = 16) 5.6 3 Moderate 
No double check (n = 1) 5.4 3 Moderate 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation (n = 6) 
4.8 3 Moderate 
Filter needle not used (n = 21) 4.4 3 Moderate 
Unused apron (n = 16) 
 
2.9 2 Minor 
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Table 5.17 (d): Mapping of severity data from the medical ward (B) on to NPSA consequence descriptors 






5.8.9 Likelihood score 
 
The results obtained for the likelihood scores for the four wards are shown on Table 
5.18 (a, b, c, d). The majority of error types were likely to occur at least daily on surgical 
ward (H) and medical ward (B). For surgical ward (S), 81% of errors were likely to 
occur at least weekly, and 19% at least daily. Most (56%) of the errors on medical ward 











Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked (n = 5) 
6.5 4 Major 
Wrong medicine (n = 2) 6.3 3 Moderate 
Faulty labelling (n = 19) 6.2 3 Moderate 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
(n = 17) 
6.2 3 Moderate 
Wrong diluent (n = 2) 6.1 3 Moderate 
Breach of ANTT (n = 18) 6.0 3 Moderate 
Undissolved powder left in vial 
(n = 5) 
5.8 3 Moderate 
Wrong dose (n = 4) 5.7 3 Moderate 
Unused gloves (n = 9) 5.5 3 Moderate 
No double check (n = 1) 5.4 3 Moderate 
Rubber septum not wiped  
(n = 8) 
5.0 3 Moderate 
Omitted medicine (n = 3) 5.0 3 Moderate 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation (n = 20) 
4.8 3 Moderate 
Filter needle not used (n = 20) 4.4 3 Moderate 
Signature of nurse who 
prepared product missing from 
drug chart (n = 1) 
4.0 3 Moderate 
Unused apron (n = 16) 
 
3.0 2 Minor 
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Table 5.18 (a): Mapping of predicted number of errors from surgical ward (S) onto NPSA time frequency 
descriptors to obtain likelihood score. 
 
 
* Total observations = 176   ** Total items prepared = 393 
              








Type of error (n = 45) Error 
rate* 
Predicted 
number of errors 






Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
(n = 7) 
0.040 574 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Faulty labelling (n = 7) 0.040 574 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Unused apron (n = 6) 0.034 488 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Air bubbles not expelled 
before volume checked  
(n = 4) 
0.023 330 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
No double check (n = 4) 0.023 330 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Breach of ANTT (n = 3) 0.017 245 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong diluent (n = 2) 0.011 158 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong medicine (n = 2) 0.011 158 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial (n = 2) 
0.011 158 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong dose (n = 2) 0.011 158 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Unused gloves (n = 1) 0.005 72 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Rubber septum not wiped  
(n = 1) 
0.005 72 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation (n = 1) 
0.005 72 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Signature of nurse who 
prepared product missing 
from drug chart (n = 1) 
0.005 72 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Filter needle not used  
(n = 1) 
0.005 72 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Omitted medicine (n = 1) 0.005 72 Expected to occur 




Table 5.18 (b): Mapping of predicted number of errors from medical ward (C) onto NPSA time frequency 
descriptors to obtain likelihood score. 
 
 
* Total observations = 170  ** Total items prepared = 365 
             





















Type of error (n = 44) Error 
rate* 
Predicted 
number of errors 






Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked  
(n = 9) 
0.053 706 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
 (n = 9) 
0.053 706 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Faulty labelling (n = 8) 
 
0.047 626 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
No double check (n = 8) 
 
 
0.047 626 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Undissolved powder left in vial 
(n = 4) 
 
0.024 320 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong expiry date (n = 2) 
 
0.012 160 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Filter needle not used (n = 2) 
 
0.012 160 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong medicine (n = 1) 
 
0.006 80 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Breach of ANTT (n = 1) 
 
 
0.006 80 Expected to occur 




Table 5.18 (c): Mapping of predicted number of errors from surgical ward (H) onto NPSA time frequency 
descriptors to obtain likelihood score. 
 
 
* Total observations = 357   ** Total items prepared = 863 
              


















Type of error (n = 133) Error 
rate* 
Predicted 
number of errors 






Faulty labelling (n = 26) 
 
0.073 2299 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Filter needle not used  
(n = 21) 
 
0.059 1858 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
(n = 17) 
0.048 1511 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Breach of ANTT (n = 16) 
 
 
0.045 1417 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Unused gloves (n = 16) 
 
0.045 1417 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Unused apron (n = 16) 
 
 
0.045 1417 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial (n = 9) 
0.025 787 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation  
(n = 6) 
0.017 535 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Wrong diluent (n = 2) 
 
0.006 189 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong dose (n = 2) 
 
 
0.006 189 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Calculation error (n = 1) 
 
0.003 94 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
No double check (n = 1) 
 
 
0.003 94 Expected to occur 




Table 5.18 (d): Mapping of predicted number of errors from medical ward (B) onto NPSA time frequency 
descriptors to obtain likelihood score. 
 
* Total observations = 445  ** Total items prepared = 981 
              




Type of error (n = 150) Error 
rate* 
Predicted 
number of errors 






Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
 (n = 20) 
0.045 1611 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Filter needle not used  
(n = 20) 
0.045 1611 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Faulty labelling (n = 19) 
 
 
0.043 1540 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Breach of ANTT (n = 18) 
 
 
0.040 1432 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
(n = 17) 
 
0.038 1361 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Unused apron (n = 16) 
 
 
0.036 1289 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Unused gloves (n = 9) 
 
0.020 716 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
 
5 
Rubber septum not wiped  
(n = 8) 
 
0.018 644 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Air bubbles not expelled 
before volume checked 
 (n = 5) 
0.011 399 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial (n = 5) 
 
0.011 399 Expected to occur 
at least daily 
5 
Wrong dose (n = 4) 
 
 
0.009 322 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Omitted medicine (n = 3) 
 
0.007 251 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong medicine (n = 2) 
 
0.004 143 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Wrong diluent (n = 2) 
 
0.004 143 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
No double check (n = 1) 
 
0.002 72 Expected to occur 
at least weekly 
4 
Signature of nurse who 
prepared product missing 
from drug chart (n = 1) 
0.002 72 Expected to occur 




5.8.10 Risk score: 
 
The risk scores assigned to the various error types occurring on the hospital wards are 
shown in Table 5.19 (a, b, c, d).  
 
Table 5.19 (a): Risk scores assigned to error type in the surgical ward (S)  
 
Type of error (n = 45) Consequence Likelihood Risk Score Assigned grade 
Wrong diluent (n = 2) 4 4 16 Extreme risk 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
(n = 7) 
3 5 15 Extreme risk  
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked (n = 4) 
3 4 12 High risk 
 
No double check (n = 4) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Breach of ANTT (n = 3) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Wrong medicine (n = 2) 3 4 12 High risk 
Undissolved powder left in vial  
(n = 2) 
3 4 12 High risk 
 
Wrong dose (n = 2) 3 4 12 High risk 
Unused gloves (n = 1) 3 4 12 High risk 
Rubber septum not wiped (n = 1) 3 4 12 High risk 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation (n = 1) 
3 4 12 High risk 
Signature of nurse who prepared 
product missing from drug chart  
(n = 1) 
3 4 12 High risk 
Filter needle not used (n = 1) 3 4 12 High risk 
Omitted medicine (n = 1) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Faulty labelling (n = 7) 
 
2 5 10 High risk 







  Table 5.19 (b): Risk scores assigned to error type in the medical ward (C)  
 
 





Type of error (n = 133) Consequence Likelihood Risk Score Assigned grade 
 
Calculation error (n = 1) 
 
4 4 16 Extreme risk 
Wrong diluent (n = 2) 
 
4 4 16 Extreme risk 
Faulty labelling (n = 26) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Filter needle not used (n = 21) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
(n = 17) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Breach of ANTT (n = 16) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Unused gloves (n = 16) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Undissolved powder left in vial 
 (n = 9) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Inappropriate location of medicine 
preparation (n = 6) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
No double check (n = 1) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Wrong dose (n = 2) 3 4 12 High risk 
Unused apron (n = 16) 2 5 10 High risk 
Type of error (n = 44) Consequence Likelihood Risk Score Assigned grade 
 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked (n = 9) 
4 4 16 Extreme risk 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
(n = 9) 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
No double check (n = 8) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Undissolved powder left in vial  
(n = 4) 
3 4 12 High risk 
Wrong expiry date (n = 2) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Filter needle not used (n = 2) 3 4 12 High risk 
 
Wrong medicine (n = 1) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Breach of ANTT (n = 1) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 




  Table 5.19 (d): Risk scores assigned to error type in the medical ward (B)  
 
 
Type of error (n = 150) Consequence Likelihood Risk Score Assigned grade 
 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked (n = 5) 
4 5 20 Extreme risk 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation (n = 20) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Filter needle not used (n = 20) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Faulty labelling (n = 19) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Breach of ANTT (n = 18) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room  
(n = 17) 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Unused gloves (n = 9) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Rubber septum not wiped (n = 8) 
 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Undissolved powder left in vial  
(n = 5) 
3 5 15 Extreme risk 
Wrong dose (n = 4) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Omitted medicine (n = 3) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Wrong medicine (n = 2) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Wrong diluent (n = 2) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
No double check (n = 1) 
 
3 4 12 High risk 
Signature of nurse who prepared 
product missing from drug chart 
 (n = 1) 
3 4 12 High risk 
Unused apron (n = 16) 2 5 10 High risk 
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The majority of the errors that occurred were graded ‘high risk’; however, 12 types of 
error (i.e. gross disregard for clean/ uncluttered treatment room, inappropriate location 
of medicine preparation, unused gloves, wrong diluent, calculation error, air bubbles not 
expelled before volume checked, filter needle not used, breach of ANTT, rubber septum 
not wiped, undissolved powder left in vial, no double check and faulty labelling), were 
assigned the grade ‘extreme risk’. Extreme risk errors were detected on all four wards 
however surgical ward (H) and medical ward (B) had the highest number of extreme 
risk errors. 
 
Errors categorised as representing an extreme risk were selected for the development of 
risk reduction strategies. Specific risk scores assigned to these errors should enable 
prioritisation of risk reduction strategies for each ward.  
 
5.9 Discussion  
 
 
Direct observation of the injectable medication preparation process was conducted at 
two UK hospital sites. Observations were conducted using a validated and reliable 
method (Dean and Barber, 2001), and a list of IPE definitions based on that developed 
by Crowley (2006). An observational method to identify IPEs in practice has been used 
previously to study IPEs in UK hospitals (Wirtz et al. 2003; Taxis & Barber, 2003; 
Crowley, 2006).  
 
During the observation, the researcher only observed the process of preparing an 
injectable medicine and did not interfere with the process unless an error was observed. 
If the investigator observed an error, then the relevant staff member was informed; they 
 
256 
then followed standard procedure to correct the error. If after carrying out the 
observations and interviews, the investigator had reason to doubt the fitness to practice 
of a member of staff, then this was discussed with the supervisory team (which includes 
two registered pharmacists with experience working in the NHS). If the supervisory 
team agreed there were grounds to be concerned about a member of staff’s fitness to 
practice; they disclosed this to the relevant ward manager. 
 
For the study, a total of 66 nurses were observed, while preparing 1148 doses from a 
possible 2602 schedule of doses, over 40 days. The observer witnessed and reported 372 
IPEs, denoting an error rate of 32.4%. A panel of five healthcare professionals separately 
reviewed all 372 IPEs. The panel agreed that an error had occurred in 100% (n= 372) of 
the cases recorded by the researcher. The panel were consulted to validate the errors to 
ensure reliability as the observer carried out the observations autonomously. Other 
similar studies have used two or more observers to validate the data (Dean and Barber; 
Crowley, 2006).  
 
To put these results in context, recent systematic reviews of studies using the same 
method have found an error rate of 35% in UK hospitals (McLeod et al., 2013), and 
48% worldwide (Keers et al., 2103). The overall error rate (32.4%) for the preparation 
of injectable medicines was similar to that previously reported in a UK study carried 
out using the same methodology (39.7%) (Crowley, 2006). This error rate is higher 
than that reported in some previous studies in the UK and Europe hospitals. For 
example, error rates of 7.4%, 22%, and 19% were reported by Taxis & Barber, 2003, 
Wirtz et al., 2003 and Taxis & Barber, 2004, respectively. Perhaps the reason is that 
the current study focuses only on the preparation of injectable medicines in contrast to 
 
257 
previous studies (Taxis & Barber, 2003; Wirtz et al., 2003; Taxis & Barber, 2004), 
which have been very focused on the administration of injectable medicines rather than 
on injectable preparations. The overall error rate in drug preparation and administration 
was reported as 25% (Bruce and Wong 2001) in a UK-based study, rising to 69.7% in 
Australia (Cousins et al. 2005, Westbrook et al. 2011). The error rates for IPEs may 
differ between studies due to differing definitions of what constitutes an error, the 
prescribing and preparation systems set out, dates permitted, and the settings and 
methods used to identify IPEs. Hence, comparisons between studies may be 
unrepresentative (Allan and Barker 1990; Wirtz et al. 2003; Taxis & Barber, 2003; 
Crowley, 2006; Ferner 2009).  
 
Another finding of this study was that of the 372 IPEs, 186 (50%) were associated with 
antibiotics. This error rate is comparable with that in other studies in the literature 
investigating IPEs (Wirtz et al. 2003 and Crowley, 2006). Antibiotic medicines are 
commonly used in hospitals. In 1995, Wilson et al. stated that antibiotics were the 
medicine class most associated with medical errors (13%, 30/233) and that 29% of these 
could be considered highly preventable. In the same year (1995), Bates et al reported 
that antibiotics were the second medication class most frequently associated with errors 
(25%, n=59), of which 11% (n=46) were preventable. In the following year, Rose et al. 
(1996) identified that 44% (48/109) of all the errors reported over five years at a large 
paediatric hospital involved antimicrobial agents (Ross et al., 2000). Furthermore, an 
analysis by Winterstein et al. (2004), at a US teaching hospital, found 42% (n=100) of 
the 240 preventable medical errors prospectively classified by different specialist 
healthcare providers related to antibiotics. In 2006, Otero-Lopez et al. found 23% 
(11/48) of the preventable ADEs classified were associated with antibiotics. In the UK, 
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Ashcroft and Cooke (2006) analysed ME reports over a 26-month period at a large 
teaching hospital (1000 beds) and found 14% of 495 submitted incidents related to 
antibiotics. Additionally, antibiotic related errors are common in paediatric medicine. 
In 2008, with regard to an observational study at a paediatric hospital in New Zealand, 
Kunac and Reith stated that antibiotics were subject to an error rate of 21% of all orders. 
A three and a half year research study on elderly patients in a large hospital in the US 
reported 861 errors, 152 of which (18%) were involved antibiotics (Picone et al., 2008). 
In a Spanish analysis at a small hospital (200-bed), (6% n=173) MEs were stated for 
2,696 hospitalisations over a two-year study, of which (20% n=34) involved antibiotics 
(Menéndez et al., 2008).  
 
The majority of the above studies cited a common link between antibiotics and MEs, 
and the frequency with which these medicines are prescribed. In 2004, Winterstein et 
al. noted that the inclusion of transplantation, oncology and critical care units in studies, 
which frequently prescribe antibiotics, might have contributed to making them the 
medicine class most commonly correlated with MEs. In 2006, Ghaleb and colleagues 
stated that because sedatives and antibiotics are the most commonly prescribed 
medicines, this explains why they are the medicine classes most frequently linked with 
MEs.  
 
Frequent use of a medicine might explain why it is subject to a greater risk. A medicine 
that is used infrequently might be correlated with fewer errors and would then appear to 
be less risky. However, when the potential effects from medications are taken into 
account (e.g. Insulin, Heparins, Chemotherapy and Factor VIII), a drug that is rarely 
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used, when associated with fewer errors might represent a higher-risk drug than a drug 
that is commonly used and associated with more errors.  
 
The results of this study show that incidents of IPEs can be framed according to two 
categories: contamination related health and safety issues (51% n=188/372) and dose 
selection and preparation (49% n=183/372). The majority of the errors associated with 
contamination-related health and safety issues related to the treatment room not being 
clean and tidy before and during injectable drug preparation (12.3% n=46/372), nurses 
not following correct ANTT (10.4% n=39/372), aprons not being worn (9.9% 
n=37/372), preparing injectable medicines outside the treatment room (7.2% n=27/372), 
and gloves not being worn during preparation (6.9% n=26/372). A previous study also 
reported that contamination-related health and safety factors are a common problem. 
Beaney and Goode (2003) examined the risk of contamination in clinical areas, 
reporting that 35% of the plastic trays on the ward showed contamination with skin 
microorganisms and staphylococcus. This shows the risk of microbiological 
contamination is much higher when injectable medicine preparation takes place in an 
uncontrolled environment, such as a hospital ward.  
 
By contrast, the pharmacy IV room has clean filtered air and staff wear protective 
clothing to avoid contaminating the medicines (Beaney and Goode, 2003). This has led 
the authors of several studies to suggest that all injectable medicines should be prepared 
in a pharmacy department (NHS North West, 1997; Beaney and Goode, 2003). The 
likelihood that admitted patients might encounter risk rises when injectable medicines 
are prepared in hospital wards, both in relation to medication errors (Taxis and Barber, 
2003; Cousins et al., 2005) and regarding contamination with microbes, leading to 
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infection (Beaney and Black, 2012). Injectable medicines are intended to be prepared in 
high-quality cleanrooms in NHS Trust pharmacies (RPS, 2016), in accordance with 
defined national standards; and pharmacies are frequently assessed to confirm these 
standards are being preserved (Beaney, 2006). Indeed, standards in hospital wards 
commonly differ from those in the pharmacy cleanroom (Beaney and Goode, 2003; 
RPS, 2016), supporting the proposition that all injectable medicines should be delivered 
in a ready-to-use form, either by pharmaceutical companies or the pharmacy 
department. Unfortunately, our study did not assess whether microbiological 
contamination occurred as a result of the errors observed, as its aim was to investigate 
the incidence and types of IPEs in hospital clinical areas. Nevertheless, it can be stated 
that all hospitals should ensure policies and guidelines are available and used by staff, 
to ensure the proper preparation method is employed regardless of the working area.  
 
The most common errors noted during dose selection and preparation were faulty 
labelling (12.3% n=46/372); not using a filter needle when specified (11.8% n=44/372); 
the drug not fully dissolving in the diluent (5.3% n=20/372); strongly shaking a drug 
causing foaming/bubbles (4.8% n=18/372), and absence of a second checker (3.7% 
n=14/372). The research findings revealed that faulty labelling was the most common 
type of error in this category at both hospitals. The findings from this research are 
comparable with previous findings. In 2005, Cousins and colleagues stated that 44% of 
the injectable medicines prepared in the UK Trust contained some type of labelling 
error, and that in 22% of incidents, the label was missing. Faulty labelling was also 
common in 20 hospital pharmacies in Wales and almost half of time, these were not 
prevented (James et al., 2011). There is several proposed explanation for these findings 




Failure to use a filter needle was observed in 44 dose preparations across both sites of 
study during the observation periods. 11.8% of nurses did not use a filter needle to 
transfer the diluent from a glass ampoule into a syringe. Poor commitment to filter use 
and frequent inappropriate use in the study periods suggests this is a routine deviation 
from protocol engaged in by an important percentage of nurses. No previous injectable 
error studies have reported data regarding nurses’ compliance with the use of a filter 
needle.  
 
Thirty-eight errors were observed during the reconstitution phase and resulted from poor 
preparation technique. The majority of errors occurred when nurses failed to fully 
dissolve a powder during the reconstitution phase, or did not comply with mixing 
instructions stated in the product monograph or hospital guidelines; e.g. vigorously 
shaking teicoplanin, causing foaming and hard shaking Factor VIII, leading to the loss 
of some of the prescribed dose. A study by Taxis and Barber (2003) reported that most 
preparation errors were associated with multiple step preparations (14%, n= 50/345), as 
with drugs that required reconstitution with a solvent and the addition of a diluent. Two 
studies have also reported that faulty reconstitution, addition and mixing is a common 
problem (Hoppe-Tichy et al., 2002; Wirtz et al., 2003). McDowell et al. (2010) reported 
that the reconstitution phase in IV preparation was the most error-prone step, and that 
eliminating this step by using ready-to-use infusions would reduce the overall injectable 
medicines preparation error rate.  
 
Almost all the preparations in the study periods were linked to at least one deviation 
from best practice. Lack of nursing commitment to some stages, e.g. involving wearing 
 
262 
apron/gloves and no second checker, were observed during the study period. The 
commitment by nurses to the stages in the present study was lower than in the few 
studies designed to investigate the prevalence of nurses’ deviations from best practice 
while preparing and administering injectable doses. For example, an observational study 
by Ong and Subasyini (2013) stated that 74% of nurses were not committed to routinely 
wearing gloves when preparing injectable doses. Gill et al. (2012) reported that 83% of 
nurses check the name and expiry date of injectable medication during administration 
stage, our study showed that checking procedure are lacking during preparation. 
Previous studies have reported that the lack of a checking stage is a common practice 
among nurses, and may be considered a significant factor contributing to errors, 
particularly with injectable doses (Armitage and Knapman 2003, Westbrook et al. 2011, 
Gill et al. 2012, Keers et al. 2013). The systematic review by McDowell et al. (2010) 
stated that appropriate checking during injectable dose preparation reduced the error rate 
from 0.73 to 0.22.  
 
Differences in nurses’ level of commitment to checking procedure during injectable 
medication preparation was found in previous studies, to range from 50% (Westbrook 
et al., 2011) to 89.5% (Gill et al. 2012). In the present study, inadequate commitment to 
double-checking was reported (3.7% n=14/372) than in previous studies, while adequate 
commitment to double-checking was stated (96.2% n=358/372). The observer 
impression was that nurses’ commitment to the two stages (wearing apron/gloves prior 
to the start of preparation, and double-checking of the final product) was lower towards 
the end of their shifts than at the start of their shifts. Nurses’ commitment to wearing 
apron/gloves declined during a shift, even though Trust policy emphasises the 
importance of wearing apron/gloves before commencing preparation, as an aseptic 
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requirement for infection control (Nursing & Midwifery Council, 2015). This result may 
be associated with the length of shifts and nurses’ tiredness at the end of their shift and 
will be explored in the next chapter.  
 
An incompatibility with other previous studies that was noted involved the investigation 
of aseptic techniques (ANTT). The current findings reported that 10.4% (n=39/372) of 
observation, staff did not follow ANTT (i.e. not touching the sterile tip of a syringe, and 
not using apron and gloves). Microbiological assessment would be necessary to assess 
the significance of these deviations. There are currently insufficient specified 
instructions or policies regarding aseptic techniques. For example, the hospital medicine 
policy used on the wards notifies nurses to follow ‘ANTT’, with no further clarification. 
Instructing nurses about the clinical effects of these types of errors might reduce the 
number of associated IPEs. Moreover, further investigation is needed to study 
consequences of deviating from recommended ANTT techniques. Additionally, making 
a provision to the centralised intravenous additive service (CIVAS) or purchasing ready-
to-use injectable medicines could usefully be studied to minimise preparation errors.  
 
The severity of the mistakes was measured based on potential harm to the patient, and 
was measured by expert judgement on a validated linear scale, ranging from 0 to 10, 
where 0 equated to no harm and 10 to a mistake that would result in death (Dean and 
Barber, 1990). The severity of errors and the frequency of the error data were used to 
calculate consequence and likelihood scores, to find a risk score for each error analogous 
to that used by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA, 2008). Errors with extreme 
and high-risk scores will provide a focus for developing strategies to help prevent them 




For all four wards included in this study, the majority of errors were assigned a moderate 
level of potential harm (Taxis and barber, 2003; Wirtz et al. 2003; Taxis and Barber, 
2004). In total 13.1% (n = 49) of errors scored between 0.5 and 3.4 and were thus 
considered eligible to cause minor harm; 79.5% (n = 296 errors) scored between 3.5 and 
7.4, and were thus considered to cause moderate harm; and 7.2% (n = 27 errors) scored 
between 7.5 and 9.4, and so were deemed to be capable of causing harm of major 
severity. None of the 372 errors had a mean score higher than 9.5, suggesting none 
would have proven fatal. Some errors with minor consequences for the patient, e.g. 
faulty labelling of an antibiotic, might represent a failure in the existing system of policy. 
Guidance and policies include not leaving the treatment room to prepare medicines, and 
an injectable medicines preparation guide should be initiated by the pharmacist checking 
the preparation room at ward level. The gross disregard for a clean/ uncluttered 
treatment room was a common factor on all four wards that the researcher (AA) 
observed. This may involve nursing culture, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 
six.  
 
In the current study severity data and frequency data was used to calculate the risk score 
for the preparation errors, to provide a focus for developing risk reduction strategies. 
The results showed that data requiring action can be divided according to two levels: 
extreme risk and high risk. In the present study, the researcher has chosen to focus on 
extreme risk when developing risk reduction strategies for the four different wards.  
 
The results of this study showed the errors could be graded as representing an extreme 
risk in approximately half (52.1% n=12/23 types of errors) of cases. The most frequent 
types of errors graded as representing an extreme risk were wrong diluent; gross 
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disregard for a clean/ uncluttered treatment room and faulty labelling. Characteristic 
types of errors were clarified at each study site. The variations in practice between them 
might have contributed to the errors discussed in the next chapter. Moreover, the 
resulting risk scores suggest different priorities need to be tackled to reduce the errors 
in each of the wards. For example, in surgical ward (S) risk reduction strategies should 
focus on ensuring that the nurses always keep the treatment room clean and tidy before 
and after preparing injectable medicines, and making sure that the wrong diluent is not 
given, especially if the drug has potential toxicity such as insulin (S38). Whereas, in 
medical ward (C) the risk strategies should focus on addressing problems during the 
reconstitution stage; for example C62 and C73 and the absence of a second checker (e.g. 
C74). In the surgical ward (H), risk strategies should prioritise avoiding a breach of 
ANTT (e.g. H209); faulty labelling (e.g. H250) and use of the filter needle for 
withdrawing the medicine from ampoules (e.g. H237). On the other hand, in medical 
ward (B), risk strategies should focus on ensuring injectable medicines are prepared in 
the treatment room only and that nurses follow NHS policies (e.g. B102). 
 
As far as this author knows, this is the first study to employ severity data and frequency 
data to calculate a risk score for IPEs, to provide a focus for developing risk reduction 
strategies. The types of errors graded as extreme risk are of greatest concern, as they can 
have a direct effect on the patient’s care management. However, it should be emphasised 
once again that there were no errors graded as catastrophic/fatal were witnessed during 
this study, in contrast to previous patient safety incident reports (NPSA, 2009). In 
addition, it is important to note that this study did not capture all the IPEs reported (Dean 
and Barber, 2001; Taxis and Barber, 2013; Wirtz et al. 2003; Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 
2105). This includes incidents involving wrong route and administering of non-
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prescribed medicine. The presence of the researcher in the preparation room might have 
helped to minimise some errors. However there is no concrete evidence proving this 
interpretation. 
 
This study was subject to some limitations. When it was designed, it was anticipated 
that the observations would cover three shifts; however, due to the length of nurses’ 
shifts, it was difficult for the observer to arrive at a morning shift and stay until after the 
night shift. Therefore, all observations were conducted from the middle of the morning 
shift to the end of the first half of the night shift to ensure adherence to the study 
objectives. The nurses were aware that their injectable preparation task was being 
observed and therefore all were consenting participants. This may have affected their 
performance, as they might not behave in the same way when not being observed. 
However, before the observations began, clear instructions were given to the nurses 
about working in their normal way, and they were familiarised with the significance of 
this research, so as to undertake the task on that basis.  
 
Another limitation of the study was that the observation studies were carried out over a 
limited time frame: 10 days for each ward. However, this proved sufficient time to 
observe errors made during medicine preparation, and ten days is a common time frame 
for this kind of investigation to limit observer fatigue. Also, the sample size was 
sufficient to confirm an association between nurses’ preparations and occurrence of 
errors (see section 5.8.1).  
 
Another limitation of the study is that some selection bias with those nurses who agreed 
to participate and observed differing from those who did not (i.e. those nurses more 
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confident in their skills more likely to give consent –therefore leading to lower error rate 
than population rate). However, the effect of the selection bias may not be great in this 
study as all the nurses observed agreed to participate in the present study. 
 
 
A final limitation of the study was that there was no mechanism to establish whether the 
nurses were aware they had made IPEs, or if they learnt from their mistakes.  
 






The observation method is valid for use with nurses on both surgical and medical wards. 
The observational approach to medication preparation practice revealed a high rate of 
IPEs in the hospital environment, consistent with other UK studies. The results of this 
study show no significant difference in the IPEs rate between four wards; there were 
however differences in the phase of the preparation process at which errors occurred. 
There were no differences between the severities of errors on the different wards; the 
majority of errors were ranked as being moderate to major. However, after accounting 
for error frequency, twelve types of errors were graded as posing extreme risk namely, 
two types of errors on surgical ward (S); three types of errors from medical ward (C), 
and nine types of errors from surgical ward (H) and medical ward (B).  The chief errors 
witnessed were: gross disregard for clean/ uncluttered treatment room, faulty labelling, 
filter not used, breach of ANTT, wrong addition/mixing, unused gloves, and no double 
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check for the final product. Our findings indicate the significant role played by nurses 
in the safe preparation of injectable medicines.  
 
These data therefore provides a significant tool for prioritising risk reduction strategies 
when preparing injectable medicines on the four wards, to enhance patient safety. In 
addition, the results from this study indicate a need to develop a set of safety measures 
to address key issues, such as the gross disregard for maintaining a clean/ uncluttered 
treatment room. In addition, the need to improve the systemic factors that cause IPEs, 
for example addressing the use of a filter needle when dealing with ampoules or offering 
ready-to-administer injections to minimise error potential. The findings of this study 
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Preparing injectable medicines is a fundamental skill required of many nurses. 
Sufficient clinical knowledge and adequate nursing skills are essential for ensuring a 
safe and high quality preparation practice. Furthermore, ensuring patient safety is a main 
role of nurses in clinical practice (Elliott and Liu, 2010). Appropriate preparation of 
injectable medicine accounts for a significant portion of a nurse’s duties. Nurses spend 
more than a third of their time on activities associated with medicines (Keers et al., 
2013), and it has been said that preparing injectable medicines is the most risky job a 
nurse undertakes (Beaney, 2010). Additionally, the nurse is the final individual who can 
confirm the injectable medicine has been correctly prescribed and prepared before it is 
administered (Davey et al., 2008; Beaney, 2010). Hence, nurses play a vital part in 
ensuring patient safety by avoiding harmful errors (Rothschild et al., 2006). In the 
absence of effective safeguards to avoid injectable medication preparation errors (IPEs), 
patients (and nurses) can be at a high risk during the medication preparation phase 
(Beaney, 2010). Hence, understanding the nature and causes of IPEs is important to 
develop more efficient defensive barriers and strategies to prevent errors during the 
preparation stage (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Wirtz et al., 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2004; 
Cousins et al., 2005; Westbrook et al., 2011; Keers et al., 2013).  
 
The purpose of injectable medication preparation is to ensure that the correct drug and 
formulation is prepared at the correct time, in the correct dose, via the correct route, and 
administered to the correct patient (National Patient Safety Agency, 2007, Beaney, 
2010; Royal College of Nursing, 2016; The Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2016). All 
UK hospitals are required to have an injectable medications standard policy that must 
contain injectable medicine preparation procedures that are in line with the Nursing and 
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Midwifery Council (NMC) code of conduct and Standards for Infusion Therapy (NPSA, 
2007; Nursing and Midwifery Council 2016). 
 
Healthcare staff who are involved in preparing injectable medicines in UK hospitals 
should have completed essential training and demonstrated the competencies required 
by the NHS Trust in relation to injectable medicines. Furthermore, a high level of 
training is required for some specific groups of injectable medicines (e.g. preparation of 
IV doses and chemotherapy drugs) (NMC, 2016).  
 
Injectable medications must only be prepared according to clear and accurate written 
prescriptions provided by an authorised prescriber (Royal College of Nursing, 2016; 
NMC, 2016). 
 
A small number of studies have investigated the causes of errors in the preparation of 
injectable medicines.  Three studies (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2004; 
Crowley, 2006) focused on the causes of injectable medicine errors in UK and German 
hospitals, whereas other studies have placed greater focus on administration errors 
(Hartley and Dhillon, 1998; Bruce and Wong, 2001; Wirtz et al., 2003; Cousins et al., 
2005). All studies used direct observation to investigate IV drug errors. Two studies 
(Taxis and Barber, 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2004) collected additional data through 
informal conversations with the nurses being observed, and then applied human error 
theory as a framework to analyse and categorise incidents in UK and German hospitals, 
respectively. One UK study (Taxis and Barber, 2003) reported complex or unclear 
design of equipment, such as unclear or complicated presentation of vials, and 
preparation procedures. Other less common factors found to contribute to IPEs in 
injectable doses involved unauthorised medication, and unclear prescriptions (Taxis and 
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Barber, 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2004); preparation of the wrong medicine; 
unacceptable cleaning technique; failure to follow aseptic non touch technique (ANTT); 
and expired medication, or unknown expiry date (Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 2015). Lack 
of knowledge about the preparation of injectable doses, including how to use infusion 
equipment, incorrect preparation technique (e.g. not using a filter needle; gross 
disregard for clean/aseptic technique during injectable medication preparation), and 
unclear procedures, instructions/guidelines, and manufacturer leaflets were other 
common causes of injectable errors (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2004).  
Taxis and Barber (2004) reported that, in a German hospital, nurses did not have 
adequate knowledge to safely prepare injectable medications, and that nurses were not 
evaluated appropriately on injectable drug preparation. In a UK hospital, lack of 
training, which focused mainly on the reconstitution stage (failing to fully reconstitute 
a product during preparation, or follow to the mixing instructions) also contributed to a 
lack of knowledge, and most nurses were not aware of the potential risk of such a 
practice (reconstitution process) (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 
2015). Furthermore, in their study of the UK and Germany, Taxis and Barber (2003) 
reported that the lack of involvement of pharmacists during injectable preparation, and 
of a separate room or dedicated area for injectable drug preparation on hospital wards, 
were the main causes of error in injectable medicine preparation.  
 
In terms of working environment, a lack of qualified nurses, insufficient skill mix, poor 
communication between nurses, and lack of staff, combined with the common factors 
of multitasking and distraction/interruption, have also been found to lead to errors in 
injectable preparation (Bruce and Wong, 2001; Taxis and Barber, 2003; Taxis and 




6.2 Methods to determine the causes of IPEs 
 
Several investigation approaches have been utilised to collect data on the causes of IPEs, 
including quantitative self-completion questionnaires, qualitative interviews, focus 
groups, and direct observation (Osborne et al., 1999; Crowley, 2006; Ulanimo et al., 
2007, Cohen and Shastay, 2008; Jones and Treiber, 2010; Ameer, 2015). A limited 
number of nurses used daily notebooks (i.e. a book in which nurses record details and 
incidents relating to errors in preparing injectable) (Ameer, 2015). Limited investigates 
have employed a mixed approach, although Crowley (2006) conducted a focus group 
followed by face-to-face interviews and Ameer (2015) collected data using three 
different methods: incidents reports, questionnaires, and semi-structured interviews 
with staff who had been involved in medication errors. Some investigative studies 
reported data corresponding to Reason’s (1990) categorisation of active failures to 
determine the main cause of IPEs (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Taxis and Barber 2004; 
Crowley, 2006; Ozkan et al., 2011; Ameer, 2015). These studies mainly reported slips, 
lapses, mistakes, and violations. While there were some differences between the studies 
in terms of the approaches used, the most common contributing factors classified in the 
studies were similar. However, studies varied in the level of detail they provided. For 
example, studies which relied on interviews (with or without observation), focus groups, 
or self-report methods enabling free text responses were able to provide detailed 
information about the different causes of IPEs. In some cases, the studies related the 
causal factors to specific IPEs (e.g., incorrect dose); however, others relied on structured 
methods, such as short answer surveys/questionnaires (Tang et al., 2007; Jones and 
Treiber, 2010), and others used direct observation methods alone (Tissot et al., 2003) - 




In 1954, Flanagan was used the critical incident technique as a method to investigate 
and analyse causes of incidents that led to an adverse event. This qualitative and 
retrospective method requires the collection of data about behaviours from the staff 
involved in relevant incidents in the form of a written statement, interviews, and 
questionnaires. The critical incident technique is considered to be a valid method of 
collecting and analysing data on adverse event (Vincent, 2003). Nevertheless, a key 
weakness of this method is that the collected information relies on participants’ 
memories, which can be influenced by hindsight bias (Flanagan, 1954; Keers et al., 
2013).  As such, the observational technique used by Tissot et al. (2003) may be more 
valid and reliable approach to collecting data about the causes of MEs, as it maintains a 
distance from the opinions of individuals directly involved in the errors, assuming that 
there is no influence of researcher opinion (Keers et al., 2013). In addition, using an 
observational method, the researcher can classify deviations from standard procedure 
that the staff missed. But, a weakness of research using direct observation only, for 
example that by Tissot et al. (2003), is that the researcher may be incapable to explore 
the causes that led to an individual’s error. Hence, a number of investigations have 
merged observational approaches with interviews (Crowley, 2006; Chua et al., 2009; 
Ozkan et al., 2011; Ameer, 2015) or informal conversations with the nurses involved 
(Taxis and Barber 2003; Taxis and Barber 2004) to establish error causation. The key 
strength of such studies is that collecting data using two methods can help to link the 
causes of mistakes that the researcher would be incapable of noticing alone, with those 
causes that would not be known by the individual who made the error (Keers et al., 
2013). Furthermore, this mixed method approach can resolve contradictions between 
actions that the staff report they have undertaken, and those that they actually undertake 




In investigations that conducted self-completed questionnaires, although some included 
an already prepared list of contributory factors for participants to choose from (Deans, 
2005; Tang et al., 2007), others only used open-ended questions (Jones and Treiber, 
2010). Ready prepared lists can be considered a weakness, as the list of factors 
contributing to IPEs provided to nurses may not include sufficiently detailed 
information, or all likely causes.  
 
In conclusion, numerous studies have investigated the causes of medication errors in 
general, and a few with a focus on IPEs. Various approaches have been used by studies 
to collect data on this issue. While these studies differed in their approaches, hospital 
settings, drug distribution systems, and the description of errors studied, factors such as 
the quality of prescriptions, distraction and interruption, lack of staff, workload, length 
and type of shift, and lack of nurse training and knowledge were reported in almost all 
studies. Some contributing factors differed depending on the study setting and computer 
system used in the hospitals.  
6.3 Significance of the research 
 
 
A few studies, particularly in the UK, have focused on the causes of IPEs, and studied 
the views and opinions of nurses via qualitative interviews to gain insight into nurses’ 
understanding of the issue. Moreover, numerous modifications have recently been 
implemented in the UK hospitals. These modifications include increasing the shift 
lengths to 12 hours, and running automated dispensing cupboards on hospital wards. 
Furthermore, the NHS Trust has recently employed numerous nurses, especially within 
surgical and medical wards, thus, at the time of this study, there were many junior and 
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inexperienced nurses working in the NHS Trust. These modifications in environment 
and staffing may have an influence on medication safety, particularly in regard to 
medication preparation.  
 
This chapter employs interviews and questionnaires to examine the underlying causes 
of a number of errors reported in the observational study, by gathering views of the 
nurses involved. It also establishes nurses’ opinions on how such errors can be 
minimised, in order to develop preventative strategies.  
 
The analysis in the present study is more robust and more clearly linked with human 
error theory than previous research. Earlier studies addressing injectable medicine 
preparation errors have focused on quantifying the problem (Wirtz et al., 2003; Taxis 
and Barber; 2003; Cousins et al., 2005; Crowley, 2006; Dehmel et al., 2011). Yet, in 
order to effectively reduce injectable drug preparation errors, a deeper understanding of 
how and why errors occur is required (Leape, 1994). To that end, the NPSA has adopted 
a systems approach to safety, within which applying a human error or human factors 
approach to understanding and analysing error incidence is appropriate (NPSA, 2003). 
In this context, human factors are defined as: “An applied science of system design that 
assesses human strength and compensates for human limitation” (Schneider, 2002, p. 
1156). The analysis of the current study focuses on active failures that led to injectable 
medicine preparation errors, and also further explores the local task-based, team-based, 
and individual factors, as well as working environment, and organisational factors 





6.4 Aims and Objectives  
 
 
The aim of this investigation is suggestions ways to reduce the IPEs in hospital wards. 
The objectives are the following points: 
 Determine the causes of errors observed during the preparation of injectable 
medicines from the hospital wards by nurses. 
 Develop strategies for reducing the risk of such errors reoccurring. 




In this study, a combination of interviews and questionnaires were used because in the 
pharmacy aseptic units the study did not find many staff happy to do an interview, so 
the study required a second way of collecting data to try to get more information. There 
are numerous different techniques that can be utilised to collect qualitative data; 
however, the three main approaches are interviews, focus groups, and questionnaires 
(Arhinful et al., 1996; Creswell, 2013; Trochim et al., 2015) (see Section 2.7). The 
present study applied a qualitative face-to-face semi-structured interview and self-
completed questionnaire. The self-complete questionnaire technique is cheaper than 
other approaches, and the survey can potentially be distributed to large numbers of 
participants at different sites (Creswell, 2103). Furthermore, it can preserve anonymity, 
enabling the participants to feel relaxed and able to provide honest responses regarding 
workplace factors (Constantinos et al., 2011). Self-complete questionnaires must be well 
designed and clear to the participants; thus questions must be simple and easy to 
understand, as no interviewer will be available to assist the participants (Phellas et al., 
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2011). Self-complete questionnaires can include three types of questions: (1) open-
ended questions; (2) closed-ended questions; and (3) a mixture of closed-ended and 
open-ended questions (Kane, 2004). The present study used a questionnaire consisting 
of a mix of closed- and open-ended questions (Appendix 17). As shown in Table 6.1, 
Creswell (2013) has summarised the main advantages and disadvantages of mixing 
closed- and open-ended questions in a questionnaire. The use of this method in the 
present study enabled a greater understanding of the views of nurses concerning the 
factors contributing to IPEs.  
In addition, qualitative interviews were used to collect data, as they combine structure 
with flexibility, which enables topics to be presented and discussed in the most 
appropriate order (see Section 2.7). Moreover, the nature of interviews allows data to be 
generated through communication between the interviewer and interviewee. The ability 
of the interviewer to utilise different investigations, prompts, and other techniques to 
elicit in-depth answers and fully explore the issue under study is another feature of 
interviews (Creswell, 2013). Semi-structured interviews consist of open-ended 
questions that relate to the research topic under investigation. While these questions are 
pre-defined, they still offer opportunities for both the interviewer and interviewee to 
discuss particular topics in further detail (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The use of semi-
structured interviews and self-completed questionnaires in the present study allowed the 
researcher to collect more robust data and maintain a focus on the views and opinions 






Table 6.1: Advantages and disadvantages of the mixture of close- and open-ended questions approach 
(Adapted from Creswell, 2013). 
 
6.5.2 Development of the questionnaire 
 
 
Developing the questionnaire was a significant part of the research study. Targeted 
responses from participants can be acquired only if a questionnaire is structured well, 
taking into account important factors such as the reliability and validity of the 
information obtained. Hague (2006) has provided guidelines outlining seven phases of 
the questionnaire design process, which are the following: (1) determine what data is 
required; (2) build a significant list of questions; (3) improve the question terminology; 
(4) develop the response format; (5) place the questions into a suitable order; (6) finalise 












Inexpensive. This means they can 
provide large amounts of research data 
for relatively low costs.  
Time consuming to collect the data. It 
takes longer for the respondent to 
complete open questions. This is a 
problem as a smaller sample size may 
be obtained. 
The data can be quickly obtained as 
closed questions are easy to answer 
(usually just ticking a box).  
Time consuming to analyse the data. It 
takes longer for the researcher to 
analyse qualitative data as they have to 
read the answers and try to put them into 
categories by coding, which is often 
subjective and difficult. 
The questions are standardised. All 
respondents are asked exactly the same 
questions in the same order. This means a 
questionnaire can be replicated easily to 
check for reliability. Therefore, a second 
researcher can use the questionnaire to 
check that the results are consistent.  
 
Allow individuals to express what they 
think in their own words.  
 
Used for complex questions that cannot 
be answered in a few simple categories 







 For the present study, a mixture of closed- and open-ended questions were included 
in the questionnaire design, in order to meet the study objectives (Appendix 17). All 
questions were formulated after studying results obtained from the aseptic study and 
reviewing published literature. Furthermore, previously published studies (Vincent et 
al., 2000; Woloshynowych et al., 2005) were referred to when formulating the questions. 
The focus of the questions included in the questionnaire was on exploring the 
perceptions of the injectable medicines preparation teams regarding the factors that 
contribute to a specific IPEs observed, and how to prevent these errors. Completing the 
questionnaire required approximately ten minutes. The questionnaire contained three 
main parts, as follows:  
 Part One: Questions about the error observed and the circumstances that the 
nurse believed lead to the error. 
 Part Two: Questions about the factors contributing to the error, and how to 
reduce the risk of this error occurring again. 
 Part Three: Demographics: questions requesting information about the 
participant’s current job grade, contract type, area of work, years of experience 
in the current trust, employment status, and number of injectable medicines 
prepared each day.  
6.5.3 Reliability and validity 
 
 
Reliability refers to the level to which data, measures, and processes are consistent and 
repeatable. In the current study, the questions were subject to an internal review by the 
supervisory team (Dr. Julie Letchford; Dr. Lynette James) to ensure the feasibility and 
reasonability of the questionnaire items. To ensure the reliability, the questionnaire was 
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piloted among nursing staff (n=5) at the Royal United Hospital in Bath. In this pilot 
study, participants indicated a good understanding of the questions.  
6.5.4 Development of the interview schedule 
 
 
A semi-structured, face-to-face interview model was developed in order to guide the 
interviews so that the researcher was able to collect significant data regarding the factors 
contributing to medication preparation errors based on the framework of factors 
influencing clinical practice developed by Vincent et al. (2000) (see Section 4.4.2). The 
interview schedule was reviewed by Dr. Lynette James, a Consultant Pharmacist - Acute 
Care and Medication Safety (All Wales) in Cardiff and Vale University Health Board 
(University Hospital of Wales). A simulation of the interview was conducted at the 
University of Bath in April 2016, with supervisors Dr. Julie Letchford and Dr. Matthew 
Jones, resulting in the final interview schedule (Appendix 18).  
 
The interview schedule was divided into three main parts (see Appendix 18). In the first 
part, participants were asked to provide brief information about the circumstances that 
led to the specific error that they were responsible for, and were asked to describe the 
steps they took when preparing the product concerned. The second part focused on the 
perceptions of the participant regarding different factors contributing to the specific 
IPEs observed, based on the following classifications: task environment; error-
producing conditions; individual factors; team factors; patient factors; and 
organisational factors (Vincent et al., 2000). The third part consisted of one general 
question asking participants how, in practice, they avoid these contributing factors. In 
each part of the interview, additional brief questions were asked to elicit further 
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explanation and justifications where required. Furthermore, questions raised by the 
participant were discussed and participants asked for any explanations needed.  
6.5.5 Study setting 
 
 
The present study was conducted in a range of hospital wards at two UK hospitals (see 
Section 5.5.2). The two hospital trusts provide a full range of hospital services for the 
local community, as well as specialist services for many medical and surgery 
specialisms including cancer, cardiothoracic surgery, women's and children's services, 
kidney care, and orthopaedics. Registered nurses are responsible for preparing all 
injectable medicines before administering them to patients. In addition, the pharmacy 
department prepares some high-risk medicines, such as chemotherapy drugs, which are 
available ‘ready to use’ from the pharmacy unit.  
6.5.6 Study participants 
 
 
All nurses were informed about the study and invited to participate before recruitment 
began; this was intended to increase awareness about the study and also to provide an 
opportunity for prospective participants to ask any questions or request further 
information about the study. This was achieved using copies of the study protocol and 
a participant information leaflet. Furthermore, information about the study was sent by 
ward managers via group emails to all nurses to inform them about the study and to 
invite them to participate. This invitation email provided brief information about the 
study, including the goal, approvals obtained, eligible participants, what participation 
would involve, and what to do if they were willing to take part. In addition, a copy of 
the invitation letter, study protocol, and participant information leaflet were attached to 
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the email.  Qualitative studies typically rely on small samples, because they are intended 
to collect detailed data, though they are relatively time consuming (Tuckett, 2004; 
Richards, 2009). Depending on the research objectives, it is generally accepted that 
between 9 to 12 participants is sufficient for this method (Dean et al., 2002; Guest et al., 
2013; Hennink et al., 2017), and was deemed to be adequate for the present qualitative 
study. All the nurses who had made a medication error were first invited for interview 
and then asked to complete a questionnaire. At the first site (pharmacy environment), 
the interview offer was made on a voluntary basis, but this resulted in a limited number 
of results and so at the second site, nurses were offered a financial incentive to 
participate in the interviews and complete the questionnaire. In both cases nurses who 
did not wish to be interviewed were still invited to complete the questionnaire; those 
who agreed to be interviewed and completed a questionnaire discussed their 
questionnaire responses in the interview. Those who were willing to take part in the 
study were provided with a participant information leaflet and consent form (see 
Appendix 14) and were required to provide their written informed consent (see 
Appendix 15) prior to being interviewed. Nurses’ participation in the interviews and/or 
questionnaire was entirely voluntary and participants were able to withdraw from the 
study at any point up to the date of the study report, which was stated as 9th January 
2017, without giving any reason. During the interviews, no upsetting, embarrassing, or 
sensitive subjects were discussed. Furthermore, nurses were free to refuse to answer any 
question they were asked during the interview. Hence, it was unlikely that any nurses 
would encounter any discomfort or harm during the interviews. In addition, the 
interviews were confidential and any personal information detected during the course 
of the research was anonymised by the researcher. The researcher (AA) clarified to 
nurses that information used for the study would not be associated with specific nurses.  
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At the end of the interview, the contact details of study team members were provided in 
all research documents and study communication (emails) in case nurses had any 
questions or desired any further information.  
6.5.7 Ethical approval 
 
 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained in accordance with the Research Ethics 
Procedure of the University of Bath’s (see Section 5.6.4). 
6.5.8 Data collection 
 
Interviews and questionnaires with nurses were conducted between September and 
November 2016. All interviews and questionnaire completion took place in a quiet room 
on the ward on which the nurses worked. Nursing staff who made an error while being 
observed by the researcher were invited to an interview first then complete a 
questionnaire within 48 hours of the error’s documentation. A semi-structured, face-to-
face interview model was conducted, using a topic guide. At the beginning of each 
interview, the investigator provided general and brief information about the study and 
the nature of the questions that would be asked. The participant was asked to verbally 
confirm that they had read the information leaflet and that they had read and signed the 
consent form. Each interview lasted approximately 10 to 15 minutes. With the consent 
of participants, interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. A 
questionnaire was also given to the relevant nurse after each interview, which took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete it. Respondents were asked to return their 
completed questionnaires to the researcher, or to an agreed location in their hospital 
ward within 48 hours of the occurrence of the error. 
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On receipt of the completed questionnaires, the nurses received a £5 gift voucher of their 
choice, and a £10 gift voucher upon completion of the interview. The vouchers only 
given at site two of the study, based on experience of poor uptake of interviews at site 
one. All data collected from the interviews and questionnaires was anonymised prior to 
data analysis to prevent the disclosure of information in any research report that could 
be linked to individual participants.  
6.5.9 Data storage 
 
To guarantee privacy and security of all study data, electronic data files were saved on 
a password locked and encrypted USB drive. All study data relating to the final 
interview transcripts, questionnaires, consent forms, and all USB drives that were used 
to store electronic files were stored in a locked filing cabinet the University of Bath. 
Audio recordings were destroyed at the end of the study. Each participant was given a 
reference number, which was used during the study and stored separately from their 
contact details. Only members of the study team had access to this data.  
6.5.10 Data analysis 
 
 
All anonymised transcribed interviews and questionnaires were subjected to thematic 
analysis (Gale et al., 2013; Vaismoradi et al., 2013) (see Sections 2.7.2 & 2.7.3). 
Thematic analysis is a qualitative descriptive method of data analysis, and one, which 
is used often, used in qualitative research of nursing practices (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). 
The use of this form of qualitative descriptive analysis was deemed appropriate for the 
current investigation, as it requires a relatively low level of interpretation, in contrast to 
grounded theory, where higher level of interpretive complexity is needed (Vaismoradi 
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et al., 2013). Framework analysis is commonly used to thematically analyse semi-
structured interview transcripts and completed questionnaires (Gale et al., 2013).  
 
 
Interview transcripts and questionnaires were analysed manually (see Section 2.7.4), 
and validated by the supervisors (JL; MJ; LJ) who checked the key researcher's coding 






















6.6.1 Participants’ demographic data for questionnaires and interviews data 
1) Questionnaires data 
 
 
The researcher distributed 62 questionnaires to hospital nurses in relation to 62 
injectable preparation errors committed on four wards at two participating sites. Fifty 
completed questionnaires were collected. Fifteen questionnaires were distributed on the 
surgical ward (S); 12 on the medical ward (C); 21 on the second surgical ward (H); and 
14 on the second medical ward (B). In total, 50 completed questionnaires were returned, 
containing information regarding 50 injectable preparation errors. Sixteen junior nurses 
(surgical ward (S): n=8, medical ward (C): n=8), five senior nurses (surgical ward (S): 
n=3, medical ward (C): n=2), 26 junior nurses (surgical ward (H): n=13, medical ward 
(B): n=13), and three senior nurses (surgical ward (H): n=2, medical ward (B): n=1) 
completed questionnaires; two errors were committed by one nurse on the medical ward 
(C).  
 
Nurses’ demographic characteristics are shown in Table 6.2, and a summary of the 
observed error associated with each questionnaire returned from the four wards in Table 
6.3. The number of participants from the surgical ward (S) (n=11) was similar to that 
from the medical ward (C) (n=10), and the number of questionnaire responses from the 
surgical ward (H) (n=17) was similar to those from the medical ward (C) (n=12). The 
mean length of participants’ experience as registered nurses was 9.7 years (range: 6 
months –31 years). Their total years of hospital experience ranged from 1 to 33 years. 
Most participants were full-time employees and had permanent contracts (86%), though 
some (14%) were part-time employees or had either a bank or an agency staff contract. 










Table 6.2. Questionnaire respondents’ (n = 50) demographic data. 
Characteristics Surgical ward (S) (n=11) Medical ward (C) (n=10) Surgical ward (H) (n=17) Medical ward (B) (n=12) 
Gender 
Woman 11 (100 %) 3 (30%) 15 (88%) 5 (42%) 
Man 0 (0%) 7(70%) 2 (12%) 7 (58%) 
Hospital employment 
Full-time 9 (82%) 9 (90%) 17 (100%) 12 (100%) 
Part-time 2 (18%) 1 (11%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Contract type 
Permanent 10 (91%) 8 (80%) 17 (100%) 12 (100%) 
Bank staff 0 (0%) 2 (20%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Agency staff 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Agenda for change band 
Band 5 8 (73%) 8 (80%) 15 (88%) 11 (92%) 
Band 6 3 (17%) 2 (20%) 2 (12%) 1 (8%) 
Years of post-registration experience 
<1 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 7 (41%) 0 (0%) 
1–10 8 (73%) 8 (80%) 6 (35%) 10 (84%) 
10–20 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (12%) 1 (8%) 
20–30 1 (9%) 2 (20%) 2 (12%) 1 (8%) 
>30 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Average number of doses prepared each day     
<5 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
5–10 8 (73%) 9 (90%) 11 (65%) 7 (58%) 
10–20 2(18%) 1 (10%) 6 (35%) 5 (42%) 
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Ref Gender Job title Type of error and description Ward Risk score 
S7 Female Senior 
nurse 





S1 Female Junior 
nurse 





S4 Female Junior 
nurse 





S19 Female Junior 
nurse 
No double check: a second nurse did not check the 




S23 Female Senior 
nurse 
Wrong dose: Leakage from ampoule /vial / syringe 




S34 Female Senior 
nurse 
Wrong dose: Leakage from ampoule /vial / syringe 




S24 Female Junior 
nurse 





S28 Female Junior 
nurse 
Breach of ANTT: Deficient in performing infection 





S29 Female Junior 
nurse 
Unused apron and gloves: A plastic apron and gloves 




S35 Female Junior 
nurse 
Wrong medicine selected: Co-amoxiclav 1.2g 




S43 Female Junior 
nurse 
Faulty labelling: Physician changed dose after being 
made up. Additional 200 mg added to infusion but 






C50 Male Junior 
nurse 
No double check: a second nurse did not check the 




C51 Male Senior 
nurse 
No double check: a second nurse did not check the 




C62 Male Junior 
nurse 
Incorrect addition or mixing: drug was strongly 




C63 Male Junior 
nurse 
Incorrect addition or mixing: drug was strongly 




C64 Male Junior 
nurse 
Incorrect addition or mixing: drug was strongly 




C65★ Female Junior 
nurse 





C65 Female Junior 
nurse 
No double check: a second nurse did not check the 




C22 Female Senior 
nurse 
Incorrect expiry date: the final product expired: out 
of date drug delivered to ward due to error in logging 






C30 Female Junior 
nurse 
Incorrect expiry date: the final product expired: out 
of date drug delivered to ward due to error in logging 






C59 Female Junior 
nurse 
Wrong medicine:  a 1.2g dose of the antibiotic co-
amoxiclav was prepared as an I.V. bolus injection 






H183★ Female Junior 
nurse 
Deficient in performing infection control after break 
in ANTT: Staff nurse not using a plastic tray to 




H183 Female Junior 
nurse 
Unused apron/gloves: A plastic apron/gloves were 




H188 Male Senior 
nurse 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and 
administered it to the patient without labelling it 




Two errors within one drug observation 
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Continued Table 6.3 
Ref Gender Job title Type of error Ward Risk score 
H189 Female Junior 
nurse 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and 
administered it to the patient without labelling it (more than 




H190 Female Junior 
nurse 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and 
administered it to the patient without labelling it (more than 




H195 Male Junior 
nurse 
Unused apron/gloves: A plastic apron/gloves were not 




H207 Female Junior 
nurse 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and 
administered it to the patient without labelling it (more than 




H219 Female Junior 
nurse 
Unused apron/gloves: A plastic apron/gloves were not 




H221 Female Junior 
nurse 
Unused apron/gloves: A plastic apron/gloves were not 




H225 Female Junior 
nurse 





H237 Female Junior 
nurse 





H240 Female Junior 
nurse 





H243 Female Junior 
nurse 





H247 Female Junior 
nurse 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and 
administered it to the patient without labelling it (more than 




H251 Female Junior 
nurse 
Unused apron/gloves: A plastic apron/gloves were not 





H246 Female Junior 
nurse 
Wrong dose: leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe resulted in 





H249 Female Senior 
nurse 






B86 Male Junior 
nurse 
Preparing product outside treatment room in unsuitable 





B96 Female Junior 
nurse 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and 
administered it to the patient without labelling it (more than 





B101 Female Junior 
nurse 






B103 Male Junior 
nurse 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and 
administered it to the patient without labelling it (more than 





B118 Male Junior 
nurse 
Preparing product outside treatment room in unsuitable 





B120 Male Junior 
nurse 




B126 Male Junior 
nurse 
Unused apron/gloves: A plastic apron/gloves were not 





B180 Female Junior 
nurse 
Preparing product outside treatment room in unsuitable 





B249  Female  Senior 
nurse 
 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and 
administered it to the patient without labelling it (more than 





B89 Male Junior 
nurse 






B90 Male Junior 
nurse 






B153 Female Junior 
nurse 








It can be noted from Table 6.3 that questionnaires were obtained for a variety of different 
errors previously categorised as extreme risk (64%, n=32/50) or high risk (36%, 
n=18/50). A summary of the observed error graded as extreme risk from the four wards 
in Table 6.4. 
     Table 6.4: A summary of the observed error graded as extreme risk from the four different hospital wards (n=32). 
 
It can be illustrated from Table 6.4 that the current study has questionnaire data for a 
good number of different types of error previously graded as extreme risk. This data can 
be used to help design error reducing strategies for the majority of extreme risk errors, 
which may also impact on some of the other errors identified. The participants ticked 
boxes to indicate which factors they considered to have contributed to the error (i.e. 
error producing conditions and latent failures), and then completed free text responses 
to describe the errors in more detail and propose barriers and defences against their 
recurrence. 
Ward Number of errors 
graded as  
extreme risk 
Types of errors graded as extreme risk Number of questionnaires 
associated with  
extreme risk errors 
S 
 
9 Messy room (n=7) 





Air bubbles (n=9) 
No double check (n=8) 




H 114 Faulty labelling (n = 26) 
       Gloves not used (n = 16) 
Filter needle not used (n = 21) 
       Breach of ANTT (n = 16) 
Messy room (n=17) 
Undissolved powder left in vial (n = 9) 
Inappropriate location of medicine 
preparation (n = 6) 
Incorrect diluent (n=2) 











B 121 Inappropriate location of medicine 
preparation (n = 20) 
       Faulty labelling (n = 19) 
Messy room (n=17) 
       Gloves not used (n = 9) 
Air bubbles (n=5) 
       Filter needle not used (n = 20) 
Breach of ANTT (n = 18) 
Rubber septum not wiped (n = 8) 













2) Interview Data 
 
The researcher conducted 12 interviews with staff in relation to 12 injectable preparation 
errors that occurred on two wards at one site. A summary of interviewees’ is presented 
in Table 6.5. Seven interviews were conducted in the surgical ward (H), and five in the 
medical ward (B). Seven junior nurses (medical ward (B) n=2, surgical ward (H) n=5) 
and five senior nurses (medical ward (B) n=3, surgical ward (H) n=2) were interviewed; 
two of the errors were made by the same individual in the surgical ward (H). Interview 
transcripts were coded drawing on Human Error Theory.  
Ref Gender Job title Type of error Ward Risk score 
H1831 Female Junior 
nurse 
1. Unused aprons/gloves: A plastic apron/gloves 
were not worn during preparation. 
2. Breach of ANTT: Deficient in performing 
infection control after break in ANTT (not used a 
plastic tray during preparation). 
Surgical (H) Extreme risk 
H187 Female Senior 
nurse 
Faulty labelling: Nurse prepared IV antibiotic drug 
(Tazocin 4.5g), placed it on a plastic tray and 
administered it to the patient without labelling it 
(more than one dose is prepared on plastic tray). 
Surgical (H) Extreme risk 
H225 Female Junior 
nurse 
Filter needle not used: whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule (Cyclizine 50mg). 
Surgical (H) Extreme risk 
H226 Female Senior 
nurse 
Filter needle not used: whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule (Cyclizine 50mg and 
morphine sulphate). 
Surgical (H) Extreme risk 
H259 Female Junior 
nurse 
Calculation error: Incorrect dose of drug due to 
wrong calculation of volume needed: prepared 8.6 
ml instead of 11.6 ml dose needed. 
Surgical (H) Extreme risk 
 
 
H245 Female Junior 
nurse 
Wrong dose: Leakage from syringe resulted in the 
dose being reduced by more than 10% 
Surgical (H) High risk 
B86 Male Senior 
nurse 
Inappropriate location of medicine preparation: 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
Medical (B) Extreme risk 
 
 
B92 Female Senior 
nurse 
Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol after 
a needle touched by maker. 
Medical (B) Extreme risk 
 
 
B106 Female Senior 
nurse 
Faulty labelling: Nurse prepared a dose, placed it 
on a plastic tray and administered it to the patient 
without labelling it (more than one dose is 
prepared on plastic tray). 
Medical (B) Extreme risk 
 
 
B144 Female Junior 
nurse 
Unused aprons/gloves: A plastic apron/gloves 
were not worn during preparation. 
Medical (B) Extreme risk 
 
B148 Male Junior 
nurse 
Wrong medicine selected: co-amoxiclav 1.2 g 
in100 ml instead of amoxicillin 1 g in 100 ml. 
Medical (B) High risk 
 
1 Two errors within one drug observation. 
 
 




In total, 114 errors classified as presenting an extreme risk were detected in the surgical 
ward H (see Table 6.5).  Interview data was obtained for six of these errors. These were 
filter needle not used (n=2); apron/gloves not used (n=1); faulty labelling (n=1); 
calculation error (n=1); and, breach of ANTT (n=1). For ward B there were 121 errors 
classified as extreme risk (see Table 6.7). Interview data was obtained for four of these 
errors. These were faulty labelling (n=1); inappropriate location of medicine preparation 
(n=1); apron/gloves not used (n=1); breach of ANTT (n=1).      
 
This data can be used to develop some error reducing strategies for the majority of 
extreme risk errors, which may also relate to some of other errors identified. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to interview participants working on wards S and C; 
because the pharmacy staff were very busy during the current study however, the 
questionnaires completed by nurses on these wards do give some insight into the causes 
of errors in these settings consider how to avoid them reoccurring in the future. 
 
 
6.6.3 Active failures for Causes of IPEs from questionnaires and interviews 
 
 
In Human Error Theory, active failures are defined as unsafe acts that have an immediate 
adverse consequence (Vincent et al., 1998). In this study, 50 active failures were 
observed whilst coding open text questionnaire responses: 25 knowledge- or rule-based 
mistakes associated with a lack of education or training or poor practice; 12 violations 
that ignored polices; 11 lapses; and, 2 slips. Interview data were obtained for twelve 
active failures, classified as six knowledge/rule-based mistakes, four lapses, one slip, 
and one violation that ignored polices. Range of Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes and 












Faulty labelling 7 1 “Dose was changed by F1 after being made up. 
Additional 200mg added to infusion but label 
not changed before leaving treatment room. 
Not actual error - dose correct but label still said 





5 None “Preparation was initially withdrawn up with 
bubbles in the syringe. It was the first time that 
I had to prepare this blood product. I was 
corrected by a colleague more familiar with the 
drug.” [C62] (From questionnaire). 
Not wearing an 
apron or gloves 
during injectable 
preparation 
3 1 “I wasn’t aware that we had to wear gloves or 
an apron. I thought it was just your own 
preference if you wanted to wear gloves- you 
know.” [H183] (From interview). 
Wrong dose 3 1 “I didn’t realise you weren’t meant to put [two 
syringes into one] into one so …but that’s 
probably a mistake on my part.” [H245] 
 (From interview). 
Breach ANTT 2 1 “Incomplete knowledge and still learning as 
newly qualified. I put the syringe down and the 
needle attached [onto a] surface to ask for a 




2 None “Chemo expiry date. It was not a mistake as it 
was spotted and reached pre going the chemo 
to the patient.” [C22]  
(From questionnaire). 
Failing to use a 
filter needle 
 
1 1 “I used a green needle to filter up cyclizine 
instead of the pink filter needle [lack of 
knowledge about pink needles] that was 




1 None “This was a usual amount of clutter for this 




None 1 “Umm, so I was asked to prepare an 
aminophylline intravenous infusion- umm, 
which I had never done before, and the nurses 
on the ward had never prepared that because it 
is not a respiratory ward it is a surgical ward so 
I was unfamiliar with the medication and I did 






1 None “Not a mistake - patient has Hickman line so 
drugs need to be prepared inside room to 
decrease infection.” [B180]  
(From questionnaire). 
Table 6.6: Causes of knowledge- or rule-based mistakes and poor practice made at four hospital wards in 





Several of violations came from deliberately ignoring the policies were stated by 
participants. The underlying causes are summarising in Table 6.7. 
 
 
Some of lapses (forgetting) were reported by participants. The underlying causes are 












Failing to use a 
filter needle 
 
3 None “I didn’t use filter needle for withdrawing IV 





2 1 “We can prepare IV medication because we don’t 
have any closed room in this ward to prepare IV 
medication we have only small area which is all 
the other wards they do it in treatment room but in 
this ward because of a high workload umm…. we 
can prepare IV medication in the entrance of the 
ward, is located in front of the HDU department.” 
[B86](From interview). 
 
Not wearing an 




2 None “I didn’t wear an apron and gloves when I was 







2 None “Work space was untidy. To tidy up messes that 
are not ours.” [S7] (From questionnaire). 
 
No double check 2 None “I should have left the treatment room to find 














                Table 6.8: Causes of lapses (forgetting) made at four hospital wards in two sites  
 
 
The slip involved selecting the wrong medicine from the shelves to prepare 
the final product was reported by participants. The underlying causes are 
summarising in Table 6.9. 
 
             














7 1 “Started drawing up the antibiotic finished 
drawing up the antibiotic and then realised I’d 
forgotten gloves and apron.” (B144).]  
(From interview 
 
Dose delayed or 
omitted 
medicine 
2 None “I forgot IV drug dissolving in treatment 
room.” [S24] 
 (From questionnaire). 
Forgetting to 
label IV bolus 
 
1 1 ““It slipped my mind since I have known that 
we’re meant to label IV bolus…but obviously 
this one just slipped through the net.” [H187] 
(From interview 
Forgetting to use 
filter needle  
None 1 “I didn’t put a filter needle on as I was drawing 
it up I used an ordinary needle umm having just 
forgotten.” [H225](From interview 
Breach ANTT None 1 “So I might forget was supposed to clean the 
needle with alcohol wipes after needle touched 
the gloves or change the needle, so someone 
might forget to.” [B92] 
(From interview 
No double check 1 None “Nurses are busy, and sometimes it is very 
difficult to find a person able to do a second 
check. If you have an increased volume of 
work, you can forget.” [S19] 
(From questionnaire). 





Wrong medicine 2 1 “Instead of picking amoxicillin I picked co-
amoxiclav” [B148] (From interview 
 
“Had co-amoxiclav in my head but realised it 






6.6.4 Error-producing conditions (EPCs) for IPEs  
1) Questionnaires data 
 
In Human Error Theory, error-producing conditions are defined as situations that 
increase the probability of an error occurring (Vincent et al., 1998). Nurses were asked 
to select all the error-producing conditions present at the time of the mistake, from a 
pre-defined list. Five main themes and 33 codes for error-producing conditions were 
identified. The error-producing conditions identified from the questionnaire data are 
presented in Table 6.10. The most common error producing conditions were 
environmental factors related to high workload and a congested environment; and 
individual factors related to distractions, interruptions and haste. The least common 
causes of errors included: failure to follow policy, protocol, or procedure; failure to use 
ANTT; insufficient equipment (e.g., plastic tray/gloves); failure of equipment (e.g., drug 
preparation guidelines); inadequate verbal communication with colleagues; lack of 







Theme Code Surgical ward 
 (S) (n = 11) 
Medical ward (C) 
 (n = 10) 
Surgical ward (H)  
(n = 17) 
Medical ward (B)  
(n = 12) 
Total 
(n = 50) 
 
Environmental factors 
High workload 7 (64%) 9 (90%) 9 (53%) 8 (67%) 33 (86%) 
Congested environment (inadequate space) 7 (64%) 4 (40%) 5 (29%) 5 (42%) 21(42%) 
Staff shortage 3 (27%) 3 (30%) 3 (18%) 4 (33%) 13 (26%) 
Poor layout of work environment 3 (27%) 0 (0%) 6 (35%) 3 (25%) 12 (24%) 
Noise 6 (55%) 0 (0%) 2 (12%) 2 (17%) 10 (20%) 
Insufficient rest breaks 1 (9%) 3 (30%) 2 (12%) 1 (8%) 7 (14%) 




Distraction or interruption 8 (73%) 5 (50%) 5 (29%) 3 (25%) 21 (42%) 
Haste 8 (73%) 1 (10%) 4 (24%) 1 (8%) 14 (28%) 
Unfamiliar with policies or protocols 0 (0%) 3 (30%) 4 (24%) 1 (8%) 8 (16%) 
Lack of knowledge 2 (18%) 3 (10%) 2 (12%) 0 (0%) 7 (14%) 
Lack of experience 1 (9%) 3 (30%) 2 (12%) 0 (0%) 6 (12%) 
Stress 2 (18%) 0 (0%) 3 (18%) 1 (8%) 6 (12%) 
Fatigue 2 (18%) 3 (30%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (10%) 
Inattention or absent-mindedness 2 (18%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 1 (8%) 4 (8%) 
Unfamiliar with environment 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 1 (8%) 2 (4%) 
 
Rule-based factors 
Misunderstanding policy / protocol / procedure 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (29%) 0 (0%) 5 (10%) 
Failure to use ANTT 2 (18%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 3 (6%) 
Failure to follow policy, protocol, or procedure 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 1 (8%) 3 (6%) 





Poor labelling 0 (0%) 2 (20%) 4 (24%) 0 (0%) 6 (12%) 
Lack of equipment (e.g. label for IV bolus, needle or syringe) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (29%) 0 (0%) 5 (10%) 
Unfamiliarity with medicine 0 (0%) 3 (30%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 4 (8%) 
Failure of equipment (e.g., syringe/ guidelines) 2 (18%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 3 (6%) 
Complexity of IV preparation 0 (0%) 3 (30%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (6%) 
Inappropriate equipment (e.g. plastic tray/label) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (12%) 0 (0%) 2 (4%) 
Unavailability of drug/diluent 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
 
Team-related factors 
Inadequate verbal communication with colleagues 1 (9%) 1 (10%) 2 (12%) 0 (0%) 4 (8%) 
Inadequate verbal communication between ward and pharmacy 0 (0%) 2 (20%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (4%) 
Lack of support from colleagues 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 2 (4%) 
Lack of supervision from senior staff 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
Poor team work 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
Working alone 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 




Various error-producing conditions could also be identified from the analysis of free-
text responses. These contributory factors related to environmental factors, individual 
factors, mental stressors, task factors and patient factors. 
 
I. Environmental factors  
 
 
Environmental factors considered to contribute to errors occurring related to high 
workload and short staffing. 
 Workload  
 
Participants suggested that errors correlated with high workload included an untidy 
workplace, forgetting to wear gloves or apron and forgetting to perform a double check, 
which were reported to happen mainly during busy times. This could result from the 
culture of the hospital ward and nurses, working under pressure to prepare injectable 
medicines and do other jobs besides drug preparation at the same moment. Typical 
examples are given below: 
“Work space untidy, we don’t have enough time due to workload to tidy up.” 
[S7] 
  
“High workload made by mind not to use apron.” [B90] 
 
“High workload to request second signature of IV antibiotics as patient 
awaiting dose.” [S28] 
 
 
Factors contributing to high workload included short staffing (n=4), other clinical 
demands (n=6), and a congested working environment [(n=4) which resulted from an 
inadequate working area in which to prepare medication]. Typical examples are given 
below: 
“Short staffing increases workload for other staff.” [H219] 
 
 “Area cluttered due to patient clinical demands.” [C65] 
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“Sometimes there are too many medications on the desk. Sometimes there are 
too many nurses preparing injectable in the same small space.” [B86] 
 
High workload was often linked with distraction, particularly during busy times during 
the day (e.g. drugs round). Participants identified that heavy workloads and distraction 
by other staff was a significant issue impacting their concentration levels during the 
preparation of injectable drugs and as a result, might lead to errors. Typical examples 
are given below: 
“Very busy ward. Many healthcare professionals coming and going and leaving 
notes / medical equipment out and not put away afterwards.” [B120] 
 “Too many staff members around nursing station at once. Shortage of doctors 
today so they are more rushed and busy.” [B120 
“Distracted from task by colleagues.” [H221]  
 
 Short of staffing     
 
Five nurses across the two sites identified staffing levels as a significant factor leading 
to mistakes. Staffing issues included staff being moved to another ward, which 
consequently raised the workload. For example: 
 “Lack of staffing. Staff moved to another ward in morning.” [C62] 
 
II. Individual factors 
 Lack of knowledge, skills and experience of nurses 
 
 
Individual factors considered to contribute to errors occurring centred on a lack of 
knowledge, skills, and experience. Inadequate knowledge and experience regarding 
specific medicines was particularly well documented amongst junior nurses. Several 
nurses related these inadequacies to the lack of training they received when they joined 
the Trust. Typical examples are given below: 
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“Staff nurse thought it was sufficient enough to wash hand before and after 
preparing IV drugs.” [H183] 
 
“Lack of knowledge on the trust policy regarding labelling of IV Tazocin.” 
[H190]  
 
III. Mental stressors 
 Distraction  
 
 
Several nurses identified that distractions were an important factor which affected their 
concentration whilst preparing injectable medicines and that this could lead to mistakes. 
In addition, time constraints resulting from high workload lead them to prepare 
injectable drugs in haste and as a result, caused nurses to make mistakes. For examples: 
 
“Lots of distraction.” [B89] 
“Presence of colleagues asking questions whilst preparing medications.” [H221] 
“Because there are computers near the place where we prepare injectable and 
the doctors or others are using the space as well.” [B86] 
 
“Due to time constraints to give medications on time did not label syringe.” 
[H189] 
 
“Many of the patients are all due IV antibiotics at the same time this put a lot 




Two of the nurses reported that pressure to prepare drugs and do other jobs at the same 
time was an important factor that contributed to injectable preparation errors. For 
examples: 
“Staff not available to tidy as pressure to do own jobs.” [B120] 
 





 Other mental stressors 
 
Hunger, and stress were identified by one nurse as a factor contributing to errors.  





IV. Task factors  
 Unavailable medication 
 
 
An unavailable medicine was reported by one nurse as being related to a preparation 
error of a complex dose of a SC anticoagulant. 
 
“There was not a dose for the amount prescribed. Not suitable injection.” [H246] 
 
 
Numerous participants reported that various other task factors also contributed to errors. 
These included a lack of filter needles, a lack of appropriate labels especially for an IV 
antibiotic bolus and the absence of clean plastic trays. Typical examples are given 
below: 
 
“No filter needle available on the ward.” [H237] 
“No labels specifically for bolus. Have to use patient label printer which is not 
at work station.” [H247] 
 












V. Patient factors 
 Patient clinically demand 
 
Patient-related issues were also reported to contribute to errors. One nurse stated that 
patients with poor clinical conditions often experienced drug preparation errors because 
of the high number of drugs prepared for them. Continuous distraction by an unwell 
patient was also revealed by one nurse working in a ward environment.  
“Distracted by unwell patient so unable to complete task.” [S24] 
 
 
2) Interviews data 
 
 
A total of five main themes and eighty-five codes of error-producing conditions were 
identified in this research study; the error-producing conditions reviewed during the 
























Congested environment n=7 Cluttered n=2 
Small space n=2 
Crowded environment n=3 Short staffing n=5 
 










Lack of knowledge and 
experience skills n=7 
Involuntary automaticity n=1 
Mental stressors n=28 
Temperature n=3 
 


















Work alone n=1 
 
Lack of teamwork n=1 
 
Lack of support n=2 
 
Hungry n=2 
 Unavailable medicine n=1 





Competing demand n=1 
Thirsty n=1 
 




I. Work Environment  
 Workload  
 
 
Issues with workload that contributed to the incidence of injectable preparation errors 
were regularly reported during interviews using phrases such as “busy”, “busy 
workload”, ”always busy”, “very busy”, “busy environment”, “got a lot going on” and 
“loads of IVs”. The majority of nurses stated that a high workload was a significant 
contributor to injectable preparation errors. For examples: 
 “If you’ve got eight patients on IV doses and you’ve got to do that within an 
hour it does get quite difficult to [do] each one properly so the heavy workload 
definitely has a factor of it as well.” [B92] 
 
“The ward was very busy it was at the time of the evening drug round so there’s 
a lot going on with lots of injections and IVs to consider yeah.” [H245] 
 
 
Some of the interviewees mentioned that their heavy workload led them to rush through 
medication tasks and consequently, caused them to make errors more easily. Typical 
examples are given below: 
“Haste I think is one of them. […] It was busy, you need – obviously, I wanted 
to do it correctly but I had other things to do as well, so it needed- this sounds 
wrong- I wanted to do it as fast as I could.” [H245] 
 
“If you’re rushing to do five or six in a short period of time then you might not 
be as aseptic [B92] 
 
 
High workload was attributed to short staffing by a number of the nurses interviewed. 
However two nurses attributed this to the patient’s clinical demand rather than staffing 
levels (see patient factors p.306). Typical examples are given below: 
“I also believe that it’s down to time. There’s a very high workload and not many 
staff.” [H225] 
 
“I think how busy the ward is - I think there should be more staff on it at any one 
time.” [H226] 
 
“Sometimes you have to help. If there is not enough nurses then you do someone 




Workload was frequently linked with competing demand, especially during busy times 
of the day (e.g. in the morning and evening). Interviewees stated that heavy workloads 
and lack of time for drug preparation made it difficult sometimes to give all the drugs 
on time, causing timing issues. For examples:  
“It was [the error] during my morning drug round, [not] my lunchtime drug 
round, [but] this morning, and there is always a lot to do around that time because 
you have got IVs and all the other drugs to do.” [H226] 
“A ward full, we have eight patients are in ours. Maybe we have six IVs at the 
same time. All of the rest of the patients and this six patients have more drugs to 
be done at the same time.” [B106] 
 
“I had a patient that was having chest pains at the same time as a new patient 
being brought in to me who was rather sick and was needing antiemetic’s quite 




 Congested environment 
 
 
Other issues identified related to the small size of the treatment room and the fact that it 
is often cluttered and easily crowded. Typical examples are given below: 
“Where we have to draw up our IV is very very small. There’s a computer desk 
where there is at least three chairs and there is also drug trolleys so it’s a very 
small, tight area and there was at least two more nurses there who were also 
prepping for IVs.” [H225] 
 
“It is a very congested area. There is enough room for maybe two nurses doing 
one drug but when you’ve got maybe more than three drug charts in total and 
you separate it that takes up the whole table so if you have another nurse that 
comes over doing drugs or you’ve got a doctor coming over to talk to you that’s 




 Environmental conditions 




“I think the worst thing is the noise because you are doing one thing and you can 
only do this thing in silence at 6 o clock in the morning. It’s the only one moment 
that you’re going to have silence to do antibiotics in this drug round. All the rest 
you are going to have a lot of noise, the families asking for information, this is 
the worst thing I think.” [B106]  
 
“It’s always very hot here so people get can get quite flustered and stressed, then 
you end up really time cutting by not being as sterile as you should be or that’s 
usually the case.” [B92] 
 
 
II. Short staffing     
 
Numerous nurses from the two wards identified staffing levels as a significant factor 
leading to mistakes. Staffing issues included an insufficient number of staff (which 
consequently raised the workload) and the skill mix of nurses during a shift. Typical 
examples are given below: 
“There is a staffing issue desperately [going] on within the NHS and I think that 
obviously helps these mistakes occur more frequently.” [H226] 
 
“There was one of me, eight patients, and no healthcare assistant so I had to 
wash, toilet, see to personal care, dinners as well as doing my job on top of that 
so it was very stressful morning. Although I did have help from other members 
of the ward, they weren’t there constantly. Like I should have had a healthcare 




III. Shift patterns / time of day 
 
Four of nurses interviewed indicated that shift patterns were a primary contributing 
factor to injectable preparation errors. Some interviewees from different wards 
mentioned that lunchtime or evening drugs rounds when staff were busy or the end of 
shift were linked with stress, which might affect their concentration as they prepared 
drugs. One of the nurses also related that the general stress associated with the end of 
shifts results from the multi-tasking nature of the job (i.e. duties given for nurses besides 
medicine preparation). For examples: 
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“I believe it was around 6 o’clock in the evening when which is when the 
evening drug round happens and you have all your patients that you need to give 
their evening medications then if they’ve got 6 o’ clock IVs you need to give 
them as well before it gets to hand over time because it’s the last part of the shift 
it’s always very busy because you have a lot to do because you need to complete 
your notes and complete everything you haven’t done that shift.” [B245] 
 




IV. Individual factors 
 Lack of knowledge, skills and experience of nurses 
 
Many of the nurses indicated that individual factors were an important aspect in 
preparation errors. Specific individual factors included a lack of knowledge, skills, and 
experience. Many of the nurses related these inadequacies to the lack of training they 
received when they joined the Trust for example one nurse was unaware you could not 
add two medicines to one syringe.   
“Well I wasn’t aware that you couldn’t add two medications into one syringe so 
that was part of the mistake I suppose …When I spoke to my senior staff they 
said that it’s not the ideal thing to do. I still don’t really understand why that is 
an issue.” [H245] 
 
Some nurses were unaware of the importance of using filter needle or labelling IV bolus. 
 “I’ve never really had much training on them or read the policy about it so I just 
kind of followed what I knew and what I’d been taught when joining the Trust.” 
[H225] 
 
“If you have clear that you are going to give this drug in this moment with your 
vial with you, with the drug chart with you, double checked, is not clear for us 
maybe that you have to label it.” [B106] 
 
 
One participant was unaware of a correct ANTT during injectable medicines 
preparation. 
“I wasn’t aware of the policy you had to wear gloves in all the years training I 





Other individual factors reported by the nurses in connection with preparation errors 
included inexperience in specialist drugs and unfamiliarity with the task. Typical 
example is given below: 
“Umm I…. felt that I could do the calculation I wasn’t too worried about the 
mathematics just being the first time doing something always feels 
uncomfortable in whatever it is.  I feel now if I was to do it again I would feel a 
lot more comfortable but I think you are always going to have the first time of 
doing anything and it doesn’t mean you shouldn’t do it just because it feels a bit 
scary at first. I think it is difficult not being experienced in a particular specialist 
drug.” [H259] 
 
Another possible factor was defined by one of the interviewees as an involuntary 
automaticity when preparing injectable medicines, which may lead to non-adherence to 
some of preparation process. For example: 
“I have done it so long without gloves you know thinking that my hand washing 
was enough, sterile enough to do it you know.” [H183] 
 
 
V. Mental stressors 
 Interruption and distraction  
 
 
Several interviewees stated that distractions and interruptions were significant factors 
affecting their concentration levels during their preparation of injectable medicines and 
as a result, this could lead to mistakes. For example: 
 
“We have only [one] open area to prepare the medication and the consequence 
[that] can happen while preparing it [is] the nurse can be distracted by different 
team members.” [B86] 
 
 
In addition, pressure resulting from the distraction and interruption within the ward 
during preparation for the final product was reported to increase stress and sometimes 
make it difficult to give all the patients’ drugs on time. Typical example is given below: 





While some nurses stated that interruptions can happen at any time and in all areas, 
others explained that in busy areas and during busy times, such as during the drug round, 
interruptions are more frequent, such as when other nurses ask for help checking their 
own medicines. For example: 




Different sources of distractions were recorded, although the primary cause of 
interruption, as stated by most interviewees, was patient families, who may ask 
questions in the middle of their own drug rounds or request help. For example: 




Other sources of distraction identified by nurses included other nurses, health care 
professionals, and, primarily, doctors asking questions during ward rounds. Typical 
examples are given below: 
“There is constantly people asking you questions and talking to you whilst 
you’re preparing so that can cause you to be distracted.” [B92] 
“I think the worst thing is the distraction. At the same time that you are doing 
the drug, doctors start coming to you and say ‘don’t forget to do this thing’, [the 
machines are] bleeping all the time, the IV you put to other patient is bleeping 















 Other mental stressors 
 
Tiredness, hunger, and thirst were identified by the nurses as factors contributing to 
errors, primarily when linked with feeling overworked and receiving inadequate breaks 
during shifts. For examples: 
“Yes potentially I am tired, I have [a] very busy workload today, umm so lack 
of time would also be a factor.” [H225] 
 
“We’re human. If you haven’t [had] any breaks […] it’s going to contribute to 
fails. If you are unwell, you are going to be more [likely] to [make] mistakes if 
you are tired.” [B106] 
“Umm, probably hungry and tired, yeah.” [H183] 
 
 
VI. Patient factor 
 Clinically demanding patients 
 
 
The acuity and clinical condition of some patients was identified by the nurses as a 
possible cause of injectable preparation errors. In this study, the condition of the patients 
was a common factor mentioned in interviews. Additionally, one of interviewees 
explained that a patient’s phobia of needles was believed to be a source of higher risk 
for incidents of medicine errors. For examples: 
“My patient is afraid of needles and I didn’t think it was fair to inject her twice 
so I added the amount from the syringes into one syringe with a subcutaneous 
needle to give that way.” [H245] 
 
“I had a patient that was having chest pains at the same time as a new patient 
being brought in to me who was rather sick and was needing antiemetic’s quite 
quickly, so I was trying to get a million and one things done at the same time. I 
knew that my patient needed this medication quite quickly to help resolve his 












VII. Task factor  
 Unavailable medication 
 
 
Unavailable medicine was mentioned by one of the interviewees as related to a higher 
risk of error. For example: 
 
“I didn’t have the correct doses on my trolley. It’s very simple straight to the 
point medicine but it’s when you get a dose which is 75mgs, yes it was 75 so 
you have the injections in 20s 40s 80s 100s and 120s so there was nothing 
appropriate for a 75 because the 80 couldn’t seem to draw it down that’s why I 
put it all into one syringe because you can then accurately measure the amount 
you are taking in.” [H245] 
 
VIII. Team factors 
 
Several team factors were classified by the nurses as possible causes of injectable 
preparation errors. Lack of support was the most common factor mentioned.  
 
“I think that I guess I could have had more support.” [H259] 
 
“I was down a healthcare assistant so I had eight patients all to myself with no 
help with personal care or their hygiene.” [H225] 
  
A lack of teamwork could also contribute to errors. For example, one nurse explained 
that the plastic trays are not clean because of the doctors.  
 
“The doctors do tend to leave everything in the trays blood everywhere you 
know so, you have got to make sure you clean them you know.  I always clean 








Additionally, working alone and miscommunication with staff was reported by one of 
the nurses as resulting in a higher risk of medication errors. 
“I think it is difficult not being experienced in a particular specialist drug and 
I think it would be helpful to be able to communicate with sort of senior nurse 






6.6.5 Latent conditions for IPEs  
1) Questionnaire data 
 
 
In Human Error Theory, latent conditions stem from flawed decisions often taken by 
people not directly involved in the workplace (e.g. management) (Vincent et al., 1998). 
As Table 6.12 shows, there were three themes and 12 codes of latent conditions that 
contributed to the occurrence of injectable medicine preparation errors. The latent 
condition that most commonly contributed to the occurrence of errors was local-work 
related and concerned the design of the treatment room, typically in relation to its size, 
and a lack of equipment and materials; this was evident on all four wards. The most 
common management-related latent condition was pressure to complete a task; again 
this was common to all wards. The most common weakness in the system defence was 
non-existent protocol or policy and difficulty with using policy or protocol; this was 








                         Table 6.12: Latent conditions cited as contributing to injectable medicine preparation errors  
 
Several management related factors and weaknesses in the system defences were 
specific to each ward, suggesting that respondents can distinguish between different 
latent conditions in different environments. Analysis of the free-text responses identified 
further examples of latent conditions, related to work pressure and local practice-
standards: 
 
a) Local work-related conditions 
 
Several latent conditions were identified as contributing to injectable preparation errors. 
Three nurses considered that heavy workload and staff shortages were significant factors 
which led to mistakes.  
Theme Code Surgical ward 
(S)  (n = 11) 
Medical ward 
(C)  (n = 10) 
 
Surgical ward 
 (H)  (n = 17) 
Medical ward 
 (B)  (n = 12) 
Total 






(e.g. small size or 
location of 
treatment room) 








Lack of equipment 
and material 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 8 (53%) 0 (0%) 8 (16%) 
Non-existent 
protocol or policy 
0 (0%) 2 (20%) 2 (12%) 0 (0%) 4 (8%) 
Difficulty with 
using policy or 
protocol 









2 (18%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (4%) 
Lack of 
information source 
(e.g. drug book) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
Unavailability of 
drug 








4 (36%) 7 (70%) 7 (41%) 4 (33%) 22(44%) 
Protocol design 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (18%) 3 (25%) 6 (12%) 
Failure to enforce 
policy/ protocol 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (18%) 1(8%) 4 (8%) 
Insufficient 
training for task 
0 (0%) 3 (30%) 0 (0%) 1(8%) 4 (8%) 
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“Busy day and staff needed.” [H225] 
“Insufficient staff: sometimes we (nurses) need to stop preparing injectable and 
help a patient.” [B86] 
 
One of the participants stated that low staff number will raise workload for other nurses 
in the shift. 
“Short staffing increases workload for other staff.” [H219] 
 
Another common issue linked to the local work and task conditions that were revealed 
by nurses included a lack of equipment (out of stock) inside the IV treatment room. 
 “We don’t have any filter needles in the ward.” [H243] 
“Lack of appropriate labels to use on syringes.” [H189] 
 
b) Weakness in the system defence 
 
Many participants from two wards reported that the poor design or poor layout of the 
work environment within the ward was a significant factor leading to errors.  
 




One nurse reported that another issue pertaining to a weakness in the system, was the 
culture of accepting practices, which may not be in line with strict policy. For example, 
one nurse indicated a need for more practical guidance on IV preparation. Because this 
detailed guidance is lacking, nurses learn from each other. This includes learning poor 
practice, such as deviations from procedures, which may then become accepted.  
“If nurses don’t focus up on mistakes then such things as not wearing aprons when 
preparing IV antibiotics is commenced these mistakes will continue and other nurses 




c) Management factors  
 
The two main organisational issues identified by the nurses were absents or insufficient 
training for nurses themselves concerning IV preparation. Several participants 
expressed the opinion that the training programme as well as the practical training 
provided by the NHS Trust was inadequate, including the training that the nurses 
undertake in IV preparation. Nurses indicated that errors often reflect a conflict between 
the policy and the actual content of the training programme. For instance, some nurses 
knew that the policy stated that IV boluses had to be labelled and they should use a filter 
needle for IV drugs, but this was not included in the training that he/she had recently 
received. Participants followed the techniques taught in training but violated the policy 
in doing so. 
 
“It’s a practise on the ward that IV Tazocin 4.5g is administered to the patient 
without labelling.” [B103] 
 
“I question it is a mistake not to wear an apron to draw up IV drugs. When I did 
my IV training we were not told to do so.” [H249] 
 
“We don’t routinely use filters, it was not mentioned at preparation training.” 
[H240] 
 
“So no knowledge led to this mistake - not knowing the trust policy on IV 
Tazocin preparation led to me preparing the IV antibiotics and not labelling the 
medication which in the hospital policy states this should be done.” [H190] 
 
Another participant added that it is usual practice to shake a vial, for she and the other 
members of her cohort had been trained to do this.  
 
“This practice is not viewed as a mistake in our work environment, because it’s 
not usual practice to not shake the vial. We are trained to shake the vial. Yes, 




One of the participants believed that work pressure may lead to the IV treatment room 
becoming cluttered and unclean.  
 





2) Interviews data 
 
There were three main themes and 37 codes or sub codes of latent conditions 
identified in this study, which contributed to injectable preparation errors. 


















Weakness in the system defence 
Fatigue at work n=1 
Accessibility of information n=1 
Culture accepting n=1 
Staff rotation n=1 
Management factors 
Poor design (size) of the IV treatment room n=4 
 
Poor work layout inside treatment room n=5 
 
Insufficient training n=1 
Deficiency in training programme n=3 
Management decision n=1 
Poor practice n=1 
Local work and task condition 
Insufficient information sources n=4 
 
Low staff number n=6 
High workload n=4 
Lack of equipment n= 2 
Equipment failure n= 1 
Medication packaging n=1 
Latent Condition 
Lack of availability of required dose 
n=1 












a) Local work and task conditions  
 
Numerous latent conditions were classified as contributing to injectable preparation 
errors. Some interviewees considered that the high workload (n=4), together with low 
staff numbers (n=6), contributed to the errors. Additionally, a senior nurse reported that 
a lack of staff will increase workload and thus, could delay some of the injectable 
medicines. Typical examples are given below: 
“So it was very stressful morning. Although I did have help from other members 
of the ward, they weren’t there constantly; like, I should have had a healthcare 
assistant on the long day so I feel that, yeah, the staffing wasn’t sufficient 
enough.” [H225] 
 
“As per the management, the number is good. I think we are one of the wards 
with the, the most sufficient staff, so we can’t really blame. But if you need to 
go with the policies, sometimes we think we need many more staff to prepare 
the medication for all the patients on time.” [B86] 
 
 
Other factors linked to the local work and task conditions that were revealed by 
interviewees included a lack of equipment and lack of availability of required devices 
inside the treatment room. Typical examples are given below: 
“I would say lack of trays, you know, you can never find enough trays.” [H183] 
 
“We don’t actually have a drug label that will fit on a bolus because we have the 
infusion labels that we fill in but they are too big for a bolus.” [H187] 
 
“Not having in a correct dosage syringe. There was nothing appropriate for a 75 
because the 80 couldn’t seem to draw it down.” [H245] 
 
 
b) Weakness in the system defence 
 
 
The layout and geography of the ward as well as the size or location of the associated 
treatment room was raised by many interviewees as a significant factor leading to errors. 
Typical examples are given below: 
“We don’t have much space to keep antibiotics for this big ward so that is one 
thing. And it is in alphabetical order so it looks a similar colour and a similar 
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font. The preparation area is small and the cupboards [are too] small to 
accommodate enough antibiotics.” [B148] 
 
 “All of our needles even are all in one place and they are not particularly well 
signed so maybe if I’d seen a sign saying filter needle I would have thought, ahh 
yes, I need to use a filter needle rather than- I just picked up the one that I would 
normally use.” [H226] 
 
“The apron and gloves are on the other side of the corridor, it’s maybe a bad 
place.” [H183] 
 
“We don’t have any closed room in this ward to prepare IV medication, we have 
only [a] small area.” [B86] 
 
Several nurses attributed insufficient information about some drugs and procedure to 
increase risk of medication incidents. This includes the failure to provide adequate 
information and lack of instruction for preparing injectable medicines. For examples: 
 
“I did look in the IV book, and it said nothing about using a filter needle.” [H225]  
 
 “In the IV book it doesn’t say anywhere about labelling bolus.” [H187] 
 
One interviewee argued that difficulty in accessing medication guidelines or procedures 
from the site’s online resource can contribute to injectable medicine preparation errors. 
“They are all on our online site, however, they take a long time to find. They’re 
not particularly easy to find.” [H245] 
 
The effects of staff rotation (moving staff to cover other wards) were also classified as 
a potential source of error, because it produces a possible lack of ownership: A 
requirement for nurses to be on the ward at a specific time meant that other staff 
members were sometimes given the responsibility of completing the process of 
preparing the injectable medicine.  
“Unfortunately one of our staff got taken down to X and Y to help … but you 
do need extra staff to help …when you have got lots of IVs you know because 





Tiredness at work was reported as another important contribution factor for causing 
errors, as this leads to loss of concentration. 
“It definitely took [me] longer than it would have done if I wasn’t tired.” [H259] 
 
 
Another issue pertaining to a weakness in the system was the culture of accepting 
practices, which may not be in line with strict policy. For example, one nurse indicated 
a need for more guidance on IV preparation. Because detailed guidance is lacking, 
nurses learn from each other. However, nurses may learn poor practices from each other, 
such as deviations from procedures, which may become accepted.  
“I wouldn’t stop and think, ‘oh you should be wearing gloves when you are 
doing that’ because we do it so often without gloves, we don’t stop and say to 
each other.” [H183] 
 
 
c) Management factors  
The main organisational issue classified by the nurses is a deficiency in the injectable 
preparation-training programme provided to nurses. Nurses indicated that errors often 
reflect a conflict between the policy and the actual content of the training programme. 
For instance, interviewees knew that the policy stated that IV boluses had to be labelled 
and they should use a filter needle for IV drugs, but this was not included in the training 
received. Interviewees followed the techniques taught in training but violated the policy 
in doing so. 
 
“When we were taught in our IV policy training when we first started I remember 
being given green needles and orange needles but not the pink needles to draw 
up when we were practising in the learning and resource.” [H225] 




A senior nurse explained that nurses prepared IVs in what they considered to be an area 
authorised by the manager and the head of nursing as an acceptable area. However, this 
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practice conflicted with the hospital policy, and it proved difficult to confirm whether 
this practice is indeed accepted by the organisation. 
 
 “The manager and the head of nursing and the team are accepted in this ward 
that we can prepare IV medications in the entrance of the ward, located in front 









As a result, several strategies were suggested by participants to reduce the risk of errors 
during the preparation of injectable medicines. The underling barriers and defence are 
summarising in Table 6.13. 
 
 





























                      
 






















































































































“Re-train staff as hospital policy states 
to refresh them on the risk of not 
wearing gloves/aprons when preparing 
IV antibiotics.” [H195] 
(From questionnaire). 
 
“Make training available, once you start 
doing something all the time then nurses 
follow in suit so it’s just making 
everyone aware that filter needles are 
there to be used and that we should be 
using them.” [H226] (From interview). 
 
“I think having extra staff would ease 
the pressure on everyone else a bit.” 
[H245] (From interview). 
 
“If it was your first time doing it, you 
could maybe find a senior nurse and 
show her your calculation, Ideally, you 
would show your calculations to 
someone that had a lot of experience in 
preparing that infusion.” [H259] (From 
interview). 
 
“It should be clarified with our team 
leader if we need to wear aprons to draw 
up IV medications.” [H249]  
(From questionnaire). 
 
“Incorrect expiry date from pharmacy. 
Sometimes chemo delayed by doctors 
due to patients being unwell. This can 
cause a problem with patient’s 
chemotherapy by having incorrect 
expiry date. Pharmacy should check 
expiry date for chemo. Better 
communication between doctors, 
nurses, and pharmacists.” [C30]  
(From questionnaire). 
 





























































































































































“Area not cleaned due to open window. 




“Ok I believe if we have a bit more 
controlled preparation area, where we are 
not distracted.” [B148](From interview). 
 
“Bigger space to prepare IV medication or 
spilt in two as the ward is big and make that 




“If the sink and gloves were in the middle, 
separating us from the doctors and the 
computers that might help.” [B144] (From 
interview). 
 
“Enoxaparin in a vial just in case it’s not a 
standardised dose. If they did it like that 




“With label we have nothing for syringes.  
Not for syringe. We have to fix it to the 
syringe. This is more work- this is more 
work because you have to write properly to 
avoid that when you fix it you don’t lose 
information sometimes it’s uncomfortable. 
Maybe with another kind of label, a smaller 
that fits better to the syringe.” [B106] 
(From interview). 
 
“By supplying filter needles to the ward 
area.” [H243](From questionnaire). 
 
“Ensure trays are clean and used when 
preparing IV medication. Provide us with 
enough trays.” [H183](From 
questionnaire). 
 
“Clarifying this point of the policy with the 
staff and maybe explaining why this is 
necessary… why it is not enough if you 
have your syringe in your hand your vial in 
your other hand and the drug chart with 
you, why it’s necessary to have a label with 
this kind of thing... why it is not enough 
with all the precautions that we made to be 
safe for a patient.” [B106] (From 
interview). 
 
“Could be some policies handed out 










The results of the current study shows that quantitative and qualitative data can be used 
to better understand the underlying causes of errors, and the potential barriers that can 
be put in place to reduce the incidence of injectable preparation errors.  


















































“Signals that remind you don’t forget 
to wear aprons and gloves.”[H251]  
(From questionnaire). 
 
“In packaging, we have, well, most of 
the medication [is] the same colour. 
Amoxicillin and amoxiclav is most 
similar in font as well so maybe in a 
different font and colour coding may 
help.” [B148](From interview). 
 
“Ensuring we encourage staff to wear 
aprons and report mistakes when 
noticed.” [H195]  
(From questionnaire). 
 
“Make sure everyone has their breaks 
and has time to have a drink and have 
something [to] eat so they’re not 
forgetful”B92] (From interview). 
 
“More signs around … which go 
through the steps that you should do to 
be aseptic. Just more visible signs to 
keep updating people and reminding 
them.” [B92](From interview). 
 
“Should be … a ‘Stop think’ sign; 
before you do this, drug please be 
aware you must wear gloves and use a 
tray. I think it should be like that right 
in front of you.”[H183](From 
interview). 
 
“If there was better labelling on the 
needles then it would be another 









A qualitative face-to-face semi-structured interview and self-complete questionnaire 
study was conducted to explore the views, knowledge, and experiences of nurses on four 
hospital wards regarding the contributory factors associated with IPEs in the hospitals, 
and the strategies that can be used to reduce errors during preparation. Although similar 
studies have been conducted on preparation and administration of injectable medicines 
in general, this is the first study to investigate these issues specifically for injectable 
preparation. Furthermore, in this study, Reason’s (1990) organisational accident 
causation model (Vincent et al., 1998) was used to analyse the causes of IPEs. 
 
The nurses who participated in this study had been observed making a specific error 
while preparing injectable medication and were selected in order to expand the current 
understanding of factors influencing injectable medicine preparation in hospital wards, 
and of how incidents threatening patient safety arise. While previous studies have been 
conducted on the causes of medication errors, most of these studies did not investigate 
the causes of errors as the main purpose of the study, or did study the causes of observed 
errors but using a self-report document that provided limited information and detail 
about the topic (Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, Alrwisan et al. 2011, Cousins et al. 2012). 
 
The questionnaire and interview data was divided into four main themes: (1) active 
failures; (2) error producing conditions and factors related to the individual nurses, the 
task, shift patterns, environment (interruption and distraction), patient, team, or 
management, all of which were identified as factors contributing to IPEs; (3) latent 
conditions; (4) barriers and defence.  Any stage or process within the injectable medicine 
preparation procedure can give rise to errors. IPEs can arise from the incorrect choice 
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of medicine, incorrect dose, incorrect calculation, incorrect volume of diluent, wrong 
route of administration, or faulty labelling. For example lack of familiarity with the NHS 
Trust’s guidelines and policies, the outcome of the use of abbreviations or poor 
handwriting on the prescription, inadequate knowledge about the medicine or policies, 
or misjudgements of potential harm (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2004; 
Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 2105).  
 
Interesting similarities in the causes of IPEs were identified at the two hospitals used in 
this study. Similar types of slips, lapses, violations, and knowledge or rule-based 
mistakes were observed in both hospitals. Lack of knowledge and skills, such as blood 
product knowledge, amongst nurses, especially bank agency and junior nurses who may 
have less knowledge and experience, were cited in the questionnaires and interviews as 
factors contributing to errors during injectable medicine preparation. Lack of knowledge 
and skills have been cited as a cause of error in some published studies (Taxis and 
Barber, 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2004; Crowley, 2006), and in other studies that used 
Human Error Theory, rule-based mistakes have been found to be strongly associated 
with nurses’ knowledge and experience (Westbrook et al, 2011; Keers et al., 2013). In 
2007, Tang and colleagues reported that approximately 30% of nurses associated their 
mistakes with being new and having limited experience. Taxis and Barber (2003) 
studied errors related to IV doses; they observed nurses preparing and administering IVs 
in two UK hospitals (n=113) and reported that lack of experience and knowledge 
amongst nurses caused 80% of observed errors. Nurses’ knowledge and rule-based 
mistakes frequently involve a lack of knowledge about the medicine itself, protocols, 
guidelines, policies and procedures of injectable medicine preparation, and also 




Some investigations have attributed the lack of knowledge amongst nurses to university 
programmes and the teaching of better technical and pharmaceutical knowledge. The 
findings from numerous studies of nurse education point to a lack of sufficient 
pharmacological knowledge amongst nurses, as well as inadequate on-going teaching at 
hospitals (Crowley, 2006; Brady et al., 2009; Avery et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015). 
Furthermore, a lack of experience was associated with new staff. According to some 
studies, nurses specified that mistakes mainly happened in the early times of their 
nursing profession (Taxis and Barber, 2004; Crowley, 2006; Jones & Treiber, 2010; 
Ghaleb et al., 2010).  
 
In 1995, Reason reported that errors caused by insufficient individual knowledge could 
be managed by increasing the number of training programmes available. Similarly, 
numerous studies have suggested that comprehensive training, especially for new 
nurses, is needed to overcome the effects of nurses’ lack of knowledge on injectable 
medicine preparation safety (Taxis and Barber, 2004; Prot et al., 2005; Crowley, 2006; 
Tang et al., 2007; Brady et al., 2009; Ozkan et al., 2011; Avery et al., 2012; Ameer, 
2015). Hence, overcoming insufficient training and inadequate knowledge is reflected 
at organisational responsibility, and not an individual factor only (Taxis and Barber, 
2004; Crowley, 2006; Ozkan et al., 2011, Ameer, 2015).  
 
In the present study, nurses also highlighted the necessity for training, and placed the 
responsibility of their training on the organisation. In addition, they believed that the 
education and training delivered by the NHS Trust was inadequate for them to prepare 
injectable medicines safely. This was further highlighted when participants described 
the on-going training provided to them, and the inadequate evaluation of their injectable 
medicine preparation skills. Therefore, the ‘lack of knowledge and experience of nurses’ 
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factor indicates that providing sufficient training, especially for new staff, by increasing 
their training period would be one strategy for meeting nurses’ requirements and 
reducing IPEs.  
 
There is much evidence for the influence of nurses’ training and staffing levels on 
patient safety outcomes overall, though limited studies reporting on medication errors 
(McGillis Hall et al., 2004; Ball, 2010). Within one year, the National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA) stated that 35,000 patient safety incidents in England and Wales were 
caused by staffing issues due to lack of trained staff or lack of experience, and 
approximately 25% of these incidents were associated with severe harm (NPSA, 2009). 
In 2010, the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) published a report entitled “Guidance on 
Safe Nurse Staffing Levels in the UK”, which reviewed various evidence for a 
relationship between lack of nursing staff and patient safety in hospitals. The report 
showed that an increased number of registered nurses on the staff was related to lower 
rates of adverse patient events and mortality (Ball, 2010).  
 
The questionnaire and interview participants in the present study identified the lack of 
or inadequate training and evaluation provided by the NHS Trust as another factor. For 
example, participants highlighted the need for additional training on the practical side 
of injectable medicine preparation, where they currently learn from each other. In this 
situation, nurses might learn poor practices from each other, for example violations of 
policies and guidelines (Taxis and Barber, 2004, Crowley, 2006, Ameer, 2015). Hence, 
it is essential to ensure that nurses receive the training they need by increasing the 
training provided to them, especially for new graduate nurses. Increasing nurses’ skills 
and knowledge in this way would improve patient safety and minimise risks. This can 
also be achieved by re-evaluating the competency exam that nurses must undertake 
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before they are permitted to prepare injectable drugs. On-going learning and education 
sessions for nurses must also be provided to guarantee that nurses’ knowledge of 
injectable medicines, such as blood products, is up to date. A ward nurse manager who 
was interviewed also highlighted the importance of re-evaluating nurses’ competence at 
preparing injectable medicines at frequent intervals to ensure their competence to carry 
out injectable medicine duties. In addition, it is necessary to assess the training methods 
implemented in the NHS Trusts and evaluate their impact on nurses’ skills and 
knowledge.  
 
Participants specified that they are more likely to make errors under stress and pressure, 
especially at the end of shift. Since long shifts are common practice in several hospitals, 
measuring the influence of pressure and stress at the end of shift on the incidence of 
IPEs is important in order to assess the risk of this problem. While some studies have 
focused on this relationship, to date most of these studies have relied on self-reported 
data on errors made by nurses. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, as yet there 
has been no quantitative research studying this correlation via observational studies. 
Observational investigations are considered the ideal method for collecting data about 
IPEs. Hence, further study using the direct observation technique is required to 
adequately measure the impact of stress and pressure amongst nurses at the end of shift 
on IPEs.  
 
Pharmacological form was also identified as a significant contributor to IPEs by one of 
the nurses in the present study, especially during a complex injectable preparation. 
Several causes were found to contribute to this issue, although nurses’ experience, 
knowledge and workload inside the wards were common factors mentioned by the 
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interviewees. Latent failures contributed to this issue included lack of training, which 
meant nurses were preparing the injectable medicines under stress.  
 
A further issue that was identified was the skills and knowledge of individual nurses, 
which was cited as a common cause of IPEs involving nurses’ calculation skills. In spite 
of nurses’ calculation skills being a major aspect of nursing efficiency (Nursing and 
Midwifery Council, 2012), some previous studies have also reported that major 
deficiencies in both mathematical and conceptual skills amongst nurses may affect their 
capability to calculate medication doses correctly in practice (Wright, 2007; Fleming et 
al., 2014). A study by McMullan and colleagues (2010) reported that 91% of student 
nurses and 88% of registered nurses failed to pass a medication calculation test. This 
has led to investigators suggesting additional education on conceptual drug calculation 
skills and mathematical (Fleming et al., 2014) as a part of medicines education via 
nursing courses and on-going education programmes (McMullan et al., 2010; Fleming 
et al., 2014).  In terms of the role played by nurses’ calculation skills in medication 
errors, numerous previous studies have cited this as one of the factors contributing to 
errors (Gladstone, 1995; Taxis and Barber, 2004; Deans, 2005; Crowley, 2006; Chua et 
al., 2009; Avery et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015). However, a study conducted by Wright 
(2010) to determine whether there was an association between medication errors and 
nurses’ poor calculation skills found a lack of evidence to support a relationship between 
the two, which indicates a need for further investigation into calculation errors in 
practice.  In the current study, one participant who highlighted nurses’ poor calculation 
skills as a potential factor leading to IPEs explained that this factor is even more 
significant when preparing doses for respiratory infections patients, which may require 
difficult calculations. This is comparable to the results of other studies, which have 
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found that the likelihood of making errors due to incorrect dosage calculations of dose 
is higher for complex medications (Brady et al., 2009, Ozkan et al., 2011).  
 
Different practical issues can arise during the reconstitution, mixing and addition stages 
of injectable medicine preparation. In 2005, the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) IV 
Therapy Forum published national practice standards that require organisations to have 
a protocol for reconstituting, which should be developed alongside the pharmacy. This 
document was utilised in the wards of the present study, however information about 
those medications where specific errors are common would greatly help the 
development of such a protocol. Adding/mixing errors namely (air bubbles) were one 
of the main types of injectable error classified in studies of injectable medicines, and 
general studies of medical and surgical wards, where injectable medicines are usually 
used (Schneider et al., 1998; Taxis and Barber, 2003b; Tissot et al., 2003; Wirtz et al., 
2003; Cousins et al., 2005; Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 2015).  
 
The reconstitution stage of preparation is time consuming, particularly if the powder is 
difficult to dissolve and close attention is required where medicines are oversensitive to 
foaming, as there is a risk of withdrawing an incomplete dose, for example Teicoplanin, 
Factor VIII, Tazocin, and Gentamicin (Crowley, 2006; NPSA, 2007; Royal Collage of 
Nursing, 2016; NMC, 2016). The difficulties specified by the participants in the present 
study were comparable to the previous studies (Schulman et al., 1998; Crowley, 2006; 
Ameer, 2015). The guidelines also require ward managers to highlight those 





The main issues mentioned by the participants in relation to the work environment were 
high workload, congested environment, staff shortage, interruption and distraction, staff 
skill mix, and shift patterns. These issues have also been identified in other studies (Beso 
et al., 2005; Crowley, 2006; James et al., 2008; James et al., 2011; Avery, 2012, Ameer, 
2015).  High workload was mentioned by most of the participants in the present study 
as a significant contributor to IPEs, primarily in reference to the time of preparing the 
therapeutic doses. This is a similar finding to those of other studies on factors 
contributing to IPEs, which have also highlighted workload as one of the most common 
factors (Gladstone, 1995; Taxis and Barber, 2004; Deans 2005, Crowley, 2006; Chua et 
al. 2009; Avery et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015). Compared with other studies, the results of 
the present study also reported that high workload was primarily caused by lack of staff 
which in turn is associated to management decisions with regard to employment. Some 
participants related this to the number of injectable medications needing to be prepared 
for patients, and others to the patients’ conditions rather than to insufficient staffing.  
Tissot and colleagues described heavy workload for nurses as the numbers of patients 
each nurse (Tissot et al, 2003). The nurse to patient ratio is usually used to measure 
workload in order to study the correlation between nurse workload and patient outcomes 
(Aiken et al, 2002). However, this mode of assessment has some weaknesses, as high 
workload has been found to be multivariate and can be influenced by numerous factors 
affecting the nurse to patient ratio, such as the patients’ health situation, the skill mix of 
the nurses, and time of shift (Montgomery, 2007). As such, Reason (1990) recommends 
that workload should be measured at the management level. In addition, Taxis and 
Barber (2003) have also reported that increased workload combined with distractions 
and interruptions led to mistakes in their study of the causes of injectable medicine 
preparation errors.  
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Participants in the present study stated that high workload-related mistakes included 
incorrect dose, incorrect diluent, incorrect medicine, breach of the ‘aseptic non touch 
technique’ (ANTT), and medicine omission; all of these were described as occurring 
primarily during busy times, for example at the drugs round. This could be due to the 
nature of nursing multitasking, and the need to work under stress/pressure to prepare 
injectable medicines and complete other tasks at the same time. Multitasking at the same 
time as preparing injectable medicines is a time saving commonly used by staff to 
control heavy workload (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Brady et al., 2009).  
 
Other published studies further indicate that high workload also contributes to other 
types of mistakes. For example in an observational study, Crowley (2006) identified that 
heavy workload contributed to all types of IPEs, though especially errors in aseptic 
technique and re-use of single dose containers. Furthermore, Ameer (2015) stated that, 
in situations of stress and time pressures caused by high workload, nurses were more 
likely to make calculation errors. Furthermore, investigations that have stated data 
regarding the cause of violations during injectable medicine preparation have reported 
that such violations by nurses could be caused by increased workload (Taxis and Barber, 
2003; Keers et al., 2013, Ameer, 2015). A prime example of these types of violations 
was nurse non-compliance with injectable medicine preparation polices. Crowley 
(2006) confirmed that stress, time pressures, and a heavy workload led to nurses not 
following the standard policies and protocols of injectable medicine preparation. In a 
recent study, nurses’ compliance with injectable medication preparation practice 
policies was found to be influenced by patient health situation and high workload 
(Ameer, 2015). It was further reported that high workload, in addition to other factors, 
affected nurses’ compliance with the procedures of checking and double-checking 
medications (Ameer, 2015). This is comparable to the findings of the present study, in 
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which nurses have stated that the causes of inappropriate checking or non-commitment 
with the checking process, specifically the failure to double-check, were mostly the 
result of high workload.  
 
The number of nurses working also has an influence on the rate of IPEs, as reduced 
nursing staff means an increased number of preparations per nurse, and so increases 
workload will increase the chance for making errors (Crowley, 2006). Staff shortage has 
been found to increase mistakes by creating a busy work environment, impeding proper 
process and procedures, preventing nurses from preparing injectable medicines on time, 
and leading to decreased attention to detail (Taxis and Barber 2004; Crowley, 2006; 
Ameer, 2015). Additionally, when staff shortages are combined with a high workload 
and increased patient acuity (patients who are very sick), this can lead to increased levels 
of fatigue and pressure or stress amongst nurses, posing additional and increasing risks 
to patients (Crowley, 2006). Research that has studied the influence of nursing staff 
levels on the rate of medication errors has found that the rate of IPEs is minimised by 
increasing the number and experience of staff. In 2004, McGillis Hall and colleagues 
studied the influence of various nurse staffing strategies on patient outcomes, including 
medication errors, and found that a low number of professional nurses on the staff was 
linked with a higher proportion of medication errors occurring on the units under study 
(McGillis Hall et al., 2004). Similarly, Beyea and colleagues reported that 40% of 206 
medication errors were the result of new nurses (17%); heavy workloads (15%) and staff 
shortages (8%) (Beyea et al, 2003). Tissot et al. (2003) carried out direct observation to 
collect data on the risk factors related to injectable medicine administration errors, and 
found that the risk of making a mistake was three times higher in nurses caring for more 
than five patients when compared to nurses with less than five patients. In addition, Ball 
and colleague (2009) surveyed 9,000 nurses in the UK, and more than 52% stated that 
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they experienced a high workload when providing treatment. Those who reported that 
they were very busy were working in an environment where there were nine patients per 
nurse; by contrast, those who stated that their workload was not very high were caring 
for six patients (Ball and Pike, 2009). The National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) advice on safe staffing levels for nursing states that there is no 
standard nurse-to-patient ratio for all wards that can guarantee safe patient care, and that 
the safe level depends on the individual requirements of the wards. Nevertheless, the 
advice makes an evidence-based suggestion for safe nurse staffing levels to meet both 
nurse and patient requirements (NICE, 2014).  
 
Inappropriate workspace, which were mentioned by the majority of participants, have 
also been referenced in several past studies as factors that negatively affect nurses’ 
concentration, and as such contribute to IPEs (Taxis and Barber, 2004; Pape et al., 2005; 
Wrench and Allen, 2006; Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 2015).  Several published literature in 
the UK and other European countries have identified the need of a solely IV treatment 
room to prepare injectable medicines as an issue contributing to mistakes, requiring staff 
to prepare injectable medicines in less than perfect situations (Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 
2015). In summary, clinical areas had no solely IV treatment room; hence, nurses used 
nursing stations and patients bedsides for this task (Tissot et al., 2003; Taxis et al., 2004; 
Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 2015). Zavery et al. (2005) investigated the injectable 
preparation rooms on 71 wards in two UK hospitals, and reported that 80% wards had 
unclean and cluttered IV preparation rooms. This highlights the lack of understanding 
of the significance of design to patient safety within the NHS (Department of Health 
and the Design Council, 2006). At present, there are ideas about how to resolve this 
issue within the improved NHS hospital plan, which sets out the need for a solely, clean 
and uncluttered IV treatment room for injectable drugs preparation, with adequate 
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storage room that is isolated from physicians, patients and usual causes of environmental 
contamination (Smith and Watkins, 2016). The results of the current study, confirmed 
by the previous studies, focus the important of comprehensively assessing the injectable 
drugs preparation procedure, as management and environmental factor can impact on 
patient safety. Adequate attention and appropriate priority should be awarded to 
overcome these issues, and it is essential that the aforementioned factors are considered 
in the design and planning of new hospital wards.  
 
The most common task-related factors reported by the participants at both sites were a 
lack of filter needles and a lack of and inappropriate labels in the IV treatment room, 
especially for IV antibiotic boluses. Poor commitment with filter or label use, and 
common inappropriate use in wards suggested that this is a routine deviation engaged 
in by a large percentage of nurses. Various causes were found to contribute to this 
practice. Nurses’ confidence in their experience and knowledge were common factors 
mentioned by participants. EPCs that contributed to such a practice included insufficient 
staff and a high workload, which led to nurses preparing medication task under stress or 
pressure. These results are comparable with those of published literature, where 
problems about non-use of a filter needle and faulty labelling during injectable drug 
preparation have been often stated (Taxis and Barber, 2004; Crowley, 2006; Keers et al, 
2013; Ameer, 2015), although incomplete information/knowledge has been provided 
about the sources of such practice.  
 
Unclean or the absence of clean plastic trays was reported as another task-related factor 
leading to a congested environment in the IV treatment room. This factor can be directly 
linked with other factors cited by some participants, for example the design of the IV 
treatment room. An open area should be provided in the IV treatment room, making it 
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easy for staff to enter the IV treatment room, take the plastic tray and return it dirty or 
put it in the wrong place – this was reported on all of the wards. The significant influence 
of poor quality plastic trays indicates that the quality of injectable medicine preparation 
also depends on the performance of other healthcare professionals (Keers et al., 2013).  
 
Numerous studies have highlighted interruption and distraction as major factors 
contributing to general medication errors in hospitals in the UK, Europe, and the USA 
(Gladstone, 1995; Meurier and Vincent, 1997; Osborne et al., 1999; Hand and Barber, 
2000; Pape, 2001; Tissot et al. 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2003; Mayo and Duncan, 2004; 
Deans, 2005; Pape et al. 2005; Crowley, 2006; Tang et al. 2007; Jones and Treiber 2010; 
Ozkan et al. 2011; Gill et al. 2012; Ameer, 2015). However, little information has been 
published about the types, rate, and sources of interruptions, or the correlation between 
distractions and interruptions and error in practice (Raban and Westbrook, 2014). In 
2004, O’Dowd investigated distractions and interruptions on medicine rounds, and 
reported that nurses were interrupted and/or disturbed on average more than six times 
each round, and a maximum more than twenty-five distraction/interruptions per round 
were reported. Furthermore, the participants in the study expressed that there should be 
no distractions or interruptions, as being removed from the task at hand could be unsafe. 
In addition, Biron et al. (2009) reviewed 23 studies on the types and rate of distraction 
and interruption in nursing work environments, and their potential contribution to 
injectable medicine administration errors. The authors reported that nurses themselves 
were the most common cause of distractions/interruptions, however, some were caused 
by system failures, for example lack of medicine or equipment. However, in the present 
study, participants indicated healthcare professionals were the main cause of 
distractions/interruptions, though they also mentioned other causes, for example other 
nurses and other patients. A large number of published literatures that classified the 
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contribution of distraction and interruption to mistakes were either qualitative or based 
on incident reports that might indicate a weakness in the form of under-reporting. An 
Australian study used the direct observation approach to control the influence of 
distraction and interruption on injectable medicine administration errors in hospitals 
(Westbrook et al., 2010). The authors relied on a sample of ninety-eight nurses preparing 
and administering more than 4,000 medicines, and identified an important relationship 
between the rate and severity of injectable medicine administration errors and 
interruptions to nurses during administration. The authors found that interruptions were 
reported in more than 50% of administrations and that every interruption was linked 
with a 13% increase in mistakes. The number of errors increased from 25% in 
administrations with no interruptions to 39% in administrations with three interruptions. 
The severity of the errors also increased with an increased number of interruptions. 
Where there was no interruption, the likelihood of a major error was 3%; with four 
interruptions this risk almost doubled to 5%.  
 
Numerous interventions have been used in various studies to reduce distractions and 
interruptions during the preparation of injectable medications and measure their effect 
on IPE rate; however, Raban et al. (2014) examined the efficiency of these interventions 
in reducing rates of distraction and interruption, and related medication errors, and found 
that there was little indication of their efficiency in this regard. To reduce the occurrence 
of distractions and interruptions, their natures should first be identified; hence, more 
direct observation techniques on distraction and interruption during the preparation of 
injectable medicines is needed to control preventable distractions and interruptions. 
Furthermore, the way in which nurses manage distractions/interruptions in practice is 
another strategy requiring further study (Biron et al, 2009). Therefore, more support 
information regarding the distraction and interruption strategies applied by staff to 
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reduce their occurrence is vital, as well as the used of disguised observation to better 
measure the efficiency of any strategies (Crowley, 2006; Raban and Westbrook, 2014; 
Ameer, 2015).  
 
The findings of the current study indicated that some of nurses believed that skill mix 
and inappropriate staff contributed to the occurrence of mistakes. Participants believed 
that, agency, bank and new staff they were untrained to prepare injectable drugs or 
inexperienced with the area, and so required close supervision. These results are similar 
to those of other studies that have stated inappropriate staff and skill mix as a cause of 
IPEs, and consistent with what was reported by the participants in the present study, 
were factors mentioned by many other studies (Taxis and Barber 2003; Taxis and Barber 
2004; Deans, 2005, Crowley, 2006; Chua et al., 2009; Avery et al., 2012; Keers, 2013; 
Ameer, 2015). Staff skill mix, in other words the proportion of inexperienced to 
experienced staff within the staff team, has been already stated to impact the safety of 
injectable drug preparation. In 2012, Frith and colleagues studied the correlation 
between staff skill mix and medication mistakes in eleven hospitals. The authors stated 
an important correlation between the ratio of experienced staff in the ward and the 
occurrence of medication mistakes, whereby the number of medication mistakes 
reduced when the number of experienced staff increased, and when the number of 
inexperienced staff decreased.  
 
Shift patterns, specifically in relation to lunchtime or evening medicine rounds, and 
those at the end of a shift, were also cited as a factor contributing to errors in the present 
study. Some of the participants stated that there was increased incidence of mistakes 
during the lunchtime or evening medicine rounds. However, previous studies indicate 
that this may have been due to the increased number of doses being prepared during the 
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day, or the higher frequency of error detection during the day shift (Ruggiero, 2003; 
Crowley, 2006; Geiger-Brown et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015). Participants specified that the 
risk of mistakes increased at the end of shift, and linked this with stress affecting their 
concentration as they prepared drugs, particularly when combined with hunger and not 
taking enough breaks. As far as this author knows, that working twelve hours is usual 
occupation for hospital nurses thru both day and night shifts, exhaustion become more 
of a problem in the end of the shift, as the nurses have to prepare the doses of injectable 
drugs before they leave, which is when their exhaustion, and pressure, are expected to 
be at their highest. The correlation between the end of shift and increased levels of 
exhaustion, and stress or pressure between staff has been proven in the literature, 
particularly when merged with insufficient breaks and shift rotations (Crowley, 2006; 
Winwood et al, 2006, Stimpfel et al, 2012; Dall’Ora, 2015; Ameer, 2015). Rogers and 
colleagues (2004) highlighted that the probability of making a mistake tripled when 
nurses reached the end of their shift. A study by Scott et al. (2006) including more than 
500 critical care nurses investigated the influence of shift patterns and time of day on 
hospital nurses’ wakefulness and the occurrence of medication errors. The results 
further supported the correlation between end of shift, reduced wakefulness amongst 
nurses, and a larger number of medication errors. The authors showed that the risk of 
medication errors doubled when nurses reached the end of their shift. Consequently, in 
2011, the Joint Commission published a notification to all hospitals requiring them to 
pay more attention to the risks of exhaustion between hospital nurses caused by 






In the present study, few numbers of patient-related factors were highlighted. 
Participants considered that patients with complex clinical states were at higher risk of 
IPEs due to either their capability to deteriorate quickly, or because of the number of 
injectable medicines prescribed for them. Comparable findings were reported by various 
other studies. For example, Tang and colleagues found that patients with poor clinical 
situation usually encountered errors during injectable drug preparation (Tang et al, 
2007). A literature review also found that patient acuity affected IPEs, either due to the 
complexity of those patients’ prescriptions (Benner et al., 2002; Crowley, 2006; Tang 
et al., 2007; Ameer, 2015), or due to the increased workload of nurses, mostly due to 
the additional intensive care that is needed or the high number of injectable medicines 
needing to be prepared (Jones and Treiber, 2010). A number of studies have related 
patient acuity with an increased rate of distractions and interruptions, high workloads, 
and high levels of stress or pressure between nurses (Crowley, 2006; Keers et al., 2013; 
Ameer, 2015).  
 
In accordance with several previous studies, miscommunication issues between nurses 
or with other healthcare professionals (e.g., physicians) were reported by one of nurses 
in the present study as common factors contributing to mistakes (Taxis and Barber 2004; 
Crowley, 2006; 2008; Ameer, 2015). In general, the communication problem raised by 
participant, such as lack of communication between the preparation team and pharmacy 
department during the shift, led to frequent omissions and expiry date of injectable 
medicines. Regarding communication issues with pharmacy department, the main 
problem nurse stated was related to incorrect expiry date of chemotherapy medicine 
from pharmacy, and she/he suggested that better communication between the doctor 
who prescribes the medicine, the pharmacy department, and the ward can reduce the 
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risk of errors. Several studies of medicine safety have shown that the most significant 
IPEs result from miscommunication between healthcare professionals (McBride-Henry 
and Foureur, 2007). Hence, any interventions and strategies to enhance medication 
safety must consider the need to improve communication within the nursing team and 
amongst healthcare professionals. In the present study, some recommendation by nurse 
was presented; for example, increasing number of senior nurses inside the IV treatment 
room may assist to resolve communication problems relating to the importance of 
injectable preparation. Unsuccessful communication between healthcare professionals 
contributes to increase the rate of medication errors in hospital wards (Balas et al., 2004; 
Ameer, 2105).  
The findings of this study have revealed that many individual, environmental, and 
organisational factors can contribute to injectable medication errors. The key factors 
identified include the complexity of some injectable preparations, insufficient training, 
and lack of access to the information required in order to safely prepare the injectable 
medicines on hospital wards. The complexity of some injectable preparations, such as 
aminophylline doses, which require complex calculations, have been mentioned as 
contributing to mistakes involving incorrect dose preparations and use of the incorrect 
preparation technique. The results of the present study support those of previous studies 
in terms of nurses’ lack of adequate training on preparing injectable medicines, although 
only a few studies have focused on the factors contributing to errors in injectable 
medication preparation (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2004; Crowley, 
2006). Participants attributed responsibility for training insufficiency and inadequate 
evaluation to the managers, and reported that the NHS Trusts intend to review the 
training provided to nurses continuously. Taxis and Barber (2003) stated that clinical 
pharmacists on wards can play an important part in classifying and focusing nurse 
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training requirements. Furthermore, two of the participants in this study have cited the 
performance of ampoules and the complex design of some drugs, such as enoxaparin 
sodium, as issues linked to manufacturers. Some strategies for minimising mistakes in 
injectable drugs preparation were recommended; one was to implement a Centralised 
Intravenous Additives Service (CIVAS), however there was no importance evidence of 
this action being taken (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 2015). 
Moreover, the participants in the current study suggested that nurses would benefit from 
refresher sessions, and that all nurses should be required to demonstrate their 
competence in injectable medicine preparation. Previous studies have also supported 
continuous training in injectable medicine preparation, in accordance with other 
compulsory training programmes (Nicholas and Agius, 2005; Crowley, 2006; Ameer, 
2015).  
In summary, there were some factors are common, others are more specific to the ward 
in which participants worked having an impact on the factors reported to contribute to 
IPEs. Participants from surgical wards stated that distractions and interruptions were 
more of a challenge when they came from the nursing team than from patients, as 
patients in surgical wards are mostly very unwell, although very unwell patients were 
stated to be at higher risk of mistakes due to their inability to communicate. Furthermore, 
when reviewing their workloads, participants working on surgical wards related their 
high workload to patient acuity rather than fewer staff, as participants from medical 
wards did. This may be due to the different nurse-patient ratio in surgical wards 
compared to medical wards, as each nurse in surgical ward was responsible for just three 




Finally, the staff were in some wards denial on medication errors that had occurred, this 
differed between wards. For example, participants from the surgical wards did not 
consider this to be an issue, and stated that they received routine feedback via ward 
supervisors. In contrast, participants from medical wards believed learning from known 
mistakes was impeded due to the absence of feedback. This may be because senior 
nurses and ward managers in areas such as surgical wards were more active in keeping 
their staff updated with information about identified mistakes. Nevertheless, almost all 
nurses who participated in the present study reported that receiving feedback is 
important and that more feedback on errors would be useful.  
A summary of the errors categorised as posing an extreme risk led to the development 
of risk reduction strategies for each ward, as summarised in Tables 6.14, 6.15, 6.16, and 
6.17. These were developed from interview and questionnaire data and previous studies 
(Breckenridge, 1976; Hadaway, 2001; Jones, 2003; Taxis and Barber, 2003; ISMP, 
2004; RCN, 2005; Alldred, 2006; Crowley, 2006; Brady et al., 2009; Avery et al., 2012; 
Ameer, 2015). Tables 6.14, 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17 show that individual, EPC, and latent 
factors can contribute to injectable preparation errors in the hospital environment.  
 
The main factors recognised in the surgical ward (S) were difficulties related to the 
design and layout of the treatment room. Several participants mentioned difficulty 
working in the IV treatment room as a result of its small size, and interruption and 
distraction by other nurses, which led to gross disregard for maintaining a clean and 
uncluttered treatment room and the selection of an incorrect diluent for some injectable 
medicines (i.e. S7; S83). One of the participants suggested that having a quieter 
treatment room might help nurses to avoid errors. The outcomes of the present study 
supported the results of previous studies in terms of interruption and distraction during 
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the preparation of injectable drugs, by the nursing team or others, although only few 
studies have specifically investigated the factors contributing to mistakes related to 
injectable drug preparation in hospital wards (Taxis and Barber, 2003; Crowley, 2006).  
 
The main factors in the medical ward (C) related to nurses’ lack of knowledge or 
experience regarding the complexity of some injectable preparations requiring complex 
adding and/or mixing, with one participant mentioning specifically a lack of knowledge 
or experience of the blood product, i.e. Factor VIII doses (C62). The observed error in 
this case was strongly shaking the medicine, which caused foaming and bubbles. As 
specified above, participants acknowledged lack of knowledge and experience as a 
factor, and that the NHS Trust should ensure that its training is followed before start 
work in IV treatment room, and follow this up with adequate training.  
 
The main factors on the surgical ward (H) were related to high workload and the critical 
health situation of patients on that ward. Several participants highlighted the difficulties 
of working on that ward as a result of patients’ clinical demands, and the requirement 
for extra nurses to minimise the reoccurrence of IPEs. One participant mentioned 
patients’ phobia of needles as contributing to IPEs, due to the incorrect preparation 
technique that can result (i.e. using one syringe rather than two syringes), resulting in 
too low a dose (H245). This participant further reported that high workload and patients’ 
clinical demands led to a lack of breaks, and recommended that managers assign specific 







The main factors documented in the medical ward (B) related to a lack of knowledge of 
NHS Trust policy regarding some of the injectable medicines and low staffing levels on 
the ward. Some participants explained that they did not know that they should label IV 
antibiotics bolus, wear an apron and gloves, and prepare all injectable medicines in the 
IV treatment room (e.g. B86; B92; B144).  
The participants further reported that absence of regular training and education sessions, 
and suggested that the NHS Trust should ensure annual training and regular sessions 
either within or outside the Trust.  One participant clarified that the lack of signs or 
posters illustrating the ANTT procedures in the IV preparation room was one of the 






The present study has a number of limitations. The first limitation was one that is true 
of all qualitative studies specifically that the outcomes of the study may not be 
generalisable (Johnson and Christensen, 2003).  This is because of the study sample may 
not be representative, particularly due to the relatively small sample size included in 
qualitative studies. However, because two research methods were used (questionnaires 
and interviews), the sample size was adequate for achieving the aims of this study. In 
addition, there are significant similarities in the outcomes of the present study and 
previous studies that used either qualitative methods or different methodologies to 
categorise factors contributing to IPEs (Taxis and Barber 2004; Pape et al., 2005; 





The second limitation of this study is that it was conducted in only two types of ward, 
surgical and medical wards. Hence, nurses’ opinions may not be generalisable to other 
types of ward, such as the Intensive Care Unit. Nevertheless, as numerous nurses had 
worked in other wards previously, they may have varied experience and opinions that 
reduce this limitation.  
 
The third limitation of this study is that all interviews were conducted with nurses from 
only two wards, Surgical H and Medical B, and no nurses from the other wards (Surgical 
S and Medical C) were interviewed. This was the case due to issues around taking nurses 
away from their clinical responsibilities, fear of discussing a sensitive topic, and lack of 
nurse confidence. If nurses had been individually paid for participating in the interview, 
this may have motivated more nurses to participate in the study such as (Surgical H and 
Medical B). In spite of the fact nurses from the other wards (Surgical S and Medical C) 
were informed of the study, none volunteered to participate. Their participation may 
have improved the results of this study. In addition, the interviews were conducted with 
nurses who had made errors in injectable medicine preparation, which may have made 
them afraid to participate in the study, even though it was clarified that all personal 











6.9 Future work 
 
 
A number of participants acknowledged the issue of miscommunication between 
nursing teams, especially the expiry date of chemotherapy, which they said contributed 
to IPEs. Errors due to miscommunication included an expiry date, whereby it was 
unclear, due to lack of documentation, when a dose had been delivered by pharmacy 
department, or whether a dose had been delivered without being checked. 
Documentation issues could feasibly be enhanced by introducing an electronic 
preparation system, which has already been implemented in some wards of international 
hospitals (e.g. in Saudi Arabia). Further research could measure whether an electronic 
preparation system would reduce the number of documentation errors and minimise 
miscommunication problems. 
 
From the statements received from the participants, some issues arose over the 
design/size and layout of the IV treatment room, Hence, the IV preparation process 
should take place in a solitary area. Consideration should also be given to studying this 
issue. It could be helpful to put some of these issues (open IV treatment room or small 
size) to a panel of healthcare professionals, for example focus groups to ascertain the 
ideal design / size / layout of a treatment room. This would enable different 
recommendations to be gathered and studied. The panel might not always identify issues 
or explanations that are relevant outside of their own professional area or expertise, 





Another factor contributing to IPEs identified in study, and others, is the heavy workload 
and limited staff on wards, with a large number of agency or bank nurses working. 
Agency or bank nurses may have inadequate knowledge and training, and some may not 
be permitted to prepare and administer injectable medicines. Numerous studies have 
shown the harmful impact of nurses’ heavy workload and low staffing levels on 
medication safety. These studies have also found that an increased number of staff, 
especially senior staff, leads to improved patient outcomes and minimises medication 
errors (Taxis and Barber 2004; Cousins et al., 2005; Pape et al., 2005; Wrench and Allen, 
2006; Crowley, 2006; Avery et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015). Hence, staffing levels should 
be taken into account by nurse supervisors and institutional management. More studies 
using more robust methods are required to study whether there is an ideal staffing level 
for different wards, taking into account the patients’ clinical demands (i.e. patient 
acuity) and shift patterns. Further work is also required to investigate the correlation 
between the ratio of experienced nurses (registered nurses) within a team and the 
proportion of IPEs that occur. Patients’ clinical demands might also be included in such 
an analysis.   
 
Good work flow and good strategy when completing the injectable medicine preparation 
procedure with clear delegation of responsibility for each member of the nursing staff 
is important to improve safety during preparation. The ward manager must thus consider 
how to enhance the work flow and work strategy. NHS Lothian has published a 
workbook entitled Intravenous Therapy and Infusion Devices (NHS Lothian, 2012); this 
workbook illustrates how a good work flow and good strategy can make the injectable 
medicine preparation procedure safer. However, further work is also needed to optimise 
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work strategy according to incidence of IPEs. Good supervision should also be included 
in that relationship analysis. 
As discussed in section 5.6.4, patient consent was not required for this study as it was 
approved as either service evaluation or audit. However, ethical standards for the 
conduct of research have increased over the years, so in the future it is possible that a 





Numerous factors were found to have led to IPEs in the hospital environment; some of 
these were common to all four-hospital wards, though some were reported only on a 
specific ward. Several common factors were associated with the nurses themselves, and 
involved lack of knowledge or experience, lack of concentration, and forgetting to 
complete tasks. Common error producing conditions (i.e. work environment) associated 
with IPEs included gross disregard for maintaining a clean and uncluttered IV treatment 
room, interruptions and distractions, high workloads with few nurses, and lack of 
commitment or adherence to the NHS Trust guidelines and policy processes. 
 
Lack of materials or equipment and the preparation of injectable medicines outside the 
IV treatment room (at the nursing station) were contributory factors reported in wards 
H and B. This issue was also raised in wards S and C, but less often, as the site had a 
closed treatment room, and provided filter needles and labels. By contrast, there were 
some other factors that may have increased the occurrence of IPEs in wards S and C, 
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for example breach of ANTT and insufficient staff education. Numerous strategies were 
suggested by the nurses to improve safety during injectable medicine preparation tasks. 
These included developing the nursing team through training and education, particularly 
of new nurses; and minimising staff stress by ensuring that nurses have sufficient breaks 
in a quiet relaxing room.   
Reporting identified mistakes, and the outcomes of these mistakes, is a key strategy for 
minimising IPEs. Moreover, enhancing the work environment can help to improve 
patient safety, for example by facilitating good work flow and good strategy, enhancing 
communication, and preventing interruptions and distractions. In addition, creating 
commitment to guidelines and policies, and ensuring clear delegation of responsibility 
to each member of the nursing team are further significant factors.  
 
Utilising electronic systems, for example an electronic preparation design and electronic 
incidents reports, is a valuable practical solution for minimising IPEs. Future studies 
should therefore study the impact of these risk reduction strategies on errors related to 







Table 6.14: Risk-reduction strategies for active failure, EPC, and latent failure to minimise the risk of IPEs in the surgical ward (S) 
Type of error Class of contribution factor Cause of error Strategies 
Gross disregard for 
maintaining a 
clean/uncluttered 
treatment room  
S7 
Active failure Violation 
(i.e. deliberately ignoring policies) 
1. Train and inform each nurse to ensure commitment to policy. 
2. Signs to indicate that the IV treatment room must be always clean and tidy. 
EPC Work environment 
(i.e. high workload) 
Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
Latent failure 1. Management factor 
(i.e. poor supervision) 
2. Weakness in the system  
(i.e. poor design of treatment room) 
1. Enforce policies and alert staff to clean and tidy the space as they work. 
 
2. Provide a better IV treatment room (i.e. adequate space, lighting, and good layout). 
 
 
Table 6.15: Risk-reduction strategies for active failure, EPC, and latent failure to minimise the risk of IPEs in the medical ward (C). 
Type of error Class of contribution factor Cause of error Strategies 
No double check 
C50andC51 
Active failure Violation 
(i.e. deliberately ignoring policies) 
1. Train and inform each nurse to ensure commitment to policy. 
 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2. Mental stressors 
(i.e. destruction/interruption) 
3. Team factors 
(i.e. lone worker) 
1. Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
 
2. Designation of a quiet room without telephones for preparing and checking 
products.  
3. Plan workforce to ensure adequate staff and skill mix, and assign staff 
specific responsibilities. 
Latent failure Management factor 
(i.e. Poor distribution of work by supervisor) 
Create good work flow and good plan/strategy of work, for example: 
1. Ensure that two nurses always prepare injectable medicines together.   
2. Request a second signature prior to mixing in order to ensure that two nurses 
check the final product. 






The second nurse forgets to check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse.  
 
1. Independent accuracy check of prepared medicines performed by senior 
nurse or accredited checking nurses. 
2. Posters specifying the need to double check products attached to walls in 




1. High workload 
2. Inadequate staffing 
3. Mental stressors 
(i.e. destruction/interruption) 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
2. Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels.  
3. Checking zone without telephones (quiet room) for preparing and checking 
products.  
 
Latent failure Management factors 
(i.e. poor allocation of work by supervisor) 
As for no double check (C50 and C51). 
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Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e. lack of education or training)  
and poor practice 
A clear structure instructions on preparation / administration of blood product. 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2. Inadequate staffing 
Individual factors  
1. Lack of skills and knowledge 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
2.  Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels  
 
 
1. Standardising nurse training and assessing competency of nurses to prepare 
injectable drugs; induction programmes for new nurses, including nurses who 
have transferred from a different hospital - should include a procedure for 
validating competency at each stage of the process of preparing injectable 
medicines; details of changes in procedures and errors should be disseminated to 
nurses to ensure they are up to date.  
Latent failure Management factors 
(i.e. deficiencies in training, guidance, or education) 
 
 
Weakness in the system defence 
(i.e. lack of experienced nurses) 
Ensuring nurses are familiar with standard operating procedures; standardising 
the training of nurses; development of validation procedures to ensure that new 
staff, and those transferring from different hospitals, are competent to work in 
the IV treatment room. 
 
Ensure more experienced nurses are working on the shift; better nurses should 
rotate on the shift. 
Gross disregard 
for maintaining a 
clean/uncluttered 
treatment room  
C65 
Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e. poor practice)  
  
1. Train and inform all nurses of the importance of keeping the IV treatment room 
always clean and tidy. 
2.  Signs indicate that the IV treatment room must be always clean and tidy. 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2. Patients’ clinical demands 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
 
2.  Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels.  
 1. Management factors 
(i.e. pressure to complete tasks) 
 
2. Weakness in the system defence 
(i.e. open window inside IV room) 
1. Rotating nurses’ duties may reduce the fatigue, stress and risk associated with 
prolonged task performance; improved workforce planning; prioritisation of 
workload with products made in advance if appropriate.  











     Table 6.16: Risk-reduction strategies for active failure, EPC and latent failure to minimise the risk of IPEs in the surgical ward (H). 
 









Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e., lack of education or training)  
and poor practice 
Train and inform each nurse to wear apron/gloves; signs to indicate that nurses 
must wear apron/gloves inside the IV treatment room. 
 
EPC Work environment 
Individual factors  
1. Lack of skills and knowledge 
 
2. Involuntary automaticity 
1. Standardising nurses’ training and assessing nurses’ adherence to wearing 
apron/gloves in the IV treatment room; induction programmes for new nurses; 
details of changes in policies/guidelines and mistakes should be circulated to 
nurses to guarantee they are up to date.  
2. Enforce nurses’ commitment to the policy, enable nurses to attend 
conferences, and display posters demonstrating the risk of injectable 
preparation errors. 
Latent failure 1. Management factors 
(i.e. deficiencies in training, guidance, or education) 
 
 
2. Weakness in the system defence 
(i.e. poor design and poor work layout of the IV room) 
1. Inform nurses it is a legal requirement to wear apron/gloves when preparing 
IV drugs; ensuring nurses are familiar with standard operating processes; 
standardising nurse training. 
 
2. Ensure an appropriate designated room (big room) and separate the nurses 
from the doctors and computers; the gloves and aprons should be stored in an 







Active failure Lapse 
(i.e. nurse forgotten to wear apron and gloves) 
 
Signs/posters stating ‘Don’t forget to wear apron/gloves while preparing 
injectable medicines’ attached to the walls in the IV treatment room (i.e. remind 
nurses to wear apron/gloves). 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
  
Latent failure Management factors 
(i.e. poor supervision) 
Ward manager should observe staff that they are always wearing apron/gloves, 




Active failure Violation 
(i.e. deliberately ignoring policies)  
Train and inform each nurse to ensure commitment to policy. 
 
EPC Work environment 
1. Inadequate staffing 
Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels.  
Latent failure 1. Weakness in system defence 
(i.e. deviation from guidance) 







Continued Table 6.16 
Type of error Class of contribution factor Cause of error Strategies 






Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e. lack of education or training)  
and poor practice 
Train and inform all nurses that injections should be labelled immediately after 
preparation.  
 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
Individual factors  
2. Lack of skills and knowledge 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
 
2. Standardising nurse training and assessing the competency of nurses to prepare 
injectable drugs; induction programmes for new nurses, including nurses who have 
transferred from a different hospital - should include a procedure for validating 
competency at the labelling stage of the process of preparing injectable medicines; 
details of changes in procedures and errors should be disseminated to nurses to 
ensure they are up to date.  
Latent failure Management factors 
(i.e. deficiencies in training, guidance, or education) 
 
Re-training and ensuring nurses are familiar with the trust policy on the standard 
operating procedures for labelling IV medications; contacting learning and 
resource departments for more information regarding training on IV Abs labelling. 





Active failure Lapse 
Nurse forgotten to label the IV  antibiotics 
Posters/signs explaining IV  antibiotics  labelling for products to be attached to 
walls in the IV treatment room (i.e. remind nurses to label IV  antibiotics )  
 
EPC Work environment 
Time constraints resulting from high workload  
(i.e. haste) 
Improved work flow/work strategy; prioritisation of workload with products made 
in advance if appropriate.  
  
Latent failure Local work and task conditions 
(i.e. lack of label or inappropriate label) 
Provide labels at the IV treatment room so that labels are easily accessible label. 
Faulty labelling  
H189 
Active failure Violation 
(i.e. deliberately ignoring policies) 
1. Train and inform each nurses to commitment to the policy. 
2.  Signs indicate that the IV antibiotics must be always labelled. 
 
EPC Work environment 
Mental stressors 
(i.e. pressure) 
Rotating nursing staff duties may reduce pressure/stress and risk associated with 
prolonged task performance; improved workforce planning; prioritisation of 
workload with products made in advance if appropriate.  
Latent failure 1. Management factors 
(i.e. pressure to complete tasks resulting from 
inadequate staffing levels) 
2. Weakness in system defence 
(i.e. inappropriate label for IV  antibiotics ) 
1. Ensuring there are enough nurses on the shift and nurses are familiar with 
standard operating procedures. 
 
























Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e. poor practice)  
 
1. Train and inform all nurses on the importance of following ANTT. 
2.  Signs/posters to show the correct ANTT technique inside IV treatment room.  
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2.Patients’ clinical demands 
Teamwork 
3. Lack of teamwork 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
2. Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels.  
 
3. Scheduling staff to undertake specific duties; encouraging healthcare professionals 
(i.e. doctors, nurses, technicians) to clean trays if they have completed their work. 
Latent failure 1. Local work and task conditions 
(i.e. lack of equipment or equipment failure) 
2. Management factor 
(i.e. poor supervision) 
1.  Provide enough trays inside IV treatment room. 
 
2. Ward managers should observe staff to see that they are cleaning the trays, 
especially the physicians. 
Filter needle 





Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e. lack of education or training)  
and poor practice 
1. Train and inform all nurses on the importance of using a filter needle. 
 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2. Inadequate staffing 
1. Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
2. Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels.  
Latent failure Local work and task conditions 
(i.e. poor layout of cupboards) 
Careful design of cupboards such that filter needles are separated or highlighted in 
different font colours or text styles; ensuring that the filter needle is available in IV 
treatment room. 
Filter needle 





Active failure Violation 
(i.e. from deliberately ignoring the policies) 
1. Educate and inform each nurse to ensure commitment to policy. 
2.  Signs to indicate that the ampoules must be withdrawn by using a filter needle. 
EPC Work environment 
Mental stressors 
(i.e. pressure) 
Rotating nursing staff duties may reduce the pressure, stress and risk associated with 
prolonged task performance; improved workforce planning; prioritisation of 
workload with products made in advance if appropriate.  
Latent failure 1. Management factors 
(i.e. deficiency in training, guidance, and 
education) 
Re-training and ensuring nurses are familiar with the NHS Trust policy on the 











Type of error Class of contribution factor Cause of error Strategies 
Filter needle 
not used  
H225 
 
Active failure Lapse 
Nurse forgotten to used filter needle  
1. Train and inform all nurses on the importance of using a filter needle. 
2.  Signs/posters highlighting the filter needle on cupboards to remind staff to use 
a filter needle.  
 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2. Inadequate staffing 
Individual factors  









4. Lack of teamwork 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
 
2. Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels.  
 
3. Standardising staff training and assessing the competency of nurses to prepare 
injectable medicines; induction programmes for new nurses, including nurses who 
have transferred from a different hospital - should include a procedure for validating 
competency at each stage of the process of preparing injectable medicines; details 
of changes in procedures and errors should be disseminated to nurses to ensure they 
are up to date.  
 
4. Scheduling staff to undertake specific duties; encouraging nurses to support other 
nurses if they need help. 
 
Latent failure 1. Local work and task conditions 
(i.e. lack of equipment or equipment failure) 
2. Weakness in the system defence 
(i.e. lack of information or resources) 
 
3. Management factors 
(i.e. poor supervision) 
1. Provide enough filter needles. 
 
2. Ensuring that guidelines and information/resources of filter needle are always in 
the IV treatment room.  
























room in an 
unsuitable 
location, such 
as a nurse 
station 
B86 and B118  
Active failure Violation 
(i.e. deliberately ignoring policies) 
1. Educate and inform each nurse to ensure commitment to the policy. 
2. Signs to indicate that all injectable medicines must be prepared in the IV treatment 
room. 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload related to staff shortage 
Individual factors  
2. Lack of skills and knowledge 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team, and workforce planning to determine 
adequate staffing levels.  
 
2. Standardising nurse training and assessing the competency of nurses to prepare 
injectable drugs; induction programmes for new nurses, including nurses who have 
transferred from a different hospital- should include a policy/guidelines for the process of 
preparing injectable medicines; details of changes in procedures and errors should be 
disseminated to nurses to ensure they are up to date.  
Latent failure 2. Management factors 
(i.e. deficiencies in training, guidance, or 
education) 
2. Re-training and ensuring nurses are familiar with the NHS Trust policy on the standard 









room in an 
unsuitable 
location, such 
as a nurse 
station 
B180 
Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e. poor practice)  
1. Train and inform all nurses on the importance of preparing all injectable medicines in 
the IV treatment room. 
EPC Work environment 
Time constraints resulting from high 
workload  
(i.e. fatigue/tiredness) 
Improved workflow/work strategy; prioritisation of workload with products made in 
advance if appropriate.  
  
Latent failure 1. Local work and task conditions 
(i.e. lack of information and sources) 
 
2. Management factor 
(i.e. poor supervision) 
1. Ensuring that guidelines and information/resources are available in the IV treatment 
room.  
 
2. Ward manager should observe staff to ensure that they are preparing all injectable 










Type of error Class of contribution factor Cause of error Strategies 
Faulty 
labelling  





Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e. lack of education or training)  
and poor practice 
Train and inform each nurse to ensure adherence to injection labelling; signs to indicate 
that nurses must label all injectable medicines inside the IV treatment room. 
EPC Work environment 
Individual factors  
1. Lack of skills and knowledge 
 
 
1. Standardising nurse training and assessing the ability of nurses to label all injections; 
induction programmes for new nurses; details of changes in policies/guidelines and 
mistakes should be circulated to nurses to guarantee they are up to date. 
2. Enforce nurses’ commitment to the policy, enable nurses to attend conferences, and 
display posters demonstrating the risk of injectable preparation errors. 
Latent failure 1. Local work and task conditions 
(i.e. lack of label or inappropriate label) 
 
2. Management factors 
(i.e. deficiencies in training, guidance, or 
education)  
1, Provide labels for the IV treatment room and make labels easily accessible. 
 






Active failure Lapse 
(i.e. nurse forgotten to wear apron and 
gloves) 
Signs/posters statin ‘Don’t forget to wear apron/gloves while preparing injectable 
medicines’ to be attached to walls in IV treatment room (i.e. remind nurses to wear 
apron/gloves). 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2. Inadequate staffing 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
2. Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels.  
 
Latent failure Management factor 
(i.e. poor supervision) 
Ward manager should observe staff to ensure that they are always wearing apron/gloves, 





Active failure Violation 
(i.e. deliberately ignoring policies)  
 Train and inform each nurse to ensure commitment to the policy. 
 
EPC Work environment 
(i.e. high workload ) 
  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
Latent failure Local work and task conditions 
(i.e. poor layout of IV room ) 
Careful design of IV treatment room such that gloves are in the middle of the IV room 






    Continued Table 6.17 









the needle or 
swabbing with 
alcohol after a 
needle touched 
by the maker 
B92 
Active failure Lapse 
(i.e. nurse forgotten to change the needle, or 
swabbing with alcohol after a needle 
touched by the maker) 
Signs/posters stating ANTT procedure for the preparation of injectable medicines 
attached to the walls in the IV treatment room. 
(I.e. remind nurses to follow ANTT). 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2. Inadequate staffing 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
2. Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels  
 
Latent failure 1. Local work and task conditions 
(i.e. Poor design of IV room) 
 
2. Management factors 
(i.e. deficiencies in training, guidance, or 
education)  
1.  Appropriate space in the IV treatment room (i.e. bigger size and closed room).  
 
 
2. Ensuring nurses are familiar with standard operating processes; standardising the 





Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e. lack of education or training)  
and poor practice 
Clearly structured instructions on the preparation/administration of antibiotics 
medicines. 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2. Inadequate staffing 
Individual factors  
1. Lack of skills and knowledge 
1.  Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
2.  Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels.  
 
 
1. Standardising nurses’ training and assessing the competency of nurses to prepare 
injectable drugs; induction programmes for new nurses, including nurses who have 
transferred from a different hospital - should include a procedure for validating 
competency at each stage of the process of preparing injectable medicines; details of 
changes in procedures and errors should be disseminated to nurses to ensure they are 
up to date.  
Latent failure Management factors 
(i.e. deficiencies in training, guidance, or 
education) 
 
Weakness in the system defence 
(i.e. lack of experienced nurses) 
Ensuring nurses are familiar with standard operating procedures; standardising the 
training of nurses; development of validation procedures to ensure that new staff, 
and those transferring from different hospitals, are competent to work in the IV 
treatment room. 
Ensure more experienced nurses are working on the shift; better nurses should rotate 























Active failure Knowledge- or rule-based mistakes  
(i.e. poor practice)  
  
1. Train and inform all nurses on the importance of keeping the IV treatment room 
clean and tidy. 
2.  Signs to indicate that the IV treatment room must be always clean and tidy. 
 
EPC Work environment 
1. High workload 
2. Individual factors  
 
1. Setting priorities of work for the nursing team. 
 
2. Workforce planning to determine adequate staffing levels.  
 
 1. Management factors 
(i.e. pressure to complete tasks) 
 
 
1. Rotating nurses’ duties may reduce the fatigue, stress and risk associated with 
prolonged task performance; improved workforce planning; prioritisation of 




























7.1. Overview  
 
 
The current study examined the safety of the preparation of injectable medicines in both 
a pharmacy and ward environment. Firstly, it outlined issues associated with patient 
safety and iatrogenic injury, i.e. an illness caused by a medication or healthcare. Several 
guidelines and policies, as well as specified quality and safety organisations, have been 
established by healthcare agencies and governments to enhance patient safety and 
healthcare. The key function of organisations (i.e. the NPSA; WHO Patient Safety 
Programme) is to investigate and evaluate errors, followed by the creation of plans and 
strategies to reduce such errors. For example, NPSA was created as a guide for a 
government programme enhancing patient safety and the quality of healthcare, by 
establishing a national reporting agency for medication errors and launching training 
programmes resulting from the investigation of these errors (DOH, 2001; NPSA, 2004). 
Over the previous five years, the main NPSA roles concerning the safety of patients 
have been transferred to the NHS Commissioning Board Special Health Authority to 
guarantee an improvement in patient safety and handle problems related to patient 
safety (NPSA, 2015).  
Previous studies of IPEs within the pharmacy and hospital environment revealed the 
importance of these issues on a global basis. There are a number of fundamental 
variations in the terms defining IPEs; however the key component remains constant, 
i.e. that IPEs are associated with the preparation of injectable medications, deviating 
from the prescribed instructions or the standard procedures for preparation.  
Injectable medicines are an important treatment for patients on hospital wards, but are 
reported as a key cause of errors (Crowley, 2006; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Vogenberg and 
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Benjamin, 2011; Cousins et al. 2012; NPSA, 2013; Ameer, 2105), despite the fact that 
many are preventable (Breckenridge, 1976; Bates et al. 1995; Barker et al., 2002; Taxis 
and Barber, 2004; Keers, 2013). Extensive investigation has been carried out globally 
to study errors correlated with the practice of medicine or its use within healthcare 
locations (Leape et al., 1991; Wilson et al., 1995; Vincent et al., 2001; Barker et al., 
2002; Taxis and Barber, 2004; James et al., 2008; Morimoto et al., 2010; Poon et al., 
2010; Cousins et al., 2012; Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al., 2012). The majority of 
medication errors take place during prescription, preparation and administration 
(Crowley, 2006; Ashcroft & Cooke, 2006; NPSA, 2009; Ameer, 2015). Most 
investigations into such errors have focussed on the prescription and administration 
phases, with only a limited examination of the preparation stage within a pharmacy and 
hospital environment. However, preparation errors are common in healthcare 
organisations, with up to 16,000 preparation errors resulting in patient harm or death 
being reported to the NPSA in 2009 (NPSA, 2009). This led to a recommendation that 
concerted efforts should be undertaken to improve the safety of injectable medicine 
preparations within both the pharmacy and hospital environment. It is therefore vital to 
identify how and why errors occur.  
This thesis is one of the first UK empirical studies to actively investigate errors 
occurring within this complex domain by highlighting IPEs within a range of aseptic 
pharmacy processing units and hospital wards throughout the UK. Numerous 
approaches can be used to detect IPEs, each of which has its own strengths and 
limitations (see Section 2.3.2). Direct observation was the principle method chosen for 
this study because it is valid, reliable and effective for collecting data on medication 




This thesis adopted quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate the incidence, 
types, severity and causes of IPEs in three pharmacy aseptic production units and four 
hospital wards. The project comprised three stages. Stage one employed direct 
observation to investigate the incidence and types of errors, which occurred during the 
preparation of injectable medicines within aseptic pharmacy unit and hospital clinical 
area. Stage two assessed the severity of IPEs using a validated method (Dean and 
Barber, 1999) and calculated a risk score for each error type using consequence and 
likelihood scores analogous to that used by the NPSA. In Stage Three, staff who made 
the errors completed questionnaires and semi-structured interviews to assess the causes 
of these errors and the underlying contributory factors. Data were analysed using a 
thematic analysis according to the Reason’s (1990) model of human error and Vincent 
et al.’s (1998) framework for accidents in healthcare organisations (Reason, 1990; 
Vincent et al., 1998).  
7.2 Main Findings  
 
Chapter Three of this thesis investigated the incidence, types and severity of IPEs 
occurring in three different pharmacy aseptic units across the UK. Over a period of 
twelve weeks, 27 pharmacy employees were observed preparing 997 doses, and 46 
internal IPEs were identified. Hence, the incidence of IPEs in this study was 4.6% of 
the doses observed. This is higher than levels reported in previous UK studies (Bateman 
and Donyai, 2010), although consistent with a US study (Flynn et al, 1997). One 
external error occurred at site A. Therefore, the incidence of external errors in this study 
was 0.09% of the all doses prepared, which is higher than the UK published literature 
(Bateman and Donyai, 2010). No significant difference was identified between the 
incidence of internal IPEs at units A, B and C (One away ANOVA, f = 0.1223, p. value 
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= 0.8891) (see section 3.9.2). The majority of errors (67%) related to cytotoxic 
products, which may relate to a high number of these products being made by pharmacy 
aseptic production units.  
The IPEs were categorised by type as follows: (1) worksheet errors (52.1%); (2) errors 
made whilst preparing the final product (26%); (3) errors made during the setup of 
materials (19.5%); and (4) errors made during the labelling phase (2.1%). Two types of 
errors (wrong diluent and wrong dose) graded as extreme risk were associated with 10 
IPEs. This concurred with the conclusions of the published literature of a need for 
strategies to prevent the reoccurrence of IPEs in a pharmacy environment. 
Nevertheless, both the present study and previous studies observed differences in 
practice and preparation requiring several strategies to ensure IPEs are completely 
minimised. Only a small number of strategies to reduce IPEs have been identified in 
the published literature and none were identified within the setting of the three different 
pharmacy aseptic units. Hence, in order to determine proof of an existing solution, it 
was important to classify strategies employed nationally for the practices observed in 
the three pharmacy aseptic units. Consequently, the fourth chapter designed to create 
strategies to use in the three different pharmacy aseptic units (large unit; small unit and 
unlicensed unit) to reduce IPEs. Interviews were conducted with nine staff involved in 
injectable preparation errors across the three participating sites. Interviews were 
conducted without apportioning blame, enabling staff to express their views openly so 
that the researcher (AA) could better understand the causes of errors and the underlying 
contributory factors. The published literature recognises the importance of staff views 
in understanding errors. This study produced nine overall main themes associated with 
active failures; EPCs; and latent conditions from the interview data. The themes 
identified were as follows: (1) slips; (2) lapses; (3) knowledge-based mistakes; (4) the 
 
 368 
work environment; (5) individuals; (6) the task; (7) the team; (8) local working and task 
conditions; and (9) weakness within the defence system. This resulted in numbers of 
strategies to minimise the errors. On order to priorities these were: (1) improve the 
layout of storage area (2) the creation of a medicine worksheet; (3) quality improvement 
of the design of the pharmacy computer system; (4) staff training and knowledge; (5) 
improve access to guidelines/policies; (6) double checking. These interviews 
highlighted the difficulties in dealing with IPEs in practice, and demonstrated that a 
single strategy is insufficient to reduce IPEs in pharmacy aseptic units. When 
interviewees were asked to categorise defences and barriers for IPEs strategies, their 
answers could be categorised into factors relating to: (1) individuals; (2) the work 
environment; and (3) the organisation. This highlights the importance of building a safe 
work environment and a supportive management/organisation. However, the 
management and/or an organisation also needs to establish a more organised and 
appropriate practice for preparing injectable medicines. This evidence has not been 
revealed by previous studies. For example interviews revealed unsafe activities among 
management, including: (1) poor layout of the storage area with similar packaged 
medications located next to each other (2) heavy workload combined with a shortage 
of staff; (3) poor design of pharmacy computer systems; and (4) inadequate staffing 
levels. The investigation must therefore go beyond the active failure resulting in the 
IPE to investigate the related: (1) individual; (2) working environment; (3) team; (4) 
task; and (5) organisational factors. Human error theory (i.e. Reason’s (1990) model of 
error causation) was used to identify the contributory factors of IPE. These were 
described by the participants as being primarily related to error producing conditions 
(EPCs), with the most common being continuous interruptions and distractions. In 
addition, risks to patients were increased by: (1) a heavy workload; (2) a shortage of 
 
 369 
staff; (3) stress/pressure from colleagues or patients; and (4) the education and 
knowledge of staff. 
This thesis also recognises the contributory factors relating to active failures, i.e. (1) 
selecting an incorrect strength of drug from the shelves to prepare the final product; (2) 
knowledge-based mistakes, i.e. due to failing to understand the correct number of doses 
for a paediatric patient; (3) a failure to attach a label to the worksheet; and (4) forgetting 
to sign the label. 
The interviewees were also asked to suggest strategies required to minimise IPEs within 
their practice. This highlighted: (1) the need for routine training programmes; (2) the 
improvement of the double-checking system; (3) the improvement of the working 
environment through the designation of a quiet room; and (4) the separation on storage 
areas and shelves of drug having a similar appearance or name. 
In general, the results of these interviews demonstrated the need for improvements to 
the system. Some modifications can prove challenging (i.e. planning the workforce), 
however the study identified the following safety strategies in order of priority to 
minimise IPEs in the three different pharmacy aseptic units: (1) separating similar 
packaged medicines on shelf; (2) standardising colour signs for medicines; (3) bar-code 
verification of medicine/diluent identify at accuracy check; (4) setting work priorities 
for pharmacy staff; (5) rotating the preparation team responsibilities; (6) enhancing the 
training programme; (7) careful design of pharmacy computer screens (i.e. 
programming alerts into computers for potential overdoses); and (8) improvements to 
double-checking procedures.  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Chapter Five of this current study assessed the incidence, type and severity of IPEs in 
medical and surgical wards at two UK hospitals. Over eight weeks, 66 nurses were 
observed preparing 1148 doses, with 372 IPEs being noted. Therefore, the incidence of 
IPE in this study was 32.4% of the doses observed. To put these results in context, 
recent systematic reviews of studies using the same method have found an error rate of 
35% in UK hospitals (McLeod et al., 2013), and 48% worldwide (Keers et al., 2103).  
There was no significant difference in the incidence of errors between medical and 
surgical wards (one way ANOVA, f = 0.8706, p. Value (P) = 0.5264). 
 
IPEs were divided into: (1) contamination-related health and safety issues (50.5%); and 
(2) dose selection and preparation errors (49.4%) which correlated with those found in 
other UK and international studies (Wirtz et al. 2003; Taxis & Barber, 2003; Cousins 
et al., 2005; Crowley, 2006). Twelve types of error were graded as extreme risk, and 
these were associated with 270 IPEs. These findings led the researcher to investigate 
the causes of these errors and the underlying contributory factors through the 
completion of semi-structured interviews and self-completion questionnaires (see 
Chapter 6). Many studies have used a self-reporting database or questionnaire, 
accompanied by a chart review or direct observation, to establish the causes behind 
reported, documented or observed errors. As far as the current researcher is aware, three 
studies conducted in UK and German hospitals used interviews to identify nurses’ 
perceptions of the contributing factors associated with IPEs (Taxis and Barber, 2003; 
Taxis and Barber, 2004; Crowley, 2006). The NHS has focused some of these issues, 
e.g. long shifts; electronic prescribing; and increased staffing of inexperienced nurses, 
in particular in surgical and medical wards. These changes may have improved the 
safety of medication preparation in the NHS, in conjunction with UK health 




The qualitative analysis resulted in twelve main themes arising from the questionnaire 
and interview data. These were: (1) knowledge/rule-based mistakes; (2) lapses; (3) 
slips; (4) violations; (5) work environment; (6) individuals; (7) patient; (8) task; (8) 
team; (9) local work- and task-related conditions; (10) weakness in the system defence; 
and (11) management-related factors. The most common EPCs contributing to 
preparation incidents in order of priority were: (1) mental stressors (e.g. distractions; 
interruptions and stress/fatigue at the end of shifts); (2) heavy workload (3) congested 
workspace; (4) lack of knowledge and experience skills; (5) shortage of staff; (6) Shift 
patterns/time of day; (7) lack of equipment (e.g. labels for IV bolus, and plastic trays, 
needles and syringes); (8) poor layout of the working environment (9) lack of 
familiarity with policies or protocols; (10) insufficient rest break; (11) patient clinically 
demanding; and (12) poor communication between nurses, or with physicians. Large 
numbers of these issues have been reported in published literatures as impacting on 
nurses’ concentration and thus contributing to medication errors (Taxis & Barber, 2003; 
Crowley, 2006; Avery et al, 2012; Keers et al., 2013; Ameer, 2015; James et al, 2016). 
The nurses were asked to identify defences and barriers in order to help build error 
prevention strategies. This established the importance of a well-designated treatment 
room to prepare injectable medicines, along with clean, tidy, uncluttered and 
appropriate working spaces. These problems should be identified during the design of 
clinical areas within the hospital, thus enhancing the working environment by: (1) 
reducing distractions/interruptions; (2) increasing commitment; (3) alleviating staff 
pressure; and (4) increasing staffing levels.  
Seven strategies were proposed to minimise errors on these hospital wards. These were 
(1) better designated area to prepare injectable medicines; (2) better distribution of work 
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on the ward; (3) better training for nurses; (4) improved access to guidelines/policies; 
(5) improved stock of medicine, equipment and materials; (6) improve double 
checking; and (7) proactive reporting of all errors. A key finding from questionnaires 
and interviews was a lack of training with injectable medicines among nurses 
undertaking injectable preparation. The participants reported major variances in 
training programmes provided at university and hospital levels. Training they get at 
university, as a student was seen as different to what they receive as a registered and 
qualified nurse. Moreover the participants stated that the training for injectable 
medicine preparation in one NHS Trust was delivered either infrequently or not at all. 
The participants reported that the official training programme at NHS Trust 
concentrated on very general aspects, with preparation skills subsequently gained by 
observing nurse members and during practical supervision. The National Patient Safety 
Agency (in assistance with Skills for Health) have established an efficiency guide 
outlining the skills required to prepare injectable medications, along with an evaluation 
guide (NPSA, 2006). Furthermore, the Royal College of Nursing standards for infusion 
therapy (2016) specified the skills needed by nurses involved in injectable medicines; 
however, there is no robust procedure to guarantee such skills. These should be 
employed by the NHS Trust to determine training programme requirements and create 
written guidelines and procedures and protocols for all phases of the injectable 
medicine process.  
Finally, the results of this hospital study illustrate that injectable medicines graded as 
extreme-risk for preparation within hospital wards could be prioritised for preparation 
within pharmacy aseptic units (Breckenridge, 1979; Bateman & Donyai, 2010). 
Although mistakes can also happen within the pharmacy unit, so a robust double-
checking system is an essential stage of the injectable medicines preparation procedure, 
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ensuring the noting (and thus the prevention) of potential errors. Pharmacy staff 
preparing aseptic injectable drugs can concentrate completely on the task of preparing 
the injectable dose, with fewer distractions and interruptions (Crowley, 2006; Beaney, 
2010). There are also a number of further strategies to minimise IPEs from reoccurring. 
This study recommends the following safety strategies to minimise IPEs in hospital 
wards: (1) to improve the IV treatment room (i.e. closed IV station, temperature control 
and reduced interruption/distraction; (2) to improve the training programme (i.e. one-
to-one training can enhance skills in the preparation of injectable medicines); (3) to 
implement regular training for nurses; (4) to enforce policies and alert staff of the need 
to follow the protocol and guidelines; (5) to ensure workforce planning to determine 
adequate staffing levels; (6) to organise the workplace (i.e. effective work flow and 
plans/strategies); (7) to ensure an independent check of the accuracy of prepared 
medicines by senior nurse or accredited checking nurses; (8) the provision of sufficient 
equipment and materials within IV treatment rooms (e.g. filter needle, labels and plastic 
trays; (9) the improvement of error reporting and learning from errors. This summary 
of findings demonstrates that the aims and objectives of this study have been achieved.  
7.3 The Study’s Contribution to Knowledge  
 
 
Results from this study have contributed to our understanding of IPEs. A key 
contribution of the current study is the evidence of unidentified errors occurring in the 
preparation process, which has not been reported previously in UK studies of 
medication errors. This may in part be due to the fact that previous studies have often 
focused on injectable administration errors, although Crowley (2006) examined 
injectable preparation errors in general, but without any emphasis on those responsible 
for the error. The present observational study and follow-up interviews or questionnaire 
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surveys focussed on those making the errors, to provide an in-depth understanding of 
the causes of injectable preparation errors. Furthermore, the approach used for the 
observation study was developed from an existing method developed by Crowley 
(2006).  The adoption of such an audit tool in three different aseptic pharmacy units 
and four hospital wards allowed for a detail comparison of findings both between, and 
across, study settings. Findings will assist in raising staff awareness and promoting 
patient safety. A further contribution to knowledge results from the qualitative analysis 
of error causes using Human Error Theory. Much of the published literature has focused 
on quantifying of the problem whereas this study has uncovered underlying factors 
contributing to an injectable medicine preparation error. These include local task 
factors; team factors; individual factors; the working environment; and organisational 
factors.  
Finally, a significant contribution to knowledge made by this current study is that the 
severity of errors was assessed using an independent panel of healthcare professionals, 
used to determine consequence and likelihood scores and calculate a risk score 
analogous to that used by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA, 2009). As far as 
the current researcher is aware, this is the first study to employ this method. The 
advantage of this method is that it allows the researcher to focus on errors with the 
highest scores to develop risk reduction strategies and help prevent their reoccurrence. 
This study was unique, because it covered two real environments: (1) pharmacy aseptic 
units and (2) hospital wards.  The investigation of such a real working environment 
within this complex domain allowed for deep details of comparisons between pharmacy 
and ward environments. For example: (1) the overall error rate of IPEs in hospital wards 
was six times more than the aseptic units; (2) breach ANTT; unused apron/gloves were 
commonly occurred in hospital wards, on the other hand, those errors were not detected 
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in pharmacy units; (3) pharmacy units were better organised than the hospital wards. 
Overall, this study confirmed: (1) the incidence and types of IPEs; (2) their severity; 
(3) factors associated with the causes of these errors; and (4) the views/opinions and 
experiences of the preparation team. This study formed preliminary conclusions 
regarding the extent to which IPEs are a real problem in the pharmacy and hospital 
environment and findings will assist with the development and implementation of 
procedures to reduce IPEs in three different aseptic pharmacy units and on two hospital 
wards. Comparisons made between pharmacy and hospital environments will assist 
with the development of safer systems. 
7.4 Study Limitations  
 
Specific research limitations were noted in each results chapter. More general 
limitations included a lack of published data or incident reports relating to the impact 
of IPEs on patients. This information would have proven beneficial in determining the 
clinical significance of the IPEs that occurred. Furthermore, the generalisability of 
findings could be influenced by the sample size i.e. the number of staff who participated 
in the studies and the limited numbers of participating sites. A further potential 
limitation is the accuracy of the main researcher (AA), who was the sole observer, 
responsible for recording the preparation processes in the narrow IV treatment room 
during busy periods. Nevertheless, after being double-checked by the researcher and 
evaluated again by the supervisors (JL; MJ; LJ) all recorded IPEs were considered 
valid. In addition, the complete details of each error included in this thesis have been 
assessed by panel of five healthcare professionals, who were consulted in order to 




A major limitation of this type of study concerns the probability of the influence of the 
observer on the observed. However, no increase or decrease was identified in the rate 
of error within the two environments over consecutive observational days suggesting 
that there was no evidence of the ‘Hawthorne Effect’ in the current study. 
7.5 Future Work 
 
This work has developed risk reduction strategies which could be used in the three 
different pharmacy units and hospital wards to addressed errors with the highest risk 
scores. The highest risk scores reported incidents in the three different pharmacy aseptic 
units described in this thesis consisted of wrong diluent and wrong dose, with many of 
the drugs reported as being considered extreme risk. Hence, it is recommended that 
future research should be undertaken to further explore reasons for wrong 
diluent/wrong dose and to measure the efficiency of interventions. The participants 
classified poor design of computer software as a common problem contributing to 
wrong diluent /wrong dose. Computer system weaknesses can be improved by ensuring 
labels for sound-alike medicines are printed using different fonts and colours and short 
expiry dates are highlighted. Further research is required to assess whether these 
strategies can reduce the level of wrong diluent/wrong dose. The observational study 
described in the hospital environment should be expanded to include all hospital wards, 
staff grades and night shifts. It is important to measure the influence of nurses’ fatigue 
on medication errors and deviations from practice across hospital wards and during 
night shifts. Moreover, this current study found that nurses described increased levels 
of work pressure and stress during their shifts, combined with inadequate breaks. 
Therefore, further research should be undertaken to investigate the relationship between 
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the numbers of breaks nurses are able to take during their shifts, accompanied by their 
recovery levels. This could suggest a minimum number of break periods during a shift 
to ensure adequate recovery and reduce the influence of long working hours on nurses, 
as well as the impact of fatigue and the needs of patients. In addition, this study did not 
investigate the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), despite this being one of the most important 
units in the hospital, managing patients in a critical condition. Future research is 
required to explore the causes, incidences, types and severity of IPEs in ICUs. 
This current study did not explore the microbial contamination of the prepared 
injectable medicines. The most frequently reported incident (50.5%) in the hospital 
study described in this thesis consisted of issues related to contamination, as well as to 
health and safety, with many of the medicines considered to be extreme risk. Further 
work is therefore required to investigate the incidence, type, severity and causes of 
microbial contamination of injectable medicines prepared in the hospital environment.  
Finally, this thesis demonstrated the existence of a relationship between the 
contributing factors to IPEs and has developed strategies for the identified contributing 
factors. Future work is needed to study, understand, implement and evaluate these 
strategies in the three different pharmacy units and the two hospital wards. After 
implementation is important to evaluate its impact and thus complete a cycle of learning 




Figure 7.1: The cycle of learning 
 
There are several barriers to implementing these strategies these may include financial 
constraints; staff resistance (i.e. not easy to change people behaviour); and technology 
issues (Nanji et al., 2009; Woods et al., 2012). 
7.5 Recommendations from this research 
 
 
This thesis makes a number of specific recommendations, focussing on current 
strategies, with the potential to assist the minimisation of IPEs in pharmacy and hospital 
environments, as outlined below. Reference numbers in brackets link recommendations 

















The Pharmacy Environment 
 
I. Identify similar drugs that are look-alike or sound-alike and alert staff to their 
presence. Suggestions would include applying tall-man lettering; separating 
similar drugs on the same shelves and storage areas; colouring the fonts employed 
for pharmacy shelves, and using warning red label notes (PL1; PL12). This 
strategy will help to miminise the incidents and is compatible with published 
literature from a hospital in Wales, which suggested the separation of drugs of 
similar strength or colour-coded packaging (Crowley, 2006; James et al., 2008; 
ISMP, 2016).  
 
II. Balance heavy workload within the pharmacy through prioritisation of work 
undertaken by pharmacy staff (PL11). Successful management can (as discussed 
above) minimise the incidence of errors during injectable preparation (Raddle, 
1982, Limat et al, 2001).  
 
III. Regulating staff training and measuring competency of staff to prepare injectable 
medicines (including induction programmes for new staff). These should include 
a process for validating competency at the each phase of the procedure of 
preparing injectable medicines and full details of modifications in guidelines or 
policies and errors should be publicised to staff to ensure they are up to date  (PL1; 
PL12). This recommendation is stated by previous studies (Crowley, 2006; James 
et al., 2008, Bateman and Danyai, 2010, NPSA, 2012) which showed a need to 
determine a clear training programme for all pharmacy staff, in order to reduce 





The Hospital Environment  
 
I. To provide a complete training programme for trainees and newly graduated 
nurses and on-going training for experienced staff. This should ensure they work 
under supervision until they gain a sufficient level of skill (H195; H226). 
Similarly, many studies have recommended that comprehensive training, mainly 
for new nurses, is required to overcome the effects of nurses’ lack of knowledge 
on injectable medicine preparation safety (Taxis and Barber, 2004; Prot et al., 
2005; Crowley, 2006; Tang et al., 2007; Brady et al., 2009; Ozkan et al., 2011; 
Ameer, 2015). 
 
II. To review all medicines, equipment and materials stored in the IV treatment room 
to ensure all necessary items are available. Then, ensure supplies are regularly 
topped up (H245, B106, and H243). This recommendation is comparable with 
those of published literature, where problems about non-use of a filter needle and 
faulty labelling during injectable drug preparation have been often stated (Taxis 
and Barber, 2004; Crowley, 2006; Keers et al, 2013; Ameer, 2015). 
 
III. To enhance the work environment in the ward by minimising interruptions and 
distractions in the IV treatment room, so minimising errors during the preparation 
of injectable medicines. Interruptions and distractions can be minimised by 
avoiding unnecessary conversation and unnecessary phone calls, as well as 
preventing unauthorised staff from entering the IV treatment room (B86; B148). 
This is comparable to the suggestions made by previous studies to designate IV 
treatment room, with no telephones, only for preparing and checking injectable 
medicines (O’ Dowd, 2004, Raban and Westbrook, 2014, Ameer, 2015). In 
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addition, the participants in the present study reported that there should be no 
interruptions or distractions, as being removed from the task at hand could be 
unsafe. 
 
IV. To balance the heavy workload in the ward by preventing staff shortages. This 
can be achieved through efficient organisation of breaks; annual leave; and cover 
for unpredictable events, for example staff who are sick (B92; H245). This 
recommendation compatible with various studies reported that an increased 
number of staff, leads to improved patient outcomes and minimises medication 
errors (Taxis and Barber 2004; Cousins et al., 2005; Pape et al., 2005; Wrench 
and Allen, 2006; Crowley, 2006; Avery et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015). 
 
V. To improve safety by ensuring an effective flow of work during the preparation 
process of injectable medicines and clarifying the responsibilities of each 
member of the nursing staff (B144; H183; H249). The ward manager must thus 
consider how to enhance the workflow and work strategy to make the injectable 
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7.7 Overall Conclusion  
 
Preparation errors concerning injectable medicines are a common concern among staff 
and patients in both pharmacies and hospitals. Mistakes can result in dangerous 
outcomes for healthcare providers and, in particular, for the patient, and thus any 
mistake is unacceptable and avoidance strategies need to be put in place. This study 
aimed to identify preventable errors and propose strategies to reduce the risk of these 
errors recurring, thus minimising patient harm and enhancing safety. This investigation 
employed a mixed methods technique to investigate the incidence, types, and severity 
of injectable medicines preparation errors at three different pharmacy aseptic units and 
two hospital wards. The research also explored the causes of these errors and the 
underlying contributory factors. The observational study of medication preparation 
practice found a high rate of errors within both pharmacy and hospital environments. 
The overall results of the observation study are similar to those found in the published 
literature. Wrong diluent and wrong dose were the highest risk scores of injectable 
medicine preparation error for the three different pharmacy aseptic units. The highest 
risk scores of error for the preparation of common injectable medicines for both 
hospitals consisted of issues related to contamination and health and safety.  A panel of 
five healthcare professionals confirmed that the injectable medicine preparation errors 
observed in pharmacy aseptic units and on hospital wards could be categorised as 
errors. After accounting for error frequency, two types of error were graded as posing 
extreme risk, and seven types of error were ranked as posing a high risk in the three 
different pharmacy aseptic units. Twelve types of errors were graded as posing extreme 
risk in four hospital wards. The majority of contributory factors on septic units and 
hospital wards were: (1) a lack of knowledge; (2) a lack of experience; (3) the presence 
of look- alike/sound-alike medicines; (4) heavy workload; (5) staff shortages; (6) 
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pressure/stress; (7) loss of concentration during work; (8) memory block; (8) hurrying 
through the preparation of injectable medicines with interruptions and distractions. The 
relative importance of these factors varies between units and wards. Further 
contributory factors in the pharmacy aseptic unit included prescription ambiguity, while 
in the hospital ward these consisted of the design of the IV treatment room and 
workflow. Safety during the preparation of injectable medicines can be improved by 
concentrating on staff development (i.e. training and education), focussing in particular 
on new members of staff. Furthermore, safety can be improved by minimising pressure 
on staff, ensuring that they have a quiet room and a sufficient number of breaks to 
promote relaxation times during shifts. Moreover, enhancing the work environment can 
increase patient safety in pharmacy and hospital environments, including: (1) ensuring 
an effective design of the IV treatment room; (2) enhancing communication between 
staff members; and (3) preventing interruptions and distractions for the IV preparation 
team. Additional essential factors include policy commitments and clear 
responsibilities being set out for each member of staff in the pharmacy and the wards. 
Further beneficial technical solutions for minimising injectable medicine preparation 
error include the implementation of electronic systems, i.e. electronic prescriptions and 
electronic reporting systems.  
Further work is need to evaluate the feasibility of the recommended safety strategies 
and their application in practice. To the best knowledge of the current researcher, this 
is the first empirical study of its kind to actively investigate errors taking place during 
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Assessment of the severity of injectable drug preparation errors previously observed in 
pharmacy aseptic units and on hospital wards 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The preparation of injectable medicines is a complex, high-risk procedure, yet very little is known about 
preparation errors in UK hospitals. There is a need for investigations that can expand the current 
understanding of factors influencing injectable drug preparation in UK hospitals and how incidents that 
threaten patient safety arise.       
 
In 2006, the UK National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) received 9,000 reports of medication 
safety incidents related to injectable drugs. That year, injectable drugs accounted for 53% of patient 
mortality or harm due to medication errors (NPSA, 2006). In response, the UK NPSA published a 
report called ‘Patient Safety Alert 20: Promoting the Safer Use of Injectable Medicines’ (NPSA, 2007). 
In this context, an injectable preparation error is defined as “the preparation of an injectable medication 
that deviates from the prescription, manufacturer’s guidelines, nationally or locally agreed-upon policy, 
procedure, or guidance, or generic standards for clean or aseptic preparation” (Crowley, 2006,). This 
study will adopt this same definition to enable a direct comparison of injectable drug preparation errors. 
By using Crowley’s study in particular, this protocol can take advantage of that study’s links with 
Patient Safety Alert 20 (Crowley, 2006). 
 
An in depth assessment of errors can help to identify strategies to prevent similar errors happening in 
the future and thus improve patient safety. In response, this project will investigate the severity of 
injectable drug preparation errors recorded in pharmacy aseptic units and on hospital wards during 
previous observations.  
 
This project focuses on internal errors, or near misses that occurred during the preparation of an 
injectable medicine. These were discovered during the work process before the medication had been 
delivered to the hospital bedside for patient use.  
 
The median internal error rate recorded following observations at three different pharmacy aseptic 
units was 4.2%, which is higher than that (0.49%) reported in previous UK studies (Bateman & 
Donyai, 2010). This difference could be related to the methods used in their study. For example, 
Bateman and Donyai (2010) used incidence report details of internal errors from the UK National 
Aseptic Error Database. Also, self-reporting depends on staff knowledge that an error has happened, 
which can be affected by the staff being unaware of the reporting process or being hesitant to report 
errors for fear of being blamed. On the other hand, the result of median internal error rate in this 
research is consistent with a study by Flynn et al. (1997) in the US, which reported a median internal 
error rate of 5% in five US hospital pharmacies. The similar error rate may result from use of the 
same method (direct observation) in both sets of research.  
 
A total of 46 internal errors were observed at three different pharmacy aseptic units; approximately 
90% of these occurred during the preparation of chemotherapy medicines and monoclonal antibodies 
(MABs). Most errors occurred on the worksheet, the most common being failure to record the syringe 
volume. Errors were also commonly reported during set up and labelling; during set up of materials, 
the most common error was an incorrect quantity of syringes and during labelling, the most common 
error was incorrect batch number of starting materials. Errors were also recorded whilst preparing the 
product, which included wrong starting materials and wrong diluents. An observational study on 




I. To confirm that the injectable drug preparation errors observed in pharmacy aseptic units 
and on hospital wards can be classified as errors. 
II. To rank the severity of injectable drug preparation errors observed in pharmacy aseptic 
units and on hospital wards on a scale of 0-10.  
 
Errors with the highest severity ranking will provide a focus for developing strategies to help prevent 
these types of mistakes from happening again. 
 
2.0 Research Method 
 
This project will employ a visual analogue scale to rank the severity of medication errors. This is 
simple to use and familiar to most healthcare professionals (Dean & Barber, 1999; Taxis & Barber, 
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2002). This method of assessing the potential of severity has been used previously by the General 
Medical Council for prescribing errors in primary care settings (Avery et al., 2012). It was initially 
developed by Dean and Barber (1999) specifically to assess the severity of medication errors without 
knowing the patient outcomes. This method of assessing the potential of severity was selected since 
it was found to be valid and credible (Taxis & Barber, 2002; Ameer, 2015). Dean and Barber (1999) 
suggested that, when the severity of medication errors is scored by each of four experienced 
healthcare professionals on a scale of 0 to 10, the mean score for each error can be used as a reliable 
index of severity. This was the first reliable, validated scoring method of assessing the severity of 
medication errors for which patient outcomes are not known. Their statistical analysis showed that, 
if any four reviewers from a panel of 30 experienced U.K. pharmacists, medical staff, and nursing 
staff were used; their mean scores would be generalisable to any other four reviewers selected from 
the same panel. Furthermore, the scoring method was valid because errors with known outcomes 
were included in the errors to be ranked, and the scores given for these medication errors reflected 
the severity of these outcomes.  
 
This study will employ an independent panel technique to collect the opinions of healthcare 
professionals through two on-line questionnaires. The panel will comprise five experts: two 
physicians (a general physician and an oncologist), two pharmacists (a clinical pharmacist and an 
aseptic pharmacist), and one senior nurse. The research team will select the panel based on their area 
of clinical expertise. Each member will be invited to complete two questionnaires, one for 
observations previously reported as errors in pharmacy aseptic units (Questionnaire A; Appendix X) 
and the other for observations previously reported as errors on hospital wards (Questionnaire B; 
Appendix X). Each member of the panel will be given a description of the observation, and asked to 
agree or disagree that each observation was an error using definitions adapted from a previous study 
(Crowley 2006). An agreement of opinion among three of the five judges will be considered 
consensus (Ameer, 2015). Then, they will be asked to rank the severity of each injectable drug 
preparation error in terms of its potential to cause clinical patient harm on a scale of zero to ten: A 
mean score between 1 and 3 indicates a low level of harm, a score between 4 and 6 is a moderate 
level of harm, a score between 7 and 9 is severe harm, and a score of 10 indicates the potential for 
death. As all errors recorded previously did not reach the patient, the actual patient outcome of these 
errors is unknown. However, a small number of errors (approximately 10% if the total) with a known 
patient outcome will be included to validate the method in our hands. The panel members will not be 
aware of which these errors are. 
 
Panel members will be invited to take part in the study by an email from the researcher. This is a 
well-established method for obtaining data on error severity (Dean & Baber, 1999; Taxis & Barber, 
2002; Avery et al., 2012; Ameer, 2015). The email (Appendix Y) will introduce the purpose of this 
study, outline the overall aims and objectives and explain that the panel participants will be expected 
to do; this protocol and the questionnaires will be included, as attachments and contact details for the 
research team will be provided in case participants have any questions. As the hospital study is on-
going, panel members will receive and complete the questionnaires A and B at different times. Each 
questionnaire is expected to take approximately two hours to complete and panel members who agree 
to take part will be expected to return their completed questionnaires to the researcher via email 
within two weeks. On receipt of each completed questionnaire, panel members will receive a £50 gift 
voucher of their choice (e.g. Amazon, Love2Shop, etc.). All questionnaire responses will be 
confidential to prevent the disclosure of information in any research report that could be linked to 
individual participants.  
  
2.1 Data Analysis  
 
The project will use a validated scale to assess the potential clinical harm of errors in preparing 
injectable medicines (Dean & Baber, 1999; Taxis & Barber, 2002; Avery et al., 2012). A coding 
framework will be developed for the severity questionnaire, and coded data will be entered into the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Validation of errors will be based on the 
judgement that three out of five will be taken as consensus. The severity score will be based on the 
mean.  The mean panel severity score will be calculated and used on an index of severity. If a panel 
member says an incident is not an error, it will be assumed that they would give it a severity score of 
zero. Furthermore, the panel members will have direct access to the findings of this study. The new 
error rate after the panel members have reviewed errors will be calculated as defined by Allan and 
Barker (1990), as summarised below:  
 
 
 Calculation used for new error rate (%): 
 
The equation for this rate is: Number of types of new internal errors (incorrect in at least 
one way) × 100 / Number of observations 
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3.0 Ethical approval  
 
Ethical approval for this research was obtained from the University of Bath’s Research Ethics 
procedure. 
 
3.1 Data storage 
 
Raw data will be securely retained for five years before secure destruction. Analysed data will be 
anonymised. 
 
4.0 Study funding   
 
The author received an award from the government of Saudi Arabia to fund his doctoral study. 
 
Contacts for further information 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study, then please contact:  
 
Dr. Julie Letchford   J.A.Letchford@bath.ac.uk  01225 38 6729       
Dr. Matthew Jones  M.D.Jones@bath.ac.uk  01225 38 3829 
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Assessment of the severity of injectable drug preparation errors previously observed in 
pharmacy aseptic units and hospital clinical areas 
 
Dear Healthcare Professional,  
 
My name is Abdulaziz Almatroudi and I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Pharmacy at the 
University of Bath. I would like to invite you to complete an email questionnaire to assess the 
severity of some injectable drug preparation errors that occurred during a previous observational 
audit in pharmacy aseptic units and hospital wards, to help reduce the possibility of these errors 
from happening in the future. The specific aim of the severity questionnaire is to focus on the errors 
with the highest ranking and develop strategies to prevent these types of mistakes from happening 
again. I would be very grateful if you could volunteer to take part in this study, and to thank you 
for your time, you will be sent a £50 gift voucher of your choice (e.g. Amazon, Love2Shop. Etc.) 
Once you have completed the questionnaire. 
If you decide to participate, please complete the attached questionnaire, which should not take 
longer than two hours, and return it by email to the researcher at (aa687@bath.ac.uk) within two 
weeks. Participation is entirely voluntary and the obtained data will be kept confidential.  
 
The results of the study will be published or presented at meetings, but the data will be kept 




If you have any queries, please contact: 
 
Dr. Julie Letchford:               J.A.Letchford@bath.ac.uk              Tel 01225 386729  
Dr. Matthew Jones:               M.D.Jones@bath.ac.uk             Tel 01225 383829 
Mr. Abdulaziz Almatroudi (Researcher): aa687@bath.ac.uk         Mobile              
Kind regards,  
Abdulaziz Almatroudi 
 
Questionnaire A: An assessment of the severity of injectable drug preparation errors 
previously observed in pharmacy aseptic units 
 
This questionnaire requires you to make judgements about observations, previously recorded as 
errors in pharmacy aseptic units. Results will provide important data for my PhD thesis, which 
investigates injectable drug preparation errors. Specifically, it will enable the project team to focus 
on errors with the highest ranking, in order to put forward strategies to help prevent these types of 
mistakes from happening again. The tables on the following pages contain a description of each 
observation, previously recorded as an error. Please state whether you agree or disagree that each 
observation was an error using definitions adapted from a previous studies (Crowley 2006; Ghalab et 
al, 2010; NAERS, 2016), by clicking on the appropriate box. Then, rank the severity of each 
injectable drug preparation error in terms of its potential to cause clinical patient harm on a scale of 
zero to ten, by clicking on the appropriate box. A score of zero indicates no harm at all and a score 
of 10 indicates a potential for patient death. The questionnaire should take you less than two hours to 
complete. Once you have completed the questionnaire, please save the document and return the 
questionnaire to the researcher (aa687@bath.ac.uk) by email within two weeks. All data collected in 
this questionnaire will be will be analysed within the Department of Pharmacy and Pharmacology at 
the University of Bath. It will treated confidentially and anonymised before publication.  
 
If you have any further queries, please contact:  
 
Dr. Julie Letchford:   J.A.Letchford@bath.ac.uk  Tel 01225 386729  
Dr. Matthew Jones:    M.D.Jones@bath.ac.uk             Tel 01225 383829 
Mr. Abdulaziz Almatroudi (Researcher): aa687@bath.ac.uk   Mobile   
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Ref: PL1 Prescribed medicine: Description of potential error 















Level of potential clinical patient harm 
No harm                                                                                                    Death                
 
                  
                
   
☐0  ☐1      ☐2    ☐3         ☐4     ☐5     ☐6         ☐7     ☐8    ☐9       ☐10 
 
 419 
Questionnaire B: An assessment of the severity of injectable drug preparation errors 
previously observed on hospital wards 
 
 
This questionnaire requires you to make judgements about observations, previously recorded 
as errors on hospital wards. Results will provide important data for my PhD thesis, which 
investigates injectable drug preparation errors. Specifically, it will enable the project team to 
focus on errors with the highest ranking, in order to put forward strategies to help prevent 
these types of mistakes from happening again.  
  
The tables on the following pages contain a description of each observation, previously 
recorded as an error. Please state whether you agree or disagree that each observation was an 
error using definitions adapted from a previous study (Crowley 2006), by ticking the 
appropriate box. Then, rank the severity of each injectable drug preparation error in terms of 
its potential to cause clinical patient harm on a scale of zero to ten, by ticking the appropriate 
box. A score of zero indicates no harm at all, a score of between 1 and 3 indicates a low level 
of harm, a score between 4 and 6 indicates a moderate level of harm, a score between 7 and 
9 indicates severe harm, and a score of 10 indicates a potential for patient death.  
The questionnaire should take you less than two hours to complete. Once you have completed 
the questionnaire, please save the document and return the questionnaire to the researcher 
(aa687@bath.ac.uk) by email within two weeks. All data collected in this questionnaire will 
be will be analysed within the Department of Pharmacy and Pharmacology at the University 
of Bath. It will treated confidentially and anonymised before publication.  
 
If you have any further queries, please contact:  
 
Dr. Julie Letchford:         J.A.Letchford@bath.ac.uk    Tel        
01225 386729  
Dr. Matthew Jones:         M.D.Jones@bath.ac.uk      Tel        
01225 383829 
Mr. Abdulaziz Almatroudi (Researcher): aa687@bath.ac.uk       Mobile     
 





Ref: PL1 Prescribed medicine: 
 
Description of potential error: 
 
















Level of potential clinical patient harm 
No harm                                                                                                    Death                
 
                  
                
   
























Participant Information Leaflet. 
Errors in the Preparation of Injectable Medicines in the Pharmacy Environment 
 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, it is important that you understand 
why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this information sheet. If there 
is anything that is not clear, if you would like more information or if you have any queries, please contact with 
the researcher. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for taking the time to read 
this information sheet. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Patient safety is paramount within healthcare as increasing numbers of patients are harmed by medical 
treatment. Injectable medicines have been identified as high risk of medication errors (NPSA, 2007). Between 
January 2005 and June 2006, the UK National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) received 800 reports a 
month on medication safety incidents involving injectable medicines. These incidents accounted for 24% of all 
medication safety incidents (NPSA, 2007). Injectable medication errors accounted for 62% of incidents 
resulting in severe patient harm and death (NPSA, 2009). Consequently, the UK National Patient Safety Agency 
published Patient Safety Alert 20: Promoting the Safer Use of Injectable Medicines (NPSA, 2007). 
 
Injectable medicines are unique in that they often require preparation in the clinical setting prior to 
administration to the patients. An analysis of 14,228 medication safety incident reports involving injectable 
medicines revealed that 10% of errors occurred during the preparation of injections (NPSA, 2007). The majority 
of UK research on preparation errors has evaluated both the preparation and administration of injectable 
medicines by nurses in the ward setting. However, very little is known about preparation errors in pharmacy 
aseptic production units. This study aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the process, incidence, types and 
causes of internal error and external error so that effective risk reduction strategies can be developed and 




Why have I been chosen to participate? 
 
Any member of pharmacy staff who is involved in the preparation of injectable medicines in the pharmacy 
environment is suitable for inclusion in the study. It is vital that injectable preparation errors are investigated to 
gain an in-depth understanding of their incidence. By sharing your experiences of preparation errors, an in-sight 
into the process of will be gained. This will enable the identification and implementation of strategies for 
minimising preparation errors.  
  
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to 
withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason.  
If you decide not to participate in the study, you are likely to be observed by the researcher present in the aseptic 
unit but your activities will not be documented. All activities witnessed by the researcher will be kept 
confidential.  
Deciding not to take part or withdrawing from the study will not affect your employment in any way. 
 
What would happen to me if I take part? 
 
Over a period of four weeks, a researcher will be present in the aseptic unit observing the process of preparing 
injectable medicines. Any mistakes in the preparation of the injections that are observed by the researcher will 
be noted on an anonymous, standardised data collection form. This observation will enable the determination 
of the number and type of mistakes that happen during the preparation of injectable medicines in the pharmacy 
environment. The researcher is interested in mistakes occurring at worksheet preparation, label generation, 
assembly, and manufacture/preparation, packaging and final release. The researcher is only interested in internal 
errors i.e. mistakes that detected and reported during the preparation process, before the medication is released 
to the patient/ward. 
 
If you are involved in a mistake during the preparation process, the researcher will invite you to take part in a 
short interview. The confidential interview will take approximately 15 to 20 minutes. The interview will take 
place at a time and location that is most convenient for you but as soon as possible after the mistake occurred. 
The purpose of the interview is to explore how the mistake occurred, what factors contributed to the mistake 
and what strategies could be implemented to prevent the mistake from happening again. With your permission, 
the researcher will audio-record the interview.  
 
All data collected by the researcher, as part of the study is strictly confidential. Data from the interviews will 
be anonymised during data analysis. It will NOT be possible to link information used in the research report 





What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
This study will gain an in-depth understanding of the incidence, types and causes of mistakes occurring during 
the preparation of injectable medicines in the pharmacy environment. It allows pharmacy staff involved in the 
preparation of injectable medicines to share their experiences and suggestions for improvement. The findings 
will enable the development of strategies for minimising the risk of preparation errors, thereby improving 
patient safety.  
 
The study findings will be useful for all UK hospitals but particularly for participating hospitals as these 
departments will receive feedback to allow them to act on issues identified. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
 
The pharmacy department is keen to learn of areas where practice in the preparation of injectable medicines can 
be improved and will welcome any comments or suggestions. These should be directed to the manager for 
technical services at your hospital pharmacy. 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
 
If taking part in this research harms you, there are no special compensation arrangements. If you are harmed 
due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for legal action but you may have to pay for it. 
Regardless of this, if you have a concern about any aspect of the study, the way you’ve been approached and 
treated during the course of this study, you should speak with the researcher who will do their best to answer 
any questions. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, the normal National Health Service 
complaints procedures are available to you. Details can be obtained from the hospital.  
 
Would my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All information that is collected about you during the course of the research study is kept strictly confidential. 
The forms used by the researcher to record mistakes are anonymous. In addition, the interviews are confidential 
and the researcher will anonymise the data collected. All data collection forms will be stored securely at the 
University of Bath.  
 
What would happen to the results of the research study? 
 
 
Individuals will not be identified in any report or publication. The findings will be shared across hospital 
pharmacy departments to improve patient safety. It is hoped to publish and/or present at national level so all 
information gained is shared widely. If you would like a copy of any resultant publication, you will be sent one. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
 
 
The research is being organised by Dr Lynette James, Dr Julie letchford and Abdulaziz Almatroudi (University 
of Bath) the research team are providing their time and expertise free of charge.  
 
Contacts for further information. 
 
 
Should you have any further questions, or would like to enquire further please contact Abdulaziz Almatroudi 
or by either e-mail or phone number between 9am-5pm Monday to Friday. 
 
Abdulaziz Almatroudi: aa687@bath.ac.uk;  
 
If you are happy to participate in this study, please complete the attached consent form and return them to the 
researcher based in your pharmacy department. 
 



















Errors in the Preparation of Injectable Medicines in the Pharmacy Environment 
 
 
Name of Researcher: Abdulaziz Almatroudi 
 
You are provided with two copies of this consent form. Both forms should be returned to the 
researcher based in your pharmacy department. A copy signed by the researcher will be 
returned for you to keep. The second copy will be to Abdulaziz Almatroudi for secure storage. 
 
 
         
  Please initial box 
         
    
1. I have read and understand the information sheet (version1) for the 
Above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
Withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my standing 
Or employment within the Trust or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree that what I say during the interviews can be used, anonymously, 
In the presentation of the research. 
 








Address for those requesting a research report 
……………………………………………………………….. 
         
………………………………………………………………… 
         
………………………………………………………………… 




………………………………….  …………………………………… 
 
 
Name of pharmacy staff              Signature   




………………………………….  ……………………………………  
 
Name of researcher    Signature  





































































Accuracy check of 
worksheet & label 
 
Assembly of 





















Transfer of materials 
to clean room 
 



























Transcribing Errors – RX to Worksheet 
Patient 
identifier 



























 Aseptic unit 
name/code 







































































Observer name  Aseptic unit 
name/code 





 Wrong drug (Please 
specify) 
 



















Wrong batch number (Please 
specify) 
 
 Missing batch number (Please 
specify) 
 









Wrong expiry date (Please 
specify) 
 





















Setup  Errors (1) 
Patient 
identifier 























 Aseptic unit 
name/code 
   
Wrong drug (Please 
specify) 
 





















































    
 
 
Setup Errors (2) 
























Observer name  Aseptic unit 
name/code 
   
Is all equipment 
sprayed/wiped 
before entering clean 
room 













Do checks occur? Yes No If “No” please specify 
omitted checks 
  
Are product checks 
adequate/appropriat
e? 




Wrong batch number Yes No Missing batch 
number 
Yes No 
Are drugs within 
expiry date range? 
Yes No If “No” please specify 
discrepancy 
  
Are diluents within 
expiry date range 










Errors in making the product 
Patient 
identifier 

























 Aseptic unit 
name/code 
   
Wrong drug (Please 
specify) 




































Yes No If “No” please 
specify problem 











Yes No If “No” please 
describe final 
volume checks and 







Yes No Signatures included 
for: 










If product placed in two bags to protect from light, were labels attached 












































Observer name  Aseptic unit 
name/code 
   





    
Was final product 
visually 
inspected 


























































National Aseptic Error Reporting Scheme reporting categories 
Licensed Status 
 A Section 10, individual patient non-licensed unit  
 B Section 10, batch non-licensed unit 
 C Section 10, individual patient, licensed unit 
 D Section 10, batch licensed unit 
 E Licensed, individual patient 
 F Licensed, batch 
Product Category 
 1 A Cytotoxic adult 
 2 B Cytotoxic paediatric 
 3 C Parenteral nutrition – adult 
 4 D Parenteral nutrition – paediatric 
 5 E Other IV additive 
 6 F Other pre-filled syringes 
 7 G Other 
 8 Not recorded 
Error Type – Please include all errors 
 A Incorrect transcription 
 B Calculation error 
 C Incorrect drug 
 D Incorrect dose/strength 
 E Incorrect diluent/Infusion fluid 
 F Incorrect final volume 
 G Labelling error 
 H Incorrect expiry date 
 I Incorrect container, eg infusor, bag 
 J Other 
 K Not recorded 
Who Made/Detected Error 
 1 A Pharmacist 
 2 B Technician 
 3 C ATO 
 4 D Student Technician 
 5 E Pre Reg 
 6 F Nurse 
 7 G Doctor 
 8 H Patient 
 9 I  Other 
 10 J Not recorded 
When was Error Detected 
 1 A First check in assembly area 
 2 B Operator check in preparation area 
 3 C During labelling 
 4 D Final check prior to release 
 5 E At release stage 
 6 F In clinical area prior to administration 
 7 G In clinical area during or after administration 
 8 H Other 
 9  Not recorded 
 
 
Who Made the Error 
As in “Who Detected Error” above.  More than one person may be involved since one person may have compounded the error 
or missed a check. 
Contributory Factors 
There may be more than one 
 A Staff error 
 B Inadequate training 
 C Facility/equipment error 
 D Poor quality of starting materials used 
 E Inadequate computer system 
 F Process design 
 G Poor storage/distribution 
 H Staffing level below establishment 
 I 1A 
 J Poor segregation 
 K Distraction/interruptions 
 L Other 


















Meaning Number Code 
A Catastrophic 1 
B Major 2 
C Moderate 3 
D Minor 4 


























The  purpose  of  this  interview  is  to  find  out  what  happened  in  relation  to  the  error(s)  observed.  This study  has  been  
conducted  within  a  range  of Aseptic  processing  units  throughout  the  UK  and  is  one  of the  first  UK  empirical  studies  to  
actively  investigate  errors  that  occur  during  real  working  within  this complex  domain. All  responses  you  provide  in  this  
interview  will  be  completely  confidential.  You  will  never  be  identified within  this  study  or  the  subsequent  analyses  and  
reports  by  your  actual  name,  only  by  your  participant number.  Correspondences  between  participant  names  and  numbers  
will  never  be  disclosed  to  anyone beyond  the  research  team the  duration  of  the  study  or  at  any  time  after  it  has  been  
completed. Furthermore,  while  we  would  like  to  find  out  about  the  error  in  as  much  detail  as  possible,  please be assured  
that  we  are  not  interested  in  assigning  any  blame  to  yourself  or  anyone  else the  errors observed  or  in  penalising  you  in  
any  way  for  what  has  transpired.  Furthermore,  the  findings  of this interview  will  have  absolutely  no  implications  in  terms  
of  your  career  here  at  [Aseptics  unit].  It  is  important  for  any  research  into  such  an  important  area  as  Aseptic  processing  
that  answers  given  are truthful  and  accurate  as  only  by  truly  establishing  context  in  this  way  is  it  possible  for  lessons  
to  be learned  and  research  within  this  important  area  to  proceed/develop  in  a  meaningful  and  constructive way. 
 
The main purposes of this interview are: 
 
1.  To  find  out  about  a  little  bit  more  about  the  error(s)  observed. 
 
2.  To determine the context in which it/they occurred. 
 
3.  To  understand  the  potential  causes  of the  error  as  you  see  them. 
 
Establishing the chronology of the error 
 
As part of the [procedure] we noticed that you [error].  The  correct/appropriate  course  of  action  when [doing  x]  is……Therefore,  
in  [doing x  this  constituted  an error]  
Do you agree with this assessment? 
 
Have  you  encountered  this  error  or  similar  types  of  error  in  the  past  either  perpetrated  by  yourself  or other  staff? 
 
Please describe the events leading up to this error.  You were...  (describe  what  they  were  doing  a  stage or  two  before  the  
error  took  place). 
 
Please  try  to  recall  your  thoughts  and  feelings  at  this  point.  Please feel free to include any information you feel relevant (e.g.  
stresses  you  might  have  been  feeling,  worries  you  might  have  been  having,  how routine  the  process  was,  level  of  
workload  you  experienced). 
 
Now  please  go  on  to  describe  your  frame  of  mind  and  any  thoughts,  feelings  or  impressions  you  had when  the  error  
occurred. 
 
Were you distracted at the time the error occurred? 
Were  you  aware  at  any  time that  your mind  had  wandered  from  the task  at  hand? 
 
If the answer is yes, discuss this further.  Determine  whether  they  often  get  distracted  in  performing their  role  and  the  extent  
to  which  this  may  impact  upon  their job.  However,  explain  to  them  that distraction  is  normal  particularly  when  carrying  
out  routine  or  sometimes  mundane  tasks. 
 
Based  on  your  thoughts/feelings at the  time  and on the  various  aspects  of your job,  please  imagine  a scale  ranging  
on  a  scale  of  1  to  5  ranging  from  1  (not  at  all  likely)  to  5  (very  likely).  How likely do you feel that this error might have 
occurred? 
 
Did  you  notice  or  realise  that  an  error  had  occurred  at  this  time? 
 
Do  you  feel  that  you  may  have  made  such  an  error  in  the  past  or  would  you  say  based  on  your experience  that  this  
is  the first  time  you  have  made  this  particular error? 
 
Using  the  scale  outlined  previously,  how  likely  do  you  think  it  is  that  you  will  make  this  particular  error  at this  stage  
in  the  preparation  process  in  the  future? 
 
There will then be a further discussion about the particular error observed. Given the range of potential errors, it is difficult here to 
suggest precise questions for the particular error observed, it will depend on the circumstances of the error and the idiosyncrasies 
of that particular error type.  The error will be discussed in an informal manner according to the precise error observed.This will 
be very dependent upon the situation but it will then be important to determine the type of error. If the error occurred due to a 
deviation from normal clinical practice from rules and regulations of the particular aseptic unit then it would constitute a violation. 
It is important to establish whether it was a violation or a slip/lapse or a mistake. 
 
Responsibility for the error 
 
We  are  now  going  to  try  to  assess  the  extent  of  responsibility  for  the  observed  error.  Although  they  are often  only  
observed  at  the  front-end  of working  by  personnel  such  as  yourself,  research  from  many domains  shows  us  that  full  
responsibility  for  error  rarely  lays  completely  with  a  single  person.  Errors  are complex  events  and  an  error  may  reflect  




• Individual level factors (e.g.  High workload, timing, fatigue, stress, lapses in memory/attention). 
 
.Team level factors eg.inter/intrateam coordination, communication, roles/responsibilitis. 
 
• Organisational level factors (e.g.  Training, organisational climate/culture). 
 
Individual level questions 
 
1.  Do  you  feel  you  had  sufficient  knowledge/experience  to  deal  with  the  tasks  you  were  assigned? 
 
2.  Did  you  feel  tired,  hungry  or  unwell  around  the  time  that  the  error  occurred? 
3.  Do  you  feel  appreciated  in  your  work  environment  and  do  you  have  high  morale/self-esteem  in relation  to  the  job  
you  are  doing? 
 
4. Do  you  feel  that  the  expectations  of the  work  you  do  are  realistic  in  the  preparation  phase  in which  the  error  occurred? 
 
Team level questions 
 
1.  Do  you  feel  that  you  are  able  to  communicate  effectively  with  all  members  of  your  team. 
 
2.  Do  you  ever  encounter  language/cultural  problems  between  yourself  and  other  team  members. Do  you  feel  that  such  
problems  may  have  been  salient  in  committing  the  error  that  was observed? 
 
3. Do  you  feel  that  you  can  ask  for  help  or  advice  from  members  of  your  team  and  that  help/advice is  readily  available.  
To  what  extent  could  extra  help/advice  have  been  useful  around  the  time  of the  error? 
 
 
4. Do  you  feel  that  your  opinions  and  competence  are  accepted  by  other  people  within  your  team? 
 
5.  How  tight  is  the  coordination  between  yourself  and  other  members  of your  team  in  completing tasks  set  for  you? 
 
6.  Do  you  feel  that  all  member  of your  team  have  clearly  defined  roles?  Do  you  understand  your role  and  the  roles  of  
others  and  how  you  fit  in  with  the  rest  of  the  team? 
 
Organisational level questions 
 
1.  Do  you  feel  that  you  have  received  adequate  training  for  what  you  are  required  to  do  in  this job? 
 
2.  To  what  extent  do  you  feel  that  the  error  that  was  observed  could  be  attributed  to  a  lack  of  or insufficient/inadequate  
training? 
 
3.  Can  you  suggest  how  the  training  regime  might  be  altered  to  reduce  the  frequency  with  which this  type  of  error  
occurs? 
 
4.Do  you  feel  that  the  rules,  regulations  and  procedures  within  your  unit  made  any  contribution  to the  error  observed? 
 
5.  Can  you  suggest  potential  changes  to  the  rules,  regulations  and  procedures  within  your  unit  that might  make  this  
particular  error  occur  less  frequently? 
 
Finally  before  closing  this  interview,  we  would  like  you  to  tell  us  about  any  ways  not  previously mentioned  that  you  
feel  this  particular  error  or  similar  types  of  error  might  be  prevented  in  the  future. 
 
Closing the interview 
 
Thank you for taking part in this interview.  The  information  you  have  provided  us  with  will  be  extremely valuable  in  both  
our  own  analyses  and  in  ensuring  the  potential  for  error  is  further  eliminated  in  the future  within  your  own  working  
environment  and  within  other  similar  working  environments throughout  the  country. would  also  like  to  take  this  final  
opportunity  to  remind  you  that  your  responses  in  this  interview  were completely  confidential.  While  they  may  be  drawn  
upon  in  our  analyses  and  report  you  will  never  be identified  by  name,  only  by  your  participant  number.  Furthermore,  
your  responses  will  have  no  impact upon  your  career  here  at  (aseptic  unit)  either  now  or  in  the  future. If you  have  any  
questions  about  the  entire  study  please  feel  free  to  ask  me  now  and  i  will  try  our best  to  answer  them  for  you.  Once 
again thank you very much for your participation. 
 
………………………………………End of interview…………………………………….. 












































































































































































Appendix 16                                                                                                         
 
 
1: Description of all errors that occurred on the surgical ward (S). 
Prescribed medicine Description of potential error 
 
 




100ml 0.9% NaCl 
1. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and 
free from interruption and distraction as 
possible before/during I.V. drug preparation 
(leakage of drug solution onto sink/floor and 
continued preparation without any 
corrective action). 
 
2. A plastic apron was not worn during preparation. 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 















1. Disregard for clean, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. 
drug preparation (leakage of drug solution onto sink/floor 
and continued preparation without any corrective action). 
 
2. A plastic apron was not worn during preparation. 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 












1. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. 
drug preparation (leakage of drug solution onto sink/floor 
and continued preparation without any corrective action). 
 
2. A plastic apron was not worn during preparation. 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 

















2. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. 
drug preparation (syringes; plastic bottles and gauze on 
sink/floor). 
 




2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 














2. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. 
drug preparation (syringes; plastic bottles and gauze on 
sink/floor). 
 




2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 











Prescribed medicine Description of potential error 
 
 







1. Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 





2. Signature of member of staff who prepared product 
missing from drug chart. 
 
 




4. Signature of member of staff who prepared product 
missing from the label. 
1. Wrong 
addition/mixing. 




2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (S) 2016, p18 
 
3. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (S) 2016, p25 
 
4. Wrong preparation 
technique. 









1. Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 
embolism or measurement of incorrect volume. 
 
2. Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final product 
not clear “cloudiness”). 
1. Wrong 
addition/mixing. 












Violation of “aseptic non touch technique” (ANTT) where 
the maker touches areas that may cause contamination 













1. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. 
drug preparation (dropping uncapped syringe and needle 








3. Signature of 2nd checker who checked product missing 
from the label. 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 





2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (S) 2016, p4 
 
3. Wrong preparation 
technique. 


























Prescribed medicine Description of potential error 
 






1. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. 
drug preparation (dropping uncapped syringe and needle 








3. Signature of 2nd checker who checked product missing 
from the label. 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 





2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (S) 2016, p4 
 
3. Wrong preparation 
technique. 

















shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air embolism 
or measurement of incorrect volume. 
 
 
2. Drug not fully dissolved in diluent  
(Final product not “cloudiness” clear). 
1. Wrong 
addition/mixing. 











1. Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 




2. Violation of “aseptic non touch technique” (ANTT) 
where the maker touches areas that may cause 
contamination (needle hub). 
 
 





(IV Policy,2016, p39) 
 
 





3. Wrong preparation 
technique. 







Wrong medicine selected: co-amoxiclav 1.2g /100ml 










1. Signature of member of staff who prepared product 
missing from the label. 
 
2. Failure to double-check the final product by another 
nurse. 
 
3. Signature of 2nd checker who checked product missing 
from the label. 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
RUH, Bath 2016, p18 
2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (S) 2016, p4 
3. Wrong preparation 
technique. 






Continue Table: 5.10 
 
 452 






Leakage from vial resulted in dose being too low. Wrong dose. 





Wrong medicine selected: metronidazole 500mg/100ml 
instead of paracetamol 1g/100ml. 
Wrong medicine 










2. Signature of 2nd checker who checked product missing 
from the label. 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (S) 2016, p4 
 
2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (S) 2016, p15 
 
Actrapid 50 units in 
50mL of 0.9% NaCl 
Infusion pump 
1. Wrong strength of diluent picked to prepare final 
product: 0.45% NaCl instead of 0.9% NaCl. 
 
 
2. Wrong volume of diluent: Picked 100ml 0.9%Nacl 
instead of 50 ml 0.9% NaCl. 
 
1. Wrong diluent. 
(NPSA, 2007; p3). 
 
 
2. Wrong volume of 
diluent used. 






1. Violation of “aseptic non touch technique” (ANTT) 
where the maker touches areas that may cause 
contamination (needle hub). 
 
2. Deficient to performing a proper infection control after 
break on ‘ANTT’ (continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing it with alcohol after a 
needle touched by the maker. 
 














Preparing product outside treatment room in unsuitable 
location such as nurse reception. 
Wrong preparation 
technique. 





Physician changed dose after being made up. Additional 
200mg added to infusion but label not changed. 
Wrong labelling. 





in 10ml water 
injection 
 











     2: Description of all errors that occurred at the medical ward (C). 
Prescribed 
medicine 
Description of potential error 
 







1. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. drug 
preparation (syringes; needle; plastic bottles and gauze on bench; 




2. Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 
embolism or incorrect volume of treatment. 
 
 
3. Open window in the area where the injectable dose is prepared 
(Bees and spiders inside treatment room). 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 


















1. Failure to double-check the final product by another nurse. 
 
 
2. Signature of 2nd checker missing from the label. 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (C) 2016, p4 
 
2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 







1. Failure to double-check the final product by another nurse. 
 
 




3. Open window in the area where the injectable dose is prepared 
(insects inside treatment room). 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (C) 2016, p4 
 
2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (C) 2016, p15 
 
3. Wrong preparation 
technique. 







1. Failure to double-check the final product by another nurse. 
 
 
2. Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (final product not 
“cloudiness” clear). 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 











Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 





















Description of potential error 
 
 






1. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. drug 
preparation (insects inside treatment room). 
 
 
2. Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 
embolism or measurement of incorrect volume. 
 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 




















3. Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (final product not 
“cloudiness” clear). 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (C) 2016, p4 
 
 
2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 











1. Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 






















A 1.2g dose of the antibiotic co-amoxiclav was prepared an I.V. 
bolus injection instead of 1g of amoxicillin. 
 
Wrong medicine 




Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 
embolism or measurement of incorrect volume. 
Wrong addition/mixing. 






Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 
embolism or measurement of incorrect volume. 
Wrong addition/mixing. 



















Description of potential error 
 
 




Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 
embolism or measurement of incorrect volume. 
 
Wrong addition/mixing. 







1. Failure to double-check the final product by another nurse. 
 
 




3. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. drug 
preparation (syringes; needle; plastic bottles and gauze on bench; 





Ward (C) 2016, p4 
 
2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (C) 2016, p15 
 
3. Wrong preparation 
technique. 






in 10ml 0.9% 
NaCl 











1. When a melphalan infusion (prepared in pharmacy) was about 
to be administered but it was noticed by the observer that it had 
expired two hours ago. 
 
 
2. Open window in the area where the injectable dose is prepared 
(resulting in insects inside treatment room). 
1. Wrong expiry date. 




2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 







1. When a melphalan infusion (prepared in pharmacy) was about 
to be administered but it was noticed by the observer that it had 
expired two hours ago. 
 
 
2. Open window in the area where the injectable dose is prepared 
(resulting in insects inside treatment room). 
 
1. Wrong expiry date. 




2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 





1. Failure to double-check the final product by another nurse. 
 
 
2. Signature of 2nd checker missing from the label. 
Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (C) 2016, p4 
 
2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 













Description of potential error 
 
 






1. Failure to double-check the final product by another nurse. 
 
 
2. Signature of 2nd checker missing from the label. 
Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (C) 2016, p4 
 
2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 







1. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. drug 
preparation (syringes; needle; plastic bottles and gauze on bench; 
sink/floor and continuing preparation without any corrective 
action). 
 
2. Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 




3. Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (final product not 
“cloudiness” clear). 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 



























1. Disregard for cleanliness, uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction as possible before/during I.V. drug 
preparation (syringes; needle; plastic bottles and gauze on bench; 
sink/floor and continuing preparation without any corrective 
action). 
 
2. Failure to double-check the final product by another nurse. 
 
 




4. Filter needle not used during making product (packaged 
ampoule). 
 
1. Wrong preparation 
technique. 




2. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (C) 2016, p4 
 
3. Wrong preparation 
technique. 
Ward (C) 2016, p15 
 








Strongly shaking a drug that foams/bubbles – risk of air 





(IV Policy,2016, p39) 
 
   





Violation of “aseptic non touch technique” (ANTT) where the 









in 10ml water 
injection 
 










    3: Description of all errors that occurred on the medical ward (B). 
 
 
Description of error 
 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space created for preparation and surface was not cleaned 
e.g. leakage of drug solution onto sink/floor and continued preparation without any corrective action 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p3. 
 




1. Furosemide I.V infusion 80 mg in 100 ml 0.9% sodium 
chloride. 
 
2. Meropenem I.V injection 500 mg 
in 10 ml water for injections (x 2) 1. 
3. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium 
chloride. 
 
4. Meropenem I.V injection 1 g 
in 20 ml water for injections. 
5. Digoxin I.V infusion 250 micrograms in 100 ml 5% 
glucose. 
 
6. Ceftazidime I.Vinfusion 2 g in 100    
ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
7. Paracetamol I.V infusion 1g/100 ml. 
 
8. Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml. 
9. Levomepromazine hydrochloride S.C injection 5mg. 
 
10 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml I.V 
injection. 
11. Levofloxacin I.V infusion 500 mg 
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
 
12. Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg 
in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
13. Pabrinex I.V infusion (4 pairs) 
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
14. Aciclovir I.V infusion 500 mg 
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
A plastic apron was not worn during preparation. 
 
Policy violated: RCN, 2010, p22. 
 
The above error was observed with all the following medicines.  
Prescribed medicine 
1. Furosemide I.V infusion 40 mg in 50 ml  
0.9% sodium chloride 
2. Meropenem I.V injection 1 g  
in 20 ml water for injections  
3. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml  
0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
4. Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 
   100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
5. Metronidazole I.V infusion 500 mg in 100 ml  6. Actrapid 50 units in 50 mL  
    0.9% sodium chloride  
7. Clarithromycin I.V infusion 500 mg in 250 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
8. Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml 
 
9. Methylprednisolone I.V infusion 750 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
10. 0.9% sodium chloride 10ml  
I.V injection 
11. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 4.5 g in 
20 ml water for injections (x 2) 1. 
12. Ondansetron I.V injection 4 mg in 20 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
13. Pabrinex (3 pairs) I.V infusion in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
 
 458 
1 Two medicines prepared. 
 
 
1 Two medicines prepared. 













Description of potential errors 
   
Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
Policy violated: NBT, 2015, p14. 
 
The above error was observed with all the following medicines.  
 
Prescribed medicine 
   
1. Furosemide I.V infusion 40 mg in 50 ml  
0.9% sodium chloride 
 
2. Actrapid 50 units in 50 mL  
0.9% sodium chloride 
3. Ondansetron I.V injection 4 mg in 20 
ml 
 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
4. Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml 
 
5. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml  
0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
 
6. 0.9% sodium chloride 10ml I.V injection 
 
7. Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p4. 
 




1. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g in 20 ml water for injections (x 2) 1. 
2. Teicoplanin I.V infusion 400 mg  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
 
3. Meropenem I.V injection 1g  
in 20 ml water for injections. 
4.Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
 
5. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 

















Description of potential errors 
 
Deficient in performing infection control after break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol after a needle touched by maker. 
 
Policy violated: NBT, 2015, p14; RCN, 2010, p5. 
 
The above error was observed with all the following medicines.  
 
Prescribed medicine 
   
1. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
injection 4.5 g in 20 ml water for 
injections (x 3) 2. 
 
2. 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml I.V injection 
 (x 7) 3. 
3. Pabrinex (4 pairs) I.V infusion in 100 ml  
0.9% sodium chloride 
 
4. Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml (X 2) 1. 
 
5. Hydrocortisone I.V infusion 100 mg  
     in 4 ml water for injections (x 2) 1. 
6. Furosemide I.V infusion 80 mg  
in 100ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
  
7. Ondansetron I.V injection 4 mg  
      in 20 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
8. Aciclovir I.V infusion 500 mg  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing foam/bubbles.  
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p5. 
 




1. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g in 20 ml water for injections (x 4) 4. 
 
2. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride. 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B) 2015, p5; p6; p15. 
 
The above error was observed with all the following medicines.  
 
  Prescribed medicine 
   
1. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g in 20 ml water for injections (x 3) 2. 
2. Meropenem I.V injection 500 mg in 10 ml 
water for injections  
 












Description of potential errors 
 
Filter needle not used whilst making product packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p4. 
 
The above error was observed with all the following medicines.  
 
 Prescribed medicine 
   
1. Furosemide I.V infusion 80 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride (x 5) 5. 
 
2. Furosemide I.Vinjection 40 mg  
in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
3. Pabrinex (3 pairs) I.V infusion  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
 
4. Phytomenadione I.V infusion 10 mg 
in 50 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
(x 3) 2. 
5. Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml (x 7) 3. 6. Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg  
in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Preparing product outside treatment room in unsuitable location, such as ward reception desk 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p3. 
 
The above error was observed with all the following medicines.  
 
Prescribed medicine 
   
1. Meropenem I.V injection 1 g. 
in 20 ml water for injections (x 3) 2. 
 
2. Co-trimoxazole I.V infusion 960 mg  
    in 250 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
3. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 4.5 g 
in 20 ml water for injections (x 4) 4. 
4. Levofloxacin I.V infusion 500 mg  
     in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
5. Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g  
   in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
 
6. Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml (x 3) 
2. 
 
7. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g  
      in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
8. 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml I.V 
injection 
 
9. Furosemide I.V injection 40 mg  
        in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
10. Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg  
     in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
 
11. Aciclovir I.V infusion 500 mg  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
 
12. Digoxin I.V infusion 250 micrograms 
in 100 ml 5% glucose 
 
1 Two medicines prepared. 
2 Three medicines prepared. 
3 Seven medicines prepared. 
4 Four medicines prepared. 




























































2 Three medicines prepared. 
6 Six medicines prepared. 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Wrong spelling of drug name on label. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p6. 
 





   
1. Methylprednisolone I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose was prepared on plastic tray). 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p6. 
 




1. Meropenem I.V injection 1 g 
in 20 ml water for injections (x 3) 2. 
2. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 3) 2. 
3. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g in 20 ml water for injections (x 6) 6. 
4. Levofloxacin I.V infusion 500 mg in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
5. 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml I.V injection. 6. Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml (x 2) 
1. 
7. Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Signature of nurse who checked product missing from drug chart. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p4; p7; p14. 
 
The above error was observed with the following medicine. 
 
Prescribed medicine 
   
1. Pabrinex I.V infusion (4 pairs) in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
 
Description of potential errors 
 
A second nurse did not check the dose prepared by the first nurse. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p8-p10. 
 
The above error was observed with the following medicine. 
 
Prescribed medicine 
   









Description of potential errors 
 
Leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe resulted in the dose being reduced by more than 10%. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p5; p6. 
 




1. Pabrinex I.V infusion (4 pairs)  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
 
2. Enoxaparin sodium S.C 110 mg / 0.74 ml  
 (x 2) 1. 
 
3. Ondansetron i.v injection 2 mg in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Dose not prepared, omission not documented.  
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p32. 
 




1. 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml I.V injection. 2. Hydrocortisone I.V infusion 100 mg  
       in 4 ml water for injections  
 
3. Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Wrong medicine selected: co-amoxiclav 1.2 g in 100 ml instead of amoxicillin 1 g in 100 ml. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (b), 2015, p3. 
 




1. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Wrong medicine selected: metronidazole 500mg in 100 ml instead of paracetamol 1 g in 100 ml. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p3. 
 













Two medicines prepared. 
4 Four medicines prepared. 











Description of potential errors 
 
Wrong volume of diluent picked to prepare final product: 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride instead of 50ml 
or 30ml 0.9% to prepare final product. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (B), 2015, p3. 
 




Sodium ferric gluconate (unlicensed) 
medicine, Germany) I.V infusion 30ml  
 
Magnesium sulfate 50% I.V infusion 20 mmol in 
50ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space created for preparation and surface was not cleaned 
e.g. leakage of drug solution onto sink/floor and continued preparation without any corrective action. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p3. 
 




1. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g in 20 ml water for injections (x 6) 6. 
2. Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg  
in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
 
3. 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml I.V injection 
(x 2) 1. 
4. Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g  
in 20 ml water for injections (x 4) 4. 
 
5. Flucloxacillin I.V infusion 2 g 
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
6. Co-trimoxazole I.V infusion 960 mg in 250 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
 








     4 Four medicines prepared. 







Description of potential errors 
 
A plastic apron was not worn during preparation. 
 
Policy violated: RCN, 2010, p22. 
 




1. Amoxicillin I.V. infusion 1 g  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride.  
2. Tramadol I.V. infusion 100 mg  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
3. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V infusion 4.5g 
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
4. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g in 20 ml water for injections (x 4) 4 
 
5. 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml  i.v. injection 
 (x 6)6  
6. Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 
10 ml water for injections 
 
7. Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g 
in 20 ml water for injections. 
 
8. Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg  
 in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p14. 
 
The above error was observed with all the following medicines.  
 
Prescribed medicine 
   
1. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride.  
2. Tramadol I.V infusion 100 mg  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
 
3. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V infusion  
  4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride. 
4. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g in 20 ml water for injections (x 4) 4. 
 
5. 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml 
I.V injection (x6) 6 
6. Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg  
   in 10 ml water for injections. 
 
7. Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g  
in 20 ml water for  injections. 
 
8. Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg  





1 Two medicines prepared. 
3 Seven medicines prepared. 
















Description of potential errors 
 
Deficient in performing infection control after break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol after a needle touched by maker. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p14; RCN, 2010, p5. 
 





1. Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride.  
 
 
2. Flucloxacillin I.V infusion 2 g  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
 
3. Meropenem I.V injection 1 g  
in 20 ml water for injections  
 
 
4. Vancomycin I.V infusion 500 mg  
in 100 ml 0.9 % sodium chloride 
 
5. 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml I.V injection  
(x 8)7 
6. Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg  
        in 10 ml water for injections 
 
7. Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g 
in 20 ml water for injections (x 2) 1 
 
 
8. Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg  
    in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p5; p6; p15. 
 





1. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V infusion 
4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x2)1 
 
 
2. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 4.5 





1 Two medicines prepared. 
2 Three medicines prepared. 
3 Seven medicines prepared. 















Description of potential errors 
 
Filter needle not used whilst making product packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p4. 
 





1. Pabrinex I.V infusion (4 pairs)  
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
 
2. Ondansetron I.V infusion 4 mg in 50 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride (x 2) 1. 
 
3. Gentamicin I.V infusion 300 mg  
in 250 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 3) 2. 
 
4. Ranitidine I.V infusion 50 mg  
in 50 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
5. Oxycodone hydrochloride 20 mg and 
midazolam 50 mg in 17 ml 0.9% sodium 
chloride for 24-hour subcutaneous infusion. 
 
6. Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 10 
ml water for injections  
(x 4) 4 
 
7. Amiodarone I.V infusion 200 mg  
in 250 ml 5% glucose 
 
8. Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg  in 10 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride (x 7) 3. 
9. Calcium gluconate I.V infusion 950 mg in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Preparing product outside treatment room in unsuitable location such as ward reception desk. 
 
Type of error 
Wrong preparation technique: Ward (H), 2015, p3. 
 





1. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g in 20 ml water for injections (x 2) 1 
 
2. 0.9% sodium chloride 10 ml I.V injection (x 
2) 1. 
3. Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg  
in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
4. Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 10 





1 Two medicines prepared. 
4 Four medicines prepared. 










Description of potential errors 
 
Wrong spelling of drug name on label. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p6. 
 









Description of potential errors 
 
Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray and administered it to the patient without labelling 
it (more than one dose is prepared on plastic tray). 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p6. 
 




   
1. Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg 
 in 10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride (x 2) 1 
 
2. Meropenem I.V injection 1 g in 20 ml water for 
injections  
 
3. Amoxicillin I.V injection 1 g  
in 20 ml water for injections 
 
4. Ceftazidime I.V injection 2 g  
in 10 ml water for injections 
 
5. Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
injection 4.5 g in 20 ml water for 
injections (x 16) 8 
6. Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g  
in 20 ml water for injections (x 4) 4 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
A second nurse did not check the dose prepared by the first nurse. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p8-p10. 
 




   











Description of potential errors 
 
Leakage from syringe resulted in the dose being reduced by more than 10%. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p5; p6. 
 









Description of potential errors 
 
Wrong volume of diluent picked to prepare final product: 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride instead of 
250ml/500ml 0.9% to prepare final product. 
 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p3. 
 





1. Co-trimoxazole I.V infusion 960 mg  
in 250 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
 
2. Aminophylline I.V infusion 290 mg  
in 500 ml 0.9 % sodium chloride 
 
 
Description of potential errors 
 
Incorrect dose of drug due to wrong calculation of volume needed: prepared 8.6 ml instead of 11.6 
ml dose needed. 
 
Policy violated: Ward (H), 2015, p14. 
 














5: Mean Severity Score assigned by panel for each individual error observed on the four wards (n = 372). 
Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















S1 Adrenaline I.V infusion 1 




Gross disregard for 
clean/ uncluttered 
treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space created for 
preparation and surface was not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug 
solution onto sink/floor and continued preparation without any 
corrective action. 
6.2 
S1 Adrenaline I.V infusion 1 




Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
S2 Phytomenadione I.V 
infusion 10 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for 
clean/ uncluttered 
treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space created for 
preparation and surface was not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug 
solution onto sink/floor and continued preparation without any 
corrective action. 
6 
S3 Phytomenadione I.V 
infusion 10 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for 
clean/ uncluttered 
treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space created for 
preparation and surface was not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug 
solution onto sink/floor and continued preparation without any 
corrective action. 
6 
S4 Phytomenadione I.V 
infusion 10 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 
S5 Phytomenadione I.V 
infusion 10 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 
S6 Furosemide I.V infusion 




Gross disregard for 
clean/ uncluttered 
treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space created for 
preparation and surface was not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug 
solution onto sink/floor and continued preparation without any 
corrective action. 
6 
S7 Furosemide I.V infusion 




Gross disregard for 
clean/ uncluttered 
treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space created for 
preparation and surface was not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug 
solution onto sink/floor and continued preparation without any 
corrective action. 
6 
S8 Furosemide I.V infusion 




Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 






Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















S9 Furosemide I.V infusion 40 mg in 50 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during 
preparation 
2.8 
S10 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles. 
6.2 
S11 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles. 
6.2 
S12 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in vial Drug not fully dissolved in diluent  
(e.g. final product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
5.4 
S13 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Rubber septum not wiped 
 
Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without 
wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
 
4.8 
S14 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
-------------- Signature of nurse who prepared product 
missing from drug chart. 
 
4.6 
S15 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
 
Faulty labelling -------------- Signature of member of staff who prepared 
product missing from the label 
 
3 
S16 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation 
without changing the needle or swabbing with 






Lowest severity score 
Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















S17 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned, e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
S18 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned, e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
S19 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
No double-check A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
5.4 
S20 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
No double-check A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
5.4 
S21 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 
missing from label. 
2.4 
S22 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 
missing from label. 
2.4 
S23 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Wrong dose ------------- Leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe resulted in 
the dose being reduced by more than 10% 
5 
S24 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Omitted medicine ------------- Dose not prepared, omission not documented 6.4 
S25 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles. 
6.2 
S26 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 




Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles. 
6.2 
S27 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in vial Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 









More than one error in one product 
Lowest severity score 
Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















S28 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation 
without changing the needle or swabbing with 
alcohol after a needle touched by maker. 
6 
S29 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during 
preparation 
3 
S29 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 





Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Wrong medicine ------------- Wrong medicine selected: co-amoxiclav 1.2 g 
in100 ml instead of amoxicillin 1 g in 100 ml. 
 
6 
S31 Co-amoxiclav I.V infusion 1.2 g in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of member of staff who prepared 
product missing from the label  
 
3 
S32 Co-amoxiclav I.V infusion 1.2 g in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
No double-check ------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
5.4 
S33 Co-amoxiclav I.V infusion 1.2 g in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 
missing from label. 
2.4 
S34 Co-amoxiclav I.V infusion 1.2 g in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Wrong dose ------------- Leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe resulted in 
the dose being reduced by more than 10%  
 
5 
S35 Paracetamol I.V infusion 1g in 
100ml 
 
Wrong medicine ------------- Wrong medicine selected: Co-amoxiclave 1.2g 
instead of amoxicillin 1 g. 
 
6.6 
S36 Ondansetron I.V infusion 4 mg in 
50 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / TB 
No double-check ------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
5.4 
S37 Ondansetron I.V infusion 4 mg in 
50 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / TB 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 







More than one error in one product  
                        ★Highest severity score. 
 
Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















S38 Actrapid 50 units in 50 mL of 0.9% 
sodium chloride infusion pump 
Wrong diluent Wrong strength of diluent Wrong strength of diluent picked to prepare 
final product: 0.45% sodium chloride instead of 
0.9% sodium chloride.  
6.6 
S38 Actrapid 50 units in 50 mL of 0.9% 
sodium chloride infusion pump 
 
Wrong diluent Wrong volume of diluent Wrong volume of diluent picked to prepare final 
product: 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride instead 
of 50ml 0.9% to prepare final product. 
8.6★ 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
6 
S40 Meropenem I.V infusion 1 g in 50 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
4.6 
S42 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 
mg in 10 ml water for injections 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
S43 Teicoplanin I.V infusion 600 mg in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Physician changed dose after being made up. 





C22 Melphalan I.V infusion 220mg  
in 176ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult on chemo 
Wrong expiry date ------------- The final product expired: out of date drug 
delivered to ward due to error in logging expiry 
date in fridge record. 
6.4 
C30 Melphalan I.V infusion 265mg 
in 220ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult on chemo 
Wrong expiry date ------------- The final product expired: out of date drug 
delivered to ward due to error in logging expiry 
date in fridge record. 
6.4 
C43 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned, e.g. Open window in the area where 
the injectable dose is prepared, resulting in 




Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for all 


















C44 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space 
created for preparation and surface was not 
cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without any 
corrective action. 
6.2 
C45 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.2 
C46 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.2 
C47 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.2 
C48 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space 
created for preparation and surface was not 
cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without any 
corrective action. 
6.2 
C49 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate space 
created for preparation and surface was not 
cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without any 
corrective action. 
6.2 
C50 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 







------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
5.4 
C51 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 





------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 







Lowest severity score 
Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















C52 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
No double-check 
 
------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
5.4 
C53 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
No double-check 
 
------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
5.4 
C54 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 
missing from label. 
2.4 
C55 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 
missing from label. 
2.4 
C56 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 
missing from label. 
2.4 
C57 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 




Undissolved powder left in vial Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
5.4 
C58 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in vial Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
5.4 
C59 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Wrong medicine ------------- A 1.2g dose of the antibiotic co-amoxiclav was 
prepared as an I.V. bolus injection instead of 1 








More than one error in one product 
Lowest severity score 
Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















C60 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.2 
C61 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in vial Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
5 
C62 Wilate factor VIII I.V infusion 
2000 units 
Patient: adult / haemophilia A 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
7.2 
C63 Wilate factor VIII I.V infusion 
2000 units 
Patient: adult / haemophilia A 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
7.2 
C64 Wilate factor VIII i.v infusion 
2000 units 
Patient: adult / haemophilia A 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
7.2 
C65 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 
10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned, e.g. Open window in the area where 
the injectable dose is prepared, resulting in 
insects inside treatment room. 
6 
C65 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 
10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
No double-check --------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
5.4 
C66 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 
10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
C66 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 
10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
C66 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 
10 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 





Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















C67 Paracetamol I.V infusion 1 g / 
100 ml 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 
missing from label. 
2.4 
C68 Melphalan I.V infusion 220 mg in 
176 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult on chemo 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned, e.g. Open window in the area where 
the injectable dose is prepared, resulting in 
insects inside treatment room. 
7.2 
C70 MelphalanI.V infusion 220 mg in 
176 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult on chemo 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned, e.g. Open window in the area 
where the injectable dose is prepared, resulting 
in insects inside treatment room. 
7.2 
C71 Paracetamol I.V infusion 1 g / 
100 ml 
No double-check ------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
5.8 
C72 Furosemide I.V infusion 40 mg in 
50 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 
missing from label. 
2.4 
C72 Furosemide I.V infusion 40 mg in 
50 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
No double-check ------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
6 
C73 Teicoplanin I.V infusion 600 mg 
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned, e.g. Open window in the area where 
the injectable dose is prepared, resulting in 
insects inside treatment room. 
6.2 
C73 Teicoplanin I.V infusion 600 mg 
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled before 
volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.2 
C73 Teicoplanin I.V infusion 600 mg 
in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in vial Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
5.6 






Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















C74 Digoxin I.V infusion 500 micrograms 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. Open window in the area where 
the injectable dose is prepared, resulting in 
insects inside treatment room. 
6 
C74 Digoxin I.V infusion 500 micrograms 
in 100 ml 5% glucose 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
C74 Digoxin I.V infusion 500 micrograms 
in 100 ml 5% glucose 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of nurse who checked product 
missing from label. 
2.6 
C74 Digoxin I.V infusion 500 micrograms 
in 100 ml 5% glucose 
No double-check ------------ A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
6.2 
C75 Co-amoxiclav I.V infusion 1.2 g in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled 
before volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.7 
C77 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 
mg in 10 ml water for injections  
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Signature of member of staff who prepared 





H91 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6.2 
H181 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V 
infusion 4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium 
chloride 




Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
5.4 




Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 


















H182 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V infusion 4.5 
g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
5.4 
H183 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V infusion 4.5 
g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
H183 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V infusion 4.5 
g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 
H183 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V infusion 4.5 
g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: Staff nurse not using a plastic 
tray to prepare IV medications. 
 
6 
H184 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
6 
H184 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H185 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H186 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
6 
H186 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
More than one error in one 
  
 480 
Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score 


















H187 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 




Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
6 
H187 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H188 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V infusion 4.5 
g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H189 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V  infusion 
4.5 g in 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H190 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H191 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H192 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6.4 
H192 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
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H193 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6.4 
H193 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H194 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6.4 
H194 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 




H195 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
H195 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.8 
H195 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H196 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6.4 
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H197 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
H197 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 




Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.8 
H197 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
6 
H197 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 




H198 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
5.2 
H198 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
6.4 
H198 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
6 
H198 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
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H199 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
H199 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.8 
H199 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
6 
H199 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H200 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
5.2 
H200 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H201 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
H201 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.8 
H201 Piperacillin and tazobactam I.V injection 
4.5 g / 20 ml water for injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
6 
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H202 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
6 
H203 Flucloxacillin I,V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
6 
H204 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
6 
H205 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 





H206 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 





H207 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
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H208 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
H208 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 
 Patient: adult/ lung abscess 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
H208 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 
 Patient: adult/ lung abscess 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 
H208 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
6 
H209 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
6 
H209 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.8 
H210 Flucloxacillin I.V infusion 2 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
H210 Flucloxacillin I.V infusion 2 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
More than one error in one 
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H211 Flucloxacillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml 
water for injections 
Patient: adult/bacterial infection 
Faulty labelling ------------- Wrong spelling of drug name on label. 
 
5.2 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
5.8 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
5.8 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
5.8 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
5.8 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 





Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 






















Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 




Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 




Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 




Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 




Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 




Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 





Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 
 
2.8 




Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 5.4 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 





Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 




Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 




Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 5.4 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
More than one error in one 
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Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 




Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 




Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 





Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
4.6 
H224 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
H224 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during 
preparation 
2.8 
H224 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 
H224 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
H224 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H224 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
4.6 
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H225 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H226 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H227 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H228 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H229 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H230 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H231 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H232 Cyclizine I.V injection 50 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
H233 Co-trimoxazole I.V infusion 960 mg in 250 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
6.4 
H234 Co-trimoxazole I.V infusion 960 mg in 250 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6.4 
H235 Co-trimoxazole I.V infusion 960 mg in 250 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Wrong diluent Wrong volume of diluent Wrong volume of diluent picked to prepare final 
product: 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride instead 
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H236 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
H236 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 
10ml water for injections  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 
H236 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 




Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.8 
H236 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
H236 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 
10ml water for injections  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Not used a filter needle Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H236 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 
10ml water for injections  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
4.6 
H237 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 




Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
H238 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 




Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
H239 Morphine sulphate I.V injection 10 mg in 




Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
H240 Gentamicin I.V infusion 300 mg in 250 ml 




Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.6 
H241 Gentamicin I.V infusion 300 mg in 250 ml 




Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.6 
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H242 Gentamicin I.V infusion 300 mg in 250 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.6 
H243 Ondansetron I.V infusion 4 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / TB 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
H244 Ondansetron I.V infusion 4 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / TB 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
H245 Enoxaparin sodium S.C 110 mg / 0.74 ml  Wrong dose ------------- Leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe resulted in 
the dose being reduced by more than 10%  
5.8 
H246 Enoxaparin sodium S.C 110 mg / 0.74 ml  
 
Wrong dose ------------- Leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe resulted in 
the dose being reduced by more than 10%  
5.8 
H247 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ skin infections 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.4 
H248 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
H249 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
H249 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 
H249 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
No double-check ------------- A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
5.4 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
5.2 
 H250 Amoxicillin I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.4 
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H251 Tramadol I.V infusion 100 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 
H251 Tramadol I.V infusion 100 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.8 
H252 Ranitidine I.V infusion 50 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H253 Oxycodone hydrochloride 20 mg and 
midazolam 50 mg in 17 ml 0.9% sodium 
chloride for 24 hour  
S.C infusion  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4 
H255 Amiodarone I.V infusion 200 mg in 250 ml 
5% glucose 
Patient: adult / HIV 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H256 Ceftazidime I.V injection 2 g / 10 ml water 
for injections 
Patient: adult HIV/respiratory infection 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.4 
H257 Calcium gluconate I.V infusion 950 mg in 
100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
H258 Vancomycin I.V infusion 500 mg in 100 ml 
0.9 % sodium chloride 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
H259 Aminophylline I.V infusion 290 mg in 500 
ml 0.9 % sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / severe acute asthma 
 
Wrong diluent Wrong volume of diluent Wrong volume of diluent picked to prepare final 
product: 100 ml 0.9% sodium chloride instead 
of 500 ml 0.9% to prepare final product. 
8 
 H259 Aminophylline I.V infusion 290 mg in 500 
ml 0.9 % sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / severe acute asthma 
Calculation error ------------- Incorrect dose of drug due to wrong calculation 
of volume needed: prepared 8.6 ml instead of 
11.6 ml dose needed. 
7.6 
 H260 Pabrinex I.V infusion (4 pairs) in 100 ml 




Filter needle not used Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.6 
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B78 Furosemide I.V infusion 80 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B79 Furosemide I.V infusion 80 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B80 Furosemide I.V infusion 80 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B81 Furosemide I.V injection 40 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B82 Paracetamol I.V infusion 1g in 100ml 
 
Wrong medicine ------------- Wrong medicine selected: metronidazole 500 
mg in 100 ml instead of paracetamol 1 g in100 
ml. 
6.6 
B83 Methylprednisolone I.V infusion 1 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Faulty labelling ------------- Wrong spelling of drug name on label. 5 
B84 Sodium ferric gluconate (unlicensed 
medicine, Germany) I.V infusion 30ml  
in 100ml of 0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Wrong diluent Wrong volume of diluent Wrong volume of diluent picked 250 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride instead of 100 ml 0.9% to 
prepare final product. 
6 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B86 Co-trimoxazole I.V infusion 960 mg in 250 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
4.8 




Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
B88 Magnesium sulfate 50% I.V infusion 20 
mmol in 50 ml of 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong diluent Wrong volume of diluent Wrong volume of diluent picked 100 ml 0.9% 
sodium chloride instead of 50 ml 0.9% to 
prepare final product. 
6.2 
B89 Clarithromycin I.V infusion 500 mg in 250 




Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
B90 Methylprednisolone I.V infusion 750 mg in 








Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 



















B92 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation 
without changing the needle or swabbing with 
alcohol after a needle touched by maker. 
 
6.6 
B93 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
6 
B94 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 




Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
6 
B95 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 




Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
6 
B96 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 




Rubber septum not wiped 
 
Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without 
wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
 
5.6 
B96 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
5.2 
B96 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
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B97 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Rubber septum not wiped 
 
Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without 
wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
 
5.6 
B97 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
5.2 
B97 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 




B98 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 




Air bubbles not expelled 
before volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.6 
B98 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 




B99 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled 
before volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.6 
B99 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
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 496 
Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 



















B100 Piperacillin and tazobactam 
 I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during 
preparation 
3 
B100 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled 
before volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.6 
B101 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
B101 Piperacillin and tazobactam 
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled 
before volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.6 
B102 Piperacillin and tazobactamI 
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
5.2 
B102 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
B103 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
5.2 
B103 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 
Patient: adult/management of sepsis 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6 
B104 Levomepromazine hydrochloride S.C 
injection 5mg 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
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B105 Levofloxacin I.V infusion 500 mg in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
Patient: adult/ pneumonia 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B106 Levofloxacin I.V infusion 500 mg in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/ management of pneumonia 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
4.6 
B106 Levofloxacin I.V infusion 500 mg in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride  
Patient: adult/ pneumonia 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.4 
B107 Levofloxacin I.V infusion 500 mg in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride  




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B108 Pabrinex (3 pairs) I.V infusion in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.6 
B109 Pabrinex (3 pairs) I.V infusion in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.6 
B110 Pabrinex (3 pairs) I.V infusion in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 
B111 Pabrinex I.V infusion (4 pairs) in 100 ml 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B111 Pabrinex I.V infusion (4 pairs) in 100 ml 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
B111 Pabrinex I.V infusion (4 pairs) in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong dose ------------- Leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe resulted in 
the dose being reduced by more than 10% 
5.4 




Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 



















B111 Pabrinex I.V infusion (4 pairs) in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
------------- Signature of nurse who prepared product 
missing from drug chart. 
4 
B112 Teicoplanin I.V infusion 400 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Rubber septum not wiped Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without 
wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
4.8 
B114 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ intra-abdominal infections 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
4.8 
B114 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ intra-abdominal infections 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.4 
B115 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ intra-abdominal infections 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
4.8 
B115 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ intra-abdominal infections 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.4 
B116 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ skin infections  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
B116 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ skin infections  
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.4 
B117 Meropenem I.V injection 500 mg / 10 ml 
water for injections  
Patient: adult/ skin infections 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B117 Meropenem I.V injection 500 mg / 10 ml 
water for injections  
Patient: adult/ skin infections  
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Rubber septum not wiped 
 
Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without 
wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
 
5 
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B118 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ intra-abdominal infections 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
4.8 
B119 Meropenem I.V injection 500 mg / 10 ml 
water for injections  
Patient: adult/ skin infections 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B120 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ skin infections 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B121 Meropenem I.V injection 500 mg / 10 ml 
water for injections  
Patient: adult/ skin infections 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
5.6 
B122 Meropenem I.V injection 1 g / 20 ml water 
for injections  
Patient: adult/ skin infections 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Undissolved powder left in 
vial 
Drug not fully dissolved in diluent (e.g. final 
product not clear, “cloudiness”). 
 
5.6 
B123 Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/respiratory infection 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
B123 Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/respiratory infection 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 
B123 Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 




Rubber septum not wiped 
 
Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without 
wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
 
4.8 
B123 Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/respiratory infection 
 
No double-check ------------ A second nurse did not check the dose prepared 
by the first nurse. 
 
5.4 
More than one error in one 
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B124 Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/respiratory infection 
Wrong preparation technique Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during 
preparation 
3 
B124 Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/respiratory infection 
Wrong preparation technique Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 
B124 Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/respiratory infection 
Wrong preparation technique Inappropriate location 
of medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
4.6 
B125 Ceftazidime I.V infusion 2 g in 100 
ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult/respiratory infection  
Wrong preparation technique Gross disregard for 
clean/ uncluttered 
treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B126 Actrapid 50 units in 50 mL of 0.9% 
sodium chloride  
Infusion pump 
Wrong preparation technique Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during 
preparation 
3.6 
B126 Actrapid 50 units in 50 mL of 0.9% 
sodium chloride  
Infusion pump 
Wrong preparation technique Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
6 
B128 Phytomenadione I.V infusion 10 mg 
in 50 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation technique Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B129 Phytomenadione I.V infusion 10 mg 
in 50 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation technique Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B130 Phytomenadione I.V infusion 10 mg 
in 50 ml 0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation technique Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B131 Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml 
 
Wrong preparation technique Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B132 Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml 
 
Wrong preparation technique Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B133 Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml 
 
Wrong preparation technique Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
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Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making 
product packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B137 Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during 
preparation 
2.8 
B137 Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 5.4 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room 
in unsuitable location such as nurse 
reception 
4.6 
B138 Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a 
plastic tray and administered it to the 
patient without labelling it (more than one 
dose is prepared on plastic tray). 
6.8 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room 
in unsuitable location such as nurse 
reception 
4.6 
B139 Heparin sodium 600 units / 6 ml 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a 
plastic tray and administered it to the 
patient without labelling it (more than one 
dose is prepared on plastic tray). 
6.8 




Gross disregard for 
clean/ uncluttered 
treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface 
was not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug 
solution onto sink/floor and continued 
preparation without any corrective action. 
6 




Filter needle not used Filter needle not used whilst making 
product packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room 
in unsuitable location such as nurse 
reception 
4.6 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control 
after break in ANTT: continuing 
preparation without changing the needle or 
swabbing with alcohol after a needle 
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B142 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
B142 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
B143 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 
B143 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Rubber septum not wiped Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without 
wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
4.8 
B144 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
B144 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 
B144 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
4.6 
B145 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Rubber septum not wiped Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without 
wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
4.8 
B145 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong 
addition/mixing 
Air bubbles not expelled 
before volume checked 
Drug was strongly shaken, causing 
foam/bubbles.  
6.2 
B145 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.8 
B146 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Rubber septum not wiped Piercing the rubber septum of a vial without 
wiping with an alcohol wipe. 
 
4.8 
B146 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 




Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.4 
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B147 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B148 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
 
Wrong medicine ------------- Wrong medicine selected: co-amoxiclav 1.2 g 
in100 ml instead of amoxicillin 1 g in 100 ml. 
6 
B149 Enoxaparin sodium S.C 110 mg / 0.74 ml  Wrong dose ------------- Leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe resulted in 
the dose being reduced by more than 10% 
5.8 
B150 Enoxaparin sodium S.C 110 mg / 0.74 ml  
 
Wrong dose ------------- Leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe resulted in 
the dose being reduced by more than 10% 
5.8 




Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 




Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
B153 0.9% sodium chloride 10ml  
I.V injection 
Omitted medicine ------------- Dose not prepared, omission not documented  3.4 





Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
4.6 
B154 0.9% sodium chloride 10ml  
I.V injection  
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
5.2 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
More than one error in one 
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Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
5.8 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
5.8 





Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
5.8 






Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 





Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
6 
B162 Hydrocortisone I.V infusion 100 mg in 4 ml 
water for injections  
Patient: adult/acute asthma 
 





Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 



















B163 Hydrocortisone I.V infusion 100 mg in 4 ml 
water for injections  




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
B164 Hydrocortisone I.V infusion 100 mg in 4 ml 
water for injections  




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
B165 Furosemide I.V infusion 40 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 2.8 
B165 Furosemide I.V infusion 40 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.4 
B165 Furosemide I.V infusion 40 mg in 50 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B166 Furosemide I.V infusion 80 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
B167 Furosemide I.V infusion 80 mg in 100 ml 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
6 
B168 Furosemide I.V injection 40 mg in 10 ml 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
4.6 
B169 Furosemide I.V infusion 80 mg in 100 ml 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
5.8 
B170 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / HIV 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
4.4 
More than one error in one 
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Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 



















B171 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / HIV 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Filter needle not used  Filter needle not used whilst making product 
packaged in a glass ampoule. 
 
4.4 
B171 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / HIV 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
4.8 
B171 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / HIV 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 
labelling it (more than one dose is prepared on 
plastic tray). 
6.2 
B172 Ondansetron I.V injection 4 mg in 20 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult with hepatitis C 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused apron A plastic apron was not worn during preparation 3 
B172 Ondansetron I.V injection 4 mg in 20 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult with hepatitis C 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Unused gloves Gloves were not worn during preparation. 
 
5.6 
B173 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / HIV 
Wrong preparation 
technique 
Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
4.8 
B173 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / HIV 
Omitted medicine ------------- Dose not prepared, omission not documented  
 
4.2 
B173 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Patient: adult / HIV 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a plastic tray 
and administered it to the patient without 




B174 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
5.6 







Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score for 



















B175 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
5.6 
B175 Ondansetron I.V injection 2 mg in 10 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride  




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
6 
B176 Aciclovir I.V infusion 500 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
5.6 
B177 Aciclovir I.V infusion 500 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 
unsuitable location such as nurse reception 
 
5.6 
B178 Aciclovir I.V infusion 500 mg in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control after 
break in ANTT: continuing preparation without 
changing the needle or swabbing with alcohol 
after a needle touched by maker. 
 
6.6 
B179 Digoxin I.V infusion 250 micrograms in 




Gross disregard for clean/ 
uncluttered treatment room 
Treatment room was cluttered. Inadequate 
space created for preparation and surface was 
not cleaned e.g. leakage of drug solution onto 
sink/floor and continued preparation without 
any corrective action. 
 
6 
B180 Digoxin I.V infusion 250 micrograms in 




Inappropriate location of 
medicine preparation 
Preparing product outside treatment room in 









Ward Ref Prescribed medicine 
 
Type of error Subtype of error Description of error Mean severity score 























Wrong dose ------------- Leakage from ampoule/vial/syringe 
resulted in the dose being reduced by more 
than 10% 
5.8 
B184 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control 
after break in ANTT: continuing 
preparation without changing the needle or 
swabbing with alcohol after a needle 
touched by maker. 
 
6.6 
B199 Piperacillin and tazobactam  
I.V injection 4.5 g / 20 ml water for 
injections 




Breach of ANTT Deficient in performing infection control 
after break in ANTT: continuing 
preparation without changing the needle or 
swabbing with alcohol after a needle 
touched by maker. 
 
6.6 
B249 Amoxicillin I.V infusion 1 g in 100 ml 
0.9% sodium chloride 
Faulty labelling ------------- Nurse prepared a dose, placed it on a 
plastic tray and administered it to the 
patient without labelling it (more than one 

















































Preparing product outside treatment room in 




        





No 2nd checker  
 
 
 
